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Abstract  
The aim of this thesis is to explain and assess, from a comparative perspective, the 
drivers behind the process of democratic divergence experienced by Colombia and 
Venezuela from the mid-1990s until 2010. This thesis claims that in order to 
understand this phenomenon it is necessary to study this observed occurrence from 
two complementary perspectives. First, it introduces the ‘Circular Causality Model’ 
as an alternative theoretical framework to explain the opposite democratic paths taken 
by these cases. It critically argues that traditional strands of literature such as 
modernisation theory, resource curse theory, institutional theory, and political culture 
theory cannot, individually, provide compelling answers to explain divergence. 
Instead, it claims that the best explanation to be offered lies in combining, or merging, 
two important and contested theories; namely, institutional and political culture 
theories. Hence, it argues that not only structural factors, but also agency ones are 
important to fully understand this phenomenon. Therefore, it groups together elite 
political culture, the enactment of new constitutions and electoral system as the 
independent variables to explain democratic divergence. The causality offered by this 
circular model is one in which the renewal of political elites (agency) – which occurred 
during the 1990s in both countries- has effects over the functioning of the mentioned 
key subset of political institutions (structures) which taken together will help explain 
democratic divergence. The second part of the thesis introduces a multivariate 
regression model to assess the statistical significance of the independent variables 
included in the theoretical Circular Causality Model to explain divergence. By 
building from the scratch an entirely new dataset, seven different empirical models 
offer a rather new approach to operationalise and measure the independent variables 
contained in the theoretical model. The estimation of the regression model proves that 
the independent variables that make up the theoretical model are statistically 
significant and correctly predict the opposite democratic path followed by Colombia 
and Venezuela during the ‘divergence period.’ 
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Chapter 1 
1.1. Introduction 
For most of the twentieth century, scholars working on topics related to processes of 
democratisation found in Latin America a rich field of study, as most countries in the 
region were experiencing democratic defeat. Almost all the countries in this era were 
characterised as polities facing political instability and polarisation, military coups, 
repression, and democratic breakdown. As a result, much of the literature about regime 
performance in the region focused its attention on explaining the forces behind the 
seaming impossibility for these polities to achieve a transition to a democratic regime. 
To be sure, Huntington’s seminal article ‘Democracy’s Third Wave’ (1991a) argues 
that over, what he called the ‘second wave’ of democratisation which took place 
between 1945 and 1962, most of the Latin American countries were not democratic. 
However, the glum picture of democratic failure changed since the so-called ‘third 
wave of democratisation’1 reached Latin America. Such spread of democratic values 
throughout the region has elicited considerable academic attention providing a vast 
amount of research aiming to explain the process of democratic transition and 
consolidation.2  All these studies have concluded that by the dawn of the twenty-first 
century almost every country in the region have elected civilian presidents in a 
generation; satisfying, from a formal level, Dahl’s (1989) minimum conditions of 
democracy. This means that, to an extent, Latin American countries have met, or are 
close to meeting, the seven criteria or conditions which Dahl regards as critical 
underpinnings for a country to be considered a democracy. These are: 1) elected 
officials; 2) free and fair elections; 3) inclusive suffrage; 4) the right to run for office; 
5) freedom of expression; 6) alternative information; and 7) associational autonomy 
(Dahl 1989, 221). 
                                                 
1 According to Huntington (1991) the third wave of democratisation occurred between 1974 and 1990. 
During this time, he argues, ‘Latin America was the region that democratised most fully’ (Huntington 
1991, p. 76). 
2  See for example: Schmitter 1988, 1995; Schneider 1995; Linz, et. al. 1978, 1996a; Schedler 1998 
(a)(b); Peeler 1986, 1992; Rochon 1989; Malloy, et. al. 1987; Whitehead 1989; Karl 1990; Collier, et. 
al. 1991; O’Donnell 1992; Valenzuela 1992; Scott 1996; Lagos 1997; Mainwaring 2000; Camp 2001a; 
Naím 2001; Smith 2005; Carrión 2009; Karl 1987; McCoy 1995; Hellinger 1991; Ellner and Hellinger 
2003; Buxton 2001; Buxton and McCoy 2008; McCoy and Myers 2004; Lander, et. al., 2000, 2008; 
López Maya 2002, 2003, 2004; among others. 
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Consequently, scholars3 and qualified groups, such as Freedom House, have made 
positive assessments about the region’s progress to guarantee political rights and civil 
liberties to their citizens by classifying these countries as ‘free’ and ‘partly free’ 
(Freedom House 2006). International organisations have also claimed that, for the first 
time in Latin American history, democracy is the dominant form of government, in 
which every country in the region, apart from Cuba, has elected civilian presidents in 
a generation (UNDP 2004, 13).4 Considering this evidence, Latin American scholars 
working on topics of democratisation were no longer concerned about determine 
whether these countries were democratic or not. Instead, their attention shifted from 
the study of transitions to the study of maintenance, quality, and consolidation of 
democracy. Hence, most of the research on Latin American democratic performance 
focused primarily on topics about the modes of regime transitions, economic pre-
conditions for democracy, and the issue of parliamentary vs. presidential forms of 
government. 
In contrast, there is a set of countries in the region, namely Colombia and Venezuela 
that did not share this similar trend to achieve their democratic transition. These two 
countries differ from their neighbours in that they managed to attain their democratic 
transition long before the ‘third wave’ of democratisation swept Latin America and, 
therefore, can be regarded as outliers. Not surprisingly, the literature on Latin 
American politics for these countries is either rather scarce or poorly tracked by 
scholars.5  
It seems that scholars forgot, or perhaps overlooked, both these cases in order to 
explain the rationale behind how these polities managed to achieve their democratic 
                                                 
3 For instance, Mainwaring argues that since 1978 the number of democracies in the region has increased 
sharply at the expense of authoritarian regimes, adding that ‘by 1990, virtually every government was 
democratic or semi-democractic’ (Mainwaring 2000, 11). 
4  To get a better idea of how profound was the re-establishment of democracy in the region over the 
second half of the twentieth century one has only to look at the number of changes of government that 
occurred over time. Thus, from 1930 until 1980, all the countries in the region (including Cuba) 
underwent 277 changes of government, with 104 of those (38% per cent) being by military coup. 
However, this trend changed during the third wave because by the end of the 1990s the change of 
administration that took place through military intervention occurred in only 7 of the 37 countries in the 
region (Palmer 1996). 
5 The substantial exceptions of this incomprehensible lack are: Linz and Stepan (1978) ‘The Breakdown 
of Democratic Regimes: Latin America’; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1989) ‘Democracy in Developing 
Countries’; and Collier and Collier (1991) ‘Shaping the Political Arena’. More recently, Hagopian and 
Mainwaring (2005) ‘The Third Wave of Democratisation in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks’; 
and more recently Bejarano (2011) ‘Precarious Democracies.’ 
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transition over most part of the second half of the twentieth century. In fact, prominent 
scholars such as Mainwaring, O´Donnell and Valenzuela (1992); Malloy and Seligson 
(1987); or Linz, et. al. (1978, 1990); among others did not include these cases within 
their research agendas to explain their process of democratisation in the Latin 
American context. Although such omission was somehow understandable because 
over the second half of the twentieth century the democratic performance of these 
cases used to behave in such predictable way that scholars considered them as dull 
countries to be analysed (Mainwaring 1990). The omission was also to some extent 
justifiable due to, unlike Colombia and Venezuela, most of Latin American polities 
were struggling to attain democracy and, therefore, scholar attention was place on 
understanding and provide answers on how these countries could make the transition 
from authoritarianism to democracy. 
However, today, such omission can no longer be justified. The importance of these 
cases to explain the process of democratisation in the region have become prominent 
because since the end of the 1990s Colombia and Venezuela have taken different 
democratic paths moving away from a similar path that these polities used to share 
over most part of the second half on twentieth century. Hence, the aim of this project 
is to identify the drivers that can explain the divergent democratic path that Colombian 
and Venezuelan democracies faced from 1990 to 2010 by conducting a comparative 
analysis of their democratic performances. To be sure, my objective is to explain the 
process of regime change experienced by these countries rather than explain the 
regime type that individually these countries have attained in the time period 
mentioned above. I believe these countries deserve closer attention because when the 
similar, steady and predictable democratic performance of these regimes during the 
transitional era is compared against their later divergent democratic trajectories may 
allow us to have a complete, non-bias, and better perspective of the process of 
democratisation followed in the region. 
In fact, from 1958 until the enactment of their new constitutions (in 1991 and 1999 
respectively), these countries have been considered prime examples of what is known 
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as pacted democracies.6 Both these countries, along with Costa Rica,7 have also been 
characterised as being the more enduring democracies in the region. Consequently, the 
democratic transition of Colombia and Venezuela took place between 1945 and 1962. 
During this period, the military rule that used to govern these countries came to an end 
when in June 1957 Colombia, and in January 1958 Venezuela began their democratic 
transitions.8  
The study of the democratic performance of these polities over the transition period is 
important for Latin American politics because they managed, unlike most of the 
countries in the region, to institutionalise democratic procedures which allowed them 
to have both democratic regimes, and to keep a stable trend in their democratic 
performance. In fact, during this period both countries were classified as either ‘free’ 
or ‘partly free’ democracies by Freedom House9 (see figure 1.1); or as democratic 
polities by the Polity IV project10 (see figure 1.2). It is important to note that during 
this period, Venezuela outperformed Colombia’s democratic performance as both 
indexes clearly shows (see figures 1.1 and 1.2). This is because the former was less 
exclusionary and a more competitive regime than the latter (Bejarano 2011). 
                                                 
6 Pacted democracies refers to the explicit pact making among competing elites (i.e., elites from an 
authoritarian regime and the democratic opposition) that engage in multilateral negotiation and 
compromise and agree to make or achieve a transition from authoritarianism to electoral democracies. 
For instance, Karl and Schmitter (1991) define a pacted democracy as one in which ‘elites agree upon 
a multilateral compromise among themselves.’ (ibid.: 275). Colombia and Venezuela are prime 
examples of elite settlements to reach their democratic transition to the point that their democratic pacts 
are widely cited in the scientific literature as: ‘The National Front’ and ‘The Punto Fijo Pact’ 
respectively. This concept will be further developed in chapters 2 and 3. For additional references please 
see: Karl and Schmitter 1991; Burton and Higley 1987; Higley and Burton, 1989; Peeler, 1992; Hartlyn 
and Dugas 1999; Buxton 2001, 2005; Lopez Maya 2003, 2004; McCoy 1995; among others.  
7 Due to the particular democratic transition that Costa Rica went through, I decided to focus and study 
the cases of Colombia and Venezuela because they shared a common set of commonalities that make 
the comparative analysis richer as I have to focus the analysis on the salient differences that make these 
polities to take different democratic paths. 
8 According to Bejarano (2011), ‘the entire process [i.e., the transition from authoritarianism to an 
electoral democracy] took approximately two years in each case. The transition in Colombia lasted 
twenty-four months, from July 1956 to August 1958. The transition in Venezuela lasted eighteen 
months, from August 1957 to February 1959’ (ibid.: 89). They were brief transitions if compared with 
the Brazilian case, which lasted more than a decade. 
9 Freedom House index is a product of Freedom in the World Report launched in 1973. It produces 
annual scores representing the levels of political rights and civil liberties in each state and territory, on 
a scale from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). Depending on the ratings, the nations are then classified as 
‘free’ (1.0 -2.5), ‘partly free’ (3 – 5), or ‘not free’ (5.5 – 7.0). 
10 As for the Polity IV, its democratic index offers a scale to evaluate the quality of the democracy with 
scores ranging from -10 to +10. This scale can be arranged so that countries can be classified as 
Autocracies (-10, -6); Close Anocracy (-5, 0); Open Anocracy (1, 5); Democracy (6-9); and full 
democracy (10).  
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However, the mentioned democratic stability started to crumble at the end of the 1980s 
and early 1990s when the economic, social and political crisis struck these countries. 
Consequently, citizens were discontent as their governments were unable to offer 
solutions for, (i) high economic inequality, (ii) corruption at the elite level, (iii) 
poverty, and (iv) the impossibility to avoid the ‘politics of exclusion’ for which the 
traditional bipartisan political system remained dominant (Buxton 2001, 2005). Which 
in turn meant neglecting political participation to minority groups such as left-wing 
political parties (in Colombia); and black, indigenous and women (in both cases). The 
undeniable exclusionary characterisation conducted by the traditional political parties 
in both regimes has led to some scholar (e.g., Ellner, et. al. 2007; Ellner 2008; Buxton 
2001, 2008, 2011; McCoy, et. al. 2004; López Maya 2002; 2004) questioning the 
notion that Colombia and Venezuela constitute instances of ‘exceptional democracies’ 
in the sense that their democratic stability was ‘built upon exclusionary and 
undemocratic practices that [...] gave way to a stifling political system and an alienated 
electorate’ (Encarnación 2002, 41). 
As expected, the simultaneous crises that both countries faced threatened its 
democratic stability and survival and forced their governments to trigger a set of 
political reforms to avoid it. Thus, even though both countries took similar measures 
to solve these problems they reached a completely different outcome in terms of their 
democratic performance which transformed the steady, and predictable trend that used 
to characterised their democratic trajectories. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 shows that during 
the 1990s, volatility became the norm as their democratic performance began to 
deteriorate reaching worrisome levels of democratic deconsolidation.11 Freedom 
House (see figure 1.1) shows that Colombia passed from a score of 3 in 1990 to 4 in 
2000, while Venezuela shifted from a score of 2 in 1990 to 4 in 2004. Polity IV (see 
figure 1.2) confirmed this negative trend in democratisation. In 1990 both countries 
reached a score of 9, a decade later this score fell 3 points, reaching a score of 6 which 
again suggests a process of democratic deconsolidation. Despite both indexes, 
                                                 
11 The concepts of democratic deconsolidation, or it’s opposite, democratic consolidation relates to 
Schedler´s (1998b) one-dimensional definition of democracy. As for the latter, it should be understood 
as a dynamic process of ‘democratic progress´ whereby a polity move in the direction that is capable of 
achieving the standard package of civil freedoms and political rights proposed by Dahl´s liberal 
definition of democracy. Whereas for the former, a democracy will deconsolidate insofar as its political 
process shifts away from the precepts defining a liberal democracy. This concept will be discussed more 
at length in chapters 3 and 4. 
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respectively, still regard these countries as either ‘partly free’ democracies, or as 
‘democracies’ at the beginning of the twenty-first century, there is no doubt that during 
the 1990s both democratic performances followed the same path as both regimes 
showed signs of democratic deterioration when compared it with their trajectories 
during the previous 40 years. 
The trend of deconsolidation shared by these countries during the 1990s became blurry 
when Colombia and Venezuela´s democratic trajectories started taking divergent paths 
from 2000 onwards. Colombia´s democracy fluctuated within a bounded interval that 
enabled it to maintain, in average, its previous democratic performance; whereas 
Venezuela began a deep and continuous process of deconsolidation. Venezuela´s steep 
drop in its democratic performance has been so remarkable that some scholars (e.g., 
Puddington 2007(a) (b); Lagos 2008; Hidalgo 2009; Brewer-Carías 2010; Corrales, 
et.al. 2010) have claimed that this country belongs outside the ranks of democratic 
regimes. 
What is striking about this outcome is not only that both countries took opposite 
democratic paths, but also that for first time (since these polities made their transition 
to democracy in mid-1950s) Colombia´s democracy outperformed Venezuela. 
Freedom House (see figure 1.1) shows that both Colombia and Venezuela scored 4 in 
2000, but in 2010 these polities were located far from one another. That is, Colombia 
scored 3.5, while Venezuela scored a worrisome score of 5 very close to be classified 
as a ‘not free’ country. In turn, Polity IV (see figure 1.2), shows more emphatically 
the divergent performance these polities went through over the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. It located Venezuela as an ‘open anocracy’ with a score of 1 in 
2010, 6 points below the score it obtained in 2000, while Colombia remained stable 
by holding its classification as a ‘democracy’ with a score of 7 in 2010, the same score 
assigned to this country in 2000. 
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Figure 1.1. 
Colombia and Venezuela: democratic performance 
according to Freedom House 
Source: Freedom House Scores, 1972 – 2010, available at www.freedomhouse.org 
Figure 2.2. 
Colombia and Venezuela: democratic performance 
according to Polity IV Project 
Source: Polity IV Scores, 1960 – 2010, available at www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
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Considering the variability in the democratic performance these countries went 
through over the whole period of analysis (1958 - 2010), a set of questions might be 
worth asking: what caused this democratic divergence? How do we explain the 
volatility and the divergent democratic paths these countries have experienced from 
1990s onwards? How can we account for democratic divergence after these polities 
underwent a long-lasting, stable, and similar process of democratic transition? How 
did Colombian democracy managed to outperform Venezuela´s democracy after 
decades in which the latter always had a better democratic performance? All these 
questions will be critically engaged in order to offer both, an alternative theoretical 
framework called the ‘Circular Causality Model’, and a multivariate regression model 
to assess empirically whether the theoretical model proposed here explains democratic 
divergence.12 
To do so, this project will conduct a critical revision of various strands of literature on 
democratisation, such as: modernisation theory, resource curse theory, institutional 
theory, and political culture theory. All these approaches will be assessed aiming to 
evaluate whether, individually, they can explain processes of regime change such as 
those related with processes of democratic divergence. From this analysis, this project 
will claim that none of them, individually, can provide compelling answers to the 
questions identified previously13. 
So, if none of the previous four theoretical frameworks were individually suitable to 
assess divergence, what would be a more suitable theory to explain this phenomenon? 
Henceforth, I will attempt a novel middle range analysis by claiming that a better 
theoretical approach would be to explain democratic divergence by merging two 
frameworks that are often seen as contenders by scholars focusing on topics of 
democratisation.14 My research strategy is built on gauging whether the political 
culture and institutional theories serve together in order to explain democratic 
                                                 
12 The scope of the proposed theoretical model will be developed in chapter 3, and the empirical model 
will be presented in the second part of this project in chapters 7 and 8. 
13 A critical analysis claiming the reasons why these set of theoretical frameworks do not explain, 
individually, democratic divergence will be developed in depth in chapter 2. 
14 The middle range analysis proposed here is closely related to Mentor´s Middle-range theory widely 
used in Sociological studies. In his book: Social Theory and Social Structure, Mentor (1949) claims that 
this methodological approach is a way to avoid relying on one theory to explain a social phenomenon, 
but rather in the construction of a new theory by merging two or more theories in a coherent paradigm 
with a greater level of abstraction from which we can derive hypothesis that can be empirically tested 
(ibid.: 51). 
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divergence. The central argument propose is to stress that by merging these 
frameworks it is possible to offer a novel theoretical approach to explain democratic 
divergence. Hence, one of the contributions of this research is to offer what I called a 
Circular Causality Model in which the linkage between political culture and 
institutional theories reinforce themselves repeatedly over time to explain the process 
of democratic divergence. This model will allow me to offer a different understanding 
of the divergent democratic performance that Colombian and Venezuela underwent 
since mid-1990s. I will argue that not only structural factors, but also agency ones are 
important to fully understand this phenomenon.15 Furthermore, the causality that the 
model offers is one in which the renewal of political elites (agency) have effects over 
the functioning of a key subset of political institutions (structures) which taken 
together, this will help explain democratic divergence.16 
To operationalise this Circular Causality Model, I side with those arguing in favour of 
elite political culture (Peeler 1992; Lagos 2008; Bejarano 2011), rather than the 
masses. Elites are a crucial agency variable that will shed light over the process of 
democratic divergence which I study here. However, the model will also claim that, in 
addition to changes in the political culture at the elite level, there is a subset of 
structural political institutions, namely: constitutional reforms and electoral systems 
that will also be regarded as explicative variables. Hence, with the introduction of the 
                                                 
15 This model differs from those proposed by Collier and Collier (1991), and Bejarano (2011) in that I 
identified agent and structural factors as a set of critical junctures to explain democratic divergence. 
Collier and Collier seminal book ‘Shaping the Political Arena’ takes sole structural factors to offer a 
comparative analysis of Colombia’s and Venezuela’s political parties and party systems in order to 
assess how these institutions were shaped over the second part of the twentieth century to test their 
impact on the democratic performance of these polities. Bejarano, in turn, in her book ‘Precarious 
Democracies’ also takes structural factors to conducted a comparative analysis of these cases from a 
historical approach in order to explain that the complex patterns of democratic convergence and 
divergence followed by these countries since 1950s can be assessed by focusing not only in parties and 
party systems but also ‘on the nature and the strength of the central state, as well as on the legacies from 
the transition pacts’ as independent variables that explain democratic divergence (2011, 258). My model 
differ from these two contributions in that my approach takes together agency and structural factors in 
order to highlight and explain the process of democratic divergence that Colombia and Venezuela faced 
over a more contemporary period (since 1990 to 2010). Thus, it identifies a different set of critical 
junctures ranging from renewal in the elite political culture and its effect over a subset of political 
institutions; namely: constitutional reforms and electoral systems as the key variables that explain the 
different democratic trajectories of the cases under study. 
16 The classical model of political culture based on Almond and Verba’s (1963) seminal work expects 
political culture to adapt to political institutions over time. However, my work advance a different 
causality hypothesising that is the political culture at the elite level the one shaping political institutions. 
Meaning that changes on values, beliefs and attitudes do not impact directly upon the performance of a 
regime but first upon political institutions and then, these ‘new political institutions’, would have indeed 
effects upon the democratic performance of the regimes under study. 
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Circular Causality Model I can group together elite political culture, the enactment of 
new constitutions and electoral system as the independent variables to explain my 
dependent variable defined as democratic divergence. Therefore, the research question 
I will attempt to answer is the following: To what extent do changes in beliefs, values, 
and attitudes of political elites affect the structure and functionality of key political 
institutions which, in turn, might explain the process of democratic divergence of the 
countries under study? 
It is imperative that my theoretical framework be accompanied with an empirical test 
to validate or reject the research question. Therefore, the second contribution of this 
study is to offer a multivariate regression model to quantify and test the statistical 
significance of my independent variables in order to explain democratic divergence. 
To my knowledge, scholars have not attempt yet to develop a statistical model that 
combine the set of theoretical approaches described above for determining the 
existence of democratic divergence for the cases under study. That is not to say that 
scholars working on topics related with processes of democratic performance have not 
taken seriously the use of quantitative methodologies. The point to stress here is that 
the Circular Causality Model proposed in this project provides a holistic and 
integrated approach that I could not find anywhere in the bibliographic review 
conducted for the pair of cases under analysis.17 
Having clarified both the theoretical and the empirical model my research will 
propose, it is now necessary to define what democracy means in this project.18 A clear 
understanding of this concept is of utmost importance as it will allow the determination 
of a focal point of comparison to assess regime change. That is, it will enable an 
assessment of whether the countries under study are moving towards or away from 
this point and, therefore, to assess the causes explaining whether these countries have 
gone through a process of democratic divergence or not. Therefore and bearing in mind 
that the objective of this study is not to use a case study methodology aiming to 
                                                 
17 As discussed earlier, the only exception closest to my approach was Bejarano (2011). She was also 
interested on formulating an assessment to the divergent democratic path experienced by Colombia and 
Venezuela. However, its methodological approach relied more on a historical institutionalism account 
rather than using of a quantitative approach (ibid.: 14). Hence, the empirical component offered in my 
research seeks to provide analytical information and quantitative evidence which is expected could 
contribute to get a better and deeper understanding of contemporary studies on democratisation. 
18 The conceptualisation of this key term will be further developed in chapters 2 and 3. However, at this 
introductory point, it is necessary to delimit the scope of the concept and how it relates with the process 
of democratic performance 
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separately classify the type of democracy my cases might attain, but rather to use a 
comparative methodology to explain the causes that produced their process of 
democratic divergence this study will follow the procedural definition of liberal 
democracy suggested by Dahl (1971) in which a polity can be regarded as fully 
democratic and consolidated if it meets Dahl´s seven criteria outlined above. 
The advantage of using Dahl’s approach lies in that the notion of liberal democracy is 
not as minimalist as the simple notion of electoral democracy suggested by 
Schumpeter (1943) and, therefore, focuses its attention on broader aspects such as 
those related with the expansion of civil liberties and political rights (Norris 2008).19 
Assessing these aspects is critical in my research as both of them capture agency and 
structural factors that are contained in the theoretical Circular Causality Model 
proposed above to explain democratic divergence. Hence, Dahl’s definition of 
democracy seems less vulnerable to criticism than Schumpeter’s as the criteria 
provided by the former ‘has done much to ensure that these measures of democracy 
are squarely focused on theoretically [and empirical] relevant attributes’ (Munck, et. 
al. 2002, 23).  
Another advantage of using this concept to explain divergence is that this notion 
provides an observable and operational definition of democracy and, therefore, can be 
used as a basis for empirical measures (Norris 2008). As discussed earlier, one of the 
aims of this study is to offer a multivariate regression model to assess empirically 
whether the theoretical model proposed here explains the opposite democratic paths 
that Colombia and Venezuela when through since mid-1990s. Hence, to be based on 
the concept of liberal democracy will facilitate its empirical operationalisation as this 
concept relates very closely to the way Freedom House measure it. That is, as 
Campbell (2008) has argued, Freedom House data is closely linked with the 
dimensions of political rights and civil liberties that reflect to a certain extent the 
conventional definition of liberal democracy (ibid.: 38). Furthermore, the use of this 
concept from a comparative perspective, allows systematic comparisons with other 
nations states that are going through similar processes of democratic performance 
                                                 
19 According to Campbell (2008), ‘[t]his means that a liberal democracy demands sufficient democracy 
standards, and not only minimum standards. In other words, liberal democracy goes beyond the 
minimum standards of an electoral democracy. In such an understanding a liberal democracy already 
represents a higher manifestation form of democracy’ (ibid.: 18). 
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which facilitates replicability across different studies (Norris 2008). Overall, then, 
liberal democracy should be understood as an ideal point of arrival to which the 
countries under analysis wish to achieve.20 Therefore, the democratic performance in 
Colombia and Venezuela will be assessed insofar as they move closer or further away 
to the definition of liberal democracy.  
As expected, the notion of liberal democracy to conceptualise and measure processes 
of democratisation had also been highly contested arguing that this conceptual 
approach contains flaws to classify correctly democratic regimes within political 
science (Buxton 2001). For instance, scholars such as Buxton, criticises the concept 
for being purely procedural and therefore allows any polity to be democratic once basic 
democratic rules are accomplished. She also adds, referring to the Venezuelan case, 
that given the political events this regime went through since mid-1980s a different 
approach should be used because ‘meet[ing] the functional prerequisites of liberal 
democracy is an insufficient qualification for [assessing] legitimacy or stability’ (ibid.: 
6). 
Therefore, Buxton (2001, 2008, 2009), along with other recognised scholars such as 
McCoy and Myers 2004; Lopez Maya 2004; Lopez Maya and Lander 2011; Smilde 
and Hellinger 2011; among others, proposed a different approach to classify the 
Venezuelan regime away from the Western biased approach of liberal democracy 
claiming that through the latter the political reality of Venezuela can only be labelled 
in a dichotomous reductionist category of either being an authoritarian or a democratic 
regime. Starting from identifying that the Bolivarian model of democracy changed the 
traditional Punto fijistas social and political ways of engagement in the country by 
arguing that the ‘old elites and beneficiaries were replaced by new actors and 
constituencies with different interests […], and traditional lobby mechanisms were 
supplanted by new and typically informal networks of influence and access’ (Buxton 
2011, x), these scholars claim the need to break with the notion that Venezuela should 
be analysed or assessed as a liberal democracy and rather it should be analysed as a 
                                                 
20 McCoy and Myers (2004) argues, in a very interesting way referring to the Venezuelan case, that this 
country in the pre- and post- Chávez era was not classified as a liberal democracy, but somewhere in a 
grey area in which cannot be regarded as a polyarchy. Following this idea, one could also argue for this 
comparative study that neither Colombia not Venezuela can be classified as liberal democracies, but 
that they are also located in the grey area that these authors referred to. In this sense, liberal democracy 
serve as a point of reference to show how close or far away these regimes are from it and, therefore, to 
assess their democratic performance. 
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‘state-sponsored participatory’ or ‘protagonistic democracy’ (Buxton 2001, 2011) or 
‘participatory democracy’ (Lopez Maya  2004, 2011) or ‘Bolivarian democracy’ 
(Smilde 2011). 
Overall, all these alternative notions to re-categorise the Venezuelan regime shares a 
distinctive element not present in the definition of liberal democracy. It ‘favours the 
routinized popular participation and informal, partisan and personalised modes of state 
management’ (Buxton 2009, 147). That is, these notions represent a definition of 
democracy that seeks to give more attention to the ‘the urban poor, the military, 
entrepreneurs, grassroots groups, and intellectuals’ (McCoy, et. al., 2004, 7). Hence, 
it is claim that understanding Venezuela as a ‘protagonistic democracy’ or as a 
‘participatory democracy’ allows to highlight the advantages to put in practice 
mechanisms of direct democracy aiming to promote the autonomy that historically 
marginalised segments of Venezuelan society had demanded and that will allow them 
to achieve a more inclusive, participatory and egalitarian forms of democracy in this 
country (Buxton 2008). Thus, scholars relying on this notion to explain regime change 
in Venezuela claim that this alternative conceptualisation might unearth non-
procedural dimensions and dynamics needed to capture different nuances of this 
political system ‘that enhances popular, democratic governance by permitting social 
movements and groups to participate actively and collaborate with the bureaucracy 
and the elected official’ (Hellinger 2011, 341), dimensions that the notion of liberal 
democracy disregard. 
Despite the notion of ‘participatory democracy’ or ‘protagonistic democracy’ can be 
regarded as a novel, important, and an alternative approach to classify the Venezuelan 
regime away from the reductionist authoritarian-democratic dichotomous category, I 
will critically challenge this notion by offering two reasons aiming to claim that the 
definition of liberal democracy it is a suitable and better approach to assess regimens 
that have been taking different democratic paths. 
The first reason is based on the undisputed recognition that Chavismo, unlike the Punto 
Fijo system, promoted popular participation by bringing about ‘the development and 
institutionalisation of new mobilisation and organisational forms at the community 
level’ (Buxton 2011, xx). However, it did so by keeping a pattern of continuity with 
the past in which the once excluded over the Punto Fijo system were now included as 
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part of the government, while those who were part of the government in the past now 
were the excluded. Echoing Buxton (2005), such pattern of continuity ‘led to the 
displacement and exclusion of those who owed their position to the Punto Fijo model 
and their replacement by those who had been marginalised by it’ (ibid.: 338). Hence, 
this polarisation across social classes cast doubts on whether Chávez’s participatory 
democracy actually produced an inclusive democracy for the entire Venezuelan civil 
society or if his Bolivarian participatory democracy was only taken to co-opt the part 
of the polarised population that supported his model of governance. 
Evidence provided by the same scholars defending the notion of participatory 
democracy21 seems to agree more on the latter, rather than on the former outcome. 
They recognised that, as Posner (2015) nicely put it, ‘[…] while grassroots groups 
have been working steadfastly to achieve a more inclusive, participatory and 
egalitarian form of democracy in Venezuela, the Chávez regime often stymies their 
efforts’ (ibid.: 102). That is, under Chávez the poor saw themselves as more recognised 
and empowered, but the pro-government elites saw them as a co-opted mass. This 
means that the ‘regime pursues top-down control rather than a participatory form of 
democracy that promotes autonomy of historically marginalised segments of 
Venezuelan society’ (ibid.: 102). As discussed earlier, Buxton (2005) also seems to 
agree that co-optation marked a process of continuity when she compares the nature 
of the regime between the Punto Fijo period with the Chavismo period by claiming 
that ‘The Fourth Republic excluded the radical left and the poor [whilst the] Fifth 
Republic excluded the politicians and beneficiaries of the Fourth Republic’ (ibid.: 
345). Therefore, if co-optation existed under the Chávez regime, as seem to be the 
case, then the notion of participatory democracy can be put into question because this 
type of democracy cannot represent an inclusive form of government as argued by 
those who defend this notion. 
The second reason defending the notion of liberal democracy to explain democratic 
divergence is a methodological one. Even though if the discussion provided above 
                                                 
21 In the book: Venezuela’s Bolivarian Democracy: Participation, Politics, and Culture under Chávez 
(2011), several scholars (e.g., Smilde, Hellinger, Lopez Maya, Acosta-Alzuro, among others) examined 
how collective life was created by grassroots groups through participation in different informal 
structures that allowed them to feel that they were part of the Venezuelan society. Among the informal 
structures studied in this book promoting broader participation are: community television, Venezuela’s 
Telenovelas, Women and Poetry, religion, online democracy, etc. 
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were questioned and were left out of the analysis because the notion of participatory 
democracy is indeed appropriate and helpful to classify or categorise political regimes 
–despite the doubts casted in terms of its capability to represent an inclusive definition 
of democracy, it is important to remember that the aim of this study is not to classify, 
individually, whether the Colombian or the Venezuelan regimes attained a specific 
regime type. Rather, as explain earlier, it aims to explain the reasons behind why these 
two countries took different democratic paths since mid-1990s. That is, 
methodologically this study is not about conducting separate case studies to establish 
whether these two countries are democratic or not. Instead, it puts forward a 
comparative study between these two cases with an empirical component aiming to 
test divergence throughout seven different multivariate regression models. Therefore, 
by relying on the definition of liberal democracy, unlike the one on participatory 
democracy, it can be ensured the collection of objective and observable data due to 
this notion is closely related with the methodology followed by Freedom House to 
assess the democratic performance across countries (Coppedge, et. al. 2011; Munck 
2009). In this sense, liberal democracy, and therefore Freedom House, can be regarded 
as a more encompassing definition to assess empirically divergence because this 
notion measures democracy in a comprehensive, objective and disaggregate fashion, 
pushing in the right direction the alignment of both the theoretical and the empirical 
models proposed in this study. 
In sum, it is important to bear in mind that each of the definitions discussed above has 
its own strengths and weaknesses. As discussed earlier, the strength of the notion of 
participatory democracy is that it aims to classify regimes by assessing how ordinary 
citizens can participate in politics as a ‘lineal descendant of the “direct” (i.e., non-
representative) model of democracy’ (Coppedge, et. al. 2011, 257). It does so, by 
stressing the important role citizens have when they get involved in communal settings 
such as participating in assemblies, voting, referenda, social movements, public 
meetings, town hall meetings, among other spaces of political engagement (ibid.: 259). 
Yet, its weakness and limitation lies, in first place, in that this notion seems to cast 
doubts on its capacity to assess the inclusiveness, and therefore the political 
participation for the entire population, regardless of membership regime. Hence, if 
polarisation and co-optation of some parts of the civil society is the result of 
implementing this type of regimen then this notion can be regarded as not being as 
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accurate to classify regimens (Posner 2015). Additionally, despite this notion seems to 
work well for assessing regime types for individual cases when inclusiveness is 
guaranteed for the entire society, the same effect does not come about when a 
comparative analysis is conducted (Munck 2009), and when the comparison of cases 
aim to explain processes of democratic divergence. Finally, it also fails when this 
notion is meant to be used as an empirical tool to conduct a statistical regression to test 
the robustness of the theoretical model proposed in this study. Because the assessment 
of participatory democracy relies more on qualitative methodologies –i.e., field work 
or ‘facts on the ground’ as Buxton (2011) nicely puts it, rather than in quantitative 
methodologies there is not observable data available to measure democratic 
divergence with empirical information from a statistical perspective, and for over long 
periods of time as the one selected on this study. 
Overall, liberal democracy, despite its weaknesses such as those concerning its 
capability to measure accurately the fundamental principle of equality,22 it is still the 
most reliable conceptual approach to explain democratic divergence. This is because, 
its procedural characteristics help to stress the intrinsic importance of horizontal 
accountability (enforcement of check and balances), rule of law, minority rights, civil 
liberties, and political rights. These characteristics are closely related with the 
structural and agency variables that the theoretical model proposed in this study aim 
to explore in order to explain divergence.23 Additionally, as discussed earlier, liberal 
democracy has the benefit that its conceptualisation is closely related with the 
methodological approach used by Freedom House which means that the 
operationalisation of the dependent variable in the empirical model can be based on 
reliable empirical information to measure democratic divergence. 
Before presenting how the research will be organised, I will first introduce a 
procedural note which I believe is worthy to mention. To conduct the comparative 
analysis between both countries this project will compare two time periods in order to 
differentiate the two phases that both countries faced during the whole period of 
analysis (from late 1950s to 2010). The first period of democratic performance to be 
                                                 
22 For instance, issues such as gender democracy (see Pantelidou-Malouta, 2006), or economic and 
socio-economic sustainability, or environmental responsibility (Campbell 2008). 
23 The theoretical model proposed here to explain democratic divergence is called Circular Causality 
Model. It will be explained in detail in chapter 3  
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analysed will be labelled as the ‘transitional period’. It will cover the following time 
frames: 1958-1990 and 1958-1998 for Colombia and Venezuela, correspondingly (see 
figures 1.1 and 1.2 above). The length of this period corresponds to the year in which 
both countries made their transition to democracy (1958 for both countries) until the 
previous year in which each country introduced its new constitution (1990 in Colombia 
and 1998 in Venezuela). 
The second period of analysis will be labelled as ‘divergence period’. This period, in 
turn, will cover the years from 1991-2010 and 1999-2010 for Colombia and 
Venezuela, respectively (see figures 1.1 and 1.2 above). Again, the length of this 
period corresponds to the year in which each country enacted their new constitutions 
(1991 in Colombia and 1999 in Venezuela), until 2010, years in which data was 
available. The choice of these two periods is a methodological strategy which is 
commonly used in comparative politics to assess a political phenomenon in a 
comparative perspective. In this case and in order to explain that divergence occurred 
in this period it was necessary, first, to know how polities were performing one period 
before, that is over the ‘transitional period’. However, it is important to note that the 
research strategy for this project will be primary focus on determining the agency and 
structural factors that over the ‘divergence period’ marked the opposite democratic 
paths of the countries under study. 
1.2. The structure of the thesis 
This project will be structured in nine chapters. Following this introduction, the 
remaining eight chapters will be divided in two parts. The first one consists of five 
chapters focusing on a complete conceptualisation of the different theories and 
variables that will make up the theoretical model proposed in my research which 
explain democratic divergence. Chapter 2, empirically assess the existence of the 
process experienced by Colombia and Venezuela over the ‘divergence period.’24 Next, 
I ask what are the theoretical frameworks with explanatory power that will allow me 
to assess divergence. To answer this question, I will review four approaches: (i) 
modernisation theory, (ii) resource curse theory, (iii) institutional theory, and (iv) 
                                                 
24 Here, I claim, by looking at data from Freedom House index and Kaufmann’s dimensions of 
governance that the process of democratic divergence did happen and that it can be explained by 
structural and agency factors. 
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political culture theory. I claim that neither of them, individually, can be regarded as 
self-sufficient theoretical frameworks to explain divergence. The chapter will argue 
that the best explanation of democratic divergence lies in combining, or merging, two 
important and contested theories; namely, institutional and political culture theories. 
In the last section, I will offer a methodological note explaining the type of 
comparative method to be used in this project. I will show that using a Most Similar 
System Design is a better quantitative methodology to operationalise all the variables 
that make up the Circular Causality Model presented in the third part of this chapter. 
In Chapter 3, I focus on providing a comprehensive explanation to justify the Circular 
Causality Model as a theoretical approach to explain democratic divergence. To do so, 
I argue that the linear causality models offered by both institutional and political 
culture theories are more suitable to explain processes of democratic transition, 
maintenance, quality, and consolidation than those of democratic divergence. This 
chapter will claim the need to merge these two approaches in order to introduce a new 
causal relation in which both elite political culture and some key institutional criteria 
can interact together over time in order to explain the opposite democratic paths that 
both countries faced over the ‘divergence period’. 
Chapter 4, in turn, revisits the literature of democratisation aiming to conceptualise the 
dependent variable: democratic divergence. To that end, I will provide a theoretical 
discussion in which three traditional approaches are analysed: institutional approach, 
the social structure approach, and the path dependent approach. From this discussion, 
I will argue that the latter is the most appropriate to study the process of democratic 
performance because it understands democracy as a dynamic entity that will allow us 
to track over time the causes behind the different democratic trajectories that any 
regime can take. Next, the analysis will be narrowed down to Latin America to 
introduce a re-construction of Schedler’s (1998a) model to classify democracies in the 
region. I argue that for the Latin American context Schedler’s notion of ‘advanced 
democracy’ does not apply, and therefore the notion of ‘liberal democracy’ should be 
the highest notion to which a polity in the region should reach in order to be considered 
as a consolidated regime. In the last part of this chapter I filter the analysis to the 
Colombian and Venezuelan cases to provide the conceptualisation of democratic 
divergence. 
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In chapters 5, I examine the conceptualisation of the first independent variable, that is, 
elite political culture. By conducting a literature review I will claim that culture matters 
as a concept that can explain democratic divergence between nations and other 
political groups. Additionally, this chapter provides a comprehensive analysis to show 
that both cases experienced a renewal in their political elites when these polities 
decided to introduce a complete reform to their constitutions. This renewal will be 
explained by the appointment in the Venezuelan case and the election in the 
Colombian case of a broader set of political actors to form the Constitutional 
Assemblies which, in turn, had the responsibility of implementing all the provisions 
to be included in the new constitutions. 
Chapter 6 will examine the conceptualisation of the two additional independent 
variables that correspond to the institutional theory; namely, constitutional reforms 
and electoral systems. I will stress the role that political institutions play in explaining 
the process of democratic divergence in Colombia and Venezuela. Hence, I will argue 
that the constitutional reforms, and the accumulation of power achieved by using 
decree powers by Presidents Chávez and Uribe, along with the electoral reforms 
carried out by these countries during the 1990s changed the way political institutions 
function and perform. Overall, I will argue, they can be deemed as factors that might 
play a significant role in explaining the different democratic paths that Colombia and 
Venezuela took over the ‘divergence period’. 
The second part of this project will be split in three chapters. Chapter 7 is meant to 
operationalised and measured the variables included in the Circular Causality Model 
that were conceptualised in chapter 4, 5, and 6. The operationalised variables will be 
used as an input to estimate a set of multivariate regression models in the next chapter. 
Chapter 8 will estimate multivariate regression models to assess from an empirical 
perspective the project’s research question. By estimating this model, it is possible to 
test and quantify the hypothesis about the statistical significance of the independent 
variables in the explanation of the divergent democratic paths. The outcome of the 
models will allow me to claim that there is enough evidence suggesting that the 
divergent democratic trajectories in both countries could be explained mainly by 
changes in the elite political culture, and constitutional reforms due to their statistical 
 20 
 
significance on the empirical models presented, and in lesser extent by changes on the 
reforms of the electoral systems in both counties. 
In the final chapter, I summarise the main findings of this project by binding together 
the theoretical discussion offered in the first part of this research and the results 
obtained in the second part. It concludes by claiming that there is enough theoretical 
and empirical evidence in which both agency (i.e., elite political culture) and structural 
(i.e. constitutional and electoral reforms) factors are important variables to explain the 
process of democratic divergence experienced by Colombia and Venezuela over the 
‘divergence period’. 
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PART I 
 
CONCEPTUALISING THE DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES TO ASSESS DEMOCRATIC DIVERGENCE 
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Chapter 2 
Explaining the drivers of democratic divergence: an empirical and 
theoretical approach to Colombia and Venezuela 
2.1. Introduction 
The processes of democratic transition in the region, specifically those carried out by 
Colombia and Venezuela, were for many leaders, politicians, and scholars, rather 
salient examples of democratic stability and rule of law within Latin America (Peeler 
1992; Hausmann, et. a., 2014). Both countries were guiding democratic examples for 
countries that were reluctant to move away from their authoritarian regimes. They 
were considered as alternative political systems to both the communist revolution, and 
the right-wing authoritarian regimes that were in norm during the cold war period 
(Wiarda 2001). 
Why can Colombia and Venezuela be considered important referents of democratic 
stability over the ‘transitional period’? There is a threefold answer to this question. 
First, in contrast to other countries in the region, these polities had a long history of 
competitive democratic institutions as they maintained the institutional rules and 
procedures of an electoral democracy since 1958 (O’Donnell 1997). Secondly, the 
commonalities these countries shared in order to achieve their transition to democracy 
were remarkably similar in an era where democracy was not the first option as the 
political regime in the region (Aviles 2005).25 And lastly, both countries overthrew 
their military governments in the same year (1958) by establishing the very same 
mechanism of political settlements among their traditional political parties so that 
political elites could govern these nations through ‘a system of alternation, democratic 
freedom, and competence’ (Cardozo da Silva 2002, 33). Based on these similar 
characteristics the post-dictatorship counties in the region were willing to emulated the 
successful democratic transition of Colombia and Venezuela (Wiarda 2001; 
Mainwaring 2006). 
                                                 
25 Such similarity can be seen when: both countries began their democratic transition process long time 
before the third democratic wave swept Latin America. In addition, both kept relatively liberal economic 
systems and enjoyed important trade and economic relations between them and among other Western 
countries. Moreover, both countries also accomplished their process of democratic transition by electing 
successive presidents through relatively fair and competitive electoral processes for decades. 
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Hence, after the flourishing process of democratisation from the beginning of the 
1990s, the process of regime change began to be unpredictable in Latin America. 
Nondemocratic countries such as Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay started and 
completed their process of democratic transition; while countries such as Colombia 
continued its steady and lengthy process of democratic stability. However, countries 
such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela did not continue with their 
process of democratic transition and consolidation, but instead follow a route of 
democratic deterioration (Lagos 2008). Consequently, it can be argued that at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century democratic fogginess was the norm across the 
region.26 Some countries were moving towards a democratic consolidation, while 
others undermined their democratic performance by eroding political freedoms and 
concentrating more power in the hands of their presidents (ibid). 
The most salient consequence of such regime heterogeneity was that, from mid-1990s, 
Colombia and Venezuela´s solid and well-known stable democratic systems took 
completely divergent paths on their process of democratic performance. Therefore, it 
is striking to study how countries that have completed a long-lasting and successful 
process of democratic transition eventually ended up taking completely opposite poles 
in their democratic path by the end of the twentieth century. 
To grasp a better understanding of this atypical democratic performance, it is necessary 
to question if such process of democratic divergence really happened, and if there is 
empirical evidence that can prove it. If it did happen, a valid question to ask is: what 
caused this democratic divergence? Also, why did the Colombian regime constantly 
attempt to generate effective and secure steps towards its democratic stability, while 
the Venezuelan regime reversed many of its democratic gains, and now is setting up a 
political structure that looks more like an impaired democracy? 
The aim of this chapter is to offer comprehensive answers to all these questions. The 
next section will present some empirical evidence in order to stress that the available 
data supports the claim that democratic divergence between these two countries 
                                                 
26 For instance, according to the Democratic Index Report (2011), it is argued that Uruguay is a full 
democracy with an index score of 8.1 (out of 10) and a global ranking of 17th, while Cuba, the only 
authoritarian regime in the region, ranked 126th (see: 
http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2011 last accessed on 
1st February 2012). 
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occurred. The third section will present alternative frameworks that might help 
elucidate an answer to the process of democratic divergence experienced by Colombia 
and Venezuela over the ‘divergence period’. After analysing approaches such as 
modernisation theory, and resource curse theory, this section will conclude by saying 
that the best approach with more explanatory power to elucidate the drivers of 
democratic divergence is by merging both political culture and institutional theories 
together. In the fourth section I will discuss the methodological approach this research 
will follow and explain the process of data gathering and its sources. It also will 
conclude that the Most Similar System Design is the best methodology to 
operationalise the variables that make up the Circular Causality Model. Finally, I will 
present conclusions. 
2.2. Explaining empirically the existence of democratic divergence 
As I have discussed above, Colombia and Venezuela are two cases in contemporary 
Latin American politics facing unusual processes in their democratic performance. 
Such particularity deserves more attention in order to determine the causes and 
consequences upon which the process of democratic divergence occurred in these 
polities. This section will illustrate such process by conducting a comparative analysis 
based on empirical evidence between the two interrelated periods that this research has 
identified, namely: the ‘transitional period’ and the ‘divergence period’. 
At this introductory level, it is worth examining in more detail these two periods. First, 
by using the historical background that the former period provides I try to understand 
and identify what drove both these ‘brotherhood Republics’27 to follow opposite poles 
in their line of democratic performance during the latter period. In fact, the ‘the 
transitional period’ was characterised by the similarity in the implementation of 
policies and strategies to achieve a solid transition to democracy by these two 
                                                 
27 Brotherhood Republics is a term widely used by both Colombian and Venezuelan citizens and 
governments to refer to their common heritage. The term dates back to early 1800s when these two 
countries, along with Ecuador and other close territories, used to form one country known as GREAT 
COLOMBIA. After the disintegration of this country by mid-1800s, Colombia and Venezuela have kept 
a very close relation in both political and economic aspects that have strengthen their ties of friendship. 
However, the friendly relationship between these countries has been affected since mid-1990s when 
two presidents with ideological differences took office (i.e., Hugo Chávez in 1998 in Venezuela, and 
Alvaro Uribe Velez in 2002 in Colombia). Hence, the use of this term in my project it is by no means 
arbitrary as it is meant to show how two countries that used to be so similar during the ´transitional 
period´, ended up being so different during the ´divergence period´. 
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countries. It is important to highlight that during this period both countries -in 1958- 
experienced their transition from authoritarianism to electoral democracies. They 
managed to make such transition because both countries followed the very same 
political strategy, building alliances and consensus among the major and more 
traditional political parties (Bejarano 2011). Consequently, the end point of those 
alliances allowed political elites to reach agreements upon which both polities could 
begin their democratic transitions by implementing what is known as ‘pacted 
democracies’ (Wiarda 2001; Buxton 2005). 
The implementation of these pacted democracies came from the establishment of two 
hegemonic and resilient political parties28 in each country that governed and 
dominated the political field over the whole duration of this period (Peeler 1992; Lopez 
Maya 2002, 2003). However, the political and economic performance resulting from 
the implementation of these pacted democracies models started to crumble at the end 
of the ‘transitional period’.29 Such poor performance marked the interlude of 
fundamental shifts for both countries in terms of their process of democratic 
performance over the ‘divergence period’. It was during this period that both Colombia 
and Venezuela took different democratic trajectories; hence I will examine separately 
structural and agency reasons in order to explain this phenomenon. Among the 
structural reasons, I will show that both erratic and ineffective social and economic 
policies were delivered by the neoliberal model of development during the 1980s. 
Additionally, the permanent political exclusion of the masses and political minorities 
by traditional political parties in both countries can be identified as part of the motives 
explaining this change. 
Among the agency reasons, I will argue that during this period a fundamental 
generational change occurred among the traditional political elites as new political 
                                                 
28 For the Venezuelan case Acción Democrática (AD), and the Social Christian Party (originally Comité 
Político Electoral Independiente, or COPEI) were the most traditional parties. As for Colombia, the 
Liberal party (Partido Liberal (PL)), and Conservative Party (Partido Conservador (PC)) were the 
political parties that kept in power during this period.  
29 For instance, on the political front, both countries faced restrictions on political participation and 
political competition. This issue of political exclusion led to limited, or none, access to democratic 
representation in both countries, specifically for middle and poor social classes, and representatives of 
leftists’ parties (Corrales, et. al., 2010; Buxton 2001; Ellner 2008). On the economic front, this period 
was characterised by the implementation of the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) model, and 
its subsequent replacement –at the end of the 1970s- for the neoliberal model of development. These 
models failed to deliver satisfactory solutions for high unemployment and inequality, and a considerable 
fall in per-capita income by the end of this period (Hausmann, et. al. 2014; Mainwaring 2006; Buxton, 
et. al., 2008). 
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actors accessed the political arena when both polities decided to conduct 
comprehensive reforms. These reforms were made primary to their constitutions and 
electoral systems in order to deal with the problems linked with a potential state failure. 
Furthermore, I will argue that the appointment and election of members of the 
Constituent Assemblies –at the beginning of the ‘divergence period’- should be 
identified as a critical juncture that allowed the renewal of traditional political elites 
that led to appropriate different values, beliefs, and political attitudes in the political 
arena. Therefore, the changes in the political culture at the elite level is another motive 
underlying the beginning of a period characterised by significant political 
transformations with different consequences in the process of regime change for both 
countries. 
In what follows, in order to make a more solid case upon the dissimilar democratic 
trajectories in the ‘divergence period´; tables 2.1 and 2.2 are meant to show the 
existence of democratic divergence by analysing some economic, political and social 
figures from different sources (e.g. World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(WDI), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Freedom House Index, and 
Kaufmann’s governance indicators). By analysing these tables, it is possible to collect 
empirical evidence which will allow us to identify and measure the effect that the 
above-mentioned variables can explain the process of democratic divergence. 
Table 2.1 focuses on a comparative analysis of social and economic indicators. I focus 
on the third column of this table which shows a growth of the GDP per-capita in 
Colombia which was 56%, whereas Venezuela´s GDP decreased 11% within the two 
periods. This shows that Colombia´s economic policy was more efficient during the 
‘divergence period’. It was characterised by a neoliberal economic model which had 
state intervention as a mechanism to fix distributional failures that the free market was 
not able to fix. Conversely, Venezuela’s departure from a neoliberal economic model 
to the ‘Socialism of the XXI century’, proved not work in the direction of improving 
citizens’ well-being. 
The literacy index, during the ‘divergence period’ performed well. Both countries 
reached almost universal coverage at the basic and middle levels of education.30 The 
                                                 
30 Information on adult literacy for the Colombian case during the ‘transitional period’ was not possible 
to find. 
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Human Development Index (HDI), for both countries reached the ‘high’ level of the 
Human rankings.31 However, it is important to mention that during the ‘divergence 
period’ Colombia growth rate is greater than Venezuela´s. Life expectancy growth rate 
was, on average 7 years higher than 30 years ago.  
The only indicator in which both countries have worsened during the whole period of 
analysis was the percentage of people living below the poverty line. As table 2.1 shows 
the poverty threshold –also known as extreme poverty- has increased in 1,1 percentage 
points in Colombia, and in 4,4 percentage points in Venezuela during the last 20 years. 
This implies that in average the population had been facing the absence of enough 
resources to secure their basic needs. This is a worrisome indicator linked to the 
popular dissatisfaction with the political and economic systems put in place during the 
‘transitional period’. It may also be understood as one of the possible factors that 
triggered the change in the democratic performance mentioned above. 
Table 1.1. 
Key social and economic indicators in Colombia and Venezuela: a comparative 
analysis between the ‘transitional period’ and the ‘divergence period’ 
 
In sum, Table 2.1 shows that the evolution of the social and economic indicators was, 
to some extent, opposite in both the two periods and the two countries under analysis. 
It can be stressed that Colombia had a better performance in its socio-economic 
indicators than Venezuela. However, the failure in the reduction of poverty can be 
regarded as the big setback in both countries and one of the possible triggers that may 
explain the unusual democratic performance of both these polities. 
                                                 
31 The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite statistic used to rank countries by level of 
‘human development,’ taken as a synonym of the older term standards of living, and distinguish ‘very 
high human development,’ ‘high human development,’ ‘medium human development,’ and ‘low human 
development’ countries. 
Colombia Venezuela Colombia Venezuela Colombia Venezuela
Population (mean)a 24.262.802    13.112.048    40.212.584    24.639.185    15.949.782    11.527.137    
Population growth annual (%) (mean)b 2,5 3,2 1,7 1,9  -0.8*  -1.3*
Population below poverty line PPP $1.25 a day (%) (mean)b 4,1 1,4 5,1 5,8 1,1* 4,4*
GDP per cápita in 2005 constant prices (US$) (mean)b 2.098 6.263 3.276 5.567 56% -11%
Life expectancy at birth (years) (mean)b 63,05 66,26 71,00 72,63 7,95 6,37
Human Development Index (mean)c 0,64 0,58 0,73 0,69 13% 19%
Adult literacy (% of population >15) (mean)b - 87,3 91,5 94,5 - 7,2*
Sources: a) World Bank (2015), b) WDI (2015), c) UNDP (2015).
*The change within the periods of analysis is measured in percentual points.
(-) No data available
          
         
Social and economic indicators
Transition period 
(1960-1990)
Divergence period
(1991-2010)
Change within the periods 
of analysis
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In. Table 2.2 I analyse the evolution of political freedoms and civil liberties by 
comparing Freedom House32 ratings for both polities. The table shows that the 
evolution of this index over the two periods of analysis is rather mixed over time. 
However, in order to make a fair assessment, it is necessary to focus attention both on 
the scale of the Freedom House index score –that is, its scale from 1(most free) to 7 
(least free)- and its classification as ‘free,’ ‘partly free,’ or ‘not free.’ 
Focusing on the ‘transitional period’, table 2.2 shows that by 1972 –year in which 
Freedom House released its scores for the first time- Colombia was considered as a 
‘free’ country with a score of 2.5, but by 1990 its classification changed to ‘partly free’ 
with a score of 3.5. In the Venezuelan case, the evidence suggests a rather different 
perspective in terms of political rights and civil liberties. The scale and classification 
provided by Freedom House index shows that Venezuela scored 2 and kept its ‘free’ 
classification during the two the decades of the ‘transitional period’. Hence, despite 
both countries were classified as ‘free’ democracies at the beginning of this period; 
Venezuela can be considered a more stable, solid and mature democracy by the end of 
this period. That is, this polity achieved a more solid result in terms of its process of 
democratic performance compared with Colombia over the ‘transitional period.’ 
Table 2.2. 
Freedom house index and classification: a comparative analysis between the 
‘transitional period’ and the ‘divergence period’ 
 
However, table 2.2 also shows that this trend changed in the ‘divergence period’. The 
democratic scores were somewhat reversed as Colombia maintained its average 
classification, whereas Venezuela had a sharp fall in its democratic performance. That 
is, Colombia began this period with a worrisome score of 4.0 –due to problems 
                                                 
32 The previous chapter already offered a description of how this index measures the democratic 
performance of the countries under study (see footnote 8). 
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associated with political and drug-related violence, and corruption- but then it showed 
a recovery and persistent signs of democratic progress, measured in terms of political 
freedoms and civil liberties. This allowed Colombia to improve its score according to 
Freedom House. It reached a scale of 3.0, in 2006 and then had a small regression in 
2010 by reaching a score of 3.5.33  
Venezuela´s case was quite interesting due to this period marked a turning point in 
terms of its democratic performance. First, as table 2.2 depicts, during the first half of 
the ‘divergence period’ Venezuela kept its classification as ‘free’ country scoring 2.5 
over two consecutive periods. However, it was only until 1998 –year in which 
President Chávez took office- when Venezuela loss its classification as ‘free’ and 
became part of the group of countries classified as ‘partly free’. Since then, the fall of 
this indicator has become prominent and coincides with President Chávez’s 12 years 
term in office. In fact, the ranking given to Venezuela by Freedom House in 2010 met 
a worrisome score of 5.0. This score not only put Venezuela in the lowest scale of the 
‘partly free’ classification having no neighbouring country in the region to compare 
to, but also reflects the persistent erosion of political rights and civil liberties that 
Venezuelan citizens have been facing.34 Consequently, Chavismo has achieved 
particularly low levels of political contestation and low levels of political inclusion. 
This combination is not supported in Robert Dahl’s classic idea of a liberal democracy 
where high levels of political contestation and political inclusion are required to 
achieve a consolidated democracy35 (Dahl 1971). 
To continue the assessment of the divergent democratic process experienced in these 
countries, it is also important to take into account citizens´ political perceptions 
                                                 
33 Colombia´s democratic stability according to Freedom House index, put the country close to other 
countries in the Latin American region, such as Peru and El Salvador, all of which enjoy the 
classification of ‘free’ polities with a scale of 2.5 by the end of the ‘divergence period’. Nonetheless, 
still significant improvements should be made to reach the levels of consolidated democracies such as 
those of Chile, Costa Rica, among others (Freedom in the World 2011). 
34 According to the report Freedom in the World 2011 –which reflects events in 2010 for the countries 
under study- Venezuela is the only country in the Latin American region with the lowest score within 
the status of ‘partly free’ countries. Haiti and Guatemala are the neighbouring countries following 
Venezuela with scores of 4.5 and 4.0 respectively.   
35 According to Corrales and Penfold (2010), the level of contestation under Chavismo ‘has increasingly 
undermined political competition for office by placing state resources and security services at the 
disposal of the ruling party while denying them to its rivals. As for the level of inclusion, Chavismo 
[has also] mobilised new and non-traditional actors in the electoral arena (which clearly strengthens 
democracy), but also has deliberately excluded comparatively large segments of society, labelling them 
as ‘oligarchs,’ ‘contemptible,’ and ‘enemies of the common people’ (Corrales, et. al. 2010, 8)  
 30 
 
regarding the quality of their governments. To a greater extent, political perceptions 
reflects people´s views, beliefs and values on government performance which is 
closely related with political culture theory. 36 To capture citizens´ perceptions, I rely 
on Kaufmann/World Bank governance indicators (2010).37 Table 2.3 summarise and 
analyse the evolution of six aggregate governance indicators since 1996 to 2010.38 The 
analysis of this data will allow me to assess whether Colombian and Venezuelan 
citizens have the same level of government legitimacy in order to claim that agency 
factors can also explain the divergent path taken by the countries under study over the 
‘divergence period’. 
For the Colombian case, table 2.3 shows the positive progression in each of its six 
governance indicators for every single period through the time of analysis. In 2010, 
indicators such as governance effectiveness (GE) and regulatory quality (RQ) were 
placed in the highest ranks of Latin American nation-states, while indicators such as 
those of control of corruption (CC), rule of law (RL), and voice and accountability 
(VA) are in the middle ranks of the countries in the region. However, among Latin 
American nations, Colombia performed very poorly in relation to the indicator of 
political stability and absence of violence (PV). What is interesting about the overall 
                                                 
36 As mentioned in the introduction, this project will consider political perceptions to be an important 
variable that explain democratic divergence. Hence, the reason for analysing citizens´ perceptions is 
supported by the already mentioned argument that not only structural reasons, but also agency ones are 
important to fully understand the process of regime change. 
37 Kaufmann indicators provide a summary of six aggregate governance indicators. These indicators 
rank each country on 0-100 point’s scale where higher scores mean better governance ratings. The 
description of the six broad dimensions of governance found in Table 2.3 are the following: a) Control 
of Corruption (CC): It reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests; b) Government Effectiveness (GE): It captures perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment 
to such policies; c)Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV): It reflects perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional of violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism;  d) Rule of law (RL): It captures perceptions of 
the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence; e) Voice and Accountability (VA): It reflects perceptions of the extent of which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and free media; and f) Regulatory Quality (RQ): It captures perceptions of the 
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development. To find out more information about data and methodological issues 
please refer to ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues’ 
(September 2010) by visiting: http://www.govindicators.org  
38 The data reported by Kaufmann’s methodology is only available since 1996 which means no 
information is accessible for the ‘transitional period.’ However, this setback does not represent a 
problem due to the main period of analysis this project is focusing on is over the time frame in which 
both countries faced their process of democratic divergence: 1991-2010. 
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progression of Colombia’s government ratings is that, when comparing 1996 ranks 
with 2010 ranks, it is possible to infer that the quality of governance in this country 
has improved at a low growth rate.39 
Table 3.3. 
Key political indicators in Colombia and Venezuela: an analysis for the ‘divergence 
period’ 
 
As for Venezuela, table 2.3 also shows a continuous deterioration in the quality of 
governance during the ‘divergence period.’ In fact, this polity went from having high 
and middle ranks in 1996 to perform very poorly in five out of the six dimensions by 
2010. For instance, indicators such as control of corruption (CC), government 
effectiveness (GE), political stability (PV), rule of law (RL), and regulatory quality 
(RQ) which were rated in terms of quality of governance as middle and high ranks in 
1996, in 2010 they were rated as weak indictors. Among these indicators, (RL) went 
from a score of 32 in 1996 to 17 in 2010 this meant that people’s perceptions on how 
governmental decisions have been made are less abided by legal principals and more 
by personal interests aimed to keep the actual political regimen in power. In addition, 
(VA) can be considered as the only one scoring in the middle rank of Kaufmann 
                                                 
39 In fact, it is possible to infer that Colombia, over the ‘divergence period,’ has emphasised the 
importance of structuring a capable state, more accountable to its citizens, and operating more 
efficiently under the rule of law. 
For the sake of comparison and better understanding of the data shown in table 2.3, it should be said 
that if I take, for example, the value of 55% as the highest Colombian governance indicator in 2010, 
then I am able to claim that an estimated 55% of the countries in the world rate worse and that for 
extrapolation an estimate of 45% of the countries rate better in Regulatory Quality (RQ) than Colombia. 
This interpretation locates Colombia in the highest rank of countries making reforms aimed to improve 
the quality of government. Conversely, if I take the lowest indicator: Political Stability (PS) then the 
quality of the Colombian government is compromised as only 19% of the countries in the world rate 
worse and, therefore, an estimate of 81% of the countries rate better off. 
Indicator Country 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Colombia 40 41 42 45 47 48 48 48 46 46 44 42
Venezuela 32 31 39 29 30 32 31 31 30 28 27 26
Colombia 46 47 44 42 47 47 47 48 49 49 45 49
Venezuela 36 33 35 30 31 30 32 29 29 28 31 28
Colombia 18 15 18 10 2 6 9 13 14 13 13 19
Venezuela 38 38 34 22 24 22 26 25 26 24 25 25
Colombia 32 34 30 34 35 36 37 40 41 41 41 43
Venezuela 32 34 32 27 24 26 26 22 19 18 18 17
Colombia 37 41 39 40 41 44 44 46 46 46 47 47
Venezuela 45 49 47 39 41 38 36 37 34 34 32 32
Colombia 52 51 53 50 48 50 51 53 55 55 53 55
Venezuela 46 45 40 37 29 28 27 27 22 23 18 18
Voice and Accountability
Regulatory Quality
Source: Kaufmann indicators (2010)
Notes: Originally, the Worldwide Governance Indicators had an scale that ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) 
governance performance. Although, estimates of governance were modified to range from 0 (weak) to 100% (strong) governance 
performance. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) the Kaufmann indicators measure six dimensions of governance since 1996. 
This index ranks each country on 0-100 point scales where higher means better governance rating.
        
     
Divergence Period (1991-2010)
Control of Corruption
Government Effectiveness
Political Stability y No Violence/Terrorism
Rule of Law
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indicators in 2010. Nonetheless, its permanent decline since 1998 is a logic and 
worrisome outcome of the state intervention in the regulation of radio and television 
throughout the Communication Law enacted in 2000.40 
To assess the statistical significance on the mean difference between the scores 
presented above, I conducted a t-test. Table 2.4 shows the mean performance for each 
one of the six governance indicators analysed during the ‘divergence period’. This t-
test shows that the differences between the means of Colombia and Venezuela for each 
of Kaufmann’s indicators are statistically significant (p-value<0.01). Furthermore, this 
table shows that Colombia has a better mean and its difference from Venezuela is 
statistically different from zero for the five indicators.41 The only exception is the 
indicator of Political Stability and No Violence/Terrorism, in which Venezuela has a 
better performance42 during the ‘divergence period.’ 
The analysis of the following indicators suggests that for Venezuela the trend of the 
six aggregate indicators performed poorly since President Hugo Chávez took power in 
1998. In fact, the empirical evidence offered in table 2.3 shows the negative trend on 
each dimension of quality of governance from 1998 onwards. Moreover, one can 
contrast the positive performance these indicators had during the first two years (1996-
1998) in which Chávez had not been elected yet. The empirical evidence supports 
academic claims that President Chávez has transformed a pluralistic democracy into a 
hybrid regime43 (Corrales, et. al. 2010; McCoy, et. al. 2004). Or that Venezuela ‘has 
an authoritarian government created […] by a systematic process of destroying from 
                                                 
40 This law was enacted as Ley Orgánica de Telecomunicaciones, in Gaceta Oficial No 36.970, June 12, 
2000. Its aim was meant to empowered the Venezuelan state to administer, control, and revoke 
authorizations and permits to private media organizations that were opposed to the actual government 
(Brewer-Carías 2010). 
41 The null hypothesis should be understood as the difference between the Colombian mean (Cm) minus 
the Venezuelan mean (Vm) is less than 0. That is, Cm-Vm <0. On the contrary, the alternative 
hypothesis states that Cm-Vm≥0, which means that Colombia in average is better off that the 
Venezuelan case.  The conclusion on this test is to reject the null hypothesis with a 1% level of 
significance according to the P-values shown in table 2.4. 
42 On this case, the null hypothesis should be understood as the difference between the Colombian mean 
(Cm) minus the Venezuelan mean (Vm) is bigger than 0. That is, Cm-Vm >0. The rejection of the null 
hypothesis states that Cm-Vm≤0, which means that Venezuela is better off than Colombia for this 
indicator with a 1% level of significance according with the P-values shown in table 2.4. 
43 Hybrid regimes should be understood here as political systems in which the mechanism for 
determining access to state office combines both democratic and autocratic practices. That is, in this 
type of regimes freedom exist and the opposition can compete in elections, but the system of check and 
balances becomes inoperative. 
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within the state all the basic principles of democracy, its institutions, and the 
Constitution’ (Brewer-Carías 2010, 13).44  
Table 4.4. 
Performance of governance indicators in Colombia and Venezuela using a t-test in 
the ‘divergence period’ 
 
In sum, Freedom House index and Kaufmann’s indicators allow us to claim that the 
process of democratic performance measured in terms of both political rights, and civil 
liberties; and quality of governance, suffered a severe fracture between the 
‘transitional period’ and the ‘divergence period’. That is, tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 
showed that since the end of their last dictatorship, and until early 1990s Colombia 
and Venezuela were recognised as two of the most stable democracies around the 
region. Both countries –during the ‘transitional period’- managed to keep their 
political systems stable by reaching agreements among political elites to govern their 
nations through a system of alternation [of power between their two traditional 
parties], democratic freedoms, and competence (Cardozo da Silva 2002; Ellner 2008). 
However, it was not until mid-1990s that these ‘brotherhood democracies’ took 
completely different democratic paths as the analyses of Kaufmann´s indicators, and 
Freedom House scores has shown. In this period both indicators began behaving 
differently, that is, in opposing directions. By 2010 it is feasible to stress that Colombia 
continued its process of democratic stability, whereas Venezuela began a democratic 
deconsolidation process. 
                                                 
44 Another set of authors aligned with the idea to characterised Venezuela as a deconsolidated regime 
are: Mainwaring, et. al. (2001) who used the concept of ´Semidemocratic´ as a new type of democracy 
to describe this regime; Schedler (2010) who described it as an ´electoral authoritarian´; and more 
recently Levitsky, et. al. (2013) came up with the concept ´competitive authoritarianism´ to describe 
not only the Venezuelan regime, but also the Bolivian under Evo Morales, and the Ecuadorian under 
Rafael Correa regimes. 
Indicator Colombia
 (media)
Venezuela 
(media)
T-statistics p-value Performance 
Col vs. Ven 
Control of Corruption 44,75 30,50 11,26 *** High
Government Effectiveness 46,67 31,00 16,12 *** High
Political Stability and No Violence/Terrorism 12,50 27,42 -6,70 *** Low
Rule of Law 37,00 24,58 5,92 *** High
Voice and Accountability 43,17 38,67 2,33 ** High
Regulatory Quality 52,16 30,00 7,65 *** High
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2014 Update.
          
g   g  p  ( )
Notes: The mean calculation is based on an average of 12 observations for each country, period 1996-2010. 
***Significance 1%, ** Significance 5%, *Significance 10%
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In conclusion, from the data collected, one can claim that there exists divergence in 
their democratic performance. Colombia has shown to be a sustainable democracy in 
process of consolidation, whilst Venezuela has become a hybrid regime. These 
opposite paths are not common, as they began their democratic performance aligned 
until 1998 when President Chávez took office. From this moment, Venezuela and 
Colombia democratic performance divert into different paths. An interesting point 
which I will address in the following section is related to the origins, causes, and 
effects of the divergence. In sum, the next section will identify the drivers of the 
different democratic trajectories by presenting different theoretical explanations. 
2.3. Explaining the drivers of regime change 
In contemporary politics, experiences of regimen change towards ‘less’ democratic 
forms of government have been progressively more common among several countries 
in the region during the last 20 years.45 Consequently, acknowledging the occurrence 
of this phenomenon, scholars (e.g..: Clearly 2006; Corrales, et. al. 2007; Schamis 
2006) have spent a great deal of time following a line of research aimed to identify the 
causes and effects of left-leaning reformist governments.46 However, rather little 
attention has been devoted to explaining the causes and effects of their divergence. 
The following section will present four theoretical approaches that might explain why 
these countries are currently located in different ends of the political spectrum. 
Modernisation theory 
Modernisation theory’s main assumption is based upon the direct relation between 
economic development and democracy. That is, more development promotes more 
democracy. According to Lipset’s thesis (1959), for democracy to work high levels of 
education are required as well as a middle social class with an acceptable standard of 
                                                 
45 For instance, since the election of presidents such as: Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1998-2012), Daniel 
Ortega in Nicaragua (2006-), Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2007-2010), Fernando Lugo in Paraguay (2008-
2013), and Mauricio Funez in El Salvador (2009-); leftist victories have become increasingly clear and 
‘started representing a regional trend rather than a series of isolated events’ (Cleary 2006, 36). 
46 As chapter 3 will stress, it has been so evident the regional trend of leftist governments in the Latin 
American region that the terms of ‘Pink Tide’ or ‘left turn’ have become commonly used to describe 
the perception that leftist ideology in general, and left-wing politics in particular, is increasingly 
influential in Latin America. Particularly, the term ‘Pink tide’ it is a play on words based on ‘Red tide’ 
with ‘red’ -a colour long associated with communism- being replaced with the lighter tone of ‘pink’ to 
indicate the more moderate communist and socialist ideas gaining strength in the region. 
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living. Hence, if most of the population is illiterate, and poor; democracy will be an 
elusive goal. Historical evidence and countless academic papers agree and support 
Lipset’s hypothesis about the causality between economic development and 
democracy. He argues that more development promotes more democracy by 
‘generating more democratic values and attitudes, a less polarized class structure, a 
larger middle class, and a more vigorous, autonomous associational life’ (Diamond, 
et. al. 1992, 354). 
From the evidence presented in the previous section, it can be argued with a high level 
of certainty that over the ‘transitional period’ both Colombia and Venezuela can be 
regarded as good instances of how Modernisation theory works in practice. In fact, by 
1990 both countries were deemed as developing economies with a relatively high rate 
of adult literacy, a quite acceptable GDP per capita, and a medium level of Human 
Development Index (HDI) (see table 2.1). After comparing the positive performance 
of the previous economic indicators with the relatively good performance of the 
citizens’ perception on political rights and civil liberties obtained during this same 
period –see table 2.2- it is possible to infer that the causality between development and 
democracy is supported by the countries under study. Furthermore, it should also be 
said that during the ‘transitional period’, and in contrast with Colombia, Venezuela 
represented an even better case to support Lipset´s hypothesis as this polity delivered 
better economic results that were also reflected by its more stable democratic 
classification as a ‘free’ country according to Freedom House Index. Therefore, the 
fact that until late 1980s both countries were regarded as the most stables democracies 
in the Latin American region by politicians and academics alike also showed that 
Modernisation theory was a good approach to explain their outstanding democratic 
performance. 
Yet, the empirical evidence also confirmed that during the ‘divergence period’ this 
theory seemed to be no longer suitable to explain the opposite democratic trajectories 
followed by these countries. Table 2.1 shows that even though the economic indicators 
started performing poorly mainly those related with population below poverty line in 
both countries, and GDP per-capita for the Venezuelan case, the performance of their 
political indicators (see tables 2.2 and 2.3) behaved unevenly. That is, it can be argued 
that Modernisation theory is still a good approach to explain the democratic 
performance followed by Colombia as its economic, social and political indicators 
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have enjoyed a positive and consistent trend during the two decades that make up the 
‘divergence period’. Nonetheless, the opposite happened to the Venezuelan case. 
Although the economic indicators continued a positive path, its political indicators 
have gone through a continuous reversal since the very year President Chávez started 
his term in 1998. Thus, due to the atypical behaviour between the above-mentioned 
indicators it is possible to infer that Venezuela is a case in which Modernisation theory 
does not fit and is unable to explain the process of democratic divergence that this 
research is aim to assess. 
In sum, although this theory can be regarded as a good approach to explain the 
democratic performance during the ‘transitional period’, it cannot, in turn, be regarded 
as a good theoretical framework to explain the reasons, causes, and effects that the 
process of democratic divergence brought. That is, modernisation theory fails to fully 
explain the process of democratic divergence because, despite the good performance 
of the economic indicators for both countries, only Colombia has been able to continue 
its process of democratic stability, while Venezuela is going through a process of 
democratic regression as demonstrated by several studies such as Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (2010), Freedom House Index (2011), Democracy Index 
(2010)47, Polity IV, among others. 
Resource curse theory 
The resource curse theory can also be regarded as an approach that might help to 
understand and explain the process of democratic divergence experienced by 
Colombia and Venezuela over the ‘divergence period’. This approach claims that high 
dependence on land-based or mineral natural resources will induce serious economic 
and institutional deficiencies because the fiscal benefits derived from oil rents causes 
conflict among political factions preventing a better democratic performance –i.e., 
corruption and political centralisation (Sachs, et. al. 1995; Karl 1997; Buxton 2001; 
Tinker 2009, 2015). It also prevents an efficient distribution of wealth, which, in turn, 
                                                 
47 The magazine ‘The Economist’ publishes this index and its information relies on the Economist 
Intelligence Unit that measures the state of democracy in 167 countries, of which 166 are sovereign 
states and 165 are UN member states. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index is based on 
60 indicators grouped in five different categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, 
functioning of government, political participation and political culture. The Index was first produced in 
2006, with updated lists are produced in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
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places a ‘curse’ as it reduces popular support for the political system and, by extension, 
a democratic decay (Ross 1999; Sachs, et. al. 1995). 
This thesis has been debated by many scholars arguing that it is not universal or 
inevitable as it may affect differently certain regimes under certain conditions. On this 
line of thought, Karl (1997) in her seminal book, The Paradox of Plenty despite at the 
beginning agreeing with this general assumption,48 distance herself from this 
simplistic argument and contributes to this theory by acknowledging that the final 
effect on the economic or political performance rests not primarily on the dependence 
on a natural resource but fundamentally on the nature of the state. That is, it is not 
necessarily true that all countries ‘enjoying’ mono-export economies of a key land-
based or mineral commodity will end up promoting authoritarian regimes.49 Hence, 
by comparing several oil dependent countries, Karl and other scholars (i.e. Monaldi, 
et. al. 2014; Lopez Maya 2004, 2011; Hausmann, et. al. 2014; Buxton 2001; McCoy, 
et. al., 2004; Bejarano 2011; among others) stress that strong states50 are capable of 
absorbing and channelling efficiently the revenues derived from exporting 
commodities, such as oil, avoiding both negative consequences for regime 
performance or for other sectors of the economy. Therefore, strong states will avoid 
incurring in the so-called Dutch disease (see Hellinger 2000). Conversely, it is also 
recognised that The Paradox of Plenty will be present in those regimes that have weak 
states or lack of adequate political reforms. Hence, scholars such as Philip (2000), 
Buxton (2001), and Hellinger (2000), among others, argue that elite corruption, 
extreme political and economic centralisation, patronage politics, rent-seeking, and a 
culture that emphasises the distribution rather than the creation of wealth are 
characteristics ascribed to the formation of weak states. These characteristics, taken 
together, contribute to increase the probabilities for a state to become nondemocratic.51 
                                                 
48 That is, countries with high dependence on petroleum production (or any other high-rent commodity) 
leads to disproportionate fiscal reliance on petrodollars and fiscal spending, bringing about economic 
deterioration and political decay (Karl 1997, 44) 
49 Norris (2008) sides with this argument by stating that ‘[this theory] also needs to explain how oil-rich 
extractive industries can be an apparent blessing for the Norwegian state but a curse in Saudi Arabia’ 
(Norris 2008, 12). 
50 Terry Karl defined ‘strong states’ as those regimes with bureaucracies and other institutions that 
ensure high autonomy and high capacity to enforce laws in the public interest (see Karl 1997, and Karl, 
et. al., 1991). 
51 Overall, under this more compelling approach, the resource curse thesis generates two different 
economic and political distortions that will be present in weak political system (Sachs, et. al. 1995). The 
former distortion, it is claim (Corrales, et. al. 2010; Norris 2008; Buxton 2001; Lopez Maya 2003, 2011; 
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According to this line of reasoning, and focusing on the cases under study, it is 
tempting to use this persuasive structural explanation to explain the process of 
emergence and persistence of democracy over the ‘transitional period’, and the 
subsequent decay of democracy over the ‘divergence period’ in Venezuela. It is also 
tempting to apply it to the process of democratic stability experienced by Colombia 
over the whole period of analysis. This can be justifiable because, according to 
Bejarano (2011), both countries can be regarded as mono-export economies and 
therefore the resource curse theory might be a good approach to explain their divergent 
democratic performance. 
Undoubtedly, Venezuela is a country whose economy is highly dependent on oil 
production from which it earns huge revenues from its commercialisation.52 On the 
other hand, Colombia can also be deemed as mono-export economy because, even 
though it is a more diversified economy, the bulk of its revenues derived from its trade 
balance have historically depended on coffee exports.53 
However, it is striking to note that despite these countries being mono-exports neither 
of them have gone through processes of democratic decay caused by their dependence 
on their specific commodities. Contrary of what the resource curse thesis predicts there 
is no evidence that Venezuela’s dependence on oil have caused any negative effect on 
its democratic performance. On the contrary, as Karl (1986) argues, it seems that 
‘petroleum is the single most important factor explaining the creation of the structural 
conditions for the breakdown of military authoritarianism and the sub-sequent 
persistence of a democratic system’ (ibid.: 197). That is, following Bejarano’s (2011) 
                                                 
Hausmann, et. al., 2014), produces macroeconomic volatility, overvaluation of the exchange rate, 
income inequality, lower investment in building human capital, and heightened danger of state capture 
and rent-seeking by ruling elites. Whilst the latter distortion reduces popular support leading to 
fragmentation of the party system which in turn triggers political incoherence by increasing the stakes 
of holding power, and making a country vulnerable to civil war, rebellion, and insurgency (Karl 1997; 
Buxton 2001; Humphreys 2005; Monaldi, et. al., 2014). 
“Stakes of power” is a concept used by Monaldi and Penfold (2014) to discuss how political institutions 
can be regarded as explanatory variables to explain regime change. They define this concept as ‘the 
value that key political actors place on being in power as opposed to being in the opposition’ (ibid.: 
288). Thus, in order a democratic country avoid becoming an authoritarian regime should guarantee to 
put limits to the ‘stakes of power’. That is, if the ‘stakes of power’ are too high, those in power would 
do whatever they can to remain in power (ibid.: 288). 
52 In fact, Venezuela ‘as early as the 1930s-oil accounted for 82 percent of the total export of goods… 
and this share increased throughout the century, reaching a peak of 90 percent by mid-90s’ (Thorp 1998, 
347). 
53 According to Thorp (1998), Palacios (1983), and Bergquist (1996) since the early 20th century, coffee 
accounted for half of the total exports of goods, but its share increased to 75 percent by 1990s. 
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claim –when she compares other major oil-exporting countries- it is possible to infer 
that oil has favoured existing regime arrangements rather than undermining them. 
A similar conclusion can be reached for Colombia’s dependence on coffee production: 
there is no evidence supporting a palpable effect on its democratic performance caused 
by its commodity dependence. When Bejarano (2011) compared Colombia with other 
coffee exporters such as Brazil and Central American nations, she stressed that ‘the 
task of building a causal explanation of regime change with coffee production for 
export as the main independent variable seem rather daunting,’ a claim to which she 
immediately adds, ‘no single parsimonious hypothesis could possibly account for the 
variation between Costa Rica’s strong and stable democracy, Brazil’s punctuated 
history of regime change, and the various forms of authoritarianism characteristics of 
most Central American coffee-exporting countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua)’ (ibid.: 34). Hence, like oil in Venezuela, coffee production 
for exports in Colombia does not appear to be a good predictor of either democracy or 
authoritarianism. 
Overall, then, it seems that coffee and oil have certainly played an important role in 
both Colombia’s and Venezuela’s economy but not necessarily on defining their 
democratic performance. In my view, and given the evidence provided this far, it is 
plausible to claim that something must be wrong with the resource course theory and 
its argument linking oil/coffee and democracy when it is applied to the cases of 
Colombia and Venezuela. Several scholars (McCoy, et. al. 2004; Buxton 2001; 
Hausmann, et. al., 2014, Karl 1997) share this view by arguing that the direct causality 
between resource dependence and democratic decay cannot be properly assessed by 
the resource curse thesis because it overlooks the important effect that the nature of 
the state (i.e., weak/strong institutions) might play in explaining democratic 
performance. For instance, Monaldi and Penfold (2014), adopting a political economy 
perspective in their analysis on Venezuela, argued that in order to have a full picture 
of the decline of democratic governance in Venezuela not only oil dependence and oil 
income decline should be considered as explanatory variables, but also the role of 
institutional variables to understand the extent of the decay in democratic governance 
and institutional quality in this country (ibid.: 289). Similarly, Buxton (2001) claims 
that it is the failure or the lack of political reform (particularly on the electoral front), 
not necessarily the dependence on a specific commodity, that explains the political 
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crisis experienced by Venezuela at the end of the ‘transitional period’ which, in turn, 
contributed to understand President Chávez’s electoral success at the end of 1990s. 
In sum, despite its centrality, coffee and oil production for export seems insufficient 
for explaining the process of democratic divergence experienced by these polities. It 
seems that commodity dependence, while accounting for some broadly similar 
socioeconomic explanations, does not seem to be a good predictor of the process of 
regime change experienced by Colombia and Venezuela over the ‘divergence period.’ 
Based on Mahoney’s (2001) critique which claim that ‘a limited focus on commodity 
differences has proved unable to explain twentieth-century regime outcomes’ (ibid,: 
18), it can be argued that the resource curse thesis is not universal or inevitable as it 
may affect differently certain regimes under certain conditions. Therefore, echoing 
scholars such as Buxton (2001), Buxton, et. al. (2008), Karl (1997), McCoy, et. al., 
(2004), Hausmman, et. al., (2014), I will rule out this theoretical framework by arguing 
that the direct causality between resource dependence and democratic decay cannot be 
properly assessed by the resource curse thesis because it overlooks the important effect 
that both the building of weak or strong institutions, and political reforms might play 
in explaining democratic performance. 
Political institutions and political culture 
Having ruled out both the modernisation and the resource curse theories as suitable 
theoretical approaches to explain divergence, I now turn to an assessment of whether 
the Institutional approach or the Political Culture approach can convincingly be 
regarded as theoretical frameworks with explanatory power to explain divergence. 
To do so, first, I will argue that an institutional change –triggered by the enactment of 
new constitutions during the 1990s in both countries– is the main explanation for the 
divergent democratic path in both these regimes. Second, I will also stress that changes 
in political institutions alone fails to fully explain this phenomenon. Therefore, this 
study will propose to incorporate the contribution that a change in political culture, at 
the elite level, makes in building an explanation for this phenomenon. That is, unlike 
the approach taken by a number of scholars Bogaards (1998), Lijphart (1999), 
Andeweg (2000), Avilés (2001), Norris (2008), Bruce (2009), among others, this study 
claims that institutions certainly matter, but only in combination with a simultaneous 
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change in the attitudes and beliefs of political elites that enabled the required changes 
on key political institutions in order to enable the transformation and change of 
direction in the democratic performance of both political regimes. 
In the next chapter, I will emphasise that my hypothesis is based on the causality that 
changes in beliefs and attitudes of political elites can affect the functioning of key 
political institutions that, in turn, facilitate the transformation of the regimen 
performance in both countries. 
To support this hypothesis, I argue that the best explanation for what caused the 
democratic divergence experienced by Venezuela and Colombia rests upon two 
important and contested theories: institutional and political culture approaches. These 
theories, unlike those of economic development and the resource curse, can be 
regarded as the best suitable explanatory approaches to elucidate the reasons behind 
why these two particular regimes moved in opposite directions during the ‘divergence 
period’. These approaches may also be considered suitable because the common factor 
that contributed to the process of regime change was the enactment –during the 1990s- 
of a new set of fundamental principles or rules embedded in the form of new 
constitutions. These new rules, in turn, also allowed changes in the electoral systems, 
which enabled democratic divergence in these two regimes. Additionally, I claim that 
such institutional arrangement could have not been possible without a change in the 
political culture from those with political power. That is, for the Latin American 
context in general, and for Colombia and Venezuela in particular, elite’s attitudes and 
behaviours exerted an important influence to change the functioning of their political 
institutions. This is the reason why I consider both institutions and elite political 
culture the independent variables of this study to explain democratic divergence. 
Although the conceptualisation of the dependent variable will be discussed later; it is 
important at this point to bring forward the explanation of democratic divergence. This 
concept will be closely related to the explanation of the process of regime change, 
which in turn will be deemed as a proxy variable of the former. In other words, regime 
change is explained here by the movement a polity can make in terms of advances or 
setbacks from the ideal conditions to achieve its democratic consolidation. 
 42 
 
That is, I will follow Schedler’s (1998a) understanding of democratic consolidation as 
a nonstop process of democratic continuity that a polity should follow in reaching its 
ideal type of democracy. However, and despite the agreement with Schedler that the 
process of democratic consolidation is a dynamic one, this project argues that for 
Colombia and Venezuela the definition and the ideal type of democracy is slightly 
different to the one offered by Schedler. That is, for Schedler (1998a), the ideal type 
of democracy is called ‘advance democracy.’ In his opinion, this type of democracy is 
reached when the previous type, called liberal democracy, has been deepened enough 
to the point that, as Doorenspleet expressed, ‘democracy is not only a political but also 
a specific social and economic system’ (Doorenspleet 2001, 12). 
Nonetheless, and despite this research follows Schedler’s understanding of democracy 
as a permanent process of democratic continuity with signs of progress or setbacks, 
this research also takes distance from his conceptualisation. That is, this project re-
constructs Schedler’s contribution by excluding form the analysis his concept of 
advance democracies. The reasoning behind this is that in the Latin American context 
some countries are, if anything, trying to consolidate a type of liberal democracy; 
while, other countries are going towards a process of democratic deconsolidation. 
Additionally, another reason to move away from the concept of advance democracies 
is that this research also agrees with Doorenspleet’s (2001) opinion that there are very 
few empirical cases reaching this type of democracy. I add that if those cases exist, 
then surely, they are not within the Latin American region. 
This is another reason, as discussed in the introduction, why this study will follow the 
procedural definition of liberal democracy suggested by Dahl (1971) in which a polity 
can be regarded democratic and, therefore, consolidated when its civil and political 
rights; and fair, competitive and inclusive elections are present in the day-to-day basis. 
Hence, a polity can be regarded rather consolidated insofar as it will manage to be 
closer to the definition of liberal democracy because at this point ‘its possibility of 
breakdown appears to be very low, or the other way around, its probability of survival 
appears to be very high’ (Schedler 1998b, 3). 
In short, and based upon the above discussion, now it is possible to claim that the 
whole model on which this research will be supported relies on two independent or 
explanatory variables such as those of elite political culture, and the performance of 
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two particular political institutions; namely: constitutional reforms and electoral 
systems. These variables, I argue, will have explanatory power to describe the changes 
in the process of democratic performance. Hence, I argue that implementing this novel 
theoretical model will allow us to study basic continuities and changes in the political 
culture of national political elites and its resulting implications on the performance of 
political institutions. That is, by reconsidering the unexplored linkage in the Latin 
American context between elite political culture, political institutions, and democratic 
divergence this research will contribute with an alternative explanation of the process 
of regimen change for Venezuela and Colombia. 
2.4. Research design and methods 
This section will outline the methodological approach this study will follow, and what 
kind of empirical data will be gathered and used for that purpose. To gain a better 
understanding of the drivers explaining democratic divergence between Colombia and 
Venezuela for the two periods under analysis, I rely on the ‘most similar systems 
design’ (MSSD) as the methodological approach (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). This 
research strategy is based on Mill’s method of difference in which the researcher 
‘brings together systems that are as similar as possible, thus allowing a large number 
of variables to be ignored (under the assumption than they are equal)’ (Sartori 1991, 
250 in Bejarano 2011, 254).  
In fact, the pair of cases selected in this project, are indeed very similar in many 
aspects.54 However, building on Mill’s method of difference, this project argues that 
both cases began to differ from each other when the political, economic, and social 
crises struck these polities at the end of the ‘transitional period.’ Such differences come 
from the supposed similar strategies these polities implemented to deal with these 
crises in order to avoid a state failure. That is, both countries conducted full 
constitutional reforms, both allowed a broader participation of political actors that 
historically had been excluded from the political arena, and both conducted an 
                                                 
54 According to Bejarano (2011), at least until early 1990s, these two countries were regarded as the 
most durable and stable democracies of the Latin American region, both moved away from military rule 
and made their transition to democracy in the same year -1958. Both used elite political settlements 
known as ‘pacted democracies’ in order to become democratic regimens, and last, they shared plentiful 
similarities in areas such as history, location (neighbouring nations), population, language, ethnicity, 
religion, culture, economy, among others. 
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institutional engineering to change the way the state apparatus worked. Additionally, 
and in order to implement the above-mentioned reforms, both countries also renewed 
their political actors by appointing (in the Venezuelan case) and electing (in the 
Colombian case) more plural Constituent Assemblies that had the responsibility to 
conduct comprehensive reforms to their regimes so as to avoid a deepening of the 
crises these polities were facing at the end of the ‘transitional period.’ 
These strategies are identified in this project as critical junctures because despite their 
similarity, they were implemented with a completely different rationale. In other 
words, my argument is based on identifying and selecting a set of critical junctures to 
compare and explain democratic divergence. These critical junctures are the renewal 
of the traditional political elites that used to rule these countries, the constitutional 
reforms conducted by these new set of political actors, and the effects that such reform 
had over the electoral system. They will be regarded as the independent variables that 
will explain the complete opposite outcome in the democratic performance of these 
countries over the ‘divergence period.’ 
This project will use different methodological approaches to operationalise the impact 
of how changes in the institutional setting (i.e., constitutional and electoral reforms) 
triggered simultaneously changes in the beliefs and values of a set of renewal political 
elites, which will explain divergence. Hence, a comprehensive archive research was 
conducted to build a database enabling to track back and forth the constitutional 
reforms and amendments over the ‘transitional and divergence periods’. This database 
will allow me to compare whether these constitutional changes had an effect to 
consolidate or deconsolidate the democratic performance of the countries under 
study.55 Additionally, this project will also make extensive use of traditional and well-
known databases from recognised organisations such as cross-national surveys (e.g., 
Freedom House, Polity IV) and primary sources such as: Worldwide Governance 
Indicators; World Value Survey; Georgetown database of the Americas; Electoral 
Observatory of LA database: The Political Terror Scale:  among others. Finally, I also 
built an original database to measure power concentration in the parliaments by using 
the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI plurality index). 
                                                 
55 Appendix 2 will explain in detail the methodology used to build this database.  
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In sum, the proposed methodological approach offered by this research rather than 
intend a separate case study to assess regime type, it will offer a reliable comparative 
analysis to assess democratic change by offering both a theoretical and empirical 
contribution. In turn, this methodology will allow me to provide answers regarding the 
forces that explain the divergent democratic paths that Colombia and Venezuela faced 
over the ‘divergence period.’ Moreover, this methodological approach has the 
intention to facilitate the introduction of a statistical model that can assess the extent 
to which the independent variables chosen in this project are robust enough to explain 
democratic divergence.56 Hence, both the theoretical framework –enclosed within the 
Circular Causality Model-, and the empirical model –offered in the second part- will 
provide new analytical information that will allow me to explain the phenomenon of 
democratic divergence experienced by Colombia and Venezuela, and will also 
contribute to a further understanding of contemporary studies on democratisation. 
2.5. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was threefold. First, I showed the existence of a process of 
democratic divergence between Colombia and Venezuela during the ‘divergence 
period.’ By identifying and analysing structural factors (e.g., democratic indexes such 
as Freedom House and Polity IV and economic and well-being indicators), and agency 
factors (e.g., Kaufmann´s governance indicators) it was possible to establish that the 
process of democratic divergence began when severe crises struck these polities in late 
1980s and early 1990s. These crises were regarded as the triggers of the process of 
democratic divergence because they forced authorities to implement mechanisms to 
prevent the failure of their nation-states. The evidence provided (see tables 2.1, 2.2, 
and 2,3) showed that the indexes of democratic performance and governance had a 
variation in opposite directions in both countries during the ‘divergence period’. This 
finding gave ground to claim that the process of democratic divergence really 
happened by showing that the Venezuelan democratic performance worsened, while 
Colombia was able to remain fairly stable within a bounded interval. This enabled the 
                                                 
56 The second part of this project will explain how all the variables mentioned above will be 
operationalised and measured, and will also introduce a multivariate regression model to test its 
robustness to assess divergence. 
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latter to maintain, in average, its previous democratic performance during the 
‘divergence period’. 
Having assessed the existence of democratic divergence, the second aim of this chapter 
was to determine the best possible theoretical approach to explain this phenomenon. 
By conducting a critical approximation of the most relevant theoretical frameworks 
focussing on explaining processes of democratisation, this chapter argued that the 
modernisation and the resource curse theories can be ruled out from the analysis. 
Neither of these frameworks have explanatory power to elucidate a full explanation 
for both cases under study.  
Given that neither modernisation theory, nor the resource curse theory are feasible 
frameworks to explain divergence, the third section aimed to search and propose an 
alternative theoretical framework that could help to elucidate an answer to the process 
of democratic divergence experienced by Colombia and Venezuela over the 
‘divergence period’. Hence, I introduced a preliminary idea –that will be explored in 
greater depth in the next chapter- about the positive explanatory implications of 
merging both the political culture approach and the institutional theory as an 
alternative framework that can offer a full explanation of the different democratic 
trajectories taken by the countries under study. This novel approach, it has been 
argued, allows for the identification of a set of two independent or explanatory 
variables such as those of elite political culture, and the performance of two particular 
political institutions; namely: constitutional reforms and electoral systems. By 
analysing the relation between these variables, it is possible to describe and analyse 
the divergent democratic paths that both Colombian and Venezuelan democracies 
faced during the ‘divergence period.’ 
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One of the things that everyone knows, but no one can quite think  
how to demonstrate is that a country’s politics reflect the design of its culture’ 
Clifford Geertz. 
 
Chapter 3 
Democratic divergence in comparative perspective: developing a 
new theory with new explanations 
3.1. Introduction 
The process of democratic divergence between Colombia and Venezuela is not an 
isolated outcome of unforeseen circumstances that occurred exclusively to these 
countries. It responds to an unusual democratic detour that affected the democratic 
performance of many countries in the Latin American region since the last decade of 
the twentieth century (e.g., Bolivia under Evo Morales, Ecuador under Rafael Correa, 
Nicaragua under Daniel Ortega, and to a lesser extent Argentina under Cristina 
Fernandez de Kirchner). Such detours brought a blurry picture to the process of 
democratic performance followed by the countries in the region as some of them 
continued to seek the route to achieve their democratic consolidation, while others 
took opposite routes that moved them away from that purpose. 
Such democratic detours have created scholarly interest and intellectual tensions 
among contemporary political scientists to figure out the causes behind the 
heterogeneity that Latin American countries have presented in their democratic 
performance from the late 1980s and early 1990s.57 These scholars, have provided 
valuable academic contributions (i.e., modernisation and resource curse theories) to 
explain the different phenomena that many countries in the region have experienced 
in their processes of democratisation. However, this research will argue that in order 
to explain the particular process of democratic divergence both in Colombia and 
Venezuela over the ‘divergence period’ the best explanatory theories are the 
institutional and political culture approaches. Unlike the traditional belief that regard 
                                                 
57 Indeed, many of the explanations on the type of regimen change have mainly based their analyses on 
structural approaches such us those discussed briefly in the previous chapter; namely: modernisation 
theory, and the resource curse theory (Bollen 1980; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Coppedge 1997; Coulter 
1975; Dahl 1971: 62-80; Diamond 1992; Lipset 1960; Lipset et. al. 1993; Przeworski et. al. 1996; 
Przeworski; Limongi 1997; and Karl 1997). 
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these theories as contested ones, this research will merge them and will consider them 
as the explicative variables because by studying them together it is possible to offer an 
alternative approach that will allow us to explain democratic divergence. That is, by 
merging these two theories this project will introduce a Circular Causality Model with 
explanatory power to elucidate the causes and effects that changes in the value system 
of political elites might exert on the functioning of key political institutions that, in 
turn, will allow us to explain the divergent democratic paths during the last 20 years.58 
Hence, the aim of this chapter is to explain the rationale of this alternative theoretical 
to explain the grounds upon which the recent divergent democratic processes were 
triggered.  
To that end, this chapter will be organised in four sections, being this introduction the 
first of them. Section 3.2 will consist of three parts. The first two parts will separately 
asses the linear causal relationship offered by both the Institutional and Political 
culture approaches in order to critically argue that individually these theoretical 
frameworks are best suited to explain processes of democratic transition, maintenance, 
quality, and consolidation rather than those of democratic divergence. More 
specifically, part one of this section begins by laying down the theoretical framework 
upon which the institutional analysis will be conducted. I will stress that among the 
two-main institutional schools the attention will be focused on the New 
Institutionalism –more than on the old institutionalism-, because the former provides 
a broader range of theoretical and methodological tools to explain processes of regime 
change. That is, while the former school understand institutions as structures and 
organisations that can be shaped by different actors in a society and, more importantly, 
can be used to explain different political phenomena as independent variables; whereas 
the latter school conceived them just as fixed or monolithic structures that cannot be 
shaped in the short or medium term (Peters, 1998).  
The second part of section 3.2, will analyse the contribution that scholars such as 
Ronald Inglehart have made in the field of political culture. He argues that ‘society’s 
mass values have the stronger causal effect in strengthening democracy because values 
such as trust, tolerance, and feelings of efficacy represent ‘Civic Virtues’ that enable 
                                                 
58 The scope and impact of the Circular Causality Model will be explained in detail in section 3.3 of this 
chapter. 
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democratic regimes to function effectively’ (Inglehart 2005, 157). By following 
Inglehart’s line of argumentation, this section concludes by showing that the political 
culture model assumes a unidirectional causation, which implies that civic culture has 
an effect and causes impacts on the processes of regime change. 
The third part will focus on a central issue within the school of political culture, that 
is, I will stress the importance of differentiating between mass and elite values when 
it comes to evaluating the process of democratic change for the countries under study. 
It will argue about the need to make this distinction, as the scale of internalisation of 
political values and beliefs is uneven not only between elites and masses but also 
among countries with different democratic performances. In this regard, Inglehart 
(1990) argued that political attitudes in deconsolidated democracies are still dominated 
by ‘materialist values;’ whereas ‘post-materialist’ values are the commonality among 
citizens in mature democracies.59 Therefore, because the polities under study are not 
yet consolidated democratic regimes60 -which, in turn, means that they have also failed 
to reach a full transition from materialist to post-materialist values- then elites –rather 
than masses- might enjoy a disproportional share of political power to the extent that 
they are able, through elite settlements and other political mechanisms, to lead the 
transformation and functioning of political institutions which will explain in full the 
different democratic trajectories experienced by Colombia and Venezuela during the 
‘divergence period.’ 
Section 3.3, will introduce the Circular Causality Model as the theoretical follow by 
this research to explain democratic divergence. As mentioned above, this model is 
based on the premise that individually both the institutional and the political culture 
approach can be regarded as good frameworks to explain processes of democratic 
consolidation, however, they fail to provide a compelling explanation when they try 
to fully explain processes of democratic divergence.61 Thus, the central assumption 
                                                 
59 That is, citizens in developed societies usually have more access to particular sorts of knowledge that 
will provide them with a better understanding and more confidence in making decisions that will affect 
the functioning of their democratic regimes than those citizens from developing societies.  
60 On the contrary, as was shown in chapter 2 and in several instances during this chapter the central 
argument is that both polities have taken divergent democratic paths. 
61 In other words, because the linear models offered by the institutional theory does not consider cultural 
factors, and the political culture approach relies more on explaining the formation of mass values rather 
than the elite ones, the Circular Causality Model proposed in this section aims to merge both these 
contender theories so that they can be treated as the explicative variables to explain the process of 
democratic divergence experienced by Colombia and Venezuela. 
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behind the Circular Causality Model is that, in order to offer a comprehensive 
explanation, it is necessary to analyse the cyclical impact that changes in the formation 
of elite´s political culture –rather than those of the masses- exert on the functioning of 
key political institutions. 
The final section, will focus on closing the main arguments included in this chapter. It 
will hypothesize positive assessments that can be achieved from a theoretical and 
empirical perspective when merging the approaches. The chapter will finish by 
encouraging further systematic reflection and analysis about the importance of 
considering the concept of elite political culture in the evaluation of the processes of 
democratic divergence in Latin American countries in general, and, particularly, for 
the case studies proposed in this research. 
3.2 Revisiting institutional and political culture approaches, and 
its link with elite and mass political values 
In the comparative study of politics, few questions have been as enduring as ‘What 
causes democracy?’ Democracy has been examined repeatedly by each one of the 
major theoretical approaches in comparative politics such as those of structuralism, 
rationalism, and culturalism. However, many political scientists, see for instance: 
Diamond, et. al. (1999b), Camp (2001a), Lagos (2001, 2008), and Smith (2005), seem 
to consider the latter approach as the black sheep of the family. To the extent that most 
Latin American analysts have paid rather little attention studying how this approach 
might help explain the process of regime performance in the region. 
Scholars usually argue that, from a theoretical perspective, the cultural thesis is 
unattainable. For instance, structuralism regards the very concept of political culture 
as epiphenomenal and superfluous. This is so because they find its sources more 
varied, its nature more plastic and malleable, and its effects less decisive than 
alternative approaches (Diamond, et. al., 1999b). Following the same line of criticism 
other scholars claim that the cultural approach is misleading because it is vague about 
the object of study and the units of analysis. This vagueness comes from the blurry 
line of analysis between culture and other categories such as behaviour and institutions 
conducted by scholars such as: Camp (2001a), Lagos (2001, 2008), Smith (2005), and 
for failing to explain political change (Lehoucq 2004). However, and unlike those 
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analysts, this study is more closely aligned with Harrison (2000), Putnam (1971), and 
Muller, et.al. (1994), as they believe that ‘Culture Matters’ not only to assess the 
process of democratic consolidation, but also when the study of processes of 
democratic divergence is the aspect to be addressed. 
In order to highlight that, individually, both the institutional and the cultural 
approaches fall short to explain the current democratic divergence between Colombia 
and Venezuela, the next two parts of this section aim to make a theoretical account of 
each of them as a way to emphasise that their linear models of causality are more 
suitable to explain processes of democratic transition, maintenance, quality, and 
consolidation rather than those of democratic divergence. The third and last part of 
this section will stress that the missing variable to connect the above-mentioned 
frameworks is the variable of elite political culture. Therefore, it will be suggested that 
the likelihood of explaining the process of democratic divergence will depend upon 
elite settlements led by politicians and shaped by changes in their attitudinal behaviour, 
rather than on democratic preferences of the masses, as is the general view of many 
analysts of political culture in developed countries.62 
Institutional approach 
The analytical framework offered by the New Institutionalism63 portrays an evident 
division within the study of political sciences. On one hand, there is a set of political 
scientists focusing their attention on developing a ‘hard’ type of institutional analyses 
whose main concern focuses on the need to establish universal laws as to how political 
institutions should work in practice.64 On the other hand, there exists another set of 
political analysts who put forward a ‘soft’ type of institutional explanation. Their main 
                                                 
62 Among the political scientists that focused its attention on the preference of the masses, rather than 
on the elites’ preferences to explain the democratic performance in developed societies it is possible to 
name Almond and Verba (1963), Putnam (1971), Muller, et. al. (1994), and to some extent Lijphart 
(1999). It was only until Inglehart (2000, 2005) introduced the concept of subculture that the role of 
political elites in developing societies became important to explain processes of democratisation. 
63 The New Institutionalism –unlike the Old Institutionalism- is considered an alternative, 
complementary and explanatory theory in this research project as it stresses that the most significant 
element of political institutions is the set of values upon which both the decisions and their member´s 
behaviour are shaped, and not only as the formal and structural aspects of how politics works in practice 
–as old institutionalism used to claim. Whilst old institutionalism was meant just as a purveyor of 
descriptive analyses, new institutionalism aims to analyse both political phenomena –including 
processes of regimen change- and the actual behaviour of institutions using institutions as independent 
variables in order to explain them (Peters, 1998). 
64 Both Rational choice and behavioural theories are instances of these types of formal analysis. 
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interest is to understand political institutions not as fixed bodies but as structures that 
evolve over time and on which historical phenomena and cultural changes play an 
important role (Shapiro and Wendt, 1992; Green and Shapiro, 1994). Yet, despite their 
differences both analyses agree that in understanding the variations in the democratic 
performance of political regimes, the most important explicative elements are those 
related with institutional factors, and not exclusively with economic or social ones 
(North, 1990). 
In a sense, it can be argued that New Institutionalism –with its different interpretations 
and applications- has been focused on giving a clarifying explanation about what 
would be the most adequate institutional engineering that could produce the best type 
of both society and individuals.65 In the search to offer an alternative and 
complementary explanation of such phenomena, New Institutionalism has dealt with 
basic disagreements within its very own discipline that fostered the emergence of 
different traditions that usually differ from many theoretical and methodological 
aspects.66 However, and despite its internal discrepancy, the end of this theoretical 
framework and the major commonality among them is to propose a direct and 
unidirectional linear causality between the roles exerted by a particular set of political 
institutions over the democratic performance of different political regimes 
Figure 3.1 summarises the causality model that the Institutional explanation holds in 
order to support and explain the performance and, therefore, the consolidation process 
of different political regimes. 
 
                                                 
65 For instance, Rawls (1985) clearly supports the importance of political institutions by endorsing the 
idea that political debate should be focused not on determining whether political institutions are 
important or not, but on defining the number and type of institutions that every single polity needs 
according to its own and unique traditions. That is, contemporary scholars in political science stress that 
institutions play a powerful part in the study of political phenomena –including the analysis of 
democratic performance- because they are the mirror of social norms that govern a particular society 
(Lijphart, 1977; Lipset et.al., 1967; Putman 1993). 
66 ‘Hard’ traditions such as those of behaviourism, rational choice, game theory and Marxism were in 
force after the post-war period till mid-1980s but they lacked explanatory power to validate what these 
theories used to predict with their observed results in practice. Therefore, the renewed political interest 
on the institutional approach put ‘upside down’ such theories when scholars realised that formal political 
institutions might help to structure and better understand different political processes. Since then, 
political institutions are considered not as intermediate variables, but rather as variables with its own 
explanatory power (Rothstein, 1990). 
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Figure 3.1 
Causality model proposed by the institutional approach to assess the process of 
democratic consolidation 
 
Drawing from the causality shown in figure 3.1, it can be argued that the common 
factor shared by the institutional approach, namely; old and new institutionalism, is 
that they are intended to explain democratic performance by the direct influence that 
formal political institutions exert in providing strong conditions to achieve democratic 
consolidation. This approach, considers political institutions as the explicative and 
more important variables to offer a comprehensive understanding on topics related 
with democratisation. 
Political culture approach 
Unlike institutional theory, this approach states that political culture plays a direct and 
important role in explaining the performance, maintenance, or failure of democracy. 
It argues that mass values exert an important part in strengthening democracy. 
Inglehart (1990), as one of the most prominent scholars of this line of thought, showed 
that independent variables such as: life satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and rejection 
of revolutionary change are highly correlated not only with economic development but 
also with stable democracies. In sum, this theory focuses on showing how society’s 
mass values are the most important asset to strengthen democracy as these values ‘play 
a crucial role in the emergence and flourishing of democratic institutions’ (Inglehart 
2005). 
Several scholars have endeavoured to reassert the importance of systematic analysis 
of democratisation and in doing so they have highlighted the central place of political 
culture in the comparative study of democracy. For instance, the theory of civic culture 
proposed by Almond and Verba (1963), and further elaborated by Inglehart (1988, 
1990), postulates that the viability to consolidate a democratic regime would be 
affected powerfully by attitudes such as beliefs in one’s ability to influence political 
decisions, feelings of positive affect for the political system, and the belief that other 
citizens are basically trustworthy. That is, ‘trust, tolerance, and feelings of efficacy 
Political 
Institutions 
Democratic 
Consolidation 
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represent ‘civic virtues’ that enable democratic regimes to function effectively’ 
(Inglehart 2005, 157). 67 In this line, political culture claims that countries with high 
levels of these civic culture attitudes are more likely to adopt and sustain democracy 
over time than countries with lower levels, regardless of socioeconomic factors such 
as the level of economic development.68 
Figure 3.2 summarises the causality model that this approach holds in explaining the 
performance of different political regimes. It shows that political culture approach has 
two basic claims. First, it hypothesizes that its causal relation is grounded on the 
assumption of unidirectional causation by which ‘[…] civic culture has an effect on 
democracy, and that [the performance of] democracy does not have an effect on civic 
culture’ (Muller, et. al. 1994, 635). And second, that political institutions and mass 
values must be congruent to produce stable, effective and consolidated regimes 
(Inglehart 2005, 157). 
Figure 4.2. 
Causality model proposed by the political culture approach to assess democratic 
consolidation 
 
Nonetheless, political culture theory has also been subject of criticism mainly from 
those who defend the opposite causation between democracy and political attitudes. 
That is, for those who claim that civic culture attitudes are an effect rather than a cause 
                                                 
67 In order to explain his findings, Inglehart (1990) offers a model that it is made up of three independent 
variables; namely, (i) the gross national product in 1950, as a proxy of the country’s level of economic 
development; (ii) the percentage of the labour force employed in the tertiary sector –as an indicator of 
the size of the middle class; and (iii) a composite measure of civic culture over 1981-86 that reflects an 
average for the general public of its level of interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, and lack of support for 
revolutionary change. His dependent variable consists of the country’s years of continuous democracy 
from 1900 to 1986. The model’s estimates showed that economic development had no significant direct 
effect on the dependent variable, whereas labour force in services, and civic culture variables had a 
positive effect of .36 and .74, respectively. These results led him to infer ‘that over half of the variance 
in the persistence of democratic performance can be attributed to the effects of political culture alone’ 
(ibid.: 46). He concluded more generally by saying that the evidence ‘tends to confirm the basic thesis 
of The Civic Culture’ (ibid.: 48). 
68 Following this line of thought, Eckstein (1996) and Eckstein, et al. (1996) argue also that a democratic 
system will become stable only if people have internalised democratic norms and practice them in their 
daily relationships (Ahmadi, et. al., 2011). During the same period, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) also 
suggests that ‘mass values play a crucial role in the emergence and flourishing of democratic 
institutions’ (ibid.: 2); they conclude by suggesting that political culture fundamentally drives economic 
performance and democratic stability (Jackman, et al. 1996) 
  Democratic 
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of democracy. According to this line of reasoning, democracy typically is established 
for reasons other than by attitudinal changes in the civic culture of the people. That is, 
the successful persistence of democracy over time is likely to cause increases in levels 
of civic culture because high levels of subjective political competence, pride in the 
political system, and interpersonal trust are a rational, learned response to the 
experience of living in a country that has a stable democratic regime (Barry 1978, 
Schmitter, et. al., 1991). 
Muller and Seligson (1994) also criticised Inglehart’s conceptualisation of civic 
culture arguing that among the three variables that make up his measure of civic 
culture, interpersonal trust is ‘unrelated to change in a country’s level of democracy’ 
(ibid.: 646). That is, neither high nor low levels of interpersonal trust appear to be a 
threat or a guaranty in the promotion of democracy. By saying that, they challenged 
one of the main assumptions of the political culture school: to consider interpersonal 
trust as an important attitudinal prerequisite for the establishment of a stable 
democracy.69 Thus, Muller and Seligson´s analysis on the causal linkages between 
levels of civic culture attitudes and change in the level of democracy showed that 
Inglehart’s assertion ‘....is not supportive of the thesis that civic culture attitudes are 
the principal or even the major cause of democracy’ (ibis.: 647).70 
Not only did Muller and Seligson (1994) criticise Inglehart´s conceptualisation, they 
also criticised the set of variables chosen by him to construct the index of civic culture 
attitudes. They argued that the three independent variables suggested by Inglehart have 
no significant effect to explain democratic change (ibid.: 647). Therefore, they 
proposed a new direction for future research by shifting the focus from attitudes of the 
                                                 
69 This assumption has been defended by prominent scholars such as Almond and Verba 1963; Dahl 
1971; and finally, Inglehart 1988, 1990. 
70 Additionally, Jackman and Miller (1996) argue that political culture approach needs to be recast in 
institutional terms, acknowledging a more direct role of political considerations in explaining 
democratic consolidation (ibid.: 633). This criticism is based on Inglehart (1990) and Putman’s (1993) 
assumption which claims that political culture approach has identified distinctive sets of subjective 
attitudes that are highly resistant to change and widely held across individuals over time. These, in turn, 
are a fundamental generator of economic and political performance. Consequently, Jackman and Miller 
(1996) provide evidence that Inglehart’s measure of political culture is significantly influenced by short-
term factors (i.e. unemployment and economic growth), which allows them to question the durable 
cultural syndrome assumption. They claim that there is no evidence to suggest that cultural factors have 
any systematic effects on political and economic outcomes (ibid.: 653) and instead, they propose to 
redefine the puzzle of political culture in more institutional terms. They re-frame the political cultural 
approach so that it takes into account crucial objective conditions embodied in institutions rather than 
subjective cultural attitudes in order to improve the explanation of processes of democratic performance. 
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masses to the attitudes of the elites. Accordingly, they claimed that since elites have 
greater opportunity and ability than masses to influence the kind of regime a country 
might have, more attention needs to be paid to the way in which their value system is 
constructed in new political culture models. In fact, Dahl (1971) attributes great 
importance to the attitudes of political leaders as a cause of the consolidation and 
stability of democracy in developing counties. Following this argument, Higley and 
Burton (1989) also provide a strong argument claiming that the single critical 
determinant to evaluate the stability, and therefore, the performance of democratic 
regimens is by studying how the process of elite settlements was reached, and how 
they support and understand democratic institutions and political values (ibid.: 23). 
In short, and by bringing together the main arguments stressed above, it can be argued 
that both the institutional and political culture approaches have different 
interpretations on how to explain a regime´s democratic performance. On the one 
hand, institutionalists argue that through formal and efficient political institutions it is 
possible to disperse power so that there are multiple veto players and multiple checks 
and balances. These institutions will limit the power of central governments by 
encouraging conditions conducted to consolidate democratic regimes in divided 
societies (Lijphart 1999, Mainwaring 2001). Hence, setting up formal and efficient 
institutions as independent variables will lead to the emergence of stable democracies. 
On the other hand, political culture claims that the process of democratic consolidation 
requires more than just well-designed formal institutions or enact a constitution. 
Instead, it argues that there is a causal linkage between self-expression values and 
democracy, which indicate that ‘the causal arrow flows mainly from culture to 
democracy rather than the other way around’ (Inglehart 2005, p. 5). 
Although these schools have provided explanations in a quite accurate fashion to 
understand the different processes of democratisation in advanced and industrialised 
societies, one cannot say the same when studying and analysing developing countries. 
As was shown before, considerations of cultural factors were dropped from the 
institutional approach under the argument that this variable does not exert an important 
influence on stable Western democracies (Spinner 2007, 23). As a result, 
Institutionalism seem to have disregarded how people´s structure their political values 
and therefore its role in explaining the processes of democratic performance in non-
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Western democratic systems. In turn, advocates of the political culture approach 
mainly focus their attention on the effects that mass political values may exert on 
processes of democratisation in developed countries. However, they left aside the 
impact that elite political values might have on such processes in developing countries. 
Considering the main assumptions of the above-mentioned theoretical approaches, and 
particularly its criticism, the next section will highlight the theoretical and empirical 
implications of merging these approaches. Thus, special attention will be given to 
understand the way elites’ attitudes are formed when it comes to propose new political 
culture models that are interested in studying processes of democratic performance in 
the Latin American region, and particularly the process of democratic divergence 
experienced by the countries under analysis. 
Elite vs. mass political culture 
Differentiating between elite and mass political culture will play a transcendental role 
in supporting the central research question of this project for two reasons. First, it will 
allow me to highlight why people´s political attitudes in developing countries are still 
dominated by materialist values. And second, due to in non-Western countries human 
emphasis is mainly focus upon the struggle for economic and security survival, then 
the likelihood to explain the process of democratic divergence will depend upon the 
way elite settlements were setting up among those with political power rather than on 
the political perceptions held by the masses. Hence, this section will agree with 
Aberbach, et. al., (2006) when they argue that ‘although elites have an important role 
in advanced democracies, their political influence may be even greater where social 
inequalities exist’ which is the case for the pair of countries selected in this project 
(ibid.: 1197). 
As a starting-point, this section argues that the concept of political culture does not 
imply that all societies share the same set of political attitudes. That is, values and 
beliefs are unevenly distributed through the population (Diamond 1999, 163). As a 
matter of fact, evidence from several cross-national surveys (i.e. World Values 
Surveys, Freedom House, and Latinobarometro) indicate that the set of values a 
country may have will depend, among other things, on their level of socio-economic 
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development. Consequently, the values and beliefs found in developed societies 
should differ strikingly from those found in developing societies. 
Inglehart (1988, 1990) makes this differentiation even more evident by arguing that 
people within a country or between countries have different scales of cultural values. 
On the one hand, he stresses that poor societies are vested with ‘materialist values’ 
because people’s priorities reflect their socioeconomic conditions, placing the highest 
subjective value on the most pressing needs. Therefore, since material sustenance and 
physical security are the first requirements for survival, under conditions of scarcity, 
people in developing countries give top priority to safety goals, subordinating, in turn, 
their human freedom to social conformity and state authority. In contrast, rich societies 
are vested with ‘postmaterialist values’71 because their citizens –once they have 
secured their survival needs- have the capacity to focus or devote more attention on 
other important issues such as sense of community, quality of life, and politics.72 Thus, 
under conditions of prosperity, postmaterialists place markedly less emphasis on 
economic growth and much more emphasis on issues such as environmental 
protection, quality of life, and political freedom (Inglehart 1988, 1224). In brief, 
people´s values in developing countries prioritise ‘patriarchy over equality, conformity 
over tolerance, authority over autonomy, and security over self-expression values’ 
(Welzel and Inglehart 2009, 131).  
From the above analysis, it can be stated that Latin American societies have not 
achieved a full transition from materialist to post-materialist values, and consequently 
the value system held by the masses in these under-developed societies are still 
associated with the pursue of economic and physical security as overriding priorities. 
Therefore, masses in Latin American countries leave aside values –usually held in 
developed societies- that elevate self-expression, belonging, and political activism and 
participation. Consequently, because Colombia and Venezuela match the socio-
economic characterisation of ‘developing countries,’ it can be assumed that their 
                                                 
71 It is worth noting that ‘postmaterialist values’ are closely related to the concepts of ‘emancipative 
values’ and ‘self-expression values’ as described by Inglehart and Welzel (2005). They demonstrated 
that their measure of self-expression values has an inherently emancipative impetus and that the use of 
the terms postmaterialist, self-expression, and emancipative values are interchangeably. 
72 That is, citizens of relatively poor societies are more likely to emphasize materialist values than 
postmaterialist ones, their main concern is toward authority and strong leadership and, at the same time, 
they are more likely to ‘[…] accept limitations on democratic freedoms for the sake of national order 
and other instrumental goals’ (Welzel and Inglehart 2009, 131). 
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political culture is still dominated by materialist values. Accordingly, the elites rather 
than the masses are the ones called to explain the democratic divergence experienced 
in their processes of democratic performance during the ‘divergence period.’ That is, 
this research argues that the likelihood to explain the process of regime change for the 
countries under study will depend upon how the preferences of political elites and the 
formation of their attitudinal behaviour shaped, affected, and influenced the 
functioning of key political institutions that brought about significant consequences in 
their process of democratic divergence. By following this causal effect, this research 
has distanced itself from the traditional view of political culture in developed countries 
that considers democratic preferences of the masses as the critical factor in explaining 
the process of democratic consolidation. 
If the role of elites is important to explain the process of democratic divergence 
displayed by Colombia and Venezuela in recent years, what is the definition of elites 
this research will follow? What will be our understanding of the concept of ‘elite 
political culture’? And, how these two concepts related with ‘elite settlements’? Elites 
will be defined as those with political power. That is, it involves only the incumbents 
of the political regime including those participating in government who form the 
opposition. Following Collier’s (1999) conceptualisation, elites should be understood 
as those playing ‘a strategic [role] of the ‘ins’ or those already included in the regime, 
but not to the role of the ‘outs’ or groups excluded by the rules of the regime (i.e.: 
business, trade unions, military, media, religious, and intellectual), without political 
rights or accepted institutional avenues of participation’ (ibid.: 18). As for the concept 
of ‘elite political culture,’ I will follow Putnam´s (1971) definition which defines the 
concept as ‘the set of politically relevant beliefs, values and habits of the leaders of a 
political system’ (ibid.: 651). Therefore, these concepts will be closely related by the 
fact that the countries under study reached its transition to democracy throughout 
political agreements known as ‘pacted democracies’.73 Hence, elite settlements can be 
                                                 
73 As discussed in chapter 2, Colombia and Venezuela have been considered (see: Burton and Higley 
1987; Buxton 2001, 1989; Karl and Schmitter 1991; Peeler, 1992) good cases of what can be considered 
‘pacted democracies’. This is because its transition to democracy involved explicit pacts among 
competing elites which, in turn, ‘excluded marginal sectors, most of the middle class, and the junior 
military officers from decision making’ (McCoy 2004, 274). In fact, Colombia had the clearest instance 
of elite settlement as its democratic transition, in 1958, was the outcome of a bargaining process –called 
The National Front (El Frente Nacional)- between the two most traditional parties –Liberal Party (PL) 
and Conservative Party (PC). The purpose of this pact was the alternation of power and bipartisan parity 
in executive, legislative and judicial posts (Hartlyn and Dugas 1999). The National Front formally lasted 
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understood as the processes ‘in which previously disunities and warring elites 
suddenly and deliberately reorganised their relations by negotiating compromises on 
their most basic disagreements, thereby achieving consensual unity and laying the 
basis for a stable democratic regime’ (Higley, et al., 1992, xi). 
Overall, from the previous analysis, it is possible to infer that both Colombia and 
Venezuela are developing countries with a political culture characterised by having 
materialist values. Attaching this cultural characterisation to both these countries is 
important because this project advocates the idea that elite´s attitudes should receive 
special attention in new political culture models interested in understanding processes 
of democratic divergence. Moreover, changing the focus from masses to elites has also 
operational advantages for two main reasons. First, because this project regards elite 
political culture as the missing variable that will glue both the institutional and the 
political culture approaches in order to explain the process of democratic divergence. 
And second, the inclusion of the elite political culture as an explicative variable will 
allow us to introduce a Circular Causality Model with explanatory power to elucidate 
an alternative way to explain how the process of democratic divergence happened in 
the polities under scrutiny. This is the purpose of the next section. 
3.3 Merging the two approaches: introducing the Circular 
Causality Model to assess democratic divergence 
The main goal of this section is to provide an alternative model that can help us explain 
the process of democratic divergence that Colombia and Venezuela have experienced 
since mid-1990s till 2010. With that goal in mind, this section aims to propose a 
Circular Causality Model in which both the institutional and political culture 
                                                 
from 1958 to 1974; however, the subsequent governments kept the traditional bipartisan coalitions until 
2002 (Posada-Carbó 2006). 
Venezuela also made its transition to democracy through an elite settlement, but not as complex in its 
formation as the one in Colombia. Venezuela also had two dominant parties: Democratic Action Party 
(AD), and Committee for Independent Political Electoral Organization (COPEI). For almost half a 
century –from 1958 until 1999- these parties, through alliances and coalitions, won almost every 
election in Venezuela (Naím 2001; Buxton 2001; Lopez Maya 2002, 2004). According to Levine and 
Crisp (1999) until 1993 the two dominant parties combined (COPEI and AD) took over 80 percent of 
the vote in presidential and legislative elections. In fact, the consolidation of such alliance was sealed 
through the signature of the Punto Fijo Pact (El Pacto de Punto Fijo) in 1958. This pact guaranteed 
alternation of power between the two parties and equal participation of all party members in the 
executive cabinet of the winning party. However, this consensual picture radically did change when 
Hugo Chávez got to the presidency in 1999. 
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approaches are taken together as explanatory variables to illustrate the causes and 
effects these variables might exert upon the process of democratic divergence for the 
countries under study. 
To do so, this research builds on answering the following question: to what extent 
changes in political elites’ beliefs, values, and attitudes have effects on the structure, 
functionality, and performance of key political institutions which, in turn, may affect 
the process of democratic performance of the countries under study? In addressing this 
question, this section will rely on the findings made in the previous sections showing 
that in developing counties the concept of elite political culture does matter because it 
is able to shape political institutions. These reshaped new political institutions, in turn, 
will indeed have effects upon both the direction that the process of democratic 
divergence will take. In other words, and following Harrison’s (2000) assertion, this 
section aims to support the idea that ‘Culture is the mother, and institutions are the 
children [of political change]’ (ibid.: xxviii). 
It is within this context that this project emphasises the idea that culture is path 
dependent. That is, ‘[…] distinctive cultural values depend on different value systems 
developed in different geographical locations’ (Inglehart 2000, 80). Therefore, if 
culture matters to explain the current divergent democratic process of the cases 
selected for this study, it is argued that for developing countries culture matters even 
more because in these geographical areas political elites have a disproportionate 
influence over political outputs. If such influence is used to shape important 
democratic institutions then, both elite political culture and political institutions will 
provide enough evidence to explain the process of democratic divergence of these 
polities. 
To be sure, figure 3.3 introduces and explains the Circular Causality Model this 
project will assess as the theoretical framework this project will rely on. It shows that 
democratic divergence is the dependent variable which is a function of two 
independent variables; namely, elite political culture, and the performance of two 
political institutions: Constitutional reforms and electoral systems. Unlike the one-way 
linear models represented by figures 3.1 and 3.2; figure 3.3 shows a model where 
causality is a circular one because it reinforces itself again and again over time. That 
is, this model hypothesises that in explaining how Colombia and Venezuela followed 
 62 
 
different democratic paths during the ‘divergence period’ first it is important to look 
at how elites´ formation of values has changed their attitudes, beliefs and views of the 
political world. Such changes, the model suggest, will have implications on the way 
some key political institutions function because elites have the power to modify them 
and make them function in accordance with their political preferences. Finally, the 
impact of both independent variables will have an effect over the process of 
democratisation, which brought these polities to find themselves in opposite extremes 
of the democratic road of consolidation in just a matter of 15 years. 
Based on the above considerations, this Circular Causality Model shows an important 
contribution from a theoretical perspective. It validates the linkage between the 
independent variables: elite political culture, the enactment of new constitutions and 
electoral systems as a methodological tool to explain the process of democratic 
divergence for the countries under review. This relationship has been barely studied in 
Latin American contexts and can be regarded as a new approach to explain the opposite 
democratic path taken by these polities. Hence, this model can be considered a novel 
theoretical framework because it merges two existing, but competing, bodies of theory 
in a way to explain a new and rather rare political phenomenon; namely: democratic 
divergence. 
Figure 5.3. 
Circular Causality Model proposed by this study. 
 
 
 
 
In this sense, figure 3.3 also depicts the central role that the variable elite political 
culture plays in the formulation of this Circular Causality Model. Unlike most of the 
literature on political culture which focuses mainly on the increasingly and decisive 
role that masses have in shaping the character and viability of democracy in developed 
societies, this model critically highlights the surprisingly little understanding about the 
power and influence that political elites have in the Latin American context. This model 
conveys the idea that elite attitudes are an important element in influencing democratic 
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performance in developing countries. This is the reason why in the proposed model 
(figure 3.3) the concept of elite political culture, rather than the one of mass political 
culture (as in figure 3.2), is regarded as the missing variable that should be considered 
in order to link together the notions of political culture and institutions to explain the 
process of democratic divergence. 
At this point it is worth asking, how can this model operationalise the concept of 
democratic divergence so that it can explain the change in the democratic direction 
taken by the polities under review during the ‘divergence period’? This study proposes 
that the concept of democratic divergence –the dependent variable- can be used as a 
proxy variable of democratic consolidation. Therefore, democratic consolidation 
should not be understood here as a definition of democracy per se. Rather, it should be 
read as a dynamic process of ‘democratic continuity’ whereby a polity moves left or 
right over a continuum line of democratisation in order to reach different levels of 
democratic performance (Schedler 1998a). That is, the degree of democratic 
divergence experienced by the countries under analysis can be understood as the extent 
to which these countries have moved either right or left on the one-dimensional line of 
democratic performance proposed by Schedler (1998a). Therefore, the Circular 
Causality Model aims to explain the dynamic process a polity might follow to achieve 
either its deconsolidation or its democratic consolidation.74 
3.4 Discussion and conclusion 
The central claim of this chapter is that ‘culture matters.’ However, the chapter stressed 
that it matters even more when elite’s attitudes are considered in order to explain the 
continuous and uneven trend of democratic performance that characterised the Latin 
American context. It also claimed that this heterogeneous democratic performance can 
best be understood by studying basic continuities and changes in the political culture 
                                                 
74 Chapter 4 will explain in depth Schedler´s model. For now, it is worth mentioning that Schedler 
(1998a) located authoritarian regimes at the extreme left, and advanced democracies at the extreme right 
of his one-dimensional continuum line of ‘democraticnes’ (ibid.: 93). Between those extremes, he also 
located electoral democracies and liberal democracies to depict four regime types on which a polity 
might move at different moments in its search to achieve its democratic consolidation. Democratic 
divergence, then, will occur when the cases under study place themselves in opposite ends on Schedler’s 
line of democratisation. 
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of national political elites, and its resulting implication on the transformation and 
performance of political institutions. 
Therefore, by reconsidering the unexplored linkage in the Latin American context 
between elite political culture, political institutions, and democratic divergence, this 
research project contributes to knowledge by moving away from the traditional 
relationships of causality presented by the Institutional approach and Cultural 
approach. Typically, both these theoretical frameworks are used separately in order to 
explain processes of democratisation.  However, this chapter introduced a ‘new’ 
Circular Causality Model to explore the extent to which democratic divergence in 
Colombia and Venezuela can be explained by merging both frameworks. The 
theoretical model proposed here seeks to focus on the pertinence that changes in elite 
political culture –rather than the masses- might exert over the engineering of political 
institutions as an alternative approach to explain the different democratic trajectories 
followed by the countries under analysis over the ‘divergence period.’ 
Finally, the chapter also argued that the model proposed in figure 3.3 deserves more 
academic attention because by studying the interaction of the variables that make up 
this model is useful to provide a better understanding of the causes behind the process 
of democratic divergence. This is precisely the purpose of the following chapters. Next 
chapter will provide an in depth theoretical analysis of the dependent variable: 
Democratic Divergence. Chapters five and six will do the same but with each one of 
the independent variables: elite political culture and political institution respectively. 
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Chapter 4 
Democratic divergence: conceptualising the dependent variable 
4.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present a theoretical framework for the dependent variable 
in the Circular Causality Model proposed in the previous chapter. In figure 3.3, I 
argued that democratic divergence is the dependent variable which can be explained 
by two sets of independent variables; namely, elite political culture and political 
institutions. 
The evidence provided in the previous chapters also confirmed that the concern 
towards understanding the process of democratic transition in the Latin America has 
been superseded and today a large proportion of scholars have shifted their attention 
to two related issues. First, some scholars focused on understanding why some polities 
have been able to keep their democratic stability and continued their process of 
consolidation, while another set of scholars have been committed to provide answers 
as to why some countries in the region are experiencing democratic regressions. 
Nevertheless, there has not been enough academic research to explain the cases which 
have taken opposite democratic paths, that is, democratic divergence. 
Therefore, the plan of this chapter is to discuss and provide an explanation about the 
causes and effects that the change in direction of democratic performance has had in 
both polities. Consequently, this chapter will offer a conceptualisation of the 
dependent variable by showing how and why both the elite political culture approach 
–as opposed to mass political culture- and the institutional approach combined offer a 
better set of variables to explain the divergent paths in the process of democratic 
performance experienced by Colombia and Venezuela. 
As was outlined in the previous chapter, scholars who have tackled the problem of 
democratic consolidation in Latin America mainly study the attitudes of the general 
public –or masses-, arguing that as a norm ‘a democratic political system cannot 
survive for long without the support of a majority of its citizens’ (Miller 1974, 951). 
Although this research project believes that commitment towards democracy depends, 
to a certain extent, on pro-democratic citizens’ views and attitudes, it is also possible 
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that such commitment need not come solely from them. To a significant extent 
commitment towards democracy also comes from political elites’ views and their 
attitudes. That is, I claim that elites’ support for democracy and their satisfaction with 
political leadership are ‘[the most] important factors in evaluating Latin American 
leaders’ progress toward consolidating their democracies’ (Bishin, et. al., 2006, 1194). 
To justify the use democratic divergence – or its proxy democratic consolidation- as 
the dependent variable in the Circular Causality model, this chapter will be organised 
in five sections. Following this introduction, the second section will focus on the 
conceptual debate about the notion of democratic divergence. I will present the three 
most traditional approaches on which the debate has focussed; namely, the 
Institutional approach, the social structure approach, and the path dependent approach. 
From the three approaches, I conclude that Schedler’s path dependent 
conceptualisation is the most appropriate to describe and explain Colombia and 
Venezuela´s divergent processes of democratic performance. 
The third section will narrow down the conceptual discussion by analysing how Latin 
American countries have dealt with the transition process towards more consolidated 
democratic regimes. I present how the democratic transition from authoritarian 
regimes was reached by different types of elite settlements which, in turn, brought 
uneven levels of democratic transitions. Hence, among the different countries in the 
region many are closer to a full process of consolidation; whereas others are 
experiencing some kind of reversal processes. The latter trend will be explained by the 
influence of three factors; namely, lack of civil society participation in the process of 
establishing new democratic structures, the amnesty granted to the military for 
allowing the implementation of democratic regimes, and the transmission of 
bureaucratic patronage into the democratic structure. This section concludes that Latin 
America itself is neither a coherent region nor a proper and comprehensive unit of 
political analysis when studied as an instance of democratic consolidation. 
The notion of democratic divergence will be further narrowed down in the fourth 
section as it will explain and analyse its application in the context of Colombia and 
Venezuela. This section will describe in a comparative fashion the process these two 
countries went through to achieve what at first was thought to be a successful process 
towards their democratic maturity, but that later ended up –by the end of the 20th 
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century- taking completely different democratic paths.75 Finally, the fifth section will 
highlight the main conclusions. 
4.2. Democratic divergence: a conceptual debate 
The democratic transition period is a time of great political uncertainty as it is subject 
to ‘unforeseen contingences, unfolding processes, and unintended outcomes’ (Karl, et. 
al., 1991, 270). This period, moreover, can also be characterised by having a hybrid 
regime where institutions of old and new regimes must co-exist together, sharing 
power among authoritarians and democrats whether through conflict or by agreement 
(O’Donnell 1988). As discussed in Chapter 1, a democratic transition can be regarded 
as complete and, therefore, consolidated when a polity meets Dahl´s minimal criteria. 
That is, the polity can guarantee free, fair and contested elections; the separation of 
powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government are 
clearly delimited by constitutional rules; and, when the ruler of that polity governs 
democratically by avoiding infringing the constitution; the rights’ violation of 
minorities and individuals; and/or avoiding the damage of the legitimate functions of 
the legislature (ibid). 
But, how can we know when the process of transition has finished and, therefore, the 
beginning of a process of consolidation? Answering this question requires, first, a 
conceptual clarification in order to get a better understanding of what democratic 
consolidation means. This conceptual exercise will be useful for two interrelated 
reasons. First, this enables the research project to have a clear reference point to 
compare how far (or how close) polities are from reaching a full consolidation. And 
second, it will allow me to provide an analysis which shows that both Colombia and 
Venezuela took different democratic trajectories in their democratic process that 
places them in opposite positions of their democratic performance since the beginning 
of the ‘divergence period.’ 
                                                 
75 To do so, this section will resort to the time frames defined in chapter 1, and depicted in figures 1.1 
and 1.2. That is, the analysis of the so-called ‘transitional period’ –from 1958 to 1990- will explore the 
course of action on how the democratic transition process took place, whereas, the period so-called 
‘divergence period´ –from mid-1990s till 2010-, will examine the reasons behind why these counties 
took completely different democratic paths. 
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To start with, it can be argued that the concept of democratic consolidation is generally 
associated with that of stability or institutionalisation. However, it is important to bear 
in mind that the mere retention of a democratic regime does not necessary mean its 
consolidation (Valenzuela 1992). In other words, ‘[c]onsolidation and stability are not 
the same phenomenon, although the latter is an attribute of the former’ (Shin 1994, 
144). Following this argument, then, the democratic transition phase will reach its end 
when a new polity has enacted a new constitution and held free elections for political 
leaders with no barriers and mass participation. Nonetheless, such successful transition 
to procedural democracy guarantees neither survival and stability nor consolidation. 
For this same reason, Whitehead (1989) argues that democratic consolidation involves 
an increasingly ‘principled’ rather than ‘instrumental’ commitment to the democratic 
rules of the game. Along the same line, Linz’s minimalistic definition claims that a 
consolidated democracy is a political regime in which ‘democracy [should be 
regarded] as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and 
disincentives has become ‘the only game in town’’ (Linz and Stepan 1996, 15). This 
means that democratic consolidation requires more than elections and economic 
market strategies in order to change from one regime to another (ibid.: 16). 
Other scholars, however, offer a wider conceptualisation of the notion of democratic 
consolidation that not only focuses on structural explanations and their degree of 
institutionalisation, but also that considers agency accounts to explain the role that 
elites and masses might play to achieve consolidation. Along this line of thought, for 
instance, structuralists such as Juan Linz state that a consolidated democracy is ‘one 
in which none of the major political actors, parties, or organised interest’s forces, or 
institutions consider that there is any alternative to the democratic process to gain 
power, and that no-political institutions or groups has a claim to veto the action of 
democratically elected decision makers’ (Linz 1990, 158). In other words, when ‘a 
society frees itself from the spells cast by authoritarian demagogues and rejects all 
alternatives to such democracy so as to no longer imagine any other possible regime’ 
(Hermet, 1991, 257) then, and only then, a democracy can be regarded as consolidated. 
The agency school, on the other hand, becomes even more important when scholars 
such as Higley and Gunther (1992) argue that the process of consolidation can be 
considered complete when elite consensus on procedures is coupled with extensive 
mass participation in elections and other institutional processes (ibid). 
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In the conceptual debate about what democratic consolidation is and what is not, there 
is a third school which offers the path dependant approach. Its aim is to reconcile a 
more compelling understanding of this notion by claiming that ‘the meaning of 
democratic consolidation cannot be decided by conceptual fiat, without considering 
the concrete empirical realities as well as the practical tasks it is meant to address […] 
It varies according to the context and the goals of our research’ (Schedler 1997, 4). 
This school of thought proposes a model based on four competing definitions of 
democracy which are used to describe a regime´s performance. All of them are 
compatible with different types of polities making a transition from the least form of 
democratic regime to the point where it achieves its consolidation. That is, ‘they all 
start from some type or other of democratic regime. And they all head toward some 
normative goal which either reads democratic survival or democratic progress’ (ibid.: 
7). Thus Schedler (1998a) borrowed Collier and Levitsky’s (1995) semantic ordering 
and classification of the chaotic and countless definitions of types and subtypes of 
democracies and offered a dynamic and compact four-fold classification of regimes 
along a one-dimensional continuum of ‘democraticness.’ 
Figure 4.1 summarises Schedler’s (1998a) model as it depicts the classification of the 
different definitions of democracy used to explain democratic performance and 
consolidation. Let [0,1] be the line that depicts the one-dimensional continuum of 
democracy. He begins by showing that on the extreme left that is, at zero, a democracy 
is conceived as an authoritarian regime. Further to the right, he includes electoral and 
liberal democracies. At the extreme right of the democracy line that is, at one, he 
classifies a democracy as one that is conceived as advance democracies.76 Overall, 
Schedler argues that ‘this classification shows how these four regime types define the 
empirical context as well as the normative horizons and practical tasks that 
characterise distinct conceptualisations of democratic consolidation’ (Schedler 1998a, 
92). 
                                                 
76 ‘Authoritarianism’, Schedler claims, is to be understood as an equivalent to non-democratic regime 
and not, as others do, as a subtype of non-democracy. ‘Electoral democracy’, in turn, is deem as a border 
line case that possesses some, but not all, of the features of liberal democracies and, therefore, fall 
somewhere in between advanced democracies and authoritarianism. As for ‘liberal democracies,’ 
Schedler argues that this subtype of democracy is not a self-explanatory notion but given its widely 
acceptance this subtype can be achieved when the minimal procedural Dahlsian standard package of 
civil and political rights plus fair, competitive, and inclusive elections is fulfilled. Finally, ‘advanced 
democracy’ refers rather to an ideal and reifying established Western democracies. That is, this subtype 
possesses some positive traits over and above the minimal criteria of liberal democracy, and therefore 
ranks higher in terms of democratic quality than many new democracies (Schedler 1997, 1998a). 
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Figure 6.1. 
Schedler’s classification of the different definitions of democracy 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1, moreover, can also be regarded as a normative classification of the different 
type of regimes a polity can experience in its process of democratic performance. It 
may also be considered as a helpful tool to identify, what Schedler called: ‘positive’ 
and ‘negative’ notions of democratic consolidation (ibid.: 95). Keeping in mind that 
the study of processes of democratic consolidation presupposes that a democratic 
regime exists from the beginning to the end of the process,77 Schedler’s 
conceptualisation helps to understand the different paths that different polities might 
follow in order to either avoid regressions –negative notions of democratic 
consolidation- or move forward and try to attain further democratic progress –positive 
notions of democratic consolidation-. The usefulness of Schedler´s model, for this 
research relies on that it helps explain different normative types of democratic 
definitions over which I can locate any regime and thus, to describe their democratic 
performance over time. 
To this end, Schedler’s model (1998a) can be regarded as a good analytical tool by 
scholars as it analyses negative or positive notions of democratic performance, such 
as those related with processes of democratic divergence. Under this context, Schedler 
offers two scenarios to typify this process of regime change. Figure 4.2 represents 
these cases. The full lines represent the process to prevent a ‘democratic breakdown;’ 
whilst the dotted line represents the process of ‘democratic erosion’78  
  
                                                 
77 In fact, it does not make any sense to study democratic consolidation processes of any authoritarian 
regime. 
78 Again, Schedler (1998a) argues that ‘democratic breakdown’ occurs when a polity, standing from 
either an electoral or liberal democracy, is trying to avoid a regression towards authoritarianism. In 
other words, as O’Donnell put it: ‘[these polities] are basically preoccupied with keeping democracy 
alive and preventing its ‘rapid death’ (O’Donnell 1992). As for ‘democratic erosion,’ it occurs when the 
democratic regression moves from a position of liberal democracy and goes backwards toward a 
position of electoral democracy, that is, these polities are trying to avoid a ‘slow death’ of democracy. 
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Figure 7.2. 
Schedler’s definitions of democratic regression: preventing democratic breakdown 
(full line), and preventing democratic erosion (dotted line) 
 
 
 
 
In turn, Schedler’s model can also be useful to analyse the opposite process: one in 
which a polity is rather concerned, not with regressions, but on how to achieve a better 
democratic performance by trying to attain progress toward either liberal or advanced 
democracies. Along this line of thought, Schedler offers two additional alternatives to 
describe the process within which such polity might undergo the route to achieve its 
real consolidation. As Figure 4.3 shows, the dotted line represents the process of 
‘completing democracy;’ whilst the full lines embody, as Doorenspleet (2005) claims, 
the ‘desirable ideal’ of the process called ‘deepening democracy.’79 
Figure 8.3. 
Schedler’s definitions of democratic progression: completing democracy (dotted 
line), and deepening democracy (full line) 
 
 
 
 
Last, Schedler also offers an in-between conceptualisation to describe what he 
describes as ‘a neutral position of democratic consolidation’ (Schedler 1998a, 99). He 
refers to such position as the ‘organisation of democracy.’ Figure 4.4 represents this 
case. Here, Schedler describes those regimes which are in a phase of their process of 
democratic consolidation such that neither regressions nor progressions are meant to 
change in the near future. 
                                                 
79 As can be seen in figure 4.3 ‘Completing democracy’ should be understood as the process of moving 
to the right from electoral democratic regimes to liberal democratic regimes. Whereas, ‘deepening 
democracy’ refers also to the process of moving again to the right but this time from either electoral or 
liberal democratic regimes to the one of advanced democratic regime. 
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Figure 9.4. 
Schedler’s definition of organising democracy 
 
 
 
 
The notion of democratic consolidation discussed above, showed that in contemporary 
politics the conceptualisation of this term is not an easy task. It seems that this concept 
has been used in the literature arbitrarily. In this sense, I give credit to Pridham’s 
(1995) observation according to which it is a ‘nebulous concept’ (ibid.: 8). In fact, and 
before Schedler’s reconstruction and reformulation of his four clear notions of 
democratic consolidation, ‘the conceptual fog that [used to] cover this term became 
even denser and thicker as more [scholars] paid attention to it’ (Schedler 1997, 3). 
Fortunately, Schedler’s conceptualisation brought a pragmatic and simpler way to 
understand and reorder the conceptual map to explain processes of democratisation. 
Schedler’s concluding remarks is that we should return to the concept’s original 
concern with democratic survival to ‘restore its classical meaning, which is securing 
achieved levels of democratic rule against authoritarian regression’ (Schedler 1998a, 
103). In other words, scholars should limit its use to the two ‘negative’ notions 
described above: avoiding democratic breakdown, and avoiding democratic erosion 
(see figure 4.2). 
For the reasons outlined above, this project will follow Schedler’s conceptualisation. 
The reason behind I decided to follow this path-dependence conceptualisation is that, 
as demonstrated in chapter 2, Latin American democracies have successfully 
completed its democratic transition, and therefore its process of democratic 
performance deserves closer attention, especially over the ‘divergence period’. In fact, 
today all the countries in the region, but Cuba, can be placed in one of the two middle 
notions of Schedler´s democratic classification, namely: either minimal/electoral or 
liberal democracies. Thus, Schedler’s dynamic model based on the four-fold 
classification of regimes will allow us to track, and therefore understand the causes 
behind the process of democratic divergence experienced by Colombia and Venezuela. 
Moreover, by knowing -at any point in time- the location of a polity along this one-
dimensional continuum model, I will be able to track either the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ 
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notions of democratic change that both countries have gone through over both the 
‘transitional and divergence periods’ under analysis. 
4.3. From transition to democratic consolidation in Latin America 
In the previous section I chose the path dependent approach as an adequate theoretical 
framework to conceptualise democratic divergence. This is because it helps to track 
the performance of different regimes throughout the period studied which in turn, will 
be used to explain in a comparative fashion the different democratic trajectories that 
Colombia and Venezuela followed during the ‘divergence period.’ However, 
Schedler’s conceptualisation is still too broad to be applied to the Latin American 
context. The aim of this section is to re-construct this framework so it can be used to 
explain the heterogeneous democratic performance that characterises this region since 
the end of the 1990s. 80 
Such heterogeneity can be evidenced when in some countries, for instance, civil 
society became aware and involved on political matters. These practices can be 
regarded as new set of values people have implemented in order to strength 
democracy. On this regard, Isbester (2010a) argues that ‘civil society is becoming 
more robust and organised, [most of the] elected governments are reforming their 
states to improve the calibre of state institutions and democratic governance, and also 
their ‘Human Rights violations have diminished substantially’ (ibid.: xii). However, 
there is also evidence stressing that democracy is still fragile in other set of countries 
in the region and although some countries have not fallen, many have been shaken; 
and some are even regressing.81 There is a rather broad consensus among Latin 
Americanists: Buxton (2001, 2005), Ellner (2008), and Hausmann, et. al., (2014), 
among others, in identifying that the problems of poverty, social exclusion, and 
                                                 
80 As an example of such heterogeneity, it can be said that in 1977, only Colombia, Venezuela, and 
Costa Rica had democratically elected governments. In 1978, after the withdrawal of its military, 
Ecuador wrote a democratic constitution and a year later held presidential elections. In the same year, 
the Peruvian military held elections for a legislative assembly and, in 1980, a democratic elected 
president took power. In 1983, Argentina elected a civilian assembly and president. In 1984, after a 
negotiated transition, Uruguay elected a president. In 1985, Brazil elected civilian presidents. In 1989, 
Chile and Paraguay both elected civilians presidents. In 1990, a civilian government took over in 
Panama. In 2000, Mexico elected its first president in 70 years who was not from the long-ruling 
Institutional Revolutionary party (PRI). And, in 2001, Peru’s backsliding into authoritarianism was 
halted and a civilian president was elected again (Isbester 2010c, 55). 
81 The cases showing some levels of regression during the last decade are Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, 
and, in lesser extent, Peru (Isbester 2010b, p.8).  
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inequality are the causes explaining the democratic reversions on the latter set of cases, 
and they claim that these issues should be addressed in order to avoid further 
democratic regressions. In sum, as Isbester (2010a) stresses, ‘inequality and poorly 
structured relations of power have produced a weak state and a minimal electoral 
democracy in some Latin American countries’ (ibid.: xiii).  
Apart from this evidence, which has shown the heterogeneous levels of democratic 
performance that countries in the region have achieved, it is important to study the 
same issue from a conceptual perspective. Previously I introduced, both in the 
introduction and in chapter three, the definition of democracy as liberal democracy 
that this research will follow, which corresponds to the definition put forward by 
Robert Dahl.82 Relating this definition to Schedler’s (1998b) path-dependence 
framework, then, it is possible to claim that today most Latin American countries are 
located around the middle segments of Schedler´s democracy line classification (see 
figure 4.1). However, the time it took for each one of these countries to reach its 
classification was not the same. Some countries reached higher levels of 
democratisation than others as they met most of Dahl’s criteria; whereas others only 
met these criteria partially. Hence, the difference in achieving different democratic 
performances can be attributed to the type of elite pacts celebrated among the Latin 
American regimes.83  
Paradoxically, reaching the transition towards democracy by settlements among elites 
brought problems of different magnitude and intensity. This did not allow the process 
of consolidation to be complete. Three issues can be enumerated as the causes of this 
phenomenon. First, most of the countries in the region completely ignored the role 
civil society could have played when these settlements were signed, because they 
                                                 
82 As was previously outlined, according to Dahl a polyarchy can be considered as fully democratic 
when it meets the following seven criteria: 1) elected officials; 2) free and fair elections; 3) inclusive 
suffrage; 4) the right to run for office; 5) freedom of expression; 6) alternative information; and 7) 
associational autonomy (Dahl 1989, 221). That is why this project argues that inasmuch as a regime 
fulfil most or all of these criteria, it will be closer to the definition of liberal democracy proposed by 
Schedler (1998a); whilst if it does not fulfil neither or just a few set of these criteria the regime will be 
closer to Schedler´s notions of electoral and/or authoritarian regimes. 
83 Although all the countries in the region reached their transition towards democracy by elite 
settlements, except for Argentina and Ecuador, only three countries in the region could both made their 
transitions and, at the same time, maintain their democracies alive (without regressions) and in good 
shape until mid-1990s thanks to settlements made by political elites. Those countries were: Colombia 
in 1957-58, Venezuela in 1958, and Costa Rica in 1948. However, Venezuela during the last decade 
has shown, as will be discussed in the next section, some signs of democratic regression. 
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denied them the opportunity to participate in the process of establishing the new 
democratic regimes. Consequently, Silva (2004) stresses, ‘under the elite pact, civil 
society organisations become weakened, marginalised, fragmented, disillusioned, 
exhausted and ultimately depoliticised’ (ibid.: 145). This lack of civil participation 
became a challenge for the consolidation of democracy because it led to the rise of 
hegemonic political parties, which, in turn, neglected minorities’ legitimate right to 
participate in the electoral process during the ‘transitional period.’ 
Second, the amnesty granted to the military during the transition process left the public 
with a taste of inconformity against democracy as citizens weren´t treated as equals 
before the law which essentially led to a generalised dissatisfaction with this type of 
regime.84 Thus, civil society’s inability to bring the military to justice was a deep 
disappointment which resulted in the difficulty in implementing a comprehensive 
process of democratisation in the region. As a result, the nations that enacted 
constitutional laws to grant military forgiveness –i.e. Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, among others- required that those authoritarian legacies were removed from 
their constitutions as a necessary step to improve their democratic performance. 
A third problem that elite pacts brought during the transition process was to engage in 
economics for the benefit of special interest groups, that is, clientelistic relations, deep 
bureaucracy, and patronage (Buxton 2005). These were transmitted into the 
democratic structures as non-democratic practices. Isbester argues that these practices, 
‘operate with and through democracy’s procedures, institutionalising themselves and 
weakening democracy in the process’ (Isbester 2010c, 60). Furthermore, a problem 
caused by the institutionalisation of bad practices is that elites may use the 
conventional democratic procedures in conjunction with these informal practices in 
order to perpetuate their own bases in power. 
Because of these problems, Latin American countries since the beginning of the 
‘divergence period’ –in greater or lesser extent- have been experiencing cultural and 
institutional changes which led them to reach different levels of democratic 
                                                 
84 In fact, in countries such as El Salvador in 1993, Chile in 1978, and Argentina in 1987 the military, 
through a high level negotiation process with political elites, were able to bargain the end of their 
authoritarian regimes by writing certain authoritarian rules into the new constitutional democracies. 
These ‘rules’ allowed them to avoid being brought to justice and be judged for human right abuses 
(Schedler 1997). 
 76 
 
performance. In fact, some polities have experienced positive notions of democratic 
progress,85 while other polities have experienced some kind of democratic regression 
weakening their democratic performances, but without reaching levels of authoritarian 
regimes, that is, to the lower level of Schedler’s classification of democratic definitions 
(see figure 4.1).86 
In short, it seems that the uneven implementation of fundamental political rights, civil 
liberties, and democratic procedures during the ‘transitional period’ resulted in some 
form of divergent process in the region´s democratic performance. Based on these 
premises, the issue of whether a democracy has been consolidated in the region is 
unquestionably important. Therefore, I claim that it is important to identify the type of 
democracy a country has achieved by the end of the ‘transitional period’, because 
departing from this point it can be possible to identify and understand the various 
causes that explain the heterogeneous democratic performance experienced by the 
countries in the region. 
To succeed in this endeavour and root it into the Latin American context, it is 
necessary, first, to re-construct Schedler´s model presented in figure 4.1. Unlike 
Schedler’s model which considers ‘advanced democracies’ as the highest and purest 
level of democratic performance, I will consider ‘liberal democracies’ as the highest 
level to which a Latin American country might aspire in order to achieve full 
consolidation (see Figure 4.5). In other words, in this project I claim that if a Latin 
American country reaches an ideal combination of civil liberties and democratic 
procedures for every citizen, then, such country can be considered a liberal democracy, 
and therefore consolidated. 
The following two reasons support this methodological assumption. First, ‘liberal 
democracies’ is perfectly aligned with the definition of democracy this project has 
proposed, and second, the definition is a more realistic goal if compared that of 
                                                 
85 That is, they are located close to Schedler´s middle notions of democratic performance (i.e.: either as 
‘minimal/electoral democracies’ or ‘liberal democracies’). 
86 As instances of democratic regressions in the region it is possible to find cases such as those of Peru 
that suffered a temporary reversal of democracy in 1992-2001. Venezuela that had two attempted coups: 
one led by Hugo Chávez in 1992, and the other one against him in 2002. Paraguay attempted two coups 
in 1996 and 2000. Between 1997 and 2006, Bolivia had four governments. Whereas Argentina went 
through five governments in two weeks in 2001 as it struggled with its economic crisis. And finally, 
Ecuador’s populace drove four presidents from power between 1997 and 2006 (Isbester 2010c, 61). 
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‘advanced democracies’ which is considered more idealistic and much more difficult 
to attain by developing countries (Doorenspleet 2001). Therefore, Schedler´s original 
model will be re–constructed into the three types of democratic regimes shown in 
figure 4.5. 
Figure 10.5. 
Reinterpretation of Schedler’s model used in this research to study  
the process of democratic divergence 
 
 
This reformulated model will serve to answer the following questions. What type of 
democracies do Latin American countries have? Are they close or far away from full 
consolidation? The answer to these questions may be contradictory when it is studied 
from a conceptual perspective. For instance, it is possible to claim that most Latin 
American countries are very close to full consolidation, if we can agree with Peeler’s 
definition which stresses that, ‘once a democratised regime has had at least two 
changes of power from the ruling party to an opposition party without the threat of 
military intervention, foreign meddling, or generalised non-cooperation of the elite, it 
can be said that this democracy has been consolidated’ (Peeler 2004, 93). 
However, if we agree with a more comprehensive and challenging definition such as 
that of Linz and Stepan which state that a country can be regarded as consolidated 
when ‘it is able to defend itself against threats, while deterring regimen breakdown, 
erosion of democratic principles and procedures, and ideally working toward an 
improved democracy’ (Linz, et. al, 1996, 15), then the answer to the previous questions 
may not be straightforward. Most Latin American countries have free, fair, contested, 
and regular elections with mass participation but at the same time they lack some of 
the fundamental civil liberties that only the rule of law can protect. 
Under the latter definition, then, this project claims that the type of democracy most 
of these countries currently have achieved corresponds to the type of ‘electoral 
democracy’ according to the reformulated version of Schedler´s model offered in 
figure 4.5. This definition is closer to Wiarda and Kline’s perception as they stated that 
‘75 per cent of the democracies in Latin America have consolidated illiberal, or 
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minimum, or electoral democracies.87[By 2006,] only Chile, Argentina, Brazil, 
Uruguay, and Costa Rica have liberal democracies with both civil liberties and 
political rights’ (Wiarda and Kline 2007, 85).88 This leftist trend shows that Latin 
America itself is neither a coherent region nor a proper and comprehensive unit of 
political analysis when it concerns its democratic performance. The consequence of 
such heterogeneity makes the analysis and understanding of democratic performance 
a challenge. Hence, to study the process of democratic performance in the region it is 
necessary to examine each country individually in order to identify the determinants 
that explain how far, or close, these countries are from consolidating their 
democracies. The next section will deal with this task by focusing on the specific cases 
of Colombia and Venezuela. 
4.4. Democratic divergence in Colombia and Venezuela 
Having analysed the transition process towards regime change, and its implications in 
terms of the heterogeneous democratic performance Latin American countries have 
shown, led us to understand the divergent process followed by the cases under study. 
However, before addressing this task it is important to highlight what makes Colombia 
and Venezuela interesting cases for political analysis. As discussed earlier, both these 
polities ended their dictatorships in mid-1950s and they started a parallel and 
homogeneous process of political reforms that led them to be considered as two of the 
most democratic countries in the region. Nonetheless, only 20 years ago these polities 
began experiencing divergent democratic paths, which had, and still has, consequences 
for their democratic performance. 
                                                 
87 Because there is not agreement among scholars, this definition of democracy varies from author to 
author and the problem under analysis. Therefore, in the literature of democratisation it is possible to 
find some different names to describe the same phenomenon of ‘electoral democracies.’ For instance: 
‘Hybrid democracies,’ or ‘minimum democracies’, or ‘illiberal democracies.’ This research will use the 
concept of ‘electoral democracies’ to classify countries that have mass participation and adult suffrage 
but lack some civil and political liberties. 
88 The generalised outcome for these 75% of countries was that they triggered a wave of left-leaning 
reformist governments known as ‘the Pink Tide’ or, as other Latin Americanists called it, ‘a left turn’ 
in Latin American politics (see for instance: Cameron, et. al. (2013); Arnson, et.al. (2007); Castañeda, 
et. al. (2008); Levitsky, et. al. (2011); Silva (2009); Weyland, et.al (2010); among others). In fact, since 
the election of presidents such as: Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1998-2012), Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua 
(2006- until today), Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2007-until today), Fernando Lugo in Paraguay (2008-
2013), and Mauricio Funes in El Salvador (2009-2014); leftist victories have become increasingly clear 
and ‘started representing a regional trend rather than a series of isolated events’ (Cleary 2006, 36). 
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It is unquestionable that the political, cultural, and social homogeneity shared by these 
polities became evident even before the ‘transitional period.’ In fact, it can be stated 
that it began from the very moment the Republic of the Great Colombia89 gained its 
independence from Spain in 1819. However, it was not until the Republic was 
dissolved in 1831 that the independent states of Colombia and Venezuela -unlike those 
of Ecuador and Panama- began to implement economic, cultural, and political reforms 
so alike that they were coined as ‘Brotherhood Republics.’ Yet, such homogeneity and 
integration was challenged when Hugo Chávez in 1998 and Alvaro Uribe -four years 
later- were elected presidents of Venezuela and Colombia respectively. Because of 
different understandings about what were the best economic model, and the best 
political reforms to deal with high levels of inequality, poverty and poor political 
participation, these countries embarked in the implementation of asymmetric reforms 
which led them to achieve divergent routes in their processes of regime performance. 
To understand the rationale behind the asymmetry of the reforms adopted by these 
polities, the following sub-sections will outline separately the main characteristics that 
both countries shared in each of the periods of analysis introduced in chapter 1, that is, 
the ‘transitional period’ (1958-1990), and the ‘divergence period’ (1991-2010). This 
comparative exercise will help explain and describe the similarities and subsequent 
differences that both countries experienced over these periods. 
The democratic ‘transition’ era: 1958-1990 
As discussed above, 1958 was the year that signalled the beginning of the democratic 
transition for Colombia and Venezuela. It was then that both countries sealed political 
agreements among their hegemonic political parties aiming to finish their historical 
rivalry, and avoid the prolongation of their military dictatorships.90 These agreements, 
called ‘The National Front’ in Colombia, and ‘The Punto Fijo Pact’ in Venezuela, had 
a common goal: to bring political stability by mutually accepting rules among party 
elites. In other words, the elite agreements were about sharing power by alternating 
                                                 
89 The Great Colombia was a short-lived republic that included present-day territories such as Colombia, 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama, northern Perú, and northwest Brazil. The first three were the successor 
states to Gran Colombia at its dissolution. Panama seceded from Colombia in 1903.  
90 In Colombia, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla seized power from 1953-1957 throughout a military 
show of force. He promised to hand over power when the time of inter-party violence reach an end, and 
vowed to launch a nation-building effort. As for Venezuela, General Marcos Pérez Jiménez seized 
power in 1952 and plunged the country into a dictatorship that would last six years. 
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the presidency between those political parties, regardless of the election outcomes. 
Additionally, these political settlements also agreed to equally share all legislative 
bodies and government positions. In short, the system of institutionalised 
bipartisanship served to deter partisan conflicts by providing the political parties with 
mutual guaranties in the protection of their interests (Bushnell 1993; Dugas 2006). 
On the positive side, Karl and Schmitter (1991) referred to the effects of these ‘pacted 
transitions to democracy’ as those where both countries began enjoying a process of 
democratic stability in their deeply divided societies. This rapidly translated into 
significant economic growth, industrialisation and diversification of their trade 
balances by the implementation of the so-called import-substitution industrialisation 
(ISI) model. This model was designed to replace manufactured goods previously 
imported with those made domestically (Hausmann, et. al., 2014). However, the 
downside of these agreements was reflected in the lack of representation of new 
political parties that were excluded from the distribution of political power (Buxton 
2001, 2005). This rigid and exclusionary logic of power-sharing was based on a joint 
strategy, led by the traditional parties, considered to rule out other political forces from 
the political arena (Rochlin 2003, Buxton 2011). As expected, the result of these 
exclusionary strategies had consequences at the political and societal levels in both 
countries. 
For Colombia, when minority groups realised that they had no access to legitimate 
political avenues, they were left with no choice but to resort to extra-systemic means 
to foster the change that an important part of civil society was willing. Thus, the 
emergence of left-wing guerrilla groups in the 1960s and 1970s,91 the right-wing 
paramilitary forces in middle 1980s, and criminal-minded narco-traffickers also in the 
1980s was the response to elites’ failure to address popular concerns in terms of 
redistribution of political power and economic resources. As for the Venezuelan case, 
its political exclusion did not lead to the emergence of insurgent groups, because 
political outsiders and civil society were absorbed and controlled by the traditional 
                                                 
91 In fact, by the end of 1980s the guerrilla groups fighting for overthrowing the established political 
and socioeconomic order were: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National 
Liberation Army (ELN), the 19th of April Movement (M-19), Quintín Lame, and the Popular Liberation 
Army (EPL). 
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political parties through vertical relations of power.92 Hence, the Punto Fijo Pact, gave 
way to a restricted action by the civil society and, at the same time, an unresponsive 
form of governance by the traditional political parties (Buxton 2001; Ellner 2008; 
Smilde and Hellinger 2011). 
While these pacts were still the predominant system of governance at the end of the 
1970s,93 the ISI economic model of development proved to be exhausted due to its 
disappointing results, which led to its gradual disengagement in both countries 
(Buxton 2001). Consequently, by early 1980s, in response to the severe economic 
crisis that Latin American countries were facing Colombia and Venezuela embarked 
in the implementation of an export-oriented industrialisation strategy based mainly on 
a neoliberal model of development. During the first years of this decade the 
implementation of this economic model worked reasonably well and helped in 
deepening the implementation of democratic values which in turn also contributed to 
improve the performance of their democracies.94 
Therefore, it can be said that for the greater part of  the duration of the ‘transitional 
period’ the elite political pacts signed by these countries not only allowed them to 
reach a full democratic transition, but also enabled them to take significant advances 
in their democratic performance. Hence, two things should be said if we had to make 
an assessment about how deep or superficial the consolidation of democracy for these 
countries was at this point in history. First, a striking aspect about their democratic 
transition and subsequent performance is that both countries followed, in greater 
extent, similar policies at both economic and political levels in order to deal with the 
                                                 
92 . In fact, as Collier and Collier (2002) argued, ‘[c]orporatism in Venezuela was characterised by the 
mobilisation and organisation of both the peasantry and the urban working class into a limited number 
of officially sanctioned, non-competitive, and state-supervised interest associations linked to the 
traditional parties’ (quote in Rice 2010, 234). In turn, these organisations constituted the main social 
interlocutors with the Venezuelan state and political parties by mediating as well as to contain civil 
society interests (Salamanca 2006). 
93 In theory, the Colombian National Front pact should had lasted until 1978, however, in practice its 
real ‘desmonte’ ended only in 1986 when the Liberal President Virgilio Barco won the presidency by a 
wide margin, and effectively shut the Conservatives out of the cabinet and other high level positions 
(Martz 1989). As for the Venezuela case, the Punto Fijo Pact came to an end when Hugo Chávez won 
the presidency in 1998. 
94 By mid-1980s it was so successful the combination of neoliberal policies along with the deepening 
of democratic rule, that even Peeler (1986) had no qualms in including Colombia and Venezuela in the 
group of Latin American countries regarded as Liberal democracies (Carrión 2009, 237). Nonetheless, 
I refuse to classify these regimes as Peeler does because even though they were performing well still 
some civil liberties, and in lesser extent some political rights were restricted. This is the reason why I 
claim that they are closer to Schedler´s classification of electoral democracies rather than to liberal 
democracies (see figure 4.5). 
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different challenges they were facing in order to reach their transition and make 
progress in their consolidation. And second, Colombia and Venezuela along with 
Costa Rica –at least until the end of the ´transitional period´- might be regarded as the 
most consolidated electoral democracies in the region (Peeler 1986). Yet, as the next 
section will show, from early 1990s both countries began experiencing different social 
and economic challenges that had effects in the explanation, analysis, and 
understanding of their processes of democratic performance. 
The democratic ‘divergence’ era: 1991-2010 
By the end of the 80s, the neoliberal economic model had been completely 
implemented in Latin America, and Colombia and Venezuela were not the exception. 
The implementation of such model brought about positive and negative 
macroeconomic outcomes for different countries in the region which, in turn, also had 
consequences in their processes of democratic performance. 
Colombia, in particular, was a country highly regarded in the Latin American region 
due to the efficient way it handled the 1980s economic crisis. Unlike many other 
countries, Colombia’s neoliberal model was characterised by its gradual 
implementation and its minimal degree of state intervention, which allowed not a 
single year of negative economic growth during the 1980s, and part of the 1990s 
(Dugas 2006).95 Nonetheless, by mid 1990s the country faced a severe recession 
caused by a budgetary deficit and an overvalued currency that throttled exports. 
Although this recession only lasted until 1999, its consequences were notorious.96 
This economic downturn reached its end in 2000 when the economy grew by 3% with 
a single-digit inflation (9.1%); high oil prices and a jump in non-traditional exports 
kept the trade balance in the black, and interest rates were lower than they had been in 
years (Hoskin and Murillo 2001, 40). By 2008, Colombia’s economic performance 
was affected by the world’s economic recession, but in 2010 4.2% GDP growth stood 
                                                 
95 Indeed, during the so-called Latin America’s ‘Lost Decade’ in the 1980s, ‘Colombia was the only 
country that maintained positive growth, serviced its foreign debt responsibly, controlled inflation, and 
kept huge foreign reserves’ (Hoskin and Murillo 2001, 39). 
96 For instance, growth plunged from 5.2% in 1994 to negative 4.5% in 1999, while unemployment rates 
nearly tripled to an unprecedented 20%. Furthermore, by 1997 Colombia had one of the sharpest rates 
of income inequality, which in per capita terms meant that the richest tenth of the population received 
51% of the national income. 
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in sharp contrast to the deep recession of 1999. Inflation was rather low at 3,2%. The 
fiscal deficit, while still high, appeared to be under control. And unemployment fell 
from 19% in 1999 to 11.8% in 2010. 
The relatively robust performance of the Colombian economy at the macro-level did 
not become a threat to undermine Colombian democracy, as it was the case for most 
of the Latin American countries. Paradoxically, the low distribution of wealth 
combined with lack of opportunities, poverty, and exclusion created a social division 
that became the main peril to achieve further gains in the process of democratic 
performance for this country. In fact, Colombia’s democratic performance began to 
erode in early 1990s, not because of the lack of successful economic policies, but due 
to the highly exclusionary political structures that led the country to be a victim of an 
armed conflict between drug cartels, left-wing guerrillas, and right-wing paramilitary 
forces who were asking for a seat in the political arena. 
As a reaction to this social crisis and as an effort to rescue the state’s legitimacy, 
Colombia carried out a process of enacting a new constitution in 1991. Such 
constitutional reform was deemed to be the first and probably the biggest step towards 
deepening Colombian process of democratic consolidation (Mainwaring 2006, Van 
Cott 2005). Indeed, the enactment of this new constitution was a step forward in the 
right direction as it extended the process of decentralisation, introduced a bill of 
citizen’s rights, and provided for a new variety of new participatory mechanisms. 
Moreover, the new constitution opened spaces of representation and participation for 
minority groups which were previously excluded from the formal political arena97 
(Van Cott 2005). 
As a matter of fact, the 1991 constitution marked the formal transformation of the 
execute-legislative relationship in the sense that it placed limits to the extraordinary 
powers that until then the executive branch of government had (Harlyn, et al. 1999). 
Moreover, the 1991 constitution made commendable commitments so that Colombia 
had a specific form of government with real and powerful checks and balances.98 
                                                 
97 The new Constitution was meant to heal state-society relations, and to reincorporate guerrilla groups 
into civilian life. The EPL, Quintín Lame, and M-19 guerrilla movements all signed peace agreements 
with the government, demobilised, and become active participants in the constitutional process (Dugas 
2006). 
98 For instance, the constitution provides for referendums to repeal national laws or to amend the 
constitution, placed restrictions on the president’s emergency power, and weakened the president veto 
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Nonetheless, the Colombian constitution is still far from perfect. For instance, some 
gaps are present in terms of balance of power. Along this line, Posada-Carbó (2006) 
argues that the National Constituent Assembly failed to provide laws to prevent the 
executive to retain control over the central budget. This issue granted the president 
with the power to make use of state resources in order to build coalitions in support of 
executive policies. In short, it can be argued that, as O’Donnell stressed, despite some 
imperfections, Colombian democracy has become institutionalised in terms of 
electoral competition but it has not succeeded yet in making its ‘second democratic 
transition’ to a fully institutionalised, and therefore liberal democratic regime 
(O’Donnell 1994, 62). 
Unlike Colombia, Venezuela’s 1980s economic crisis was poorly handled. As argued 
by Ellner (2008), and Ellner and Tinker (2007), the above-mentioned crisis along with 
the elite’s massive corruption were the main reasons behind the erosion of the ‘Punto 
Fijo pact’. These two factors were also the grounds on which the course of 
Venezuelan’s democratic performance toward its consolidation changed negatively. 
In fact, by the end of the 1980s, people’s feelings of economic insecurity led to 
Venezuelan democracy facing serious challenges that ended up affecting its 
democratic performance (Puddington 2007). For instance, as Lopez Maya, et. al 
(2004), and Buxton (2001) shows, the steady decline of oil prices, combined with the 
implementation of harsh neoliberal policies that neither respond to the collapse of the 
Venezuela’s currency, nor to reduce the high rates of inflation and avoid further 
economic decline, generated social discontent which began to surface against the 
traditional political parties due to their inability to deliver the right policies to solve 
the dramatic increase in the level of poverty.99 
Consequently, Venezuela’s economic setbacks in the 1980s quickly translated into 
political ones at the beginning of the 1990s. For instance, as a response to the growing 
disenchantment with the existing political system and to the neoliberal reforms put 
forward under the presidency of Carlos Andrés Pérez (1989-93), Lieutenant Hugo 
                                                 
power. At the same time, the constitution strengthened the political and legislative power of Congress. 
Additionally, it also prohibited the appointment of legislators to other public offices or cabinet, and 
established a legislative check on the executive through a ‘motion of censure’ against cabinet members. 
99 For instance, Lopez Maya and Lander (2004) conducted an empirical study on the socioeconomic 
impacts of structural adjustments programs in Venezuela which revealed that between 1980 and 1997 
the percentage of the country’s households living in extreme poverty skyrocket from 9 to 28 percent 
(2004, 212). 
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Chávez attempted a military coup in 1992, which -despite its failure- marked the end 
of the Punto Fijo pact (McCoy and Myers 2004; Ellner and Tinker 2007). Such 
disillusion also marked the beginning of a process of regime change that started when 
Hugo Chávez took office in December 1998, which ushered the so-called Latin 
America’s Pink Tide era.100 As expected, echoing people’s disgust with traditional 
politics, President Chávez’s regime began not by focussing on the flagging economy, 
but by rewriting a new Constitution aimed to ‘kill the partidocracia (party dominance) 
that had characterised Venezuelan politics since the late 1960s’ (Corrales and Penfold 
2007, 101), and fight against the old establishment (Buxton 2001; McCoy and Myers 
2004; Ellner 2008; Mainwaring 2006). 
Indeed, the 1999 new Bolivarian Constitution fulfilled its promise and managed to 
change the rules governing relations among the branches of government. It did so by 
reinforcing the power and autonomy of the central government, the executive branch, 
and the military (Levine 2002; Monaldi, et. al., 2014). It also ‘established new organs 
of state and citizen power, including the right to hold recall referendums on all elected 
official (Buxton 2005, 2008). Thus, under the new constitution, Chávez achieved 
complete control of the institutional checks-and-balances, including a complete 
discretion over military promotions that currently do not need legislative approval. 
The Senate was dissolved in favour of a unicameral national assembly. The 
representative and protagonist nature of democracy was underscored and dramatically 
restricted the role of the political parties in the system.101 The presidential term went 
from five to six years, with the possibility of a single re-election. The president gained 
the power to enact laws by decree and to hold any kind of referendum without support 
of the legislature. Also, the new constitution introduced the possibility of recalling 
                                                 
100 The ‘Pink Tide’ term has been used by mass media in contemporary twenty-first century political 
analysis to describe the perception that leftist ideology in general, and left-wing politics is increasingly 
influential in Latin America. Origins of the term may be linked to a statement made by Larry Rohter, a 
New York Times reporter in Montevideo, who characterised the election of Tabaré Vázquez as 
president of Uruguay as "not so much a red tide but as a pink one." The term seems to be a play on 
words based on ‘Red tide’ with ‘red’ -a colour long associated with communism- being replaced with 
the lighter tone of ‘pink’ to indicate the more moderate communist and socialist ideas gaining strength 
in the region. 
101 The restriction of political parties to participate in the electoral contest was achieved by cutting their 
public funding. 
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mayors, governors, or the president, but only under highly stringent conditions for the 
latter (Corrales and Penfold 2007, 101; Buxton 2008).102 
Therefore, the new laws contained in the 1999 Constitution attracted watchdogs’ 
attention because major pieces of the new legislation have narrowed down civil rights 
such as freedom of association, regulate participation in civil society organisations, or 
give special powers to chavista citizens’ groups (Corrales 2011, 128). Equally 
worrisome, the new laws have had negative effects on press freedom as there have 
been journalists suffering harassment, television stations facing administrative 
sanctions,103 and 32 radio stations have lost their broadcast licenses (ibid.: 112). 
Consequently, Freedom House downgraded Venezuela -along with Russia- from 
‘Partly Free’ to ‘Not Free’ in its 2010 annual media-freedom report (Walker 2010). 
In sum, the 1999 new Venezuelan constitution, and its further reforms, completely 
transformed Venezuela’s political landscape. The new political order currently rests 
on a decision-making process centralised in the executive branch of government which 
has managed -among other things- to undermine its political institutions, become civil 
society dependent on its central leadership, and demoralise, overpower, and 
completely exclude political opposition (Rice 2010, 243). So, it is possible to argue 
that rather than an experiment to deepen the performance of its democracy, the 
Bolivarian Revolution should be understood as the ‘antithesis of democracy’ (ibid.: 
243); as a ‘competitive authoritarian regime’ (Corrales 2011); a ‘protagonistic a 
                                                 
102 Not satisfied with these reforms, Chávez pursued further constitutional changes so that he could 
increase even more his executive power in detriment of the advances achieved during the ‘transitional 
period.’ In fact, the second set of constitutional amendments started as soon as he won his presidential 
re-election in 2006. The constitutional changes included a new enabling law allowing him to enact or 
change more than sixty pieces of legislation without legislative approval; a redrawing of political lines 
of authority in ways meant to shrink the influence of governors and mayors by handing over more power 
to unelected ‘communal councils;’ the enforcement of the desacato (or insult) laws, which penalizes 
citizens for criticising public officials (Corrales 2011, 127). In addition, the re-elected President Chávez 
managed to weaken the constraints on executive power causing a severe threat against democracy due 
to his, as Huntington (1996a) once called, ‘executive arrogation.’ That is, when a president concentrates 
too much power in his hands and therefore has the authority of either subordinate or even suspends the 
legislature, and rules largely by decree (Huntington 1996a, 9). 
103 In fact, RCTV, the biggest and oldest television station, stopped broadcasting in 2007 as 
the government of Venezuela decided not to renew its broadcast license for what it said was the station's 
role in the 2002 cup. Today, the only station broadcasting news in the country outside government 
control is Globovisión, although some of its assets have been seized and whose owner has been arrested 
by giving a speech that Chávez found ‘offensive’ (Corrales 2011, 129). 
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‘populist democracy’ (Plattner 2010); or even as a ‘participatory democracy’ (McCoy, 
et. al. 2004; Smilde and Hellinger 2011; Lopez Maya 2004, 2011).  
The above analysis established that social, economic, and political events during the 
1990s marked the divergent democratic paths taken by Colombia and Venezuela in 
their process of democratisation. For Colombia, it was not the economic management 
that the government gave to the 1980s-economic crisis, but the enactment of its 1991 
constitution that tackled the social problems that the ‘politics of exclusion’ brought to 
the country in the form of violence the cause of what Schedler (1997) called ‘positive 
steps towards consolidation’ for this country. In fact, the enactment of Colombian´s 
constitution, allowed its democratic progress by gradually repairing its basic defects 
and pushing its democratic system closer to the so-called type of ‘liberal democracy’ 
proposed in figure 4.5. 
As for Venezuela, it was the mismanagement of the economic crisis and the corruption 
of its traditional political parties what caused deep popular antipathy towards the status 
quo (Buxton 2005, 2009) what triggered the change in the direction of its democratic 
performance. Such change came hand in hand when president Hugo Chávez took 
power in 1998, and enacted a constitution that progressively shifted the country from 
having an ‘electoral democracy’ to one closer to the notion of a ‘dominant party 
system’ under Chávez presidency (McCoy 2004). This is the reason why O’Donnell 
claims that this radical change in Venezuelan democratic performance, represents ‘a 
progressive diminution of existing spaces for the exercise of civilian power and the 
effectiveness of the classic guaranties of liberal constitutionalism’ (O’Donnell 1992, 
19), which in the end would lead to a democratura, a repressive façade democracy 
(ibid.: 33). 
4.5. Conclusion and discussion 
This chapter focussed on explaining, from a conceptual perspective, one out of the 
three variables that make up the Circular Causality Model presented in the previous 
chapter (see figure 3.3). The chapter argued that at a macro level the conceptual 
discussion on democratic divergence –the dependent variable- can be studied using 
three main approaches: Institutional approach, Social Structure approach, and path 
dependent approach. After explaining each one of these approaches, I have argued that 
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Schedler’s (1998a) path dependent approach is more appropriate to study the process 
of democratic performance in Latin America. This approach offers a comprehensive 
normative regime classification that is a helpful tool to identify, what Schedler called: 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ notions of democratic performance. Narrowing down the 
analysis at the Latin American level, the chapter introduced a re-constructed version 
of Schedler’s classification of the definition of democratic consolidation. The model 
has three, instead of four, types of possible regimes that can explain the process of 
democratic performance for Latin American countries (see figure 4.5). It was claimed 
that the reinterpretation of Schedler’s model allowed this chapter to predict that most 
of the countries in the region can be regarded as ‘electoral democracies’ because they 
have free, fair, contested, and regular elections with mass participation. However, at 
the same time, these polities lack some of the civil liberties that only the rule of law 
can protect, and for that reason these countries cannot be regarded as liberal, and 
therefore, consolidated democracies. 
Then, the analysis moved on to the Colombian and Venezuelan cases in order to 
understand how close or far away these countries were from achieving the required 
characteristics of a liberal democracy. As a methodological tool the period of analysis 
was divided in two: the ‘transitional period’ from 1958 to 1990; and the ‘divergence 
period’ from 1991 to 2010. 
For the first period, it was established that both countries made their complete 
transition to democracy, and that they gave meaningful steps in their process of 
consolidation, to the point that these polities were regarded –along with Costa Rica- 
as the most consolidated electoral democracies in the region (Peeler 1986, Bejarano 
2011). Nevertheless, from 1991 that is, over the second period, these countries began 
experiencing different social, political, and economic challenges that marked the 
divergent path in their processes of democratic performance. For the Colombian case, 
it was argued that due to the enactment of the 1991 constitution and further political 
reforms this country gradually made positive steps towards its consolidation by 
mending its basic socio-economic inequalities and its traditional ‘politic of exclusion,’ 
pushing in this way its democratic performance closer to the ideal type of ‘liberal 
democracy.’ As for the Venezuelan case, and in clear contrast with Colombia, it was 
argued that this country took negative steps towards its democratic consolidation. That 
is, since the enactment of its 1999 constitution the Venezuelan political landscape was 
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completely transformed. As Rice (2010) argues, the new political order rested on a 
decision-making process centralised in the executive branch which has managed -
among other things- undermine its political institutions; become civil society 
dependent on its central leadership; and demoralise, overpower, and completely 
exclude political opposition. In short, and because of these radical political changes, 
this polity rather than experiencing a deepening in its democratic performance, it has 
gone through a progressive democratic regression that has taken the country closer to 
Schedler´s notion of being regarded as an ‘authoritarian regime’. 
In sum, the conceptualisation of democratic divergence as the dependent variable of 
this project was achieved using an adapted version of Schedler´s classification offered 
in figure 4.5. It can be considered as a reliable conceptual approach as it was possible 
to point out that the opposite democratic trajectories actually occurred during the 
‘divergence period’, and that the explanation of this phenomenon can be found by 
clarifying the role and effects of structural factors at the social, political, and economic 
levels.  
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Chapter 5 
What is elite political culture? Conceptualising the first independent 
variable 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter focused its attention on delivering a conceptual discussion and 
offering the best theoretical approach to understand democratic divergence, that is, our 
dependent variable. There, it was claimed that to understand democratic consolidation 
–as a proxy to explain democratic divergence- it is necessary to use Schedler’s path 
dependent approach. That is, divergence was conceived as a continuous political 
process aimed to explain the gap caused -during the ‘divergence period’ between these 
two countries- by their opposite democratic trajectories (see figures 1.1 and 1.2). 
Within this framework, I also argued that these polities were located somewhere 
between the types of ‘electoral democracies’ and ‘liberal democracies’ according to 
Schedler’s (1998a) re-construction of his one-dimensional continuum line of 
‘democraticness’ offered in figure 4.5. Nevertheless, it was also made clear that due 
to the evolution of the democratic performance during the last 20 years, Colombia has 
been closer to satisfying the classification of ‘liberal democracy’. Venezuela, in 
contrast, has been below the category of ‘electoral democracy’, which implies that it 
has been dangerously close to the classification of a ‘authoritarian democracy.’ Such 
difference, I argued, was what defines the process of democratic divergence followed 
by the countries under study. 
After agreeing both on the definition of democratic performance, and the process of 
democratic divergence followed by these countries during the ‘divergence period’, it 
is necessary to present the reasons why I have selected the first independent variable 
in the Circular Causality Model described in chapter 3; namely, elite political 
culture.104 
                                                 
104 Chapter 6, in turn, will provide a conceptualisation of the second set of independent variables related 
with political institutions. Particularly, that chapter will focus on the effects that Constitutional reforms 
and electoral system reforms have had to explain the divergent democratic path taken by the countries 
under study. 
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From the standpoint of Political Culture, the present chapter will examine and describe 
the causes of the process of regime change in these two countries. To do so, I will 
answer the following questions: To what extent, does political culture lead a defining 
role in the divergent democratic path of the countries under study? And, why is it 
important to focus the attention on the changes in values, beliefs, and attitudes of the 
political elites, rather than those of the masses to explain divergence? 
It is with those objectives in mind that this chapter will be organised in five sections. 
After this introduction, the second section will focus on the conceptual discussion and 
analysis of Political Culture as the first independent variable. The third section will 
conduct a literature review to evaluate the main contributions that, at a macro level, 
have been made in the field. The aim of this section is to assess the applicability of 
this approach in the explanation on how changes in political values and beliefs at the 
elite level –rather than those of the masses- may have significant implications in 
explaining the process of democratic divergence. The fourth section will narrow the 
analysis to Latin American countries. I argue that the conceptualisation of political 
culture should be treated differently from that used in Western democracies. I will 
present two reasons to support this claim. History and early socialisation are important 
components to explain processes of regime performance because political experiences 
from the past affect traditions and beliefs of different social structures in the present. 
The second reason, echoing Inglehart’s (2000) assertion, is that different historical 
accounts cause different cultural experiences in the processes of democratisation. 
Hence, cross-cultural variations –identified as materialist and post-materialist values- 
are an important source to conceptualise political culture in Latin America as they 
might help understand why elites' political traditions matter most for explaining the 
process of democratic divergence between these two countries. The last section will 
provide some concluding remarks. 
5.2. Political culture: a conceptual debate 
The Circular Causality Model presented in chapter 3–see figure 3.3- showed that ‘elite 
political culture’ is one of the independent variables meant to explain the divergent 
process of democratic performance that Colombia and Venezuela have faced during 
the last 15 years. However, because elite political culture is just one part of a broader 
theory in political culture, this section will offer a general conceptualisation of political 
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culture. It aims to understand how this concept has contributed to get a better 
understanding of democratic studies in political sciences. This will also help to 
establish links between attitudes at the mass and elite levels; not to mention, the 
implications of culture in the process of democratic performance in Latin America. 
The concept of culture, in political science, is frequently related with the literature of 
political culture, which became important in the context of post-war political 
sociology; specially, in policy initiatives intended to reproduce the conditions of 
Western democratisation abroad (Somers 1995). However, it was not until Gabriel 
Almond and Sidney Verba’s seminal book, The Civic Culture (1963) that the 
relationship between political culture and democracy began to gain ground in social 
sciences. It was considered an alternative conceptualisation to explain how political 
orientations play an important role in understanding the process of democratisation; 
all of this, through its impact on democratic institutions.105  
These scholars conceptualised the notion of political culture ‘as the particular 
distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of 
a nation’ (Almond and Verba 1963, 13). Consequently, they offered one of the most 
influential contributions of political culture by identifying a cluster of values and 
attitudes that could lead to the stabilisation and consolidation of democratic regimes. 
Additionally, they also identified and argued that different ‘countries differ 
significantly in their patterns of politically relevant beliefs, values, and attitudes and 
that within nations these elements of political culture are clearly shaped by life 
experiences, education, and social class’ (Diamond 1999, 161). In other words, that all 
social groups not necessarily share the same beliefs and values because they are 
unevenly distributed throughout the population. 
Although Civic Culture also marked a new and important route to study processes of 
democratisation in the 1960s, it lost its ground when new theoretical approaches (i.e. 
rational choice theory, behaviourism, modernisation theory, among others) introduced 
quantitative methodologies.106 Nevertheless, it was only in the 1990s with the 
                                                 
105 In fact, The Civic Culture book was the first attempt to provide a well-developed theory of political 
culture based on cross-national empirical data. 
106 Those new approaches dismissed the notion of political culture for being vague about the object of 
study and the units of analysis; for blurring the line between culture and other categories such as 
institutions and behaviour; and for failing to explain political change (Levitt 2005, 366) 
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emergence of theoretical and empirical alternatives to the process of democratic 
consolidation, rather than to the process of democratic transition, that the notion of 
political culture regained its role in the contemporary study of democracy.  
From this point, the literature in political culture, addressed a conceptual dispute about 
what is -and what is not- political culture. Ronald Inglehart intervened in this dispute 
by pioneering a cross-national research that built on, and tested, Almond and Verba’s 
assertions. In fact, in his book Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (1990), 
Inglehart offered a conceptualisation where the prevalence of specific individual 
attitudes and values such as life satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and disdain for 
revolutionary change were strongly correlated with the process of democratic 
consolidation. At the same time, he also claimed that ‘political culture may be a crucial 
link between economic development and democracy’ (Inglehart 1990, 45). Moreover, 
he argued that political culture plays a direct and important role in the development 
and maintenance of democracy; that mass values play an important part in 
strengthening democracy; and that “trust, tolerance, and feelings of efficacy represent 
‘civic virtues’ that enable democratic regimes to function effectively” (Inglehart 2005, 
157). Finally, he went even further by claiming that ‘mass values play a crucial role in 
the emergence and flourishing of democratic institutions’ (ibid.: 2). 
While this conceptual debate was taking place, other political scientists also argued 
about the relevance of the concept of ‘social capital’ and its relationship with political 
culture. The book Making Democracy Work written by Robert Putnam (1993), found 
a link between trust and the existence of a civil society (Pérez 2009, 21). This link 
explains best the performance of democratic institutions from a set of ‘civic 
community´ attributes, rather than from the traditional socio-economic development 
approach. That is, civic attributes such as participation in social affairs, conditions of 
political equality, norms of trust and solidarity and, above all, the existence of a vibrant 
civil society –which taken together form the concept of social capital- are related with 
the performance of governmental institutions.107 
Despite those important contributions, the conceptual debate is far from over. For 
instance, Ersson and Lane (2008) claimed that the notion of political culture was more 
                                                 
107 For instance, Knack (2002) found that in some American states there is ‘strong evidence that social 
capital influences governmental performance’ (Knack 2002, 782).  
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encompassing than just its traditional relation with free associations of civic virtues. 
In fact, he claims, it also covers ‘the politics of all kinds of communities, ethnics, 
religious and sex-based ones’ (ibid.: 421). In this context, political culture refers to ‘all 
human activities that relate to a group or society’s prevailing political beliefs, norms 
and values’ (Welzel and Inglehart 2011, 312). 
In the same context, Huntington’s book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking 
of Word Order (1996b) is perhaps the most prominent and polemical recent example 
of how religion might have an influence over political culturalism in political science. 
He argues that the fundamental source of conflict in the current world is not economic 
or ideological in nature, but cultural. For Huntington, each civilization has a primordial 
cultural identity, so that the ‘major differences in political and economic development 
among civilizations are clearly rooted in their different cultures’ (Huntington, 1993, 
22). At the same time, he also warns that ‘culture and cultural identities […] are 
shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War 
world […] The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of the civilizations’ 
(ibid.: 28-29). In sum, as Wedeen (2002) underlines, ‘for Huntington, culture refers to 
the purported enduring values harboured by highly integrated civilizations (or 
cultures), that is, the values, attachments, beliefs, orientations and underlying 
assumptions prevalent among people in a society’ (ibid.: 715). 
The literature review conducted above provides evidence that despite the different 
understandings of the concept, and regardless of its empirical use: ‘culture matters’ for 
political scientists. It matters in different ways across different societies, countries, and 
the purpose of scientific inquiry.108 Overall, all these understandings of political 
culture tells us two interrelated things. First, that this concept can explain the diversity 
among, and continuity within, nations and other political groups. And second, that the 
notion of political culture would provide an alternative and deeper understanding about 
the formation of political attitudes, and therefore can be regarded as a decisive 
                                                 
108 For instance, as Wedeen (2002) summed up, political culture conceptualisations have been used as 
a conceptual umbrella to cover topics as diverse as perceptions, beliefs, and values concerning 
everything political (Brown 1984, 5; Pammett and Whittington 1976, 1); as the ‘amiable peculiarities’ 
that distinguish nations (Beer, et. al., 1958, 12); as political values (Njaka 1974; Paden 1973; 
VanderMeer 1985); as ideology (Bluhm 1974); as democratic values (Rochon and Mitchell 1989); as 
resistance to indoctrination (Almond 1983; White 1984); as common knowledge (Chwe 2001); as ‘a 
socially shared and logically interrelated set of symbols, codes, and norms’ (Rogowski 1997 and Lustick 
1997); among others. 
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conceptual tool to explain processes of democratic performance, and particularly, the 
process of democratic divergence experienced by Colombia and Venezuela over the 
‘divergence period.’ 
5.3. From political culture to elite political culture 
As presented previously, the concept of political culture, in contemporary politics, 
plays an important role in the difficult task of explaining processes of democratic 
performance. Today, scholars interested in studying such processes in Western 
democracies agree that an encompassing definition of this concept is one proposed by 
Larry Diamond (1999) which claimed that political culture should be understood as 
‘people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations 
about the political system of their country and the role of the self in that system’ (ibid.: 
163). Although this research project agrees with this definition, it also claims that for 
Colombia and Venezuela the concept of elite political culture is more suitable to 
explain the causes behind their opposite democratic trajectories over the ‘divergence 
period.’ 
The argument supporting this choice is based upon the recognition that not all social 
groups share the same political culture, which is to say that values and beliefs are 
unevenly distributed throughout the population. By accepting this premise, I stress that 
in developing countries the value systems and worldviews between masses and elites 
are particularly different if they are compared against those held by the same groups 
in developed countries. This distinction is quite important to offer a conceptual 
discussion about the understanding of political culture in Latin America. This will be 
examined in the next section; however, it is worth noting in advance that when it comes 
to assess which social or political groups matter most and have the power and 
incentives to affect the level of democratic performance in the region, without doubt 
political elites is the most influential group because they have the capacity to influence 
in the way masses form their political values in developing democracies. That is, as 
McCoy (2004) nicely puts it, political elites have an important role ‘mediating political 
orientations and political learning’ (ibid.: 264). 
In fact, renown academics such as Almond and Verba (1963), Putnam (1993), 
Inglehart (1990, 2005), and Welzel, et. al. (2009, 2011), among others, have met the 
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criticism from Third World scholars. For instance, Jackman and Miller (1996) argue 
that some of the early works have focused mostly on advanced industrial societies 
overlooking how political culture might have affected developing countries. 
Consequently, Ersson and Lane (2008) argue that some of these works have led to 
dangerous generalisations, as they have tried to homogenise the role masses can play 
in the process of democratic consolidation in developing countries, omitting evidence 
that the latter countries have different value systems. 
Hence, and based on these criticisms, this research follows Wiarda´s (2001) assertion 
to identify the key players in charge of changing the democratic performance in 
developing countries. He claimed that the ´social group that led the democratic 
transition process from the authoritarian rule in Latin America was not the masses but 
the political elites´ (ibid.: 313). For this reason, Elite Political Culture will be regarded 
as one of the independent variables with explanatory power to elucidate the reasons 
behind the divergent process of democratic performance in the counties under study. 
Next section will focus on providing theoretical support for choosing this variable to 
explain democratic divergence. 
5.4. Political culture in Latin America 
As discussed earlier, the conceptualisation of political culture in Latin America should 
be discussed from a rather different perspective to the one offered by the classical and 
Western oriented perspective. The reason for this is twofold. First, history and early 
socialisation constitute a powerful determinant of culture that has different outcomes 
amongst different social groups (Diamond 1999). Therefore, historical accounts 
should be taken into consideration to understand the influence that national political 
traditions and the experience that previous political and economic regimes exerted on 
both the understanding of political culture and the configuration of the region’s social 
structure. As will be stressed later, such configuration led to a ‘special’ role of political 
elites which both shaped political culture and established a specific set of beliefs and 
behaviours that were common across the region, and, consequently, different from 
those of the Western Europe and North America. 
Second, the autonomous and enduring cross-cultural differences among countries from 
distinctive historical experiences reinforces Inglehart’s thesis of the existence of 
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cultural zones (Inglehart 2000). That is, people´s worldviews in rich countries differ 
systematically from those of low-income societies; specifically, in areas such as 
politics, religion, and social norms and beliefs. Hence, Inglehart’s cross-cultural 
variations -based on his distinction between materialist and post-materialist values109– 
are an important source to conceptualise political culture in Latin America. These two 
distinctive characteristics will help us to understand why elites' political traditions 
matter most than those from the masses to explain divergence, stability and regressions 
of the democratic systems in the region.110 
History and early socialisation 
Latin American culture is the outcome of distinctive historical trajectories followed by 
the countries in this region. In turn, these trajectories will help understand the region´s 
elite dependence, its cycles of authoritarianism, and its pronounced social inequality. 
As Htun (2000) states, the beliefs and values system in contemporary Latin America, 
which are based on Ibero-Catholic culture, still today resembles that of their Spanish 
and Portuguese conquers, rather than that of the Anglo-protestant culture of US and 
Europe (ibid.: 191). 
In fact, Latin America was a by-product of the 1500s Spanish and Portuguese conquest 
that exported its Hapsburgian model of political authority to the region.111 This model 
was characterised by feudal traditions where militaristic, absolutists, class-based, 
rigidly Catholic and orthodox, and mercantilist attitudes were the dominant traditional 
values imposed during the sixteenth century’s occupation.112 The next three centuries 
                                                 
109 For a more detail account about the difference between materialist and post-materialist values, see 
Inglehart’s paper (1988) ‘The Renaissance of Political Culture’ American Political Science Review, 
vol. 82. 
110 Although these two reasons will be treated separately in the following paragraphs, it is worth 
mentioning here that the link between them (historical accounts and its resulting distinctions on people’s 
values) seems to be a good approach to conceptualise the notion of political culture in the Latin 
American region. 
111 The Hapsburgian model refers to the political strategy developed by Spain and Portugal during the 
sixteenth century to achieve unity and centralisation. The results of the centralising, unifying steps were 
to eliminate the corporate and autonomous groups of powers in order to pave the way of a solid 
monarchy. Because of such elimination, also the hope for future Spanish and Portuguese democracy 
went away (Véliz 1980). 
112 According to Wiarda, the transference of these set of values had an impact on all areas of Latin 
American life. For instance, the political system was top-down and authoritarian. The economy was 
mercantilist, exploitive, and statist. Socially, the system was two class and hierarchical. As for religion, 
orthodox, monolithic, and absolutist were the values imposed by the Catholic Church, which at the same 
time it played the important role of being the base of all social, political, economic, and cultural beliefs. 
The educational and legal precepts also followed the precepts of the Catholic Church. Finally, 
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of colonial rule did not have a clear effect on changing the value system imposed in 
the region (Wiarda 2001). Instead, during this time those sets of traits became deeply 
rooted and were internalised generation after generation by society, becoming part of 
their everyday life. Moreover, the influence of the colonial domination from the 
Spanish and Portuguese monarchies was so powerful that they managed to isolate the 
winds of ‘cultural’ change that modern Western civilisation were trying to implement 
in Europe and North America.113  
However, it was not until the eighteenth century that the conservative, very catholic, 
monolithic, and political and economic system implemented in Latin America began 
to disintegrate due to the influence of the Enlightenment movement that used to 
dominate the world of ideas in Europe. This movement was an ideological revolution 
led by a group of more rationalistic monarchs that came to power in Spain and Portugal 
during this century. It introduced liberal reforms in order to end the abuses of the 
church and state (Htun 2000). To a certain extent these reforms were implemented 
relatively successfully in most part of the society because Latin America’s urban and 
political structures –i.e., military, church, bureaucracy and feudal elites- began 
experiencing modest strains of liberal and rationalists’ ideas. Nevertheless, people 
from the countryside remained traditional, conservative and Catholic. The asymmetry 
in Latin America political culture between peasants and those living in the cities bred 
divisions and added tensions that led to the independence from Spain and Portugal 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
Without doubt the Latin American war to win the independence was characterised by 
the challenge that liberal and republican ideologies exerted over the traditional Neo-
Scholastic orthodoxy. As a result, liberalism reached power in some countries, but 
only temporarily. Yet, after some years of independence, conservative and reactionary 
forces staged a comeback and dominated politics in most Latin American countries. 
The common factor of this period was the permanent dispute that conservative and 
liberal ideologies had in order to reach political power. In fact, from both ideologies, 
                                                 
intellectually, the system was top-down and based on root memorisation of Catholic precepts and 
deductive reasoning (Wiarda 2001, p. 346). 
113 As a matter of fact, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Western European countries were 
moving in a modern direction by different events such as the Protestant Reformation, the Enlightenment, 
and the English Revolution, which took them to an era of liberal thinking and emancipation.  However, 
none of these currents of thought had an early political socialisation in the Latin American region. 
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the liberal one was weaker making a stark contrast with its counterpart in Europe and 
North America. This feature of Latin American liberal ideology was due to its lack of 
mass support or legitimacy, the top-down hierarchical structure and elitism dominated 
by the conservatives, and because liberalism was not able to fully develop a market 
economy based on private enterprise and economic freedom. Consequently, Latin 
American liberalism died in the last decades of the nineteenth century and 
economically in the first decades of the twentieth (Htun 2000, p. 347). So, in the early 
twentieth century -after almost three centuries of colonialism and ninety years of 
independence- Latin America’s political culture still was, as Anderson (1967) 
described it, strongly shaped by Catholic political assumptions such as the supremacy 
of God and his authority; conservative, non-(even anti-) liberal; centralised, and 
therefore, mainly authoritarian; and the society was still dominated by three elite 
groups –church, oligarchy, and the military- (ibid.: 158).  
However, the political, social, economic, and cultural changes in the international 
sphere broke down Latin Americas’ isolation from the rest of the world, which 
pressured the region to change its traditional political culture system. In fact, in the 
early twentieth century and mainly with the rise of the Great Depression, new groups 
(e.g. middle class) began to clamour for a social change that enabled them to be part 
of the political system.114 Although in the 1930’s and 1940’s the working class was 
included into the political arena, its inclusion was not as smooth and quick as that the 
middle class (Johnson 1958). Presumably, there were two reasons for this. First, the 
working class was large in numbers (mass politics), and therefore, their insertion 
required a great deal of care to organise them into the system. And second, labour 
groups had a different political ideology to those held by the traditional elites.115 By 
1960s peasants were co-opted by the system which meant that political elites adopted 
                                                 
114 In this regard, according to Johnson (1958), by 1920s, in advanced countries such as Chile and 
Argentina, groups from the middle class: business, commercial, industrial, and importer-exporter 
groups were admitted into the system but as a part of the existent oligarchical elite, while in less–
industrialised countries such as Dominican Republic and Honduras these groups were absorbed into the 
system but as part of the military elite. 
115 As a matter of fact, labour groups were organised on a Marxist, syndicalist, or communist basis that 
implied a completely different political ideology to the one of the traditional-elite groups. This 
bottleneck was settled by a negotiation process where the political elites elaborated labour codes and 
new social welfare programs designed to give benefits to the organised workers in return for labour’s 
giving up its revolutionary pretentions. However, at this time in history, those radical- Marxists groups 
or union workers that neglected to accept elite’s rules were either suppressed by the government or left 
outside of the political system. 
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agrarian reforms and other agrarian programs, not so much to redistribute land but to 
absorb them into the political system and give them limited benefits as a way of 
defusing potential rural-based revolutions116 (Wiarda 2001, p. 289; Hausmann, et. al., 
2014). 
The slow and almost precarious change in the Latin American political culture was not 
only due to the pressure of social groups wishing to be part of the political system, but 
also to the changes produced by industrialisation on the value system of the population 
(Ellner, et. al. 2007). Unlike Europe and North America, where industrialisation 
started by the late nineteenth century, in Latin America urbanisation and 
industrialisation took place later; specifically, during the decades between World War 
I and II. Certainly, Industrialisation undermined earlier feudal and medieval social 
structures and gave rise to vast social changes. Thus, the Church –and its religious 
influence- was probably one of the most affected traditional institutions that underwent 
social pressure. It became less important while sentiments of indifference and 
secularism began to take over. Although the region remained nominally Catholic,117 
the downturn in religion observance had a profound effect on the social and political 
systems in Latin America (Levine 1981).118 Such subtle secular change brought 
important transformations on people’s life perceptions. Thus, increasingly new ideas 
about egalitarianism, democracy, social justice,119 and individual rights began to 
infuse Latin America by the 1950s. 
Along with the religious decay, another factor that played an important role in 
changing political culture was economics. Industrialisation brought the re-birth of 
Corporatism as political ideology, and its economic interpretation of society. The 
Corporatist economic model was seen -during the 1930s-1940s- as a third way 
between what then seemed to be a failed capitalism (liberalism) and an unacceptable 
                                                 
116 From the 1970s and continuing to the present the insertion of women and indigenous groups into the 
system has been a constant struggle in different countries with heterogeneous outcomes. 
117 According to Levine (1981), by the 1980s only 10% to 15% of Catholics actively practice their 
religion. At the same time, he also shows evidence that the number of Catholic orders, charity, 
education, hospitals, social services, and so forth went all down. 
118 The rise of secularism and eventually Protestantism and other beliefs in twentieth century had the 
long-range effect of gradually undermine the influence of the Catholic beliefs and theology that had 
long undergirded the society and polity (Levine 1981). 
119 For instance, people started questioning the old idea of a God-given hierarchy among persons, of 
natural human inequalities, that poverty is good for the soul, or that children should be malnourished 
and diseased because God had willed it that way (Wiarda 2001, 293). 
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Marxist-Leninist model of development. According to Wiarda (2001), Corporatism is 
often referred to as a conservative political philosophy that ‘would seek to ameliorate 
the problems (rootlessness and alienation) of modern mass man but without the class 
conflict of Marxism or the anarchic individualism of liberalism’ (ibid.: 250). That is, 
Corporatism sought to restore the ideas of brotherhood, social peace, community, and 
class harmony by implementing an economic model based on the growth of modern 
state planning, and social welfare programs carried out under state auspice and of the 
integration of (and control over) interest groups through top-down government 
administration (Aron 1970).120 Thus, under the influence of a Corporatist economic 
model, elites continued receiving the means by which they could control and regulate 
lower-class groups who were increasingly challenging them from below. 
Nevertheless, by early 1950s, Corporatist Latin American elites managed, only 
partially, to fulfil its more important promise of granting full inclusion of the rising 
working class into the political, social, and economic system. As a result, this failure 
brought a vast socioeconomic gap and inequality among the population. This, in turn, 
opened a window of opportunity for a brief democratic interlude which gave a renewed 
hope to liberals and democrats, an ill-functioning of the democratic and for a Fidelista 
version of Marxism (in Cuba). 
None of these three ideologies achieved a majoritarian status.121 On one hand, during 
1930s to late 1970s, the emphasis of the liberal economic model was on import-
substitute industrialisation (ISI).122 According to Buxton (2001), ‘[u]nder the ISI 
model state subsidies and protections from imports was extended to the domestic 
sector as a mode to catalysing growth’ (ibid.: 39). That is, this model sought to build 
domestic industry and reduce the dependency on imports from foreign countries. To 
do so, governments acquired a central role by taking direct actions to stabilise the 
economic cycle throughout the implementation of policies such as: (i) nationalisation, 
                                                 
120 In fact, according to Malloy, virtually every regime that came to power in Latin America in the 1930s 
and 1940s was infuse, in some way or another, with this corporatist ideology and programs. That is, it 
is impossible to understand Latin America during this period without coming to grips with the 
phenomenon of corporatism (Malloy 1977). 
121 At this respect, Wiarda argues, that in leading countries like Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and others, the 
left (Marxism) could command from 15% to 30% of the vote; the centre (Liberalism) could also get 
25% or 30%; and the right (Corporatism, conservatism, authoritarianism) the other one-third of popular 
sentiment (Wiarda 2001, 349). 
122  The countries that pursued this model with more determination were México, Argentina and Brasil, 
and in a lesser extent Colombia, Peru, Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. 
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(ii) subsidisation of vital industries, (iii) increased taxation to fund the latter, and (iv) 
protectionist trade policies. Despite the ISI strategy managed to achieve a rapid process 
of urbanisation, increasing domestic employment, and economic self-dependence; 
such results were not enough to solve the structural economic problems. 
Hence, due to the disappointing results such as inefficient and obsolete industries 
unable to compete with the new industries in developed countries, the model was 
gradually abandoned by Latin American countries in the early 1980s. The lack of 
competitiveness was accompanied by high levels of unemployment that produced 
increasing levels of inequality and poverty, and, therefore, a strong decrease in the 
region’s GDP levels (Portes, et. al., 2005). 
Because of its inefficient outcomes, a new neoliberal model of development quickly 
replaced the ISI model during the 1980s-1990s. The neoliberal model came, in part, 
by pressures from the United States and the international lending agencies arguing that 
in order to become a dynamic, growth-oriented economy in the modern, global era, 
Latin American countries had to downsize their states, privatise, cut tariffs, and enable 
market liberalisation. In other words, as Watson (2004) emphasises, neoliberalism 
implied ‘a wholesale change in the relationship between the state and society, with a 
more vigorous embrace of the market being part of a generalised withdrawal of state 
provisioning and action’ (ibid.: 165). 
The outcomes achieved by the implementation of the neoliberal model over 
democratic performance and people´s political culture can be regarded as mixed in the 
region. On the upside, it can be argued that ‘neoliberalism and market reforms 
enhanced international protection for democracy in the region’ (Weyland 2004, p. 
138), and it also brought a coherent global change involving a reorganisation of the 
state, the class structure,123 and new values for citizens (Petras 1997, 85). 
Economically, Latin America reached a much higher level of development compared 
to what it had achieved during the 1950s. Socially, with new escalators of upward 
mobility, the region was also more pluralistic than in earlier decades. And politically, 
                                                 
123  By the end of 1990s, neoliberal social programs caused that the region was 70% more urban 
compared to 70% rural only four decades earlier. It was 70% literate compare to 70% illiterate in the 
1950s (Weyland 2004, p. 148). 
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the region witnessed the birth of new dynamic political parties, labour movements, 
and technocratic elites (Wiarda 2001, 295). 
The downside, unfortunately, came from the failure of the neoliberal model to 
consolidate the social forces necessary for its stabilisation (Harris 2000).124 This 
resulted in the early onset of crises that would weaken its course. In fact, the three 
largest Latin American economies were the theatre for the most dramatic crises that 
jeopardised the hegemony of this model. The crises of Mexico in 1994, Brazil in 1999 
and Argentina in 2002 showed that neoliberalism was crumbling as it was unable to 
deliver satisfactory and definitive cures for the worrisome social and economic 
problems these countries were facing (ibid.: 325).125 Further, national debt expanded 
exponentially and regional economies became highly vulnerable, helplessly exposed 
to attack from speculators (Walton 2004). 
From the analysis conducted above it seems that history and early socialisation 
constitute powerful determinants for the conceptualisation of political culture in Latin 
America. This has shown the strategic role that a small number of political actors –i.e., 
elites- have had within Latin American society. Overall, elites were, and still are, 
capable of accommodating themselves in order to avoid losing political power by 
changing as they please the rules under which a political regime should follow. This 
is precisely the reason behind Wiarda’s suggestion to invite political scientists in the 
region to take into account –and probably study more- the key role that political elites 
have had to influence the political order across the time. In his words Wiarda claims 
that ‘the improvisations, flexibility, adaptability, remarkable survivability, and sheer 
genius that Latin American elites have shown in protecting their power structure, [have 
enabled them] to survive and thrive well during region’s history’ (Wiarda 2001, 282). 
 
                                                 
124 In fact, in most countries, the urban working class, the peasantry, the rural workers, the lower sectors 
of the salaried middle class, the members of the large informal sector, and the indigenous communities 
have been largely excluded or marginalised from the policy making process under the implementation 
of Neoliberalism (Harris 2000, 149). 
125 For instance, although the ravages of hyper-inflation were solved, this was only achieved at the cost 
of high unemployment rates; economic development –for a decade or more- was paralysed; the 
concentration of wealth grew greater than ever before; public deficits spiralled and the mass of the 
population had their rights expropriated, most notably in the domain of employment and labour 
relations. 
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Cross-cultural variations 
This project has stressed, previously, that political culture in Latin America has 
evolved throughout time towards a more emancipated and liberal society. It has been 
highlighted that the formation of both its political traditions and value systems –in its 
different geographic locations- is historical dependent. However, to achieve a 
complete conceptualisation of political culture in the region this project will establish 
an additional relationship between the autonomous and enduring cross-cultural 
differences among countries –or regions- caused by its distinctive historical accounts 
and, what Inglehart called, the existence of cultural zones. (Inglehart 2000). 
To do so, it is reasonable to ask if, as Inglehart does, culture is not a constant, but a 
system through which society adapts to its environment. This section will also ask, to 
what extent is Latin America still more authoritarian, more hierarchical, and more 
corporatist than most of Western countries and the United States?  
According to Hartz (1955), the conceptualisation of the Western European and 
American political culture may be traced back to the English common law tradition.126 
Such tradition –belonging to the dominant liberal convention- stresses that the beliefs 
and values shared by those societies are related with ideas such as limited government, 
Protestantism, individual liberty, pluralism, check and balances, the expansion of 
freedom and equality, and the separation of Church and state (ibid). Whereas, Latin 
American political culture –while similarly predominantly Western in origins- draw 
from ideas very different from those emphasised in Europe and the United States and 
gives them different meaning.127 That is, Latin American values and beliefs are more 
conservative and place more emphasis toward order, hierarchy, discipline, authority, 
elitism, non-equality, and the group or communal –rather than individual- rights for 
the society. 
In short, and to answer the questions previously asked, it can be said here –without 
surprise- that Western European and American political cultures can be regarded as 
liberals (Hartz 1995) or, even, pluralists (Dahl 1956, Lowi 1969). Therefore, these 
                                                 
126 The English tradition rely on thinkers such us Locke, Jefferson, Madison, Tocqueville, Lincoln, and 
Roosevelt. 
127 The Latin American tradition was based more on conservative thinkers such as Aristotle, Plato, 
Roman law, Augustine, Tomas Aquinas, and Spanish medievalism. 
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regions are in marked contrast with the Catholic-conservative political culture of Latin 
America. Consequently, the former political tradition is more liberal and, more 
emancipated than the latter.128 It can also be argued, however, that the differences 
between these two political traditions are less clear-cut today, and that the differences 
between the two have become even more unclear than in previous decades. In fact, 
Latin America is becoming more modern and secular; nevertheless -and despite its 
modernisation- its traditional beliefs and ideas are still conservative and powerful if 
they are compared against the value system of Western European countries and the 
United States.129 
To emphasise even more the cross-cultural differences presented above, Inglehart and 
Welzel (2005) argue that the existence of different cultural zones is not only the 
outcome of historical heritage, but also the outcome of different and uneven paces of 
economic development among countries. That is, as societies develop economically, 
their cultures tend to shift towards a more secular and emancipator direction (ibid). 
My findings, so far, support this description when I claimed that the worldview of 
Anglo-protestant and liberal people of Western European and North American 
societies are more aligned with higher GDP per capita, lower levels of poverty, more 
education, and so forth. Which, in turn, differ systematically from that of Latin 
American societies based more on Roman Catholic and conservative traditions that are 
more aligned with lower economic, cognitive and social resources. In sum, following 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) arguments, it can be argued that the conceptualisation of 
contemporary political cultures between Western societies and Latin American ones 
should be based on both the impact of socioeconomic development and society’s 
historical heritage (ibid.: 75). 
The discussion about the effects that different socio-economic development has had 
on the formation of different value systems among regions leads us to recast 
                                                 
128 By emancipatory traditions, this project is aligned with Inglehart´s and Baker´s (2000) 
conceptualisation of this concept. For them, secular or emancipatory traditions are related with those 
values that in average are held by citizens from developed societies. That is, traditions ‘associated with 
values that are increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting, and participatory’ (ibid.: 19). 
129 As a matter of fact, since the mid-twentieth century Latin America has been going through a process 
of relative modernisation in its political, ideological, and socioeconomic fundamental beliefs that have 
produced important changes. For instance, the Catholic Church is undergoing a profound 
transformation, as it no longer maintains its grip on the population as it once did; literacy rates are 
increasing; the region is more urban; the middle class has become dominant in many areas; and 
globalisation is putting new and irresistible pressures to change its traditions. 
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Inglehart’s cross-cultural variations based on his distinction between materialist and 
post-materialist values (Inglehart 1988). As this project has already explained in the 
second chapter, and confirmed in the previous section, the socio-economic 
characterisation of Latin America can be considered as a low-income region with a 
notion of political culture still dominated by materialist values. In this context, Camp 
(2001), Lagos (1997, 2001), Puddington (2007), and Smilde and Hellinger (2011), 
have found that these countries are characterised by having a set of preferences divided 
into traditional and survival values. The former set of preferences –that is traditional 
ones- emphasise values such as; religion, family, rejection of divorce, and a pro-life 
stance on abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. In addition, the latter set of values –that is 
survival ones- are characterised by having low level of subjective well-being, low 
interpersonal trust, intolerance, low support for gender equality, and is relatively 
tolerant to authoritarian governments. Consequently, the masses in developing 
countries are more focused on the struggle of economic wellbeing to secure their 
survival, than enhancing the set of values required to consolidate their democracies. 
Hence, masses are in no condition to make a significant contribution to change their 
democratic performance from electoral to liberal democracies as they are, first and 
foremost, obliged to deal with the economic uncertainties that the economic system 
cannot provide. 
Accordingly, given the impossibility masses have to influence the democratic 
performance because they have to prioritise their economic needs, a full 
conceptualisation of Latin American political culture is one in which the inclusion of 
political elites is required because their attitudes have played an important role in 
shaping the political processes throughout the region. Along this same line of thought, 
this research agrees with Muller and Seligson (1994) when they argue that a ‘useful 
new direction to take may be to shift the focus at the micro level from attitudes of the 
general public [masses] to attitudes of elites. Since elites have greater opportunity and 
ability than the general public to influence the kind of regime a country will have, 
[therefore,] their attitudes should be given special emphasis in political culture models’ 
(ibid.: 647). Hence, this section concludes by saying that the likelihood that 
divergence, maintenance and/or consolidation of Latin American democracies occurs 
will depend on the distinctive elite transformation, carried out by the elites themselves, 
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rather than on democratic preferences of the masses as is the general view of many 
analysts of political culture in Western societies.130 
5.5. Conclusion and discussion 
In this chapter I first dealt with the conceptualisation of the notion of political culture, 
which represents the first independent and explanatory variable in the Circular 
Causality Model proposed in the third chapter. Here, I offered a two-fold analysis. 
First, an overall conceptualisation derived from the contributions of the main scholars 
that have been working on the notion of political culture in explaining how this concept 
contributes to a better understanding on topics related with processes of democratic 
performance, was presented. This analysis provided evidence that culture matters 
despite its different conceptualisations, and regardless of its empirical use. It also 
showed that for political scientists culture matters as a concept that can explain the 
diversity among, and continuity within the democratic performance of different 
regimes and other political groups. In this regard, not all social groups share the same 
political culture and their values and beliefs are evenly distributed through the 
population. By accepting this premise, I assessed the differences in the value systems 
and worldviews between masses and elites -held by the same groups- in developed and 
developing countries. Consequently, I claimed that this distinction is quite important 
to offer a conceptual discussion about the understanding of political culture in Latin 
America and to explain the democratic divergence experienced by Colombia and 
Venezuela. 
The fourth part of this chapter focussed on describing, from a historical, political 
socialisation and cross-cultural perspective, the evolution of the notion of political 
culture since colonisation until today. Here, it was stressed that without any doubt the 
political culture from the early centuries has changed dramatically compare that in the 
modern era. For instance, Latin American political culture in early nineteenth century 
                                                 
130 The main scholar defending the important role masses play in developed societies to consolidate 
democracy is Inglehart (see for instance: The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles 
Among Western Publics (1977); ‘The Renaissance of Political Culture.’ (1988); Culture Shift in 
Advanced Industrial Society (1990); ‘Postmaterialism’ (1991); ‘Culture and Democracy,’ (2000). Also 
see some of his co-authored books and articles: ‘Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence 
of Traditional Values,’ (2000); and Modernisation, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human 
Development Sequence (2005). However, this project aims to specify the idea of political culture and 
focus on elite political culture instead of mass political culture to explain democratic divergence as it is 
suggested by Muller and Seligson (1994). 
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can be described as rural, static, Catholic, closed, strictly hierarchic, and relying on 
values of obedience, order and discipline. Public opinion surveys such as, 
Latinobarometro (2009) and Freedom House (2009) have revealed that today’s Latin 
American Political Culture has evolved and can be associated with a more liberal, 
pluralistic, democratic, and socially just society, however, it cannot be regarded as an 
emancipated society such as those in Western countries. 
In other words, as Wiarda emphasises, ‘the old and ‘parochial’ political cultures that 
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba found in Latin America five decades ago are now 
giving way to a more participatory democracy, and –in some way- more liberal 
political culture’ (Wiarda 2001, 296). Nevertheless, today, and despite this positive 
evolution, political culture in the region is still conservative in its essentials and 
remains often top-down in its hierarchy, with authoritarian attitudes, organic, elitist, 
centralised, statist, conformist, with Catholic traditions, and group –rather than 
individual- oriented. 
The previous characterisation of Latin American political culture allowed me to claim 
that political elites have been the main figures that have played an important role and 
clear influence in the formation of such political tradition in Latin America. Because 
the masses have been more focused on the struggle for economic wellbeing and their 
survival, rather than enhancing the set of values required to consolidate their 
democracies that would allow them to make further progress in their democratic 
performance, political elites have been crucial. Hence, the divergent democratic paths 
of Colombia and Venezuela depends on the distinctive and transformative role that 
elites have carried out, rather than on the democratic preferences of the masses as is 
the general view from scholars that have studied the processes of democratisation in 
Western societies. 
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Chapter 6 
Which types of political institutions? Conceptualising the second set 
of independent variables 
6.1. Introduction 
As discussed earlier, to explain the drivers that have caused Venezuela and Colombia 
to take opposite democratic paths over the ‘divergence period’, I merged two important 
and contested theories; namely, Institutional and Political Culture approaches into the 
Circular Causality Model proposed. The aim of this chapter is to analyse and identify 
a subset of political institutions from those proposed by Lijphart (2009, 2012) that 
presumably have explanatory power to assess democratic divergence. 
To address this task, I will use the definition of political institutions proposed by Peters 
(1998) which claims that institutions are ‘a set of values on the basis of which 
member´s decisions and behaviours are shaped,’ (ibid.: 308). In other words, 
institutions have a ‘logical adaptation’ to the political process. The interesting feature 
of this definition is that it moves away from what had been commonly known as simple 
formal structures or procedural rules without possibilities of change. Conversely, in 
this chapter I will claim that political institutions should be conceived as a set of 
variables that cause an effect on democratic divergence, but with the needed 
intervention of political actors that have the power, the incentives, and the interest to 
change the way those institutions work in practice. 
Thus, this chapter is meant to answer the following two core questions: (i) which type 
of key political institutions –combined with changes in the political culture at the elite 
level- have triggered democratic divergence? And (ii) what has the criteria been to 
select them? Although I will critically argue against the selection of Lijphart´s 
institutional criteria, section 6.2 will focus mainly on his central contribution, as it will 
serve as a cornerstone to explain democratic performance. Thus, by reviewing 
Lijphart´s (1999, 2012) contested typologies, namely: majoritarian and consensus 
democracies, I present his contributions to democratic theory by explaining how such 
typologies can be used to distinguish different patterns of democracy and its effects on 
the democratic performance in developed societies. 
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In section 6.3, I present some of the criticisms made by Bogaards (2000), Schmidt 
(2000), Cranenburgh, et. al. (2004), among others, to Lijphart´s institutional approach. 
I will argue that although Lijphart’s criteria to classify majoritarian and consensus 
democracies are helpful to explain processes of democratic performance mainly in 
develop countries, his approach it is not fully convincing to explain the same 
phenomenon in less developed countries. Departing from the criticism conducted by 
the scholars mentioned above, the remainder of this section will provide an adaptation 
to Lijphart’s institutional setting so that it can explain the democratic divergence 
experienced by Colombia and Venezuela. To do so, I select a subset of key political 
institutions –from those proposed by Lijphart- and clarify why they can play a 
significant role in explaining democratic divergence. I claim that the full set of political 
institutions suggested by Lijphart does not have the same relative weight to explain 
democratic divergence in these two countries. Hence, I propose a two story 
institutional building, as opposed to the Lijphart´s 10 story building, where 
constitutions and electoral systems are the key political criteria over which political 
elites exerted a profound reform over the ‘divergence period’ that brought a shift in 
the democratic performance of these two countries.131 Then, I will argue that these two 
institutions are the key criteria because they have a higher explicative weight to 
connect the actions of political elites and structural changes which led the countries 
under study to follow divergent democratic paths. 
Once I have justified the choice of political institutions, section 6.4 will conduct a 
comparative analysis of each of the two political institutions over the two period of 
analyses i.e., ‘transitional period’ Vs. ‘divergence period’. I will argue that these 
polities reached their divergent point in democratic performance by the beginning of 
the ‘divergence period’ when renewed political elites decided to conduct not just a 
simple institutional engineering but instead a comprehensive reform on both 
constitutions and electoral systems. Thus, subsection 6.4.1 will offer a comprehensive 
explanation of how both the constitutional reforms conducted by Colombia and 
Venezuela, and the accumulation of power achieved by Presidents Chávez and Uribe 
                                                 
131 Lijphart´s typology will be summarised in the next section; however, it is worth mentioning here that 
the 2 political institutions picked by this study to explain the process of democratic divergence for the 
cases in question are one from the federal-unitary dimension: Constitutions; and the other one from the 
executive-party dimension: electoral systems. The justification of this selection is by no means arbitrary 
and will be explained in section 6.4. 
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that arose from the use of decree powers and granted by the enactment of new 
constitutions can be regarded as explicative variables triggering the divergent path 
over the ‘divergence period’.132 To this end, I will analyse, from a comparative 
standpoint, the provisions enacted in their old constitutions (1886 in Colombia and 
1961 in Venezuela) against those enacted in their new constitutions (1991 in Colombia 
and 1999 in Venezuela) in three fronts: electoral reforms, power distribution reforms, 
and policy-making reforms, respectively. Additionally, I will analyse how the use of 
decree powers by Presidents Chávez and Uribe in the form of either State of 
Emergency or Enabling laws, as provisions granted by the new constitutions allowing 
the concentration of power in the executive branch of government, can also be 
understood as variables to explain democratic divergence. Subsection 6.4.2, in turn, 
will place emphasis on the role exerted by electoral reforms to shift the democratic 
trend these countries used to follow over the ‘transitional period’. That is, I will argue 
that among the constitutional reforms conducted over the ‘divergence period’, 
particularly those regarding the electoral system has a greater explanatory power to 
elucidate the changes in the democratic performance in both countries.133  
Finally, section 6.5 concludes by saying that the subset of institutional criteria: 
Constitutional and electoral systems are variables with the highest explicative power 
to offer a good explanation of the divergent democratic process faced by Colombia 
and Venezuela over the ‘divergence period’. Nevertheless, I will also offer a note of 
caution by emphasising that the effects of these variables on democratic performance 
may have been due to the incentives and power political elites have to change the way 
institutions operate. Hence, it is not possible to think of institutional reforms as an 
isolated effect, it is imperative that the strategic role played by political elites play a 
                                                 
132 It is important to note here that unlike many Latin American countries that carried out changes in 
their constitutions from 1970s onwards, the cases of Colombia and Venezuela are sui generis in the 
sense that at the beginning of the ‘divergence period’ they conducted a comprehensive reform to their 
whole constitutions instead of just conducting partial amendments as many countries in the regions did. 
This is a significant issue to consider as it explains the nature of the institutional, political and economic 
crises these polities were facing at the end of the ´transitional period´ which, in turn, urged these polities 
to implement a complete reform to their institutional setting in order to avoid a state failure. 
133 As will be explained later, this is because after conducting a comparative analysis of the different 
electoral reforms enacted by Colombia and Venezuela, there would be qualitative evidence to show 
that, from 2002 -and for the first time in history-, Colombia was placed above Venezuela in terms of its 
democratic performance. I claim this occurred due to the decisive role exerted by the enactment of both 
electoral reforms in Venezuela and Colombia in 1999 and 2003 respectively. 
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decisive role to make institutional change possible which, in turn, affects democratic 
performance. 
6.2. Political institutions: a conceptual debate 
Scholars supporting the institutional framework argue that people learn to value 
democracy by living under democratic institutions for many years (Rustow 1970). 
Others claim that it is possible to shape a society by shaping its institutions –which 
means that political scientists can provide a quick fix for most problems (Welzel and 
Inglehart 2009). Overall, the central assumption of the institutional explanation 
postulates that living under democratic institutions causes the emergence of pro-
democratic values to emerge among the public. That is, ‘society’s prior democratic 
experience has the stronger causal effect on its mass culture’ (Inglehart 2005, 173). 
One of the most prominent supporters of institutionalism in the area of comparative 
politics is Arend Lijphart; particularly for his seminal book Patterns of Democracy 
(1999 and 2012). Lijphart´s innovative contribution offers a model134 that 
differentiates between two ideal types of regimes: consensual and majoritarian 
democracies that differ from each other through ten institutional criteria.135 Thus, 
Lijphart’s democratic characterisation can be regarded as a useful typology not just to 
operationalise two very different normative understandings of democratic decision-
making, but also to explain the influence that a set of political institutions might have 
over the type and performance of any democratic regime. 
According to Lijphart (1999) consensus democracy is recommended for any type of 
society, divided or not, due to dispersion of power is its salient characteristic. As 
                                                 
134 This model was first outlined in 1994 by Lijphart in his book Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian 
and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries; and then further developed in Lijphart´s book 
Patterns of Democracy (1999). The last version of this book was published in 2012. It updated the study 
of the cases with more and reliable information, but the main findings remain unchanged from his 
previous version. 
135 Arend Lijphart built his model showing that consensus and majoritarian democracies differ along 
two dimensions, each of which has five political institutions or criteria. The first five criteria belonging 
to the ‘executive/parties dimension’ that promote the majoritarian type of democracy rest on: single-
party government, cabinet dominance, a two-party system, a majoritarian electoral system –First-past-
the-post (FPTP) system-, and interest-group pluralism. Whilst the second set of institutions associated 
with the ‘federal-unitary dimension’ –also to promote majoritarian democracies- rely on the following 
five criteria: a unitary and centralized government, a unicameral legislature, constitutional flexibility, 
the absence of judicial review, and a central bank controlled by the executive. The opposite criteria 
promote consensus democracy and altogether favour the creation of multiple checks and balances, as 
well as the dispersion of power. 
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Mainwaring (2001) stresses: ‘a simple majority should not govern in an unfettered 
fashion’ (ibid.: 171). Put differently, given the conflict of interests that heterogeneous 
societies face, ‘government ‘by and for the people’ must mean not simply government 
by the majority of the people, but by as many people as possible’ (Cranenburgh, et al. 
2004, 281 original emphases). Hence, power sharing is the main principle behind 
consensual democracies. Conversely, majoritarian democracies are meant to 
concentrate power in few institutions and individuals creating sharp divisions between 
those who hold power and those who do not. 
Lijphart’s analysis on the performance of these two types of democracies led him to 
the conclusion that consensus democracy is a superior form of democracy, and 
therefore, ‘it becomes simply the best model for every country’ (Bogaards 2000, 
414).136 Hence, consensus democracy is a typology that most likely would guaranty 
the process of democratic consolidation in divided societies. Thus, Lijphart regards 
consensus democracies as the ‘kinder and gentler’ form of government and 
recommends the adoption of its institutional setting in any political regime that has the 
possibility to alter its basic framework (Lijphart 1999, 301). 
Consequently, Lijphart´s contribution can be regarded as a useful typology to analyse 
processes of democratisation in established regimes.137 Its usefulness lies, as Lehnert 
(2007) stresses, in that it is ‘[a] conceptual tool to simplify and order complex social 
phenomena such as [those concerning] political systems’ (ibid.: 62). In fact, it seems 
that the majoritarian/consensual typology offered by Lijphart met that purpose and, 
therefore, can be considered as both a tool to categorise democracies, and also to 
explain the processes followed by divided polities that have reached their transition 
and are seeking for their consolidation through the implementation of consensual 
institutions. 
                                                 
136 In fact, Lijphart concludes that, in terms of policy performance, majoritarian democracies do not do 
better than consensus democracies, particularly in terms of macroeconomic management (that is, the 
record of inflation, unemployment, and economic inequality) and the control of violence. Furthermore, 
consensus democracies clearly outperform majoritarian democracies, particularly in terms of 
democratic quality as it is more egalitarian (i.e. by generating a larger proportion of women in elected 
office, greater party competition, higher voting turnout, and stronger public satisfaction with 
democracy). 
137 Lijphart´s theory is far more encompassing and cannot be done justice to summarise it in a few 
paragraphs. However, it is expected that this summary has pointed out his most important and general 
findings.  
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6.3. Criticism on Lijphart´s institutional approach 
In the introduction of this chapter I claimed that this research project will only use as 
the second independent variable only a subset of political criteria from the full set 
proposed by Lijphart. To adequately choose such subset of variables, I depart from the 
criticism that scholars such as Bogaards (2000); Schmidt (2000); Mainwaring (2001); 
Amyot (1985); among others, have made to Lijphart’s typology. For instance, they 
critically ask whether each of the 10 institutional criteria proposed by Lijphart have 
the same explanatory power to analyse any process of regime change, namely: 
transition, consolidation and/or democratic divergence. Or, if is it possible that 
Lijphart´s institutional choice might only be useful to explain the dichotomy between 
majoritarian/consensual democracies but not to explain other type of democratic 
performance. 
Consequently, handful scholars have argued that Lijphart´s typology needs to be re-
constructed to increase its explanatory power. Thus, Mainwaring (2001) argues that 
Lijphart’s measurements of his institutional criteria are rather subjective as ‘he selects 
some institutions [criteria] on which consensus democracy has a clear advantage but 
not [those] that favours majoritarian democracies’ (ibid.: 171). Similarly, Amyot 
(1985) and Schmidt (2000) suggested that Lijphart’s selection of subjective criteria is 
not only misleading, but ‘idealistic’ in that they were assigned the same relative 
weights in the definition of his models of democracy. Bogaards (2000), on the other 
hand, argues that serious conceptual flaws plagued the concept of consociationalism. 
This is because Lijphart is not able to offer a clear-cut definition among three of the 
most important concepts used within his theory; namely, the notion of consensus 
democracy, the narrower and earlier concept of consociational democracy,138 and the 
notion of power-sharing.139 Hence, Bogaards claims, consociationalism can be 
                                                 
138 Consensus democracy, explained in the previous section, was a by-product of Lijphart´s (1977) 
previous work in which introduced the concept of consociational democracy. The main purpose of 
consociationalism was to emphasise the importance of certain institutional arrangements that could help 
to maintain democratic stability in heterogeneous societies. It included ‘the existence of coalition 
governments, minority veto rights, Proportional Representation (PR) in public offices, and self-
governing autonomy in territorial communities’ (Norris 2008, 4). In sum, Lijphart regarded 
consociational democracy as the solution for those countries in which majoritarian democracy might 
not work due to deep divisions in their societies. 
139 Lijphart’s reply to Bogaards’ criticism was that these three concepts were synonymous. For a more 
comprehensive understanding over the heated debate between these two scholars see: Bogaards, 
Matthijs. (2000). ‘The Uneasy Relationship between Empirical and Normative Types in Consociational 
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regarded as a complementary but incongruent normative typology to study processes 
of democratic performance. 
From a prescriptive value of the majoritarian-consensus distinction, Andeweg (2000) 
–referring to the advantages of Consociationalism over Consensualism- argues that the 
validity of Lijphart´s typology should be debated not in terms of its contribution to 
political sciences, but in the reasons behind ‘[the selection] of countries, the concepts, 
the causes, and the consequences associated with the use of Consociationalism [as a 
theory to explain democratic performance]’ (ibid.: 509). In other words, what 
Andeweg implies is that Lijphart´s approach is incapable of capturing patterns of 
democracy beyond the scope of the OECD world. Shortly after, Andeweg (2001) 
continued with the criticism on Lijphart’s main hypothesis by arguing that Lijphart´s 
decisive factor on selecting his ten criteria was a way of justifying his normative bias 
toward power-sharing arrangements. 
In a slightly different fashion from the previous criticism, Fortin (2008) challenged the 
applicability of Lijphart´s typology arguing that it is unsuccessful to replicate in 
different cultural settings compared to those selected in his work.140 Thus, Fortin 
concludes that a different institutional engineering is required to explain the process 
of regime performance that is not contemplated in the country selection of Lijphart’s 
work. Spinner (2007) also argues that the process of building or adapting new 
institutions after the dissolution of the Soviet Union –as his case selection included 
East Germany and Hungary- do not fit with Lijphart´s majoritarian/consensus 
framework. Thus, Spinner´s work claimed that ‘elite political culture is not 
consensualist despite the largely consensus-democratic institutional setup’ (ibid.: 10) 
because political institutions are shape by collective memories of ‘deep impact 
historical junctures’ (ibid.: 12).141 
                                                 
Theory’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 12: 395-423; and Lijphart, Arend (2000) ‘Definitions, 
Evidence, and Policy: A response to Matthijs Bogaards’ Critique’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4, 
pp. 425-31. 
140 In fact, in an attempt to replicate Lijphart´s findings on East European new democracies Fortin (2008) 
argues that Lijphart´s majoritarian/consensus classification cannot be equally applied to post-
communist countries because the relationships between institutions and the two dimensions take 
opposite directions. For example, a multi-party system is positively correlated with executive 
dominance, reversing the findings proposed by Lijphart. 
141 Like Fortin (2008), Croissant and Schächter (2009) –analysing several Asian democratic regimes- 
found no evidence that these polities might support Lijphart´s Consensualist hypothesis. After applying 
Lijphart´s institutional setting, over nine Asian polities –except for the interest group system criterion, 
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More recently, Doorenspleet and Pellikaan (2013) also joined the discussion over the 
pros and cons of implementing Lijphart´s typology. Although they acknowledge 
Lijphart´s dominant position in the study of processes of democratisation, they 
critically argue that the impact of the different institutional criteria to explain 
democratic performance is unclear. Hence, they propose ‘to combine the theoretical 
and conceptual knowledge from Lijphart´s [1960s] earlier work […] with his more 
recent work [1990s]’ (ibid.: 239). From this novel methodological exercise, they offer 
a new typology of democratic regimes which is used to depict a cube with eight 
different types of democracy. The three-dimensional figure, in turn, assesses three 
institutional criteria (electoral systems, political systems, and social structure) that 
contradict each other when Lijphart´s approach is used to explain democratic quality 
and performance. They conclude that among the three institutional choices, the type 
of electoral system is the most important to determine a regime´s democratic 
performance (ibid.: 260). However, they also argue in favour of considering both the 
type of political system (i.e., centralisation or decentralisation), and the structure of 
the society (homogeneous or heterogeneous) in order to achieve ‘the highest level of 
governance’ (ibid.: 261). 
The last criticism to be considered is made by Cranenburgh, et. al. (2004). Like 
Schmidt (2000), she also states that the consensual appearance of democracy based 
solely on formal institutional criteria can be misleading. She claims that, for the South 
African case, the party system affects the meaning of the other institutional criteria, 
meaning that Lijphart´s criteria should be assigned a relative weight. Additionally, she 
claims that the ‘distinction between consensus and majoritarian systems overstates the 
importance of formal institutions, especially if applied to the countries in the Third 
World’ (Cranenburgh, et. al., 2004, 282 emphasis added). As a matter of fact, this 
criticism aims to emphasize that less formal political variables are more important in 
                                                 
the authors found that neither the executive-parties nor the federal-unitary dimensions can be found in 
these cases. Instead, they found that some criteria from the first dimension (e.g., number of parties), 
seem to be connected to criteria of the second dimension (e.g., level of decentralisation or governmental 
system). That is, ‘single criterion show negative correlations and thus do not go together in Asia’ (ibid 
(2009) in Bormann 2010, 6). Therefore, the authors argue that this finding is not plausible within 
Lijphart´s theoretical framework as each institutional criterion from each of the two dimensions should 
be independent from each other. In turn, they argued that what explains democratic performance is the 
influence of contextual factors (i.e. historical factors) and elites trying to secure power positions against 
challenges, not the design of a particular institutional typology such as the one proposed by the 
consensual theory. 
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establishing democratic regimes than the formal institutional arrangement put forward 
by Lijphart. In sum, as Schmidt does, she also contends that in order to understand 
how a political system actually works, the formal criteria used to distinguish between 
the two types of democracy should be given a relative weight. 
Overall, the criticism on Lijphart’s consensus theory can be summed up in three main 
aspects. First, the theoretical framework seems to work better in regimes that have 
made either a successful transition towards democratic consolidation or those that are 
considered as stable democracies (i.e., OECD countries). This makes it difficult to 
generalise Lijphart´s institutional setting in newly democratising states, as well as 
those facing processes of democratic divergence. Second, and maybe most 
importantly, Lijphart’s framework lacks a differentiating factor in terms of the relative 
weight that each of his 10 formal criteria should have when studying patterns of 
democracy in developing countries. And thirdly, the lack of relevance that Lijphart 
gives to the influence that other less formal independent variables might have to track 
patterns of democratic performance in non-stable regimes. On this issue, Cranenburgh 
(2006) states that for sub-Saharan African countries –such as Namibia- ‘political 
culture and elite behaviour [...] should count as the most important variables in 
[dominant one-party] system[s]’ (ibid.: 601). I will argue, echoing Cranenburgh’s 
assertion, that less formal variables like culture and elite behaviour can be put together 
along with the formal criteria put forwarded by Lijphart to explain the process of 
democratic divergence that Colombia and Venezuela faced over the ‘divergence 
period’. 
Undoubtedly, Lijphart´s typology should be recognised as a big contribution to the 
political science as his work has provided a compelling theory that does explain 
processes of democratic consolidation for established democracies (Kaiser 1997). 
Ironically, however, his typology –following Cranenburgh, et. al. (2004), Schmidt 
(2000), and Bogaards (2000) criticism on Lijphart´s work- fell short as it became 
difficult to generalise the institutional setting in countries that have not reached a 
complete democratic transition or undergone processes of democratic divergence. 
Drawing from the above criticism, and based on both Goodin´s (1996) idea about 
institutional reform, where it is claim that the likelihood of building new or changing 
old institutions depends on a deliberate decision made by strategic actors with political 
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power,142and Cranenburgh´s, et. al. (2004) idea about the relative weight Lijphart´s 
institutional criteria should have, section 6.4 will offer a conceptual analysis of how 
political elites in Colombia and Venezuela consciously focused their reform efforts or 
gave more relatively importance to 2 out of the 10 Lijphart´s key institutional 
criteria.143 
6.4. A comprehensive reform of the state to explain democratic 
divergence in Colombia and Venezuela 
The aim of this section is to claim that the strategic choices made by political elites to 
overcome the deep political turmoil and institutional decay that were compromising 
the democratic survival of Colombia and Venezuela at the end of the ‘transitional 
period’ were focused on conducting not just a simple institutional engineering but a 
complete reform of the state; which implied reforming the very nature of two key 
political institutions/criteria. That is, the reform of both constitutions, and the electoral 
systems should be understood as the institutional criteria to be amended by political 
elites in order to achieve a transformation of the performance of their political 
regimes.144 Additionally, this section will also argue that the comprehensive 
institutional reform carried out over these regimes set a turning point in which both 
polities took different democratic trajectories. In other words, the onset of the 
‘divergence period’ for the countries under study can be explained by the institutional 
                                                 
142 Goodin (1996) not only focused his attention on this reason to explain the causes of building new 
and/or change old political institutions: He also provided two more arguments to support the importance 
of conducting institutional engineering. The first one argues that institutions are the result of an 
accidental process whereby the interaction among them can lead to the formation of a new type of 
unforeseen institutions. The second one is that institutional change may also be the result of evolutionary 
factors. That is, political institutions that have adapted to the diverse phases of social development are 
the ones who will survive in time through a type of selective mechanism. However, this project aligns 
with the reason given above because it is in accordance with the rationale offered by the Circular 
Causality Model in which the causality arrow between the independent variables goes from the power 
political elites must change or reform political institutions in explaining democratic divergence. 
143 At this point it is worth mentioning that section 6.4 will focus only on the conceptualisation of the 
second set of independent variables: constitutions and electoral systems. As discussed in the 
introduction, this research believes that these 2 institutional criteria might provide insights to explain 
the process of democratic divergence for the cases under study. The conceptualisation of the first 
independent variable: that is, elite political culture was already conducted in chapter 5. 
144 Drawing on both Schmidt (2000) and Cranenburgh, et. al.´s (2004) criticism on Lijphart´s work, this 
project assigned a higher weight to these two institutional criteria because I claim that through their 
comprehensive reform led the countries under study down to their divergent democratic paths. 
However, it is also worth noting that these key criteria would also influence the functioning of the 
remaining eight criteria proposed by Lijphart. 
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reform leaded by renewed political elites over the discussed two key political 
institutions (see figure 3.3). 
Thus, this section will conduct a comparative analysis on the above-mentioned 
institutional criteria and their evolution over both the ‘transitional and the divergence’ 
periods. These two criteria, will be separately explained in two subsections in order to 
show how the amendment of the former in both countries at the beginning of the 
‘divergence period’ will have a direct effect on the reform of the latter. This section 
will conclude by saying that the reform of both criteria has explanatory power to 
explain democratic divergence. 
6.4.1. Constitutions 
Constitutions are usually regarded as institutional frameworks providing the ‘rules of 
the game’ that structure the political regime, and as a system of incentives concerning 
government formation. Scholars, such as Negretto (2013) argue that written 
constitutions are instruments that ‘regulate[s] the basic structure of the state and the 
political regime, which includes the channels of access to principal government 
positions, the allocation of powers among different branches and levels of government, 
and fundamental individual rights’ (ibid:, 5). Similarly, Quisbert (2012) claims that a 
‘political constitution is a positive supreme legal norm governing the organisation of 
the state, which establishes the authority, the way that authority is exercised, the 
checks and balances over the public institutions, defining the fundamental rights and 
duties of citizens, and a tool that ensures people’s political and civil freedoms’ (ibid.: 
3, my translation). Similarly, other scholars such as Ackerman (2000); Fox, et. al. 
(1992); Schmidt (2000) and Cranenburgh, et. al. (2004) also endorses the idea that 
constitutions should be conceived as: (i) the essential tool to create conditions under 
which governments will continue to rule, and (ii) the conditions by which a nation can 
determine its democratic path. Unlike Lijphart (1999), these scholars conceive 
constitutions as more than just another institutional criterion by suggesting that it 
should hold the biggest relative weight among other political institutions in order to 
explain the process of democratic divergence in Colombia and Venezuela.  
As it was already suggested, Colombia and Venezuela –before the enactment of their 
new constitutions (i.e., at the end of the ‘transitional period’) were under severe strain 
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as they were suffering from structural problems (e.g. economic, political and social) 
that could have led them to be consider as failed states. This research argues that these 
issues can be understood as a contingent juncture that forced political elites to react 
and respond. The response triggered a constitutional reform aiming to contain the 
economic disarray, the political violence, and the social unrest that citizens of these 
polities were facing by the end of the 1980s (Buxton 2005; Lopez Maya, et. al., 2011). 
Hence, the enactment of these new constitutions was the result of political bargaining 
between the traditional elites and new political actors who felt the social pressure and 
ineffectiveness of successive governments. They seized the opportunity to lay down a 
new set of normative principles, expressed in constitutional reforms, that were 
expected to have a direct influence over the democratic path taken by Colombia and 
Venezuela over the ‘divergence period’. 
To justify the premise that constitutional reforms is one of the explicative variables 
triggering the divergent path of Colombia and Venezuela´s democracies, I will offer a 
comparative analysis for each of the cases. The analysis will be based on the distinction 
of three fundamental criteria of constitutional reform that political elites primarily 
focused on. Thus, subsections 6.4.1.1 and 6.4.1.2 will show that Colombia and 
Venezuela´s constitutional reforms –and further amendments- focused on criteria such 
as: electoral reforms, power distribution reforms, and policy-making reforms in order 
to offer an alternative set of tools to address and solve the challenges and problems 
both countries faced by the end of the ‘transitional period’.145 However, it is worth 
mentioning that these three criteria are not exhaustive in terms of the scope of the 
constitutional reform but are sufficient to indicate that their reform helped, in part, to 
explain the outcome of the process of democratic divergence achieved by the countries 
under study over the ‘divergence period.’146 Finally, subsection 6.4.1.3 will focus on 
explaining how the use of decree powers by Presidents Chávez and Uribe over the 
‘divergence period’ affected negatively the democratic performance of both countries. 
It will argue that the overall effect was more harmful for Venezuela’s than for 
                                                 
145 The selection of these three criteria to pursue a constitutional reform are by no means arbitrary, they 
represent the main issues over which the regimes under study were losing legitimacy by the end of the 
1980s, and, therefore, are the ones that political elites had to reform or amend in order to avoid the 
collapse of their democracies. 
146 Appendix 2 will offer a set of four tables showing in detail the type of constitutional reforms that 
cover these criteria. 
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Colombia’s political system. This is because the former regime was less vigilant than 
the latter in controlling the accumulation of power of the executive branch.  
6.4.1.1 Constitutional reform and further amendments in Colombia: 
comparing the features and performance of the ‘transitional period’ 
and the ‘divergence period’ 
The 1991 Colombian constitution was the outcome of a lengthy process of deliberation 
whose delegates147 had the mandate –throughout a Constituent Assembly148- to reform 
the constitution of 1886 that had failed to provide strong democratic institutions in 
order to overcome (i) the perplexing crises and (ii) the political exclusion caused by 
the legacy of bipartisanship labelled as the ‘National Front149’ Therefore, the aim of 
such compelling reform was to ‘endow the country with modern democratic 
institutions designed to foster greater participation [and inclusiveness] in the 
democratic process, to strength the rule of law in a country where the proliferation of 
political violence had corroded Colombian political and legal institutions, and to 
secure a firm ground for human rights with mechanisms to protect these rights' (Fox, 
et. al. 1992). As a result, the whole renovation of the political structure conducted 
throughout the 1991 constitution ‘strengthened the checks and balances of the political 
system in an effort to endow political institutions with greater legitimacy after decades 
of limited participation and low representation’ (Cardenas, et. al., 2008). Thus, the 
enactment and implementation of the new set of rules in the new constitution can be 
regarded as a good example of what Noguera-Fernandez (2011) has called a 
                                                 
147 These delegates were chosen through direct elections pursuant to a national referendum. 
148 The composition of this Assembly reflected the national commitment to inject a higher and broader 
degree of participation and inclusiveness into the traditional framework of Colombian government. In 
fact, this Assembly was composed of 70 representatives elected in December 1990 under new electoral 
rules designed to be fairer to left wing parties, former guerrilla movements (e.g., M-19 and EPL), and 
minority groups that never had a real chance to be part of the government (Yarbo 1991). The 
composition of this institution also indicates the renewal of the political elites that used to rule the 
country over the ‘transitional period.’ In fact, this Constituent Assembly was created with a pluralist 
‘spirit’ to include all the factions that the ‘National front pact’ excluded since 1950s. 
149 For a more compelling conceptualisation of the origin and effects over the legal, economical, and 
political impact this kind of political settlement brought about to Colombia please refer to chapter 2, 
section 2.2. 
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‘progressive constitution’ which, in turn, served as a model for other polities in the 
region to conduct their own constitutional reforms or updates.150 
Thus, the progressiveness of the Colombian constitution will be studied by using the 
three criteria mentioned above: electoral reforms, power distribution reforms, and 
policy-making reforms. Table 6.1 shows in detail these criteria in a comparative 
fashion and analyses how these reforms were enforced over the ‘divergence period’ 
using the 1991 constitution and further amendments against the provisions 
contemplated by the old 1886 constitution during the ‘transitional period’. 
Table 6.1 clearly shows that the inclusiveness and procedural features included in the 
1991 constitution are, without doubt, some of the distinctive and more outstanding 
characteristics of this institutional reform. In fact, the provisions contemplated in the 
electoral reform (see first row in table 6.1) were an attempt to curtail the concentration 
of power that the executive branch of government used to have when the bipartisan 
tradition ruled the country over the whole ‘transitional period.’ For instance, the 
control over the executive branch increased due to various reforms. First, by changing 
the electoral formula to elect the president from the plurality method to the majority 
runoff method. Second, by adding a proscription of presidential re-election; and third, 
by changing the mechanisms to appoint governors, mayors and the vice-president that 
went from direct appointment by the president to popular election. Additionally, the 
electoral formula to elect the legislature was also changed. Colombia, over the whole 
‘transitional period’ and the first part of the ‘divergence period’ (until 2002) had a 
semi-proportional system that used the Hare quota system151 and largest reminders to 
                                                 
150 In fact, the successful implementation of the new and progressive Colombian constitution served as 
a benchmarking model for the constitutional design followed by other Latin American countries that 
were keen to reform or update their old constitutions. Thus, the cascade effect caused by the enactment 
of new constitutions in the region by the late twentieth and early twenty-first century gave rise to what 
is known today as: ‘Latin American Neo-constitutionalism.’ This concept refers to no less than a 
decision made by some states to take distance from the western classic constitutionalist models on which 
most of the Latin American countries used to relied on as a basis to formulate their first constitutions 
after independence in eighteenth century. In this regard, then, Neo-constitutionalism became the blue 
print to restructure both the state and the functioning of political institutions exerting a positive influence 
in the reformation and constitutional design in countries such as Ecuador (1998-2007-2008), Venezuela 
(1999), and Bolivia (2006-2009). In sum, following Noguera-Fernandez (2011) it can be argued that 
the 1991 Colombian constitution can be considered ‘as the starting point of the new constitutionalism 
in the [Latin American] continent’ (Noguera-Fernandez 2011, p. 18). 
151 The Hare quota system works as follows: In each electoral district, seat quotas are calculated by 
dividing the number of votes by the number of seats. Seats are first allocated to parties according to 
integer multiples of quota’s. That is, if a party has double the amount of votes as the quota, the party is 
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distribute votes, and had no election threshold (Wills-Otero 2009). However, in 2003 
a constitutional amendment reformed the electoral system by introducing the D’Hondt 
electoral formula to award seats in congress and introduced a 2% electoral threshold 
of the valid votes for the parties to participate in the in the distributions of seats in 
congress, and a single-party list. Thus, the 2003 constitutional amendment changed 
the electoral system from a semi-proportional to a proportional system with a much 
lower party fragmentation (Wills-Otero 2009). 
Other reforms that were put into consideration –and had never been provided by the 
1886 old constitution-, were the increasing participation of new political parties. This, 
reform, first, guaranteed seats for minority groups such as indigenous and black 
communities; and second, ensured the inclusion of the left-wing political parties within 
the Constituent Assembly from the very outset of the constituent process. This reform 
also, thereby, increased the ‘effective numbers of parties […] from 2.16 in Congress 
[which was the average number of political parties over the ‘transitional period’] to 
4.45 in the Constituent Assembly [time from which the ‘divergence period’ started]’ 
(Negretto 2013, 177). 
As for the power distribution reforms, table 6.1 also shows (see second row) that the 
1886 constitution, in contrast to 1991, established a strong state with the presidency as 
its dominant feature.152 The president also had absolute control over the management 
of both public and private credit in the country, and over the national budget, not to 
mention the faculties he had to declare the state of siege anytime he considered it 
necessary to govern by decree. Consequently, the Constituent Assembly in 1990 
focused on creating a more powerful system of checks and balances over the president 
by introducing a more active role for congress, the judiciary, and sub-national 
authorities that imposed increasing constrains on the executive’s authority (Spiller, et. 
al 2008; Cardenas, et. al 2008). Thus, under the new Constitution, the expansive 
powers granted to the president were scaled back as the ‘new rules of the game’ 
imposed constitutional provisions to limit the executive´s power in favour of the 
                                                 
assigned two seats and so on. If all seats are not assigned using the quota, seats are awarded to parties 
with the largest remainders of votes (Roland, et. al. 2005). 
152 For instance, over the ‘transitional period’ it was common that 160 state companies were subject to 
the control of the president, including the banking sector, electricity, oil, and other industries (Art. 120, 
1886 Colombian Constitution). 
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legislative and judicial branches of government (Art. 212 – 214, 1991 Colombian 
Constitution).153 
Finally, the policy-making reforms (see third row in table 6.1) included in the 1991 
constitution were also an endeavour to prevent the president’s strong agenda setting 
granted by the 1886 old constitution. Thus, one of the greatest achievements attained 
by the Constituent Assembly can be summarised by repealing two important 
provisions granted in the old constitution. First, the abolition of the state of siege that 
granted the president to legislate by decree overpassing the Congress.154 And second, 
the inability of the president to convert a temporary decree into a permanent one based 
upon the declaration of the state of economic or social emergency.155 Similarly, 
constitution makers also curtailed president’s unlimited delegation of legislative 
power so that he could not use this provision as a way of legislating for his own benefit. 
Instead, the Assembly granted the ‘delegation of legislative powers to the executive 
with the proviso that the president must request that delegation and Congress must be 
explicit about the limits and terms of the delegation’ (Negretto 2013, 192). 
  
                                                 
153 An example of this was the creation of the Constitutional Court, and the offices of both the Attorney 
General and the Prosecutor General as institutions that would strengthen the control over the 
government. The Attorney General office was established to oversee the behaviour of Public officers –
including cabinet members and the president, whereas the creation of the Prosecutor General office was 
meant for prosecuting all kind of crimes. The Senate would appoint the former from a list of three 
candidates proposed by the president, the Supreme Court, and the state council. As for the appointment 
of the latter, the Supreme Court should elect it from a list of three candidates submitted by the president 
(Negretto 2013, 190). 
154 Over most part of the ‘Transitional Period’ –thirteen years (1974 – 1990)- the state of siege provision 
was the provision presidents resorted to decree laws and create legislations overpassing the control of 
the Senate. Thus, presidents could reform codes, regulate economic activities to deal with economic 
crisis, and so forth, which conferred unlimited powers to secure governability. 
155 Under the new constitution, this would be possible only if Congress support and vote in favour of 
that law, otherwise, such decrees would lapse after the emergency was over (Negretto 2013, 173). 
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Table 5.1. 
Main constitutional reforms and further amendments in Colombia: comparing the 
´transitional period´ and the ´divergence period´ 
 
Criteria 1886 Constitutional provisions: ´Transitional Period´ 
Reforms outlined in the 1991 new constitution: 
´Divergence period´ Passed 
E
le
ct
or
al
 r
ef
or
m
s 
Presidential election by majority formula  
Presidential election by majority runoff formula Yes 
Proscription on presidential re-election Yes 
Term limits for legislators  No  
Congress appoints a vice president in case 
of president´s absence, resignation or dead. Popularly elected vice president Yes 
Semi-proportional electoral system with 
Hare quota system at local district levels, 
and no threshold for legislative elections  
The 1991 initially did not change the electoral 
formula to elect the legislature. The Hare quota 
System was still in place.  
Yes 
The 2003 electoral reform abolished the Hare quota 
system by introducing the D'Hondt formula with a 
nationwide electoral district, and a 2% threshold for 
legislative elections. 
With the introduction of the D'Hondt formula the 
electoral system passed from a Semi-proportional 
system to a Proportional one.  
President appoints governors and mayors  Enable popular elections of governors and mayors  Yes 
Congressional and presidential elections are 
no concurrent  
Extension of the no concurrent elections already 
applied to national elections to the local elections. Yes 
Po
w
er
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
re
fo
rm
s 
NA 
Downsizing the Congress, and the election of 
senators from a special district for indigenous and 
black communities was set up. 
Yes 
President as a dominant figure to rule the 
state.  
Bigger participation and political control by the 
Congress over the president Yes 
Motion of censure over the Executive branch of 
government Yes 
Broad appointment powers by the president 
over the judicial branch  
Creation of the Constitutional Court whose 
members were appointed by the Congressb Yes 
Creation and appointment by the Constituent 
Assembly of the Attorney General office, the 
Prosecutor General office, and the Constitutional 
Court. 
Yes 
Po
lic
y 
M
ak
in
g 
R
ef
or
m
s 
President's strong agenda setting powers: i) 
Government's freedom to declare State of 
Siegec whenever appropriate 
Abolition of the State of Siege provision  Yes 
ii) Enactment of permanent decrees by the 
Executive during periods of economic and 
social emergency without Congressional 
approval  
Decrees issued by the Executive during state of 
economic and social emergency would lapse if not 
converted into law by Congress. 
Yes 
Unlimited delegation of legislative powers 
to the president  
Temporal and substantive limits on the delegation 
of legislative powers to the president. Yes 
NA 
Right of president to call popular referendums with 
the approval of the Senate Yes 
Source: Author's compilation from: Negretto (2013); Cardenas, et.al. (2008) 
Notes:   
a With the enactment of the new constitution, the House of Representatives was reduced from 199 to 161 members and the Senate from 112 to 100. It also 
introduced 5 more deputies from special districts and 2 more senators from a special district for indigenous communities. 
b The appointment of the members of the Constitutional Court came from a list of candidates put forward by the president, the Supreme Court, and the state 
council (Negretto 2013, 189). 
c The State of Siege provision allowed the president to legislate by decree overpassing the Congress. 
In sum, the electoral, power distribution, and policy-making reforms implemented by 
the 1991 constitution illustrate the Constituent Assembly’s intention to curtail the 
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concentration of power that the executive branch of government used to have when 
the bipartisan tradition ruled the country over the whole ‘transitional period.’ Hence, 
the outcome of such reforms during the ‘divergence period’ can be summarised as 
follow: (i) they promoted more inclusive electoral rules allowing the expansion of both 
the electoral franchise for new political parties, and the inclusion of minority groups 
into the legislative branch of government;156 (ii) it facilitated political participation of 
large segments of society that had been excluded of the political contest, thereby, 
increased their popular sovereignty that had been long forgotten from the previous 
constitution; and (iii) it made the executive branch of government loose important 
traditional prerogatives so that the legislative branch could be strengthened. Hence, 
the renewal of the political structure for a much more pluralistic, and representative 
one brought the enactment of a new constitution in 1991 whose reforms had a direct 
and positive impact on the democratic performance process just after the beginning of 
the ‘divergence period’. 
6.4.1.2 Constitutional reform and further amendments in Venezuela: 
comparing the features and performance of the ‘transitional period’ 
and the ‘divergence period’ 
In a similar way to Colombia, Venezuela´s 1999 constitutional reform –via 
referendum- was also the result of a lack of confidence and legitimacy that 
Venezuelans experienced over whether the government could solve the economic, 
                                                 
156 By looking at the distribution and composition of seats of the Constituent Assembly will help to 
illustrate the plurality principle ensuring a broader political participation by distributing the greatest 
number of seats among several political parties. The chart below summarises this issue: 
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social, and political crises that had been threatening the country’s democratic stability 
(Buxton 2001).157 However, unlike Colombia, the 1999 constitutional reform –and its 
subsequent amendments- was conducted with a different purpose which brought 
completely different results. It provided reforms intended to weaken the institutional 
checks and balances in favour of giving exceptional powers to the new elected 
president Hugo Chávez Frías (Negretto 2013). 
To analyse how constitutional makers changed the rules of the game by means of 
constitutional reforms in favour of the executive branch of government I will use the 
same methodological approach applied above to the Colombian case. More 
specifically, table 6.2, which compares the electoral, power distribution, and policy-
making reforms for the periods in which the last two constitutional reforms –and some 
amendments- took place in Venezuela.158 For this reason, I will use two periods: the 
‘transitional period’ and the ‘divergence period’. The first will cover, in turn, two sub-
periods which had two types of constitutional reforms and amendments leading to 
different outcomes in terms of the Venezuela´s democratic performance. The first sub-
period will cover from the enactment of the 1961 constitution until 1989. During this 
time, a new constitution was enacted and was of great importance in deepening the 
dominant two party systems. It did so through the enactment of provisions which 
sought to consolidate the heads of the traditional parties (COPEI and AD) as leaders 
who lurked in the shadows to rule the country. This served to maintain and strengthen 
the elite´s status quo since the signing of the Punto Fijo pact. That is, it was during this 
first sub.-period that lawmakers meant to undermine the presidential legislative 
                                                 
157 The main reason for Venezuelan’s discontent with the government was the economic decline caused 
by the dramatic reduction in per-capita oil income, which occurred in the 1980s and 1990s (Buxton 
2001; McCoy 2005; McCoy, et. al., 2004). Thus, the negative effects on incomes contributed to the 
increasing unpopularity of the leading political parties (Monaldi, et. al., 2008). 
158 It is important to note here an important difference between the roads of constitutional change taken 
for the cases under study over time. Colombia, unlike the Venezuelan case, only had two constitutional 
reforms during the twentieth century (one in 1886 and the last one in 1991), whereas Venezuela had 15 
constitutional reforms during the same period. This is the reason why table 6.1 focuses on analysing the 
only two constitutional reforms Colombia went through in more than 100 years, whereas table 6.2 
focuses exclusively on the Venezuelan last two constitutional reforms (one in 1961 and the last one in 
1999). This means that when crisis of governance appeared both countries confronted them with 
different strategies: Colombia, through constitutional amendments (more than 60 over the last century), 
whilst Venezuela used constitutional reforms (this country only had 4 constitutional amendments during 
the last century but conducted more than 15 constitutional reforms). Please see appendix 1 for a detail 
account of the years on which occurred either constitutional reforms or constitutional amendments for 
the cases under study. 
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powers even further in favour of the traditional political elites deteriorating 
Venezuelan democracy (Brewer-Carías 1997). 
The second sub-period of the ‘transitional period’ goes from 1989 –year in which an 
amendment modified the 1961 constitution- until 1998. The amendment of several 
provisions to that constitution was meant to change the political status quo by 
establishing checks and balances over the executive in order to evenly distribute the 
structure of power among the different branches of government, and improve areas of 
governance and the rule of law (Negretto 2013). Therefore, this amendment can be 
regarded as a necessary step in the right direction, a step towards improving 
Venezuela´s democratic performance as table 6.2 will show. 
The second period will be the ‘divergence period.’ This period will cover from the 
moment Venezuela enacted its newest constitution in 1999 until 2010. It was during 
this period that a turning point occurred against the very nature of the Venezuelan 
democracy when Hugo Chávez was elected president in 1998. Since then renovated 
Venezuelan political elites have overhauled its political system by concentrating 
power in hands of the president, thus diminishing the rule of law and threatening the 
foundations of a legitimate democracy. 
Analysing the reforms of the constitutions in both the two sub-periods of the 
‘transitional period’, and the ‘divergence period’ will allow us to explore the impact 
that changes among political elites had over the constitution´s decision-making 
process, in terms of passing provisions, through a Constituent Assembly which, in 
turn, changed the power structure in Venezuela. Thus, table 6.2 will show the bumpy 
road followed by the democracy in Venezuela contrasting the different and 
contradictory paths taken by this country in both the ‘transitional and divergence 
periods’. 
By focusing on the electoral reforms in table 6.2, two contradictory trends of electoral 
provisions arise when the both periods are compared (see first row in table 6.2). Firstly, 
during the first sub-period of the ‘transitional period’, the provisions approved with 
the enactment of the 1961 constitution were meant to monopolise the political regime 
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by concentrating power in hands of the traditional political parties.159 However, during 
the second sub-period, and in order to assuage the 1990s political, social, and 
economic crises, the 1989 amendment aimed to offer an electoral reform so that the 
system of governance could be more representative and participatory. Nevertheless, as 
Buxton (2005); Ellner and Helliger (2003) and Ellner (2008) argue, this belated 
amendment failed to produce the expected result, facilitating Hugo Chávez´s arrival 
to power by the end of 1990s. 
It can be argued, as the first column of table 6.2 shows, that all the provisions approved 
in the 1961 constitution by the National Congress were characterised by implementing 
both the plurality formula to elect the president and to set concurrent electoral cycles 
with the legislative branch of government. This combination of constitutional 
provisions was ideal to maintain and consolidate the traditional two party systems that 
characterised the concentration of power since the Punto Fijo pact was established at 
the beginning of the ‘transitional period’.160 Similarly, for the purpose of keeping both 
the absolute dominance of Congress and a low fragmentation of the party system, the 
1961 constitutional reform also provided the introduction of the proportional 
representation system with the D’Hondt formula to elect the legislature, and with 
closed and blocked party lists –instead of keeping the traditional plurality formula 
(Wills-Otero 2005).161 All the electoral reforms contained in the 1961 constitution 
could not be considered complete, without including a ban to allow regional elections 
for mayors and governors. This ban was consistent with the concentration of power 
that leaders of political partiers wanted to nominate candidates for their constituencies 
over which the president had to appoint for (Monaldi, et. al., 2008, 391). 
                                                 
159 In fact, the election of representatives to the Congress during most part of the ‘transitional period’ 
was viewed as the ‘election of party representatives who felt […] more accountable to their own parties 
than to their constituents or community’ (Brewer-Carías 2010, 43). 
160 According to Negretto (2013), plurality rule for presidential elections and concurrent electoral cycles 
tends to result in two major parties, even if the congress is elected by proportional representation (PR). 
Precisely, this was the electoral formula that constitution makers supported with the approval of the 
1961 constitution. The idea behind this provision was to keep secure the leadership of the heads of the 
political parties that were the power in the shadows to which presidents must rely on. 
161 The idea behind establishing the PR system for the election of the legislature was to guarantee the 
dominance of Congress by representatives of the two traditional parties (COPEI and AD), and the 
representation of all minorities in the Congress. Thus, the single closed and blocked list electoral system 
aimed to discourage the emergence of new political parties by means of powerful disciplinarian tools 
in the hands of the party leaderships (Monaldi, et. al., 2008; Brewer-Carías 2010). 
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By the end of 1980s, the outcome of these electoral reforms was promptly rejected by 
the people. Citizens felt the formulas being used to elect the legislature and the 
president did not represent them, mainly because these were viewed to be committed 
with the leaders of the political parties, as opposed to the people and their 
constituencies (Buxton 2005).162 To deal with the problem of political representation 
and the lack of confidence in the political system, political leaders proposed, in 1989, 
an amendment to the constitution. The most significant change, at least on the electoral 
front, was to enable popular elections for mayors and governors. Although the 
amendment increased political representation and participation of the civil society, it 
did not change the root of the problem. That is, these electoral formulas did not change 
the structure of power in hands of the leaders of the traditional political parties. In 
other words, the 1989 amendment wasn´t enough to solve the problems –economic, 
social and political- the regime was facing; and, it was too late. 
The impossibility to solve the problems by constitutional amendments encouraged 
Hugo Chávez to undertake a new electoral reform during the ‘divergence period’ with 
the enactment of both the 1999 constitution, and later on with the 2009 Organic Law 
of Electoral Processes (Smilde 2011). The second column in table 6.2 clearly shows 
that the provisions that the Constituent Assembly successfully passed were those in 
which the electoral formulas guaranteed a complete transference of political power to 
the executive branch, rather than distributing it among the different branches of 
government. This shows why Chávez’s strong coalition in the Constituent Assembly 
opposed any attempt to change the electoral formula and continued with a restrictive 
one, such as the plurality formula for electing presidents, even though the adoption of 
the runoff presidential election was contemplated in the 1999 constitutional reform 
(Negretto 2006). In line with the aim of concentrating power in the hands of the 
president, the new constitution also extended the presidential term from 5 to 6 years 
and in addition, passed presidential re-election for one additional term. 
 
                                                 
162 People’s rejection over the elected political elites can be seen by the fall in the support of the political 
parties. According to Brewer-Carías (2010), ‘electoral support for the two main parties varied from 
92.83% in 1988 to 45.9% in 1993, to 36.1% in November 1998, and to 11.3% in December 1998, when 
Hugo Chávez was elected president’ (ibid.: 43). 
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Table 6.2. 
Constitutional reforms and main amendments in Venezuela: comparing the 
‘transitional period’ and the ‘divergence period’ 
 
Criteria 1961 Constitutional provisions and the 1989 amendment: ´Transitional Period´ 
Reforms outlined in the 1999 new constitution and 
further amendments: ´Divergence period´ Passed 
E
le
ct
or
al
 r
ef
or
m
s 
The 1961 constitution provides presidential 
election by plurality formula concurrent with 
legislative elections. Presidential re-election 
was not alloweda 
The new constitution preserved the electoral formula 
to choose presidents by keeping the plurality formula. 
It also expanded from five to six years the presidential 
term, and allowed presidential re-election by only one 
consecutive term.  
Yes 
The 2009 amendment enable the unlimited 
presidential re-election Yes 
The 1961 constitution did not allow regional 
elections for executive offices Presidential and legislative elections no longer 
concurrent. However, legislative elections were set to 
coincide with the elections of governors and mayors. 
Yes The 1989 amendment enable popular 
elections for governors and mayors  
The 1961 constitution enables the PR 
System with the D’Hontd system, with 
closed and blocked party lists as the 
electoral formula to elect members of the 
legislative branch. 
Legislature's electoral system changed to a mixed-
member PR system with a plurality componentc.  Yes The 2009 amendment introduced a one-side 
gerrymandering strategy to strengthen electoral 
districts where the president's party was weak.  
Po
w
er
 D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
re
fo
rm
s 
The 1961 constitution grants a strong, 
centralised, disciplined, and no fragmented 
two party systems. The new constitution substitutes the newly constituted 
multiparty system with a personalist, one-party system 
integrated into the state that seized and took over 
political power. 
Yes 
The 1989 amendment allows for a 
decentralised and fragmented party system 
promoting the emergence of new, less 
cohesive and more pluralistic political 
parties competing to win elections at the 
national and local levels. 
The 1961 constitution granted very limited 
legislative powers to the president as such 
powers were exercised within the limits 
imposed by party leaders.  
The new constitution allows for concentration of state 
power in favour of the president, state centralisation, 
and extreme Presidentialism.  
Yes 
President has no autonomous decree power, 
unless enabled by congress, neither has the 
power to call for a popular referendum to 
pass legislation. 
The new constitution enables the president to enact 
laws as he pleases overpassing the Congress. He is 
also allow to call for referendums without any support 
from the legislature  
Yes 
The 1961 constitution grants the president 
the power to appoint and dismiss governors.  
The new constitution enables the president to recall 
the mandate of governors, mayors, and the president 
but only under highly stringent conditions.   
Yes 
The 1989 amendment provides for the 
election of governors and mayors by popular 
elections, and also its immediate re-election  
In 2006 a presidential decree reduced the power of 
legitimate elected governors and mayors by handing 
more power to nonelected representative entities 
named:  'communal councils', which were controlled 
by Chávez's political party.  
Yes 
The 1961 constitution allows the legislature 
to elect the Supreme Court by simply 
majority in a joint session of both houses. 
Presidents usually have no control over the 
judicial branch. 
Chávez takes full control of the Supreme Court, 
ending both decentralisation and the independence of 
the judicial system. Additionally, president is granted 
to appoint the heads of the nonelected overseen 
regulatory bodies jeopardising the system of checks 
and balances that regulates the state concentration of 
power. 
Yes The 1989 amendment grants administrative 
decentralisation and political independence 
to the Supreme Court from both party 
leaders and legislators by assuming a more 
autonomous and active role in the 
administration of justice.  
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Criteria 1961 Constitutional provisions and the 1989 amendment: ´Transitional Period´ 
Reforms outlined in the 1999 new constitution and 
further amendments: ´Divergence period´ Passed 
Po
lic
y 
M
ak
in
g 
R
ef
or
m
s 
The 1961 constitution grants a predominant 
role of national party leaders as the heads of 
the legislature. Thus, they could decide how 
the party should vote in congress, and, 
therefore, they had significant control over 
the policy-making process. 
The 1999 Constituent Assembly decrees the 
dissolution of both the Senate and the Chamber of 
Representatives of the National Congress. In its place 
the National Assembly is set up which was comprised 
by a new set of political elites supporting all the 
policies the executive wanted to implement. 
Yes 
Presidents rely on consultative commissions 
and corporatist arrangements formed by 
party leaders, labour and business groups, 
for the design and implementation of public 
policies. 
Consultative commissions and corporatist 
arrangements disappeared or were broken down with 
the enactment of the 1999 new constitution. Instead, 
the president either by his own or with the support of 
his followers in the National Assembly oversees the 
design and implementation of public policy 
Yes 
The 1989 amendment enables legislatures to 
play a much more significant role in the 
provisions of laws. Party leaders no longer 
have the power to propose laws outside the 
congress 
After becoming significantly powerful, the president 
circumvented traditional party leaders and legislatures 
as policy makers to the point that in several legislative 
periods (2001, 2007, 2010) the National Assembly 
granted Chávez 'enabling powers' to rule by decree. 
Yes 
Source: Author's compilation from: Payne, et. al. (2002); Negretto (2013); Monaldi et.al. (2008); Corrales, et. al. (2007), Corrales (2011); 
Brewer-Carías (2010). 
Notres 
a Before the 1999 constitutional reform Venezuelan presidents could run again only ten years after the end of their first term (Payne, et. al. 
2002) 
b Venezuela adopted the rule of unlimited presidential re-election after a constitutional amendment passed by referendum in 2009 (Negretto 
2013, 95) 
c It is striking to note that since the 1989 amendment to the old constitution and with the 1999 constitution, different versions of the mixed-
electoral systems were used for the legislative elections of 1993, 1998, 2000, and 2005. 
The 1999 constitutional reform conducted over the electoral system also modified the 
electoral cycles; it banned the concurrency of the presidential and legislative elections. 
However, the Constituent Assembly allowed for both legislative, and governors and 
mayor’s elections to be held at the same time. This constitutional provision reinforces 
itself with the provision of plurality formula to elect the president. These two electoral 
reforms tend to produce either two major parties or a single hegemonic party (Negretto 
2006). Hence, the design of these reforms can be regarded as constitutional designs 
meant to hurt the opposition parties rendering them absent of the political contest. This, 
in turn, allowed Chávez’s political party (PSUV) to gain control over most of the 
important political institutions that provide checks and balances to the government.163 
As if the electoral reforms made by means of constitutional reform were not enough, 
in 2009, via a questionable referendum,164 a constitutional amendment passed 
                                                 
163 According to Corrales (2011), after Chávez took office in 1998 he managed, in only two years (from 
1998 to 2000), to have complete control over the Supreme Court, the National Electoral Council (CNE), 
the National Assembly, all but two governorships, most of the military, and, finally, the state-owned oil 
company (PDVSA) (Idem, 123). 
164 The legitimacy of the consultative referendum that approved, among other things, the indefinite re-
election of the president can be called into question as only 38.7% of eligible voters casted their ballots, 
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resulting in greater accumulation of power in hands of the executive, and against the 
opposition. This amendment, for instance, enabled the elimination of alternation of 
power in the presidency. That is, it established the continuous and indefinite re-
election of the president, which had been always prohibited (Brewer-Carías 2010, 30). 
The amendment also approved the Organic Law of Electoral Processes, where the 
National Assembly introduced a one-side gerrymandering strategy to the electoral 
system to strengthen electoral districts where the president’s party was weak,165 and, 
therefore, diminishing opposition electoral stronghold districts166 (Corrales 2011). 
As for the power distribution reforms, table 6.2 (see second row) also shows that the 
constitutional provisions approved over both periods had different and contradictory 
aims on this matter. While during the first sub-period of the ‘transitional period’ the 
1961 constitutional reform initially had endeavoured to concentrate power in hands of 
the leaderships of the two traditional parties (COPEI and AD) –at the expense of 
reducing power to the legislative and executive branches-, in the second sub-period it 
tried, instead, to redistribute power by enabling both a higher level of political 
representation for new political parties, and greater autonomy for the president to enact 
new laws. However, all the gains achieved with the 1989 amendment to balance the 
power structure were sharply hampered during the ‘divergence period’ when Hugo 
Chávez took office. The enactment of the 1999 constitution engineered a system meant 
to concentrate power in favour of the president. The following description in table 6.2 
analyses these changes over the periods mentioned above.  
                                                 
that is 62.2% of voters did not turn out to vote, the yes votes obtained 81.9% and the no votes 18.1% 
Brewer-Carías 2010, 55). 
165 After 8 years in power, Chávez’s political party (PSUV) started losing electoral competitiveness in 
2007 as it lost about 1.8 million votes between the presidential election in 2006 and the legislative 
elections of 2010; whereas the opposition, during the same period, won 1.5 million votes. However, as 
Corrales (2011) clearly states, less competitive does not mean that PSUV became uncompetitive. In 
fact, despite losing an important share of the legislative house, the coalition ruling party managed to 
keep the majority in government. For instance, in the 2010 elections, the PSUV obtained 48% of the 
votes, still more votes than the opposition coalition, La Mesa, which obtained 47% of the votes casted 
(Corrales 2011, 123). 
166 As noted above, by 2008 Chávez’s electoral coalition has both shrunk and changed, thus, establishing 
a bias gerrymandering strategy was a logic step in order to avoid the electoral misfortunes his party was 
facing at the end of the 2010. The gerrymandering strategy was ‘to merge the electoral districts in which 
opposition was electorally strong with pro-government districts so as to dilute or destroy the 
opposition’s edge’ (Corrales 2011, 129). The aim of this electoral reform was twofold: first, it was done 
to benefit the ruling party in the states where it was weaker, and second to hurt the opposition where it 
was more competitive. 
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As previously discussed, the institutional engineering of the constitution during the 
‘transitional period’ was aimed to give more power to leaders of the traditional 
parties.167 This meant that presidents, during the first sub-period of the ‘transitional 
period’ (1961 -1989), had rather little autonomy of decree power (unless enabled by 
congress), had no power to call for a popular referendum to pass legislation and had 
no control over the Judiciary.168 Despite the weaknesses, the only prerogative the 1961 
constitution granted to the presidency was the direct, discretionary, and freely 
appointment and dismissal of mayors and governors for all 23 states that compose the 
country (Monaldi, et. al., 2008; 391, 397).169 
Over the second part of this same period (1989 -1998) by means of an amendment 
enacted in 1989, the 1961 constitution was changed in order to redistribute power more 
evenly among the different branches of government. Because the power structure 
established during the first sub-period had failed to deliver solutions that could 
mitigate the effects of the crises the country had faced since beginning of the 80s. The 
outcome of this amendment was indeed positive in terms of the Venezuelan 
democratic performance because the legislative branch was strengthened, the leaders 
of the political parties began to lose their influence, the executive gained autonomy, 
and the judicial branch became increasingly important as a control body for both the 
executive and legislative branches. 
                                                 
167 Two examples can be offered to show the way by which this constitution enabled the leadership of 
the party leaders. First, they had the power to control nominations of entry into the Congress thereby 
ensuring a strong, centralised, disciplined and non-fragmented two party system, with high entry 
barriers for new political parties (Monaldi, et. al., 2008). That is, the national party leaders could control 
nominations to the Congress as the 1961 constitution enable the use of the single closed and blocked 
list electoral system to win a seat in the house. This electoral system was a powerful disciplinarian tool 
used by party leaders in order to use it to control the nominations (who gets in the list) and the order of 
the election (who gets elected first) (Crisp 2001).  
Second, the presidential legislative power was exercised within the limits established by party leaders. 
This was feasible because party leaders used to control Congress; therefore, if the president wanted to 
veto a law that favoured party leaders’ interests, Congress could easily override the veto by simply 
majority. 
168 The election of the members of the Supreme Court was made by the Legislative branch by simple 
majority in a joint session of both houses. 
169 This constitutional provision in favour of the president was not regarded as a modest political asset. 
In fact, it was a powerful negotiation tool that presidents often used to equilibrate –in some way or 
another- the balance of power with party leaders. That is, it enabled presidents to appoint and dismiss 
governors and mayors to give them a relative good bargaining power with political leaders. This is 
because presidents have the control over part of the national budget to allocated regional allotments. 
Another way of looking at the importance of this provision for presidents is that both governors and 
mayors had to be completely loyal to the president, which in a way could help the president to have 
decision-making powers in several aspects of the domestic policy. 
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In fact, one of the most important achievements of this amendment was the 
introduction of a provision allowing for a more pluralistic system of political parties. 
This enabled the decentralisation and the advent of new political parties to compete 
for positions of power.170 This provision, in addition to helping the decline of 
traditional bi-partisanship, it also allowed the legislative branch to play a much more 
significant role in the policymaking process as national party leaders could no longer 
broke deals outside the congress (Monaldi, et. al., 2008).171 This amendment also 
changed the most important power prerogative conferred to presidents to bargain with 
party leaders. In other words, presidents lost control over part of the national budget 
(the constitutional allotment to the regions) when the 1989 amendment enabled the 
election of governors and mayors by popular election. This reduced political power of 
presidents because the executive branch had less influence over the legislative due to 
congressmen no longer had debts with the presidents. Finally, this amendment not only 
balanced the distribution of power between the executive and legislative branches but 
also granted more power to the members of the judiciary. It allowed that the increasing 
demands from citizens to improve access to justice and judicial independence, both at 
national and provincial levels, were heard by Congress. Thus, Congress ruled for 
administrative decentralisation and political independence of the Supreme Court from 
both party leaders and legislators by granting a more autonomous and active role in 
the administration of justice.172 
From the previous analysis, it can be argued that over the first part of the ‘transitional 
period’ the distribution of power was biased towards the national party leaders, 
whereas over the second part of that period such balance was re-distributed among the 
three branches of government. However, as will be seen next, the power distribution 
                                                 
170 In fact, while during the first sub-period of the ‘transitional period’ the average effective number of 
parties (ENP) represented in the chamber of deputies was 2.83, by the second sub-period (mid 1990s) 
the ENP rose to 6.05 (Monaldi, et. al., 2008, 278). 
171 A good indicator of this fact is that while over the first sub-period the legislative branch initiated just 
34% of the ordinary laws approved, this average increased by almost doubled to 62% over the second 
sub-period (1989-1999) (Monaldi, et. al., 2008, 395). In terms of power distribution, the above-
mentioned change in the approved rate of laws can be understood as a way by which legislator gained 
independence and became less disciplined to the party leaders, and more specialized in policy issues 
which gave them the opportunity to even split off from the traditional parties that had nominated them 
and create their own legislative groups. 
172 The increasing independence of the Court over se second part of the ‘transitional period’ can be 
illustrated by its leading role in the impeachment of President Pérez in 1992 and its many jurisprudence 
that had negative effects over the traditional parties (COPEI and AD) when conflicts arise over electoral 
issues. 
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reforms approved over the ‘divergence period’ had no other intention but to ensure a 
systematic concentration of power in the executive branch at the expense of weakening 
many of the provisions passed over the second sub-period that used to guarantee the 
checks and balances of the previous constitution. 
Accordingly, table 6.2 also showed how the enactment of the 1999 constitution 
changed dramatically the balance of power in favour of the executive branch since 
Hugo Chávez took office in 1998. First, the Constituent Assembly –appointed mainly 
by the ruling party173- ‘allowed one faction, person and party, to completely seize and 
take over political power, and subsequently use it to crush all other parties and 
opponents’ (Brewer-Carías 2010; 20). That is, under the new constitution the recently 
constituted multiparty system was abolished and replaced by a very idiosyncratic one-
party system that seized and took over political power. This led to concentration of 
state power in favour of the president, state centralisation, and extreme 
Presidentialism. These constitutional reforms gave the president more legislative 
prerogatives, with an antiparty tendency, and a military force aligned and incorporated 
into the constitution (Corrales, et. al., 2007; Corrales 2014). 
A good indicator of the excessive prerogatives granted to the president by the new 
constitution and its consequences over the structure of balance of power it produced 
in Venezuela over the ‘divergence period’ was the introduction of the so-called 
‘enabling law.’174 This law is a prerogative granted exclusively to the president to issue 
decrees with the force of law as he pleases overpassing the congress.175 Among other 
things, this law has allowed the president to call for referendums without any support 
from the legislature, recall the mandate of governors and mayors, partially reform the 
                                                 
173 With 56%of the vote, the president’s supporters obtained 95% of the seats in the Constituent 
Assembly. These disproportional results were the result of the adoption of a majoritarian system, 
contradicting the proportional representation electoral system prescribed by the prevailing constitution 
(Monaldi, et. al., 2008; 401). 
174 This particular issue regarding the use of ‘enabling laws’ as a mechanism to concentrate power in 
the executive branch will be further developed in the next subsection (6.4.1.3) in a comparative fashion 
with the Colombian case that also had the mechanism known as ‘States of Emergency laws’ and 
‘delegative laws’. 
175 President Hugo Chávez have used the full legislative power granted by this ‘enabling law’ to issue 
decrees in almost all aspects of public life such as: 1) transformation of state institutions; 2) popular 
participation; 3) public services; 4) Economy and society; 5) financial and tax systems; 6) civic security; 
7) science and technology; 8) territorial order; 9) defence and security; 10) infrastructure, transportation, 
and services; and 11) energy (International Crisis Group, 2008). 
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value-added tax (VAT)176 and modify the currency,177 among others. However, 
Chávez’s main use of this enabling law was focused on undermining the opposition, 
specifically when they showed signs of political recovery or when they won the major 
municipalities of the state-capitals in the 2008 elections.178 Provisions such as the 
creation of ‘enabling laws’ and ‘communal councils’179 can be considered as important 
examples of how the executive branch concentrates power in the hands of the president 
by constitutional means. These constitutional amendments were designed to change 
the composition of national power by changing the country’s territorial and political 
organisation which, in turn, was possible thanks to the dismantlement of the 
democratic government structures. 
A comprehensive analysis on power distribution reforms cannot be complete without 
considering the provisions entrenched in the 1999 constitution in terms of the 
independence of the judiciary. On this front, evidence shows that the judicial system 
lost ground in the battle partially won with the 1989 amendment conducted over the 
second sub-period of the ‘transitional period’ (see table 6.2).180 Unfortunately, the 
progress made in this area backfired during the ‘divergence period’ when the new 
constitution was approved. In fact, one of the first tasks assigned by President Chávez 
                                                 
176 The 26 February 2007 decree reduced the VAT to 11 per cent from 1 March until 30 June 2007 and 
9 per cent subsequently (International Crisis Group, 2008; 2). 
177 The decree of 6 March 2007 on monetary conversion paved the way for the change of the currency 
from Bolivars to Strong Bolivars (1,000 Bolivars: 1Strong Bolivar) on 1 January 20008 (International 
Crisis Group, 2008; 2). 
178 The 2008 regional election were held to elect 603 posts for governors, mayors, and local councils. 
Despite the ruling party (PSUV) won again the majority of both votes and post, the opposition won 5 
out of 8 mayor’s offices in the larger cities of the country. This electoral outcome was regarded as an 
important victory for the opposition as the cities won by them were the most populated which, in turn, 
allowed them to get 4.137.756 votes against 5.422.064 votes obtained by PSUV. Given this electoral 
outcome, Chávez made use of the power granted by the ‘enabling law’ and issued a decree that reduced 
the power of legitimate elected governors and mayors. He did this by transferring more power to 
nonelected representative entities namely: ‘communal councils’ which were controlled by Chávez’s 
political coalition (International Crisis Group, 2008; 13). 
179 The communal councils were created by law on 7th April 2006. Since then, President Chávez has 
relied on them several times in order to set the basis of its centralised government. Particularly on the 
2008 regional elections, President Chávez expanded the scope of these entities empowering them to 
administer the regional budgets of all the presidential led social programs. This new provision weakened 
the democratic elected municipal governments putting mayors and governors’ authority from the 
opposition into question, as they ended up with no budget to undertake their governing programs. 
180 As previously described, such amendment had an important and positive effect on the 
decentralisation and political independence of the judicial branch of government. This was possible 
because it assumed a much more autonomous and active role in the administration of justice, far from 
the excessive power party leaders had over the appointment of nonelected organs of the public power 
(e.g., Supreme Court, Judicial Council general controller, prosecutor general, Electoral Supreme 
Council, among other control institutions) during the first sub-period of the ‘transitional period’ 
(Brewer-Carías 2010, 47). 
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to the Constituent Assembly was not to increase checks and balances by increasing 
judicial guarantees of constitutional rights to guarantee greater citizens participation 
in the democratic order. Instead, the Constituent Assembly designed an institutional 
framework so that the judicial branch of government would be less independent and 
autonomous. It was based on giving the National Assembly (which was comprised by 
a majority of Senators from the ruling party) the authority not only to appoint but also 
dismiss judges –even by a simple majority of votes- of the Supreme Court, and all the 
other heads of the different control bodies of government (Brewer-Carías 2010, 217). 
Therefore, making use of this constitutional provision, the National Assembly 
appointed a new set of Magistrates that were close to government which allowed the 
president to gain political control over the Supreme Tribunal of Justice and, through 
it, the whole judicial system (ibid.: 227). 
Thus, with the evidence presented previously this project works from the premise that 
the power distribution reforms conducted over the ‘divergence period’ through a 
comprehensive strategy of institutional engineering was designed to concentrate and 
retain power in the hands of the president. This evidence also seems to demonstrate 
that the government has faced a gradual dismantlement of its democratic regime as the 
traditional horizontal concept of separation of power beyond the classic legislative, 
executive and judicial powers has been hampered by a ‘general reform’ which has only 
benefited the presidential institution. 
Lastly, it is necessary to review the evolution of the policy-making reforms. To do so, 
the last row in table 6.2 depicts in a comparative fashion the main constitutional 
provisions – either via amendment or reform- this country went through during both 
the ‘transitional and divergence periods.’ It should be noted that the outcomes achieved 
by the way policy-making was designed and implemented depend not only on the 
scope and stakeholder’s interests, but also on the way power distribution reforms were 
approved by the legislature. In other words, there exists a close relationship between 
those who were granted (by constitutional means) to enact laws and the way by which 
those laws became public policy. 
Such relationship is evident over the two sub-periods covering both the ‘transitional 
period’, and the ‘divergence period.’ In the case of the former, and from the analysis 
presented above, it is clear that over the first sub-period (1961-1989) party leaders 
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were the ones who concentrated power in their hands. Because congressmen owed 
party leaders their nominations and subsequent appointment, the latter were the heads 
of the legislature and thus could decide how the party should design and implement 
any public policy intended to be approved in Congress. In this sub-period, the policy-
making process was conducted not directly by the presidents and its cabinet, but 
through consultative commissions181 made up by the president, party leaders, interest 
groups, and business groups. These cooperative arrangements far from favouring a 
balanced design and implementation of public policies were meant to produce a close 
control over the policies proposed by the executive power by the other groups 
integrating these commissions, especially by the party leaders.182 Thus, and following 
Monaldi’s (2008) analysis, the consultative commissions model used by the 
Venezuelan regime for the formulations of policies is the result of a bargaining process 
led by party leaders and other interest groups to limit the presidential power in the 
policy-making process. In other words, the cooperative arrangements, such as the 
above-mentioned commissions, ‘allowed for party involvements [in the design and 
implementation] and ‘alarms’ at higher levels of the policy-making process’ (Monaldi, 
et. al., 2008; 386). 
The 1989 constitutional amendment changed little the policy-making process over the 
second sub-period (1989 – 1998). The consultative commissions were still in place to 
formulate public policy but with a lower incidence of party leaders. The less important 
role played by political parties and its leaders was the logical outcome of the reforms 
conducted over the distribution of power among the branches of government. 
Although this reform was discussed above, it is worth remembering that over the first 
part of the ‘transitional period’ the distribution of power was biased towards the 
national party leaders, however, it changed over the second part of that same period as 
was re-distributed among the three branches of government.183 As expected, those 
                                                 
181 Between 1961 and 1989, Venezuelan presidents created 330 consultative commissions to formulate 
public policy (Crisp 2000).  
182 As discussed above, the 1961 Venezuelan constitution did not give presidents significant legislative 
prerogatives. Presidents were constitutionally weak despite the fact they were often delegated legislative 
powers and were in charge of initiating most of the legislation approved by the Congress. However, 
party leaders maintained veto power over legislation, setting significant limits on the exercise of the 
policy-making process proposed by the president (Monaldi, et. al., 2008). 
183 As briefly discussed above, the 1989 amendment not only balanced the distribution of power between 
the executive and legislative branches but also granted more power to the members of the judicial 
branch. 
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power distribution reforms had a ripple effect on the policy-making process because 
the formulation of public policies became the responsibility not only of party leaders, 
but also of both legislatures and presidents. These branches of government gained 
autonomy and could freely design and implement policies that were not totally backed 
by national party leaders. In sum, once again, the analysis conducted over the second 
sub-period shows that the provisions included in the 1989 amendment concerning 
policy-making reforms was an important step in the right direction to improve the 
Venezuelan democratic performance as this amendment ensured decentralisation, 
autonomy, and a more active role by the different branches of government in the design 
and implementation of the public policy. 
However, the democratic gains achieved through the policy-making reforms over the 
second sub-period changed dramatically and in a negative way over the ‘divergence 
period’. Since President Chávez came to power in 1998, this change was expected as 
the recent appointed Constituent Assembly marked the end of the consultative 
commissions and the cooperative arrangements used over the whole ‘transitional 
period.’ That is, rather than continuing with a cooperative strategy among the different 
branches of government in favour of the design of public policies, the Constituent 
Assembly decided to dissolve both the Senate and the Chambers of Representatives of 
the National Congress, and dismiss its elected (in 1989) senators and representatives. 
In its place a unicameral National Assembly was set up and composed, in turn, by 
renewed political elite from partisans and members of the new political parties that 
fully supported the ruling government (Brewer-Carías, 2010). 
Consequently, the provisions included in the enactment of the new constitution 
regarding the policy-making process were easier to pass due to during the whole 
‘divergence period’ the legislature had pro-government majorities184 giving the 
executive branch, headed by President Chávez, extensive powers to craft public policy 
to his convenience and with the support of his allies in the National Assembly without 
almost any kind of opposition. Hence, the policy-making reforms were characterised 
by an executive branch becoming significantly powerful due to President Chávez 
managed to circumvent traditional party leaders and legislatures as policy makers. 
Such presidential dominance on the policy-making process was consolidated by 
                                                 
184 Chávez had a coalition majority since 2000 onwards and was in minority only in 1999. 
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successive reforms during several legislative periods (2001, 2007, and 2010) in which 
the National assembly granted Chávez ‘enabling powers’ to rule by decree (Monaldi, 
et. al. 2008; 395). This provision, as discussed previously, would further concentrate 
power in the hands of the president as he could craft policies to maximise his political 
power, rather than design and implement efficient policies that benefit a far larger part 
of the population. 
In sum, unlike the Colombian case, the electoral, power distribution, and policy-
making reforms in both the 1999 constitution, and further amendments had a common 
ground: the concentration of power in hands of the president. This outcome was 
achieved by constitutional means as the reforms and amendments implemented over 
the ‘divergence period’ were endorsed by a new set of political elites whose majorities 
-loyalist to President Chávez- passed laws that were set up with a political agenda 
which ended up jeopardising the democratic performance of the Venezuelan regime. 
Thus, the change in the rules of the game allowed the president: (i) to design an 
electoral system favouring the ruling political parties and threatening the existence of 
the opposition parties in the legislature; (ii) to circumvent the authority of the 
legislative branch as policy-makers; and (iii) to comprise a Constituent Assembly and 
–later on- a National Assembly with the overwhelming capacity to redistribute power 
and hand it over to the president which granted him ‘enabling powers’ to rule by 
decree. Therefore, the comparative analysis conducted above presents conclusive 
evidence on how over the ‘divergence period’ the new Venezuelan political elite 
(referred to as the chavistas), could change the path of democratic performance 
achieved during the ‘transitional period’ –especially over its second sub-period- 
through the three above-mentioned types of reforms that brought a direct and negative 
impact on the democratic performance followed by Venezuela. 
6.4.1.3 Concentration of power in Colombia and Venezuela: a trade-
off between the consolidation and the decline of democracy over the 
‘divergence period’ 
As discussed above, the policy-making reforms conducted over the ‘divergence 
period’ (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2) had clear policy implications for how presidents could 
rule their countries by decree. The previous sections showed that these regimes 
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modified and introduced checks and balances into their constitutions to improve the 
guarantee of the rule of law, political rights, civil liberties, and legitimacy through the 
general will of their citizens. Paradoxically, however, these new constitutional rules 
also allowed the modification of some provisions facilitating the concentration of more 
political power185 in the Executive branch, introducing new challenges to improving 
or maintaining the democratic performance of these countries (Montoya, 2010; 
Corrales et al., 2013). 
The intention of this section is to identify, explain and analyse the main mechanisms 
included or modified in the enactment of the Colombian and Venezuelan new 
constitutions –or granted by subsequent amendments- that enabled the executive 
branch of government to hold a greater concentration of power. Additionally, it will 
also critically assess the impact that these mechanisms had over the democratic 
performance on these countries. The analysis will focus on the ‘divergence period’ 
when the Colombian President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) and the Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chávez (1999-2010) managed to use extensively this set of rather 
extraordinary constitutional mechanisms to enhance their leadership, affecting their 
polities’ democratic performance. This section concludes by saying that despite both 
Presidents making use of these mechanisms, causing a democratic deterioration on 
their regimes, the scope and depth in the implementation of these provisions brought 
about comparatively more acute consequences for the democratic performance in the 
case of Venezuela. In this sense, it will be argued that the use of decree powers by both 
Presidents provides additional evidence to explain the process of democratic 
divergence followed by these countries over the ‘divergence period’. 
Constitutional mechanisms enabling concentration of executive 
power in Colombia and Venezuela 
As has been discussed, the enactment of both the Political Constitution of Colombia 
in 1991 and the Bolivarian Constitution of Venezuela in 1999 established a new set of 
                                                 
185 As discussed in subsections 6.4.1.1 and 6.4.1.2, both the 1886 Colombian Constitution, and the 1961 
Venezuelan Constitution also allowed for the adoption of such "enabling laws" but only with regards to 
economic and financial matters (Garcia-Sierra 2001). The enactment of the new constitutions expanded 
the scope of these provisions granting different levels of power to Presidents so that they can use these 
provisions on several areas of government as will be explained below. 
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democratic rules meant to solve the problems that their political systems faced over 
the ‘transitional period´ (Bejarano 2011; Corrales, et. al., 2010; Buxton 2001). 
However, instead of straightforwardly introducing constitutional changes to 
strengthen the rule of law and address the politics of exclusion, both constitutions also 
modified or introduced a set of mechanisms allowing the executive branch to increase 
its influence by using decree powers. The common mechanisms introduced by both 
countries with the enactment of the new constitutions were: The State of Emergency 
and the extraordinary powers (the latter known as enabling laws (leyes habilitantes) 
in Venezuela, and delegative laws (leyes de delegación) in Colombia. 
In the Colombian case, the State of Emergency was a constitutional provision granted 
to the President to enable him to enjoy more political autonomy and independence 
when either circumstantial situations arose or when traditional constitutional powers 
were not sufficient to confront them (Vanegas, 2011). However, and to prevent the 
abusive use given to a similar mechanism widely used over the ‘transitional period’ 
called:  State of Siege,186 the new Constituent Assembly opted to clearly delineate the 
situations in which this power could be used by the President, its length of time, and 
the instances to declare it. Therefore, the State of Emergency can only be applied in 
circumstances where there is an international armed conflict (external war), a serious 
disturbance in public order (inner commotion), and a serious disturbance of the 
economic, social or politic order (emergency order) (Vanegas 2011).187 Additionally, 
States of Emergency can only last, for wars, the duration of hostilities; for inner 
commotions, ninety days with maximum two extensions of the same time; and for the 
emergency order a maximum of thirty days with two equal extensions. The regulatory 
procedure for using this mechanism is relatively simple since it only requires a 
Presidential decree signed by the entire cabinet and (only in case of war) the Senate 
must authorize its execution in advance (Vanegas 2011). Finally, in any of the three 
cases mentioned above, the Constitutional Court must review the decrees made under 
                                                 
186 For example, from 1948 to 1991, Colombia was under the State of Siege for more than 30 years (the 
first period from 1948 to 1959, and the last period from 1984 to 1991). The use of this constitutional 
provision by Colombian presidents was justified under different circumstances (Semana, 1982) 
(Iturralde, 2003). 
187 The purpose of having three possible scenarios was meant to force the president to indicate with 
specificity the justifications to get access to this extraordinary mechanism. 
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the State of Emergency to declare either its constitutionality or to declare it 
unconstitutional. 
On the other hand, extraordinary powers in the Colombian case (i.e., delegative laws) 
have a different legal and political nature. The central purpose of this mechanism is to 
temporarily delegate to the President specific powers of the Legislative branch so that 
he can create and reform laws (Herrán 2001). For this purpose, the President must 
expressly request from the Congress the granting of these powers, to be presented in 
the form of a bill.188 In addition, the way in which the President will legislate will be 
through decrees with force of law that the same Congress can modify and to which the 
Constitutional Court is entitled to oversee. 
As in Colombia, the Venezuelan legal system included also into the new constitution 
the State of Emergency and the enabling laws (EL) as mechanisms for the Executive 
to accumulate power so that the President can also govern by decree. The first one was 
never used during the Chávez administration. According to articles 337, 338 and 339 
of the Bolivarian Constitution the President had also three types of situations to declare 
a State of Emergency: a state of alarm (by catastrophe or public calamity), state of 
economic emergency, and state of internal or external commotion; with a duration of 
thirty days, sixty days and ninety days respectively and with extensions of equal 
length. State of Emergency provisions should be requested by the President with the 
signature of his ministers, and any decree issued will have a legal review of the 
Supreme Court of Justice. 
As discussed in the previous section, the second mechanism introduced in the 
Bolivarian Constitution allowing the executive branch to increase its power are the 
Enabling laws. Unlike the first one, this constitutional provision has had continuous 
use since its enactment as will be shown below. According to the Bolivarian 
Constitution, as in the Colombian case, these laws are formally requested to the 
National Assembly by the President and its approval requires three-fifths of the total 
number of legislators (Tavares, et. al., 2004). However, and unlike the Colombian 
                                                 
188 Such request will be processed under the same nature of any common law, requiring a favourable 
vote of the absolute majority in the two chambers. The approval of a bill must have four debates: two 
in the House of Representatives and two in the Senate. The processed law may only grant delegative 
powers for a maximum of six months and only on the topics that the Congress specifies, excluding, in 
any case, the impossibility of modifying the codes, statutory, organic or tax laws (article 150, numeral 
10 of the Constitution of Colombia). 
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case, the National Assembly granted President Chávez complete freedom to establish 
the duration and scope of the implementation of this provision. Additionally, the 
President has the constitutional duty of justifying every decree made under the 
delegation of legislative capabilities (Tavares, et. al., 2004). 
Alvaro Uribe Velez (2002-2010): the combination of extraordinary 
constitutional provisions to accumulate power 
Over the ‘divergence period’, as Guerrero (2011) states, Uribe’s government 
continued using the State of Emergency mechanism that prevailed in the second half 
of the 20th century,189 changing not only the balance between powers but also affecting 
negatively the democratic performance that the 1991 Colombian Constitution tried to 
improve. 
Under his eight-year term, President Uribe declared three highly controversial States 
of Emergency. Two of them were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional 
Court, while only one of them was declared constitutional by the same court.190 The 
first of these was issued within the first five days of Uribe’s inauguration by the decree 
1837 of 2002 (see Table 6.3 below). The Uribe government argued that a period with 
special powers was necessary because of the situation of insecurity caused by the threat 
of illegal armed groups that the country was facing. This State of Emergency lasted 
180 days through the double extension approved by the Legislature. Its essential aim 
was to normalise the situation of the country by boosting the capacities of the military 
                                                 
189 Guerrero (2011) used this comparison, to make a reference to the permanent use of the provision 
called States of Siege, a constitutional provision form the ‘transitional period’ that was most of the time 
used by the Presidents since the formation of the National Front until the enactment of the 1991 
Constitution. 
190 Over his two terms in government Uribe also issued two additional States of Emergency decrees but 
they are not considered on this analysis because the extraordinary power was not conferred directly to 
him but to other departments attached to the government. The first one issued the decree 4333 of 2008 
declaring the social emergency aiming to control the massive collection of illegal money and money 
laundering by private citizens. On this instance was not the President but the Financial 
Superintendence’s office the authority responsible of conducting the investigation, prosecution and 
judicial proceeding. The second provision of State of Emergency that was not directly handled by the 
executive branch but by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the decree 2693 of 2010. This decree was 
issued when the diplomatic crisis of Colombia and Venezuela led to the closing of the border over 
allegations made by President Uribe that the Venezuelan government was actively permitting the FARC 
and ELN guerrillas to seek safe haven in its territory (CNN 2010). 
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forces and the fiscal effort of the Colombians to implement his flagship policy called 
Democratic Security.191 
To implement this policy, President Uribe issued the decrees 2001, 2002 and 2929 of 
2002, enabling the creation of ‘zones of rehabilitation and consolidation’. Under the 
influence of these decrees and zones, the executive branch had the power to restrict 
population mobility, to manage specific fiscal resources, to allow the security forces 
to wiretap without a court order, and carry out raids, searches and detentions without 
any prior judicial authorization or warrant (Guerrero 2011).192 Regarding the 
implementation of this State of Emergency, Guerrero (2011) argues that this provision 
went against the institutional limits for two reasons: first, it legislated on fiscal matter, 
and, second, it converted the paradigm of security into a necessary justification for 
initiating the concentration of power by strengthening personal ties with the military 
forces and passing over the national Legislature. Hence, this provision allows us to 
identify a first instance of institutional concentration of power in hands of the 
executive branch that was justified by the desire to implement Uribe's flagship 
Democratic Security policy. 
The second State of Emergency was issued by means of decree 3929 of 2008. It was 
justified by stressing the judicial paralysis experienced by the country due to the labour 
stoppage in this sector which was affecting both institutional stability and the 
guarantee of providing a fair and effective system of internal justice. To do so, the 
President issued three decrees seeking to grant special powers to the Superior Council 
of the Judiciary (SCJ) because the Supreme Court of Justice had refused to apply the 
rules dictated to solve this problem (El Tiempo, 2009). However, the Constitutional 
Court declared the decrees unconstitutional because the ordinary means of dealing 
with the crisis were not properly evaluated, and the mechanisms to address the origin 
of the problem were not clearly specified. 
Finally, the last State of Emergency was enabled through the decree 4975 of 2009. It 
was issued under the justification of rescuing the General System of Social Security in 
                                                 
191 This policy is defined by Pachón (2009) as a government program aimed at consolidating the State 
at the national level through the strengthening of public force and territorial control. 
192 Likewise, by issuing the decree 1838 of 2002, a new tax was approved to ensure the financing of the 
Democratic Security policy with a rate of 1.2% on the value of the net patrimony of the richer declarant´s 
(El Tiempo 2002). 
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Health (GSSSH) from the crisis it was facing.193 The decree opened up the way for the 
central government, headed by President Uribe, to control the entire health sector 
through the creation of special committees (such as FONPRES – Fondo de 
Prestaciones Excepcionales de Salud), and to finance the health sector deficit by both 
patients' patrimony and taxes previously earmarked to finance other sectors.194 
Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court, once again, declared this decree 
unconstitutional for two reasons. First, because the health service is a fundamental 
right and its regulation requires public participation (not only from the Executive 
branch), and second because this decree meant to seeking more resources but did not 
correct the nature of the deficit. Consequently, the Constitutional Court argued that 
there were no extraordinary events in order to declare a State of Emergency, due to 
there were ordinary mechanisms to deal with the situation, and the decree, on the other 
hand, hinders the full enjoyment of this service. 
Table 6.3 shows all the decrees issued under the three States of Emergency described 
above, as well as their outcome in terms of constitutional control. 
Table 7.3. 
States of emergency issued by Uribe’s 
government 2002-2010 – Colombia 
Decree Causes Legislated decrees Legal controls Length  
Decree 
1837 of 
2002 
Decrease of public 
control over actions by 
illegal armed groups 
and constant violation 
of Human Rights 
Decree 2555 of 2002 
(extension), decree 245 of 
2003 (extension), 
legislative decree 2001 of 
2002, legislative decree 
2002 of 2002, decree 1838 
of 2002, legislative decree 
2929 of 2003 
C-202/02 and C-
1024/02. 
The Constitutional 
Court modified and 
declared some articles 
as non-constitutional 
but left intact the bulk 
of the decree 
270 
days 
Decree 
3929 of 
2008 
Crisis of the health 
system. Financial 
Instability 
Legislative Decree 3930 of 
2009, Legislative Decree 
021 of 2009, Legislative 
Decree 3955 of 2009 
C-070/09, C-071/09, 
C-072/09, C-176/09 
Both the Decree 
calling for Emergency 
and those carried out 
under this State of 
Emergency were 
declared non-
constitutional by the 
Constitutional Court. 
30 days 
                                                 
193 The crisis in the health system was caused by the abrupt growth in the demand for expensive drugs 
and medical treatments that were not covered by government subsidies. 
194 For instance, the gambling taxes that traditionally were used to finance the sport sector. Hence, by 
the means of this decree was intended to use those resources to finance the health sector. 
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Decree Causes Legislated decrees Legal controls Length  
Decree 
4975 of 
2009 
Paralysis of the judicial 
branch 
Legislative Decree 4976 of 
2009, Legislative Decree 
073 of 2010, Legislative 
Decree 074 of 2010, 
Legislative Decree 126 of 
2010, Legislative Decree 
127 of 2010, Legislative 
Decree 128 of 2010, 
Legislative Decree 129 of 
2010, Legislative Decree 
130 of 2010, Legislative 
Decree 131 of 2010, 
Legislative Decree 132 of 
2010, Legislative Decree 
133 of 2010, Ordinary 
Decree 120 of 2010, 
Ordinary Decree 358 of 
2010, Ordinary Decree 
398 of 2010 
C-254/10, C-252-10, 
C-299/10, C-298/09, 
C-302/10, C-253/10, 
C-258/10, C-291/10, 
C-332/10, C-289/10, 
C-374/10, C-255/10 
Each separate decree 
was declared non-
constitutional by the 
Constitutional Court. 
30 days 
Source: Own compilation based on Vanegas (2011), Montoya (2010) and data from Bogota Mayor's Office 
 
Overall, from the total State of Emergency decrees issued by President Uribe over his 
eight years tenure, it is possible to recognise the authoritarian nature of President 
Uribe's decisions by relegating Congress to advisory functions (Montoya 2010). By 
looking at the nature and justification to issue the first and the third decrees, President 
Uribe was prone to put his private interests before the public interests contributing to 
social disintegration, and endangering the democratic performance of the Colombian 
regime. Nevertheless, it is also important to recognise the role played by the judicial 
system, particularly the one exerted by the Constitutional Court, as an effective 
supervisory body to keep the Executive branch accountable to the checks and balances 
embodied in the 1991 Colombian constitution. The Constitutional Court’s capacity to 
declare two out of the three State of Emergency decrees unconstitutional provides 
evidence to claim that the necessary mechanisms to ensure the independence of the 
branches of governments to preserve the rule of law worked, and it is still a prime 
principle of the Colombian political system. 
Table 8.4. 
Delegative laws issued by Uribe’s 
government (2002-2010) – Colombia 
Date Purpose  Status 
August 6, 2002 Not specified Filed 
October 10, 2002 To advance the renewal program in public administration Law 790 of 2002 
July 20, 2006 To modify the General System of Social Security in Health Law 1122 of 2007 
September 6, 2007 To determine the structure of the National Administration Filed 
July 20, 2008 Provisions in the areas of penitentiary and prison Filed 
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Date Purpose  Status 
August 6, 2008 To regulate the foreign service of the republic and the 
diplomatic and consular career 
Filed 
October 8, 2008 Special career system for the servers of the Administrative 
Department of Security 
Filed 
December 16, 2008 Not specified Filed 
April 23, 2008 Issue the rules related to the career of the personnel of the 
public force and the provisions that regulate the service of 
recruitment and mobilization 
Filed 
July 22, 2009 To determine the structure of the National Administration Filed 
July 29, 2009 To issue career rules of the personnel of the public force, of 
the service of recruitment and mobilization of the evaluation 
of the psychophysical capacity and the reduction of the 
labor capacity; and provisions on arms, ammunition and 
explosives 
Filed 
Source: Own compilation based on data from the Congress of the Colombian Government 
 
On the other hand, as discussed earlier, the Colombian Constitution also granted 
executive powers to the executive branch by allowing the president to use an 
alternative provision known as delegative laws.195 Due to the strong control that the 
Constitutional Court exerted over the laws enacted using the State of Emergency 
provision, Uribe’s administration tried to use this mechanism in multiple occasions to 
enable him to pass several laws on the basis that his party, in coalition with other 
parties, had parliamentary majorities. The use of the delegative laws as a provision to 
pass legislation without following the constitutional process evidence, once again, 
Uribe’s authoritarian tendencies in his approach to ruling the country. 
As can be seen in table 6.4, over his eight years in power President Uribe drafted 11 
delegative laws with the clear political intention to accumulate power in his hands. 
However, from them, only two finally became the law of the Republic even though 
President Uribe had a legislative majority during that period (Olivella, et.al., 2006). 
This rather poor legislative outcome underlines the point that the judicial branch, 
through the Constitutional Court, and also the Legislative branch, through the 
unwillingness from members in Congress to delegate their constitutional functions, 
were hindrances that Uribe had to deal with, restrains that did not allow him to 
concentrate as much power as he would have wanted. 
In the light of the above points, it is worth reviewing the details of the two delegative 
laws that President Uribe managed to pass after the previous control exerted by both 
the legislature, in four debates; and the Constitutional Court revision. On the one hand, 
                                                 
195 These are understood as any law that grants the President of the Republic extraordinary powers to 
execute decrees with force of law for a limited time (Herrán, 2001). 
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Law 790 of 2002 enabled President Uribe to make an administrative reform aiming to 
restructure the executive branch of government.196 This reform was achieved by means 
of five legislative decrees with a minimum modification by the Constitutional Court 
through ruling C-911 of 2004. 
On the other hand, the delegative law 1122 of 2007, aiming to reform the Health 
System, came into force after Uribe’s failed attempt to pass it through the State of 
Emergency provision was declared unconstitutional by Constitutional Court. Hence, 
this law can be regarded as a hybrid one because President Uribe, using his decree 
powers, had to negotiate with the Congress so that both branches of government could 
legislate together to restructuring the functioning of the General System of Social 
Security in Health (GSSSH) (Restrepo 2007). President Uribe’s second bet to enforce 
this law by using the delegative law mechanism rather than the State of Emergency 
clearly shows his persistent attempt to ignore the judicial control prescribed in the 
Constitution.197 Nonetheless, it is also important to emphasise the control exercised by 
the Constitutional Court to prevent that President Uribe from further deepening 
executive authority through the use of decree powers. As discussed earlier, such 
control allowed the Constitutional Court to declare unconstitutional most of the 
decrees issued by means of either State of Emergency Laws or by delegative laws 
preventing in this way severe negative effects on Colombia’s democratic performance. 
Hugo Chávez (1999-2013): the enabling laws as a mechanism for the 
consolidation of the Bolivarian project 
As introduced earlier in this section, President Chávez, unlike President Uribe, from 
the two Constitutional mechanisms available to him to concentrate power, only 
resorted to the enabling law provision and never to the State of Emergency to 
implement the laws he felt that he needed to consolidate his Bolivarian revolution. 
Two reasons can be highlighted to understand President Chávez’s preference to resort 
                                                 
196 Among the measures taken was the merging of the Ministry of Commerce with the Ministry of 
Economic Development, the Ministry of Labour with the Ministry of Health. Thus, this law cut down 
ministerial offices from sixteen to thirteen. Additionally, the law also eradicated decentralised 
administrative offices, and Ecopetrol, the oil national company, was split to eliminate functions on non-
oil mining fields (Decree-Law 1760 of 2003). 
197 It also shows his stubbornness to rule the country by means of relying more on the extraordinary 
provisions granted by the Constitution than following the traditional and procedural mechanisms that 
ensure the rule of law and a better performance of a democratic regime. 
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exclusively to the former and not to the latter. First, the enabling law, when compared 
with the State of emergency, is a more flexible, expeditious, and its implementation is 
simpler which, in turn, guarantee less constitutional controls by the other branches of 
government (Tavares, et. al., 2004).198 The second reason is even more striking that 
the previous one. As discussed above, despite the Venezuelan Constitution was drawn 
up by a democratically elected assembly, this assembly was composed by a pro-
Chávez majority allowing him to configure beforehand the legal instruments to 
concentrate or modify the logics of institutional power (Corrales, et. al., 2013). Hence, 
it is unclear, difficult, and open to debate to understand why Chávez was reluctant to 
also use the State of emergency mechanism since his coalition party was in control of 
the parliament.199 
Table 6.5 shows the dates of the four periods in which President Chávez, throughout 
his three consecutive terms as President, used the enabling law provision, the length 
of each one of them, and the number of decrees issued under this mechanism.  
Table 9.5. 
Enabling laws issued by Chávez’s 
government (1999-2010) - Venezuela 
Start Date Length New Laws Reforms Total 
April 26, 1999 6 months 26 27 53 
Announced in 2000, 
applied since 
January 2001 
12 months 33 16 49 
January 31, 2007 18 months 59 20 59-
65200 
December 12, 2010 18 months 40 14 54 
Source: Own compilation from El Mundo (2013) and Guerra (2012) 
 
As can be seen in table 6.5, the first period in which the enabling law was implemented 
was in 1999, when the constitution of 1961 was still in force. President Chávez 
justified its use by pointing out that the legislative process was too slow, and by the 
                                                 
198 Therefore, this mechanism had more attributes to quicken the implementation of the Bolivarian 
project to establish the programmatic foundations for the implementation of the ‘socialism of the 21st 
century’ (Node50 2004). 
199 Regardless of what led Chávez to rely exclusively on the use of the enabling law provision to 
strengthen the implementation of his political and socio-economic model of government, the reality is 
that he used this provision in four occasions. Not only President Chávez’s reliance on resorting on this 
provision to issue laws, but also the extended length of time that the National Assembly granted him to 
use it, as stated by Guerra (2012) and Romero, et.al., (2010), should be understood as part of a political 
strategy in which the legislative branch bestowed more powers to the executive branch so that President 
Chávez could enact or amend laws without real constitutional controls. 
200 The number of new laws and reforms issued over this period is widely debated among scholars 
because the enactment of many reforms was not considered deep enough to be considered a new law. 
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need to initiate a "process of democratisation according to the needs of a new society" 
(VTV 2015). By resorting to this enabling law, the newly-elected President Chávez 
issued 53 decrees that revolved around four axes:201 organisation of the public 
administration, financial sector, tax reform and economic reform. Echoing McCoy 
(2004), it seems that Chávez over his two first years in government focused his 
attention in attaining economic change rather than on trying to implement a radical 
political change. Hence, these decrees allowed the president to freely review and 
modify the functioning of both ministries, and offices of the national administration, 
to increase the country’s debt capacity, to establish a financial emergency regulation, 
to impose new taxes on banking operations, the unification of income tax, to carry out 
a social security reform with new funds, and to nationalise the property of gas and all 
mining goods to the State. 
According to Romero, et. al., (2010), this first enabling law seemed to initiate a process 
of democratisation because it served to open the political system in concordance to 
what civil society was expecting.202 In this sense, this first set of decrees can be 
deemed as a political manoeuvre to prepare the ground to configure the needed 
institutional apparatus so that a new type of democratic regime –more inclusive and 
participative- could be implemented. But at the same time, the issuing of these 
executive decrees also aimed to dismantle the power structure that still retained the 
traditional political parties, represented by AD and COPEI (Ellner, et. al., 2007). As 
expected, this first enabling period ended with a Constitutional Referendum held in 
1999 and the subsequent enactment of the new Bolivarian Constitution which 
contained all the characteristics of what scholars call a hyper-presidentialist regime, 
centred on the dominance of the executive branch over the legislature and judiciary 
(Ellner and Hellinger, 2003). 
The second enabling law, was applied in a new social and political context. At the 
beginning of 2001, the new unicameral Assembly was installed and President Chávez 
took office for second time in front of the Legislature. Thus, on November 13, 2001, 
the President issued 49 decrees with force of law under the Enabling law of 2001 
                                                 
201 These were published in the Official Gazette No. 36,687 of April 26, 1999 (AVDF, 2000). 
202 As discussed earlier, by this time, most of the Venezuelans’ urban poor still had a general belief that 
the political system was anachronistic and exclusionary, and they had in their memory the consequences 
that the 1989 Caracazo uprising brought about (McCoy 2004; López Maya 2003). 
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(EL2001). On this occasion, the law was justified by stressing the existence of a deep 
economic crisis due to the fall in oil prices (President's Office, 2005). Hence, this law 
enabled the President to govern, without control of the National Assembly or the 
judicial branch, in three areas of utmost importance: the land law and agricultural 
development –which enable the expropriation of land; the hydrocarbons law –which 
nationalised the production of Venezuelan oil; and the fisheries law –which abolished 
the industrial fishing permits and created large areas of artisanal fishing. 
Overall, as Guerra (2012) and Romero, et. al., (2010) claim, the enforcement of the 
two enabling laws analysed above aimed to make the transition to the Fifth Republic, 
which proposed the re-foundation of the State by means of the appropriation of whole 
branches of government by the ranks of Chavismo. From this moment, the presidency 
will have direct power decision-making over PDVSA, the Central Bank, and virtually 
over the constitutional control made by Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ).  
The third enabling law was enacted in 2007 under what is known as the 
implementation of the Bolivarian project (Romero, et. al., 2011), and it was issued 
within the framework of the announced First Socialist Plan 2007-2013. The central 
purpose of this enabling law was the structuring of the economic model, for which the 
President ‘required legislative powers to guide the process of social transformation’ 
(Guerra, 2012: 395). Interestingly, on this year the National Assembly was totally 
controlled by President Chávez’s forces because the opposition, led by AD, refused to 
run for parliamentary elections. Thus, Law EL2007 issued and approved 65 legislative 
decrees. On this instance, unlike the previous ones, President Chávez had no limits to 
enforce this law since the National Assembly gave him full freedom to carry out its 
implementation (Corrales, et. al., 2010). The two areas most affected by the decrees 
supporting this law were the organic structure of the state, and the country's economic 
system.203 According to Villasmil (2007), this enabling period provides evidence to 
recognise Chávez’s authoritarian nature, not only because he, unilaterally, was able to 
reform the organic laws of the State but also because his economic reforms can be 
                                                 
203 For example, during this enabling period the Anti-Hoarding Law came into force aiming at a general 
ban to maintain commercial inventories, speculation, boycotting, and any other conduct affecting the 
consumption of food and commodities for the Venezuelan citizens. The Monetary Reconversion Law 
also came into force strengthening the Executive's role over the National Bank, the Stabilization Law 
that transfers the oil surpluses to the National Development Fund controlled by the President was also 
implemented, and the adoption of the Law of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces that deeply 
politicised the armed forces (Corrales, et. al., 2013). 
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deemed as a direct confrontation with human rights. This is because the judicial 
procedures established to guarantee a ‘just’ expropriation of land or private property 
began to be politicised or disappear altogether in some cases (Guerra 2012). In 
addition, the involving of the military apparatus in politics consolidated the 
dependence of the armed forces on the Bolivarian political project (Corrales 2014). 
The last enabling law, enforced by President Chávez before his death, came into force 
in December 2010. It can be regarded as the last attempt to adjust and redirect the 
Bolivarian socialist project. Under this law (EL2010), 54 decrees-laws were issued. 
Officially, the justification for its enactment was linked to address the internal 
emergency after heavy rains hit the country in 2010 where thousands of people were 
left homeless. However, the political element underlying the need to resort to this 
extraordinary provision was the loss of the qualified majority in the National Assembly 
by the Chavistas (Guerra 2012), which made difficult for Chávez to carry out large-
scale legislative projects.204 
In sum, the analysis presented here shows that the enabling law provision was the 
constitutional tool used by President Chávez to consolidate his Bolivarian project. By 
relying on this mechanism, rather than in the State of Emergency provision, he 
managed to reform or enact 215 new laws (see Table 3) over his entire tenure. These 
laws allowed him to establish the programmatic foundations of his political project 
known as ‘socialism of the 21st century’. Although Chávez original intention for using 
this mechanism can be assessed as a necessary tool to change the ill-functioning 
democratic structures that prevailed over the ‘transitional period’, its constant use over 
time and the lack of judicial review to control the constitutionality of the decrees 
enacted disrupted its potential benefits allowing a disproportionate concentration of 
power in the legislative branch of government. It is quite telling that none of the 
enabling laws enabled by President Chávez had not been reviewed by the 
Constitutional Court, or that at least some of these decrees could had been declared 
unconstitutional. This reveals that the institutional checks and balances did not 
                                                 
204 This real political interest is evidenced by the fact that after six months the enabling law entered into 
effect only one decree was enacted regarding the winter crisis, while the legislation on subjects as varied 
as the organic order of the State, or the law to implement price-fixing at the private sector (Law of Costs 
and Fair Prices), or a Labour Law and the Law of Knowledge and Labour to strengthen ties between 
the State, the trade unions and the armed forces were approved by the president. 
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exercise an efficient control over President Chávez allowing him to govern Venezuela 
in a rather authoritarian manner.  
However, the outcome of using decree powers on the democratic performance in both 
countries was quite different and it can be attributed to the role played by the way the 
judicial branches in both polities exercised control over the constitutionality of the 
decrees issued when these mechanisms were used. The next section will elaborate 
further on this aspect by conducting a comparative analysis on the use of these 
provisions by both presidents and its influence and consequences in the effort to 
explain democratic divergence. 
A comparative analysis of concentration of power in Colombia and 
Venezuela, and its impact on democratic performance during the 
‘divergence period’ 
As shown above, Presidents Uribe and Chávez relied on the constitutional provisions 
that allowed them to govern by decree. Both used either the mechanisms of State of 
Emergency and/or the Enabling law to enforce their own legislative agenda which, in 
turn, affected negatively the democratic performance of their respective countries. 
Hence, based on the evidence presented earlier, in this section I conduct a comparative 
analysis of how the use of these provisions can be helpful to elucidate an additional 
explanation on why Colombia and Venezuela took different democratic paths over the 
‘divergence period’. 
To do so, it is worth asking first, why did the two Presidents choose to rely on these 
extraordinary provisions to enforce their agendas despite having legislative majorities? 
Is it not paradoxical that having been able to form majoritarian party coalitions to pass 
legislation according to their political preferences, they have rather drawn on fast-track 
mechanisms to enforce their agenda? A possible explanation of this phenomenon is 
that the presidents shared an increasing sense of urgency to solve the political, social 
and economic problems that their countries were facing when they were elected. 
Therefore, and despite having majorities in their parliaments, they made full use of the 
window of opportunity provided by the enactment of the new constitutions and 
decided to use the extraordinary provisions that allowed them to concentrate power 
and govern by decree. 
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As discussed earlier, both parliamentary majorities and judicial review played a 
differentiating role on the prospects of Presidents Chávez and Uribe making use decree 
powers (i.e., State of Emergency and the Enabling laws) as mechanisms to accumulate 
power. Therefore, these two factors can also explain the different impacts on the 
regime’s democratic performance in these two countries. As for the parliamentary 
majorities, the difference is to be found in the fact that Chávez's coalition was 
completely aligned and committed with the President's agenda (Corrales 2014), whilst 
Uribe’s coalition had certain resistance to delegating their legislative functions every 
time the President requested it (Olivella, et. al., 2006). This is explained by the fact 
that Uribe's coalition was not as homogenous as Chávez’s. Therefore, when Uribe 
requested the delegation of functions to the parliament the legislature was not always 
willing to give up some margin of manoeuvrability in the future political negotiations 
with the president, whereas when the same request came from President Chávez the 
parliament was always ready to grant it. 
The second factor explaining the different impact that the accumulation of power had 
over the democratic performance of these countries relates to the control, or lack of it, 
that the judicial branch, throughout the Constitutional Court, made to either the State 
of Emergency or the Enabling laws issued by the executive branch. As explained 
above, this control was non-existent for the Venezuelan case (see Table 6.5), whilst 
Uribe had to face, not only the modification of some of his decrees, but also the 
declaration of unconstitutionality that prevented that some of the decrees from 
becoming law (see Tables 6.3 and 6.4). Hence, when comparing the two cases based 
on the evidence presented, one can infer that Colombia’s checks and balances were 
considerably more effective than in the Venezuelan case. This difference might be 
attributed to the way by which the constituent process in Venezuela was conceived by 
the Chavismo as they not only limited the role of the Supreme Court of Justice but also 
allowed to a greater degree the concentration of power in hands of President Chávez 
(Corrales, et. al., 2013; Corrales 2014). 
Overall, the analysis conducted here fosters the claim that the effect of resorting to 
these extraordinary provisions by Presidents Uribe and Chávez led to a concentration 
of power in the executive branch in both countries, and at the same time, it also affected 
negatively their democratic performance. However, the concentration of power in 
Venezuela can be assessed as significantly deeper than in the Colombian case. Two 
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additional reasons support this claim. First, Chávez's insistence on issuing enabling 
laws to rule the county by decree had a serious negative impact on the options the 
opposition had to gain access to power throughout the electoral process.205 This is 
because by resorting to this mechanism, Chávez managed to change the electoral law 
disabling multiple candidates from the opposition to run for office at both national and 
regional levels.206 In contrast, although the strategies used by Uribe effectively 
allowed him to concentrate power, the nature of his government prevented him from 
excluding other political forces because he needed a multiparty coalition to govern, 
and the electoral support of other parties for future elections. Additionally, as Guerrero 
(2011) states, despite Uribe managed both to partially change the structure of the 
political system through the 2003 Referendum, and also to approve the Presidential re-
election, his executive decrees did not manage to become so authoritarian as he would 
have wanted, because of the strong control exercised by the Constitutional Court that 
not only declared unconstitutional most of his executive decrees but also because this 
Court did not allow the modification of the Constitution so that Uribe could pursued 
his third consecutive re-election. 
The second reason relates to the number, content and scope, and length of the reforms 
carried out by both presidents when they resorted to the use of decree powers. A 
comparison of these variables showed that the concentration of power and its negative 
impact over the democratic performance on these countries were much more far-
reaching in Venezuela when compared with Colombia. By looking at tables 6.3, 6.4 
and 6.5 it is striking to realise that the number of decrees that passed and became law 
in the Venezuelan case outnumber by far the number of decrees passed in the 
Colombian case. In fact, the relation was 215 laws in Venezuela against around 70 
laws in Colombia (Guerra 2012). 
If the number of reforms enacted is not a good measure to explain the divergent 
democratic performance of these countries, then the analysis of the content and scope 
of the reforms may be needed. On this aspect, as discussed above, Colombia (see 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4) enacted State of Emergency or Delegative Laws only on specific 
                                                 
205 As discussed above, the only exception to this trend was in the 2007 Legislative Election when the 
opposition parties refused to participate or try to boycott this election (see Buxton 2005, 2008). As a 
result, the National Assembly was totally controlled by the political parties allied to President Chávez. 
206 For instance, the National Electoral Council (CNE) disqualified 270 opposition candidates for the 
2010 elections (Corrales and Hidalgo, 2013; Corrales 2014). 
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issues that although could have affected both the institutional strength of the county, 
and the human rights of some Colombian citizens, nonetheless, these reforms were not 
deep enough to modify the economic, social, and political system in an unrecognizable 
way.207 In contrast, the case of Venezuela showed that each package of laws enacted 
by using the Enabling Law provision (see Table 6.5) brought about very profound 
changes to the state's order in areas as varied as social, economic, political (rule of 
law), the armed forces, international relations, and industrial regulation (Bejarano 
2011). 
Finally, the length of time that the legislative body granted Presidents Chávez and 
Uribe the use of decree powers was different and, therefore, can be regarded as another 
measure to explain democratic divergence. As was discussed above, the Colombian 
Constitution granted the use of decree powers only for fixed periods of time, no longer 
than six months, so that the President could implement his political agenda. In contrast, 
the Venezuelan Constitution allows the legislature to grant President Chávez complete 
freedom to establish the duration to implement the enabling laws (Tavares, et. al., 
2004). In fact, as can be seen in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 President Uribe had 270 days (9 
months) to implement his flagship policy known as Democratic Security, and only 30 
days to implement the rest of his State of Emergency (2 additional laws) and 
Delegative Laws (3 additional laws) prior approval of the Constitutional Court. 
President Chávez, in turn, had the freedom to extent the duration of his enabling 
powers as far as he wanted, and without Constitutional review. Table 3 shows that in 
a period of 10 years, President Chávez resorted 4 times to the use of decree powers,208 
2 of them lasted 540 days (18 months), 1 of them lasted 360 days (1 year), and the last 
time had a duration of 180 days (six months). Overall, comparing the length of time 
whereby both presidents managed to enact, implement, and rule by decree, it is 
possible to infer that President Chávez was granted four times more time than 
President Uribe to promote their own political agenda. Hence, if a government has 
more time to resort to decree powers it will increase the likelihood to undermine the 
                                                 
207 As discussed, the Colombian Constitution only granted the use of enabling laws on specific topics. 
Consequently, Uribe could only cover few areas in each law or else the Constitutional Court would 
declare what was decreed to be unconstitutional, which effectively happened. 
208 This is no insignificant matter when one considers that during the whole ‘transitional period’ (around 
40 years), the Venezuelan Congress only granted decree powers via an "enabling law" five times since 
1961 (Garcia-Sierra 2001). 
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very basis of this political regime due to it will negatively affect the principle of 
separation of powers and, therefore, its democratic performance. 
6.4.2. Electoral system 
The previous section highlighted that the reform and further amendments on 
constitutions had explanatory power, as independent variable, to test the process of 
democratic divergence for Colombia and Venezuela over the ‘divergence period’. It 
argued that the role played by a renewed set of political elites –either appointed in the 
Constitutional Assembly for the Venezuelan case, or elected in the National Assembly 
in the Colombian case- was crucial to determine the democratic path taken by the 
countries under study. Moreover, it also showed that political elites made reforms or 
amendments on their constitutions in order to grant different levels of concentration of 
power for their executive branches that partially explain the different democratic 
trajectories for the countries under study.209 
However, although comprehensive reforms or amendments on constitutions can be 
regarded as an important step to explain democratic divergence, its explanatory power 
over the dependent variable would be partial if reforms over the electoral system are 
not taken into consideration. Therefore, this section will claim that the main goal from 
the renewed political elites in reforming their constitutions, during the ‘divergence 
period’, was to have a direct influence on the way by which the appointment of public 
elected officials can be changed by controlling the electoral formula. Thus, in this 
subsection I propose that a central factor in the adoption of different electoral systems 
over time for the countries under study can be explained by the incentives that 
politicians have in order to guarantee different levels of concentration of power on 
both the executive and legislative branches of government through constitutional 
means. That is, if constitution makers have the possibility to alter the formulas for 
electing presidents and legislators; electoral cycles; term limits; presidential powers; 
and the relationship between national and local governments, then, they have an 
                                                 
209  Section 6.4.1 showed that Venezuela’s executive received the support of a pro-government majority 
in the decision-making bodies so that, by constitutional means, the president could accumulate as much 
power as possible; whereas for the Colombian case such accumulation was rather control by the judicial 
branch and in some extent by the legislative branch of government. This is because, both the Constituent 
Assembly and the legislative body was composed of political forces from different ideologies that 
managed to distribute power in different degree among the different branches of government. 
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important political asset to determine how power can be redistributed in a regime. 
Hence, they will have an important role in determining the democratic path a country 
might take. In this respect, electoral systems will be considered as the third 
independent variable that, along with the variables elite political culture and 
constitutions make up the whole Circular Causality Model introduced in chapter three. 
To a large extent, tables 6.2 and 6.3 already showed and analysed the effects caused 
by the electoral reforms conducted for the two countries under study, and for both 
periods of analysis. From that analysis, it was claimed that over the ‘transitional 
period’ the electoral reforms in both countries were rather rare due to traditional 
political elites tried to maintain the political status quo by backing traditional parties 
(COPEI and AD in Venezuela; and Liberal and Conservative parties in Colombia) that 
used to rule these polities (Bejarano 2011; Buxton 2005). Such stability in the electoral 
rules can be translated in the steadiness on the democratic performance that Colombia 
and Venezuela enjoyed over that period allowing them to be considered as one of the 
most stable democracies in the region (see table 2.2 and figures 1.1 - 1.2). 
Yet, it was also clear from the previous analysis that, despite the democratic stability 
enjoyed by both polities during the ‘transitional period’, the Venezuelan electoral 
system was more democratic as its electoral rule to distribute seats in the Senate (the 
upper house in Congress) was a closed-list pure PR system with the D’Hondt electoral 
formula method; whereas for the Colombian case a semi-PR system with the formula 
of larger remainders (LR) or Hare system was the electoral rule to allocate seats in the 
Senate (Wills-Otero, et. al., 2005). Thus, the latter formula, in comparative terms with 
the Venezuelan one, resulted less proportional and, therefore, more exclusionary as it 
tried to guarantee the continuation in power for Colombia’s traditional parties.210  
Nonetheless, after decades without significant modifications, electoral rules did 
change during the ‘divergence period.’ In fact, since President Chávez took power in 
                                                 
210 To be sure about the direct influence that the electoral system has over the democratic performance, 
Freedom House ratings (see table 2.2) showed that over the whole ‘transitional period’ the Venezuelan 
democratic performance was always above (lower), and therefore better, than that of Colombia. That 
is, during that period Venezuela was regarded as a ‘free country’ whereas Colombia always remained 
below as a ‘partly free’ country. 
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1998, one of his first goals in government was to appoint a Constituent Assembly211 
whose principal role was to enact a completely new set of rules that will allow him to 
rule the country. Thus, among the whole new set of rules contemplated in the new 
1999 ‘Bolivarian Constitution’, the electoral ones to elect public officials was one on 
the main focus of this comprehensive reform. As a result, over the ‘divergence period’ 
the electoral rules changed three times (1998, 2000, and 2005). These reforms 
considerably modified the incentives that ruling and opposition political parties had to 
participate in equal conditions for accessing power positions. Overall, the electoral 
formula changed from the closed-list pure PR system to a mixed system, with most of 
the National Assembly members elected by plurality. Thus, the new Venezuelan 
electoral formula weakened the ‘incentives for party discipline and the power of the 
traditional national party leaders [as used to be the case over the ‘transitional period]’ 
(Monaldi, et. al., 2008) thereby, favouring the parties allied to the government.212 
As for Colombia, its electoral formula also changed over the ‘divergence period’. 
However, it did not change straightaway with the enactment of the comprehensive 
constitutional reform carried out in 1991. In fact, the largest remainders-Hare system 
remained in place when the 1991 new constitution was enacted.213 By keeping 
untouched the electoral formula party unity was undermined contributing to 
governance problems such as successive political stalemates in the legislature. In this 
sense, the Hare system did not allow competition among parties, but rather it generated 
incentives for traditional parties to fragment into several factions. 214 
                                                 
211 Premonitory to what is going to happen with the future electoral reforms in Venezuela, the 1998 
Constituent Assembly was appointed by a Majoritarian system, leaving completely abandoned for first 
time in the twentieth century the use of the proportional formula (Monaldi, et. al. 2008). 
212 To be clear, the effect of changing the electoral formula in 1999 over the Venezuelan democratic 
performance is negative. Figure 1.1 showed that, according to Freedom House ranking, this country had 
a sharp fall moving from a ‘free country’ with a score of 2,5 in 1999 to a ‘partly free country’ with a 
score of 4 one year later (see also table 2.2). The one-year lag to observe the change in the evaluation 
of the democratic rating for this regime is explained because the electoral reform approved in 1998 
came into practice in the 1999 National Assembly election, therefore, Freedom House complies this 
result only up to its 2000 report. The data supporting this argument comes from the report Freedom in 
the World 2015, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.VXm-
p2BGjdm). 
213 In fact, this formula completed a total period of 45 years without modifications since the last time it 
was amended in 1958 (Wills-Otero, 2009). 
214 For example, the excessive party fragmentation produced that in the 2002 election only three lists, 
out of more than 300 succeeded in electing more than one senator. This means that more than 72 
different movements obtained at least one seat in the Senate (Cardenas, et. al., 2008). These movements 
were typically affiliated to the two major Colombian political parties: Liberal and Conservative. 
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Such party fragmentation and its extreme personalisation of electoral competition in 
Congress (Pizarro 2006; Shugart et. al. 2007) urged a political reform that could both 
unlock the legislative stalemate and, therefore, allow a more responsive system of 
governance. Thus, in June 2003, after repeated failures, the Colombian congress 
approved an electoral reform. It moved the electoral formula from the Hare quota 
system with no limit on the number of lists per party215 to a pure PR system with an 
optional open/closed list (Wills-Otero, 2009; Pachón-Buitrago 2008). This electoral 
reform was an important step in improving the democratic performance of Colombia 
because in addition to enhance the ability of parties to act collectively, it also allowed 
a broader competition among parties from different ideologies that used to be excluded 
from the political contest. Furthermore, this reform introduced for first time in history, 
a 2% electoral threshold that helped to limit the number of parties with legislative 
representation.216  
Like with the Venezuelan case, the effect of changing the electoral formula over the 
Colombian democratic performance can be observed by looking at the Freedom House 
scores assigned to this country. As seen in figure 1.1, Colombia before the 2003 
electoral reform was regarded as a ‘partly free country’ with a score of 4 in 2002 by 
Freedom House, but its democratic performance changed positively once the 2003 
electoral reform became operational in the legislative elections held in 2006 scoring 3 
in 2007 (see also table 2.2).217 
The key point to highlight from the previous comparative analysis is that the electoral 
reforms implemented by the countries under study over the ‘divergence period’ can be 
                                                 
215 The Colombian electoral system up through 2002 ‘was an unusual system in which most political 
parties presented multiple lists of candidates, but there was no pooling of the votes won by any of a 
party’s various lists’ (Shugart, et. al., 2007: 203). 
216 As a matter of fact, the parties winning legislative representation were indeed political parties with 
autonomous representation in the legislature away from the traditional parties or its factions. This 
outcome represents the positive effects exerted by the implementation of a pure PR system in Colombia, 
which, in turn, caused an increased in political representation for parties that used to be excluded during 
the ‘transitional period’ As a result, only 14 political parties won representation in the congress elected 
in 2006, 58 parties less than in the 2002 legislative elections (Cardenas, et. al., 2008). 
217 It is worth mentioning here that even though Colombian democratic rating did not change over the 
‘divergence period’ and remained as a ‘partly free’ country, its democratic scores along that period did 
move favourably from 4 in 2003 to 3 in 2007. Again, the three-year lag to observe the effects that 
changes in the electoral system have over democracy is explained by the period of time required for the 
reform to start operating. For the Colombian case, the electoral reform was enacted in 2003 but the next 
legislative elections were carried out just until 2006, therefore, Freedom House could only report this 
effect in its 2007 report. The data supporting this argument comes from the report Freedom in the World 
2015, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.VXm-p2BGjdm). 
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regarded as a critical juncture that can explain the divergent democratic paths taken 
for the cases under study. That is, while some scholars consider electoral systems as 
only one more criterion affecting the political process (e.g. Lijphart 1977, 1999; 
Inglehart 2005), this research claim that this criterion should be regarded, in its own 
right, as the most important factor to explain democratic divergence because it 
determines how the balance of legislative power is distributed among different 
political parties. As seen, during the ‘divergence period’ when Venezuela changed its 
electoral formula in 1998 from a pure PR system –that used to encourage political 
party competition- to a more restrictive one such as the mixed electoral system in 
which its plurality component became its major key feature benefiting pro-government 
parties to get elected at the expense of opposition parties,218 its democratic 
performance changed negatively towards a lees democratic regime. That is, the 
introduction of the mixed PR system over the ‘divergence period’ encouraged power 
concentration in hands of the president’s allies and, therefore, marked the beginning 
of the Venezuelan democratic regression. 
Likewise, when Colombian political elites decided to change the electoral formula 
during the ‘divergence period’ in 2003 -12 years after the 1991 new constitution came 
into force-, its outcome over the democratic performance of this country also changed. 
However, its democratic change, unlike Venezuela, was a positive one. That is, when 
the 2003 political reform changed the electoral formula from a Hare quota system –
that used to restrict political party competition only to the traditional Liberal and 
Conservative Parties and its factions- to a more plural and competitive system such as 
the PR system with the D’Hondt electoral formula method, its democratic performance 
improved as can be seen in figures 1.1 and 1.2. Hence, this electoral reform, whose 
purpose was to extend competition between a new set of political parties with real 
chances of having congressional representation, encouraged power distribution that 
contributed to the integration of those political forces that once were excluded from 
competition. In this sense, then, the 2003 electoral reform can be recognised as a 
                                                 
218 It is striking to note that the rate of officials elected by the plurality component from the Mixed 
System increased every time an electoral reform occurred. This was a mechanism carefully designed to 
favour the ruling party, at the expense of the opposition parties. For instance, the 1998 reform allowed 
for the election of the 50 percent of the deputies in multimember plurality districts; with the 2000 reform 
it was allowed that 65 percent of deputies were elected by the plurality component; and finally, when 
the 2005 mixed electoral system was implemented without global proportionality, dramatically 
increasing its disproportionality (Monaldi, et. al., 2008). 
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fundamental tool helping to improve Colombia’s democratic performance over the 
‘divergence period.’ 
In sum, this section showed that reforms over the electoral system have explanatory 
power over the dependent variable. This causal relationship is explained by the 
strategic intervention of political elites, such as constitutional makers, which can affect 
the electoral system and, therefore, the democratic performance of the countries under 
study. In other words, the point to stress here is that political elites should be regarded 
as intervening actors with political power that make possible changes in the electoral 
formulas. These changes, in turn, could explain the different paths taken by Colombia 
and Venezuela. Boix (1999) and Wills-Otero (2009) develops a similar argument 
claiming that for unconsolidated democracies political elites shape electoral systems 
according to their interests so that they can maximise the representation of political 
leaders, and influence the regime’s democratic path. The same argument applies for 
the cases under study. Venezuelan elites by changing the electoral rules, through 
constitutional means, managed to change electoral preferences of the voters and by 
doing so they guaranteed Chávez’s continuation in power over the whole ‘divergence 
period’, resulting in its consequent democratic setback. In contrast, Colombian elites 
by introducing the D’Hondt electoral formula managed to tackle the problem of 
concentration of power enabling an open competition from different political forces 
allowing more equity in the distribution of power, contributing to improve its 
democratic performance. 
6.5. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to assess, from a conceptual approach, the explanatory 
power of the second set of independent variables: constitutions and electoral systems 
to explain democratic divergence. The chapter began by acknowledging the 
outstanding contribution Arend Lijphart (1977; 1999; 2012) made to institutional 
theory by distinguishing different patterns of democracy. I argued that, although 
Lijphart’s contribution can be regarded as an effective theoretical framework to 
classify political regimes as either Consensual or Majoritarian democracies, it fails to 
do so when trying to explain patterns of democracy for less developed countries. The 
central argument to claim Lijphart’s theory is unsuitable for this research was based 
on the criticism made by Schmidt (2000), and Cranenburg, et. al. (2004), among 
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others. They argued that the institutional criteria chosen by Lijphart is biased in favour 
of his definition of consensual democracies, and that the relative weight of these 
criteria should not necessarily be the same to evaluate processes of regime change in 
non-stable democracies. 
Hence, this chapter argues that in order to have a better understanding of the opposite 
democratic paths taken by the countries under study, Lijphart´s typology needs to be 
re-constructed to increase its explanatory power. This shall be done by giving a higher 
relative weight to a subset of Lijphart’s institutional criteria, those that have played a 
significant role in the process of regime change. By identifying a critical juncture 
shared by Colombia and Venezuela at the end of the ‘transitional period’, one in which 
both regimes were facing political, social and economic turmoil, this chapter argued 
that these polities, particularly its political elites, had to make contingent choices 
related with a comprehensive institutional reengineering if they were to solve their 
crises. The far-reaching institutional choices were similar in both countries as they 
decided to conduct a comprehensive constitutional reform in order to create favourable 
conditions to avoid the collapse of their democracies. Additionally, these countries 
also placed particular emphasis in reforming their electoral systems. By controlling 
the electoral formula political elites could redistribute power among several political 
forces that will help explain, either the regression or the consolidation of their 
democratic paths. 
Thus, it was argued that the selection of the subset of institutional criteria chosen in 
this research was by no means arbitrary, because the reforms conducted on both 
constitutions –and its consequences on the accumulation of power by the executive 
branch-, and their electoral systems can be regarded as the key political institutions 
over which political elites exerted a profound reform that brought changes in the 
democratic performance of these two countries. 
The comparative analysis conducted in sub-sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 over constitutions 
and electoral systems, respectively, argued that these criteria have explanatory power 
to explain the dependent variable. As for the former, the analysis carried out over the 
impact that power distribution, electoral systems, and policy making reforms had over 
regime change in both countries, and in both periods of analysis –Transitional vs. 
Divergence- were conclusive. For the Venezuelan case, it was clear that when the 
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effects of these three types of reforms were compared, over time and against the 
performance of this democracy, the enacted reforms and constitutional amendments 
enshrined in the 1999 ‘Bolivarian Constitution’ led the presidency into being the 
centre of gravity, favouring concentration of power in hands of President Chávez and 
its allies. Additionally, it also limited political rights and civil liberties of those that 
were part of the opposition. In other words, the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998 and 
the adoption –via referendum- of the new constitution in 1999 signed off the start of 
Venezuelan democratic regression. 
A very different result occurred in Colombia’s democracy when its new constitution 
was enacted in 1991. Unlike Venezuela, the reforms carried out over the same three 
constitutional aspects mentioned above (i.e., power distribution, electoral systems, and 
policy making reforms) curbed the legislative powers of the president by strengthening 
the rule of law and fostering power distribution. In fact, when compared with the 
Venezuelan case, the enactment of the new Colombian constitution triggered structural 
reforms that privileged political competition over political exclusion; a more 
proportional electoral system over a less –more plural- majoritarian one; and a more 
efficient and operative process of administrative decentralisation over a just theoretical 
but rigid decentralisation process in Venezuela. Overall, the constitutional reform 
carried out in Colombia can be regarded as progressive. One that helped improve the 
performance of Colombian Democracy as it ‘strengthened the checks and balances of 
the political system in an effort to endow political institutions with greater legitimacy 
after decades of limited participation and low representation’ (Cardenas, et. al., 2008, 
202). 
Additionally, it was also argued that the comparison on the use of decree powers by 
Presidents Chávez y Uribe when they resorted to State of Emergency laws and/or 
Enabling laws to rule their countries was relatively not as bad to Colombia when 
compared with Venezuela. The analysis on the number, content and scope, and the 
length of time that each of the Presidents had to enact and implement laws under this 
extraordinary mechanism, although negative for both countries, its overall effect was 
much more adverse in terms of democratic performance for Venezuela than for 
Colombia. Overall, it was claimed that the use of decree powers allowed concentration 
of power in the executive branch leading to the erosion of the separation of powers in 
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both countries. However, and because of the control by the judicial branch, 
specifically, by the Constitutional Court, was laxer in Venezuela than in Colombia 
then President Chávez have more freedom to govern by decree affecting in a more 
negative way the Venezuelan democratic performance when compared to Colombia.  
Finally, the chapter put strong emphasis on the effect that reforms over the electoral 
systems have to explain democratic divergence. It was argued that from all the relevant 
constitutional reforms conducted over the ‘divergence period’, the ones conducted 
over the electoral system have the greater explanatory power to elucidate the reason 
behind the change of trend on the democratic performance of both countries. That is, 
the change of trend that placed Colombia above Venezuela for first time in history in 
terms of its democratic performance from 2002 onwards (see table 2.2, and figures 1.1 
and 1.2) is explained by the critical effect exerted by the enactment of electoral reforms 
in Venezuela and Colombia in 1999 and 2003 respectively.219 
Although chapters 7 and 8 will provide a multivariate regression model to estimate the 
robustness of the theoretical Circular Causality Model proposed in this research, I 
emphasise that, from a theoretical approach and from the conceptual analysis offered 
over the previous six chapters that the two institutional criteria picked by this study do 
have explanatory power to provide a better understanding of the reasons behind the 
opposite democratic paths that Colombia and Venezuela took during the ‘divergence 
period’. However, it is important to remember the premise proposed in chapter 5, that 
the effect caused by these criteria over each country’s democratic performance would 
occur only if political elites had the power and incentives to change the way they 
operate.  
                                                 
219 Additionally, the chapter also explained that the effects of those reforms over the democratic 
performance are observed in a time lag while the next legislative elections is held. Hence, when 
Venezuela changed its electoral formula from a pure PR system with the D’Hondt formula to a mixed 
PR system with a prominent plural component in 1999, its Freedom House score started a sharp fall 
moving from a 2.5 score (free country) in 1999 to a score of 4 (partly free country) in 2000, year in 
which were held legislative elections. Similarly, when Colombia changed its electoral formula from a 
semi-PR with Hare quota system to a pure PR system with the D’Hondt formula in 2003, its Freedom 
House score changed favourably three years later when the electoral reform started operating in the next 
legislative elections held in 2006. As suggested in table 2.2, even though Colombia’s rating remained 
stable fluctuating within a bounded interval that enabled it to be regarded as a ‘party free’ country its 
score showed an improvement once the 2003 electoral reform came into practice in 2006. To confirm 
the above, I presented Freedom House scores, which showed that Colombia had passed from a score of 
4 in 2002 to 3 in 2006 (when the electoral formula became operational in the legislative elections held 
that year). 
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PART II 
 
OPERATIONALISATION, MEASUREMENT AND 
ESTIMATION OF A MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODEL: 
TO ASSESS DEMOCRATIC DIVERGENCE IN COLOMBIA 
AND VENEZUELA 
  
 169 
 
Chapter 7 
Operationalisation and measurement of the dependent and 
independent variables to test democratic divergence 
7.1. Introduction 
In what follows, I will describe how the dependent and independent variables will be 
operationalised and measured, this will allow me to bind all the elements of the 
theoretical framework, which have been presented in the first part of this research 
project. I will use the results of this chapter as an input to estimate multivariate 
regression models to explain the opposite democratic paths that Colombia and 
Venezuela underwent during the ´divergence period´.  
As it was discussed in chapter 2 and 3 there are rather few theoretical approaches 
focusing on explaining processes of democratic divergence,220 and the empirical works 
to assess this phenomenon are even scarcer. Thus, the multivariate models offered in 
this part of the project intends to fill this gap. To do so, the empirical models proposed 
here will group the independent variables into two subtypes of variables according to 
their explanatory and theoretical relevance to assess divergence. The ‘hypothesis 
variables’ correspond to all the variables that are directly related with the theoretical 
Circular Causality Model proposed in chapter 3 (i.e., elite political culture, new 
constitutions and electoral system). The model also includes an additional set of 
variables called ´control variables´. Despite this last set of variables are not directly 
related to the problem under study, they need to be deemed as necessary to determine 
if there is any other variable that could have been left out of the model, which can 
explain democratic divergence in a more suitable manner (i.e., inflation, GDP growth, 
Oil rents, Primary Enrolment and Political Terror Scale (PTS)). Last, I also included a 
dummy variable called country which captures the fixed effect on democratic 
divergence by country. 
                                                 
220 As was mentioned from the outset of this project the exceptions of this incomprehensible lack are: 
Linz and Stepan (1978) ‘The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America’; Diamond, Linz, and 
Lipset (1989) ‘Democracy in Developing Countries’; Collier and Collier (1991) ‘Shaping the Political 
Arena’. More recently, Hagopian and Mainwaring (2005) ‘The Third Wave of Democratisation in Latin 
America: Advances and Setbacks’; and Bejarano (2011) ‘Precarious Democracies’  
 170 
 
This chapter will be organised into 4 sections including this introduction. Section 7.2 
offers an overview of the dependent variable or regressed variable: democracy –as a 
proxy to study democratic divergence. It will explain how this variable should be 
operationalised and measured from two empirical sources such as: Freedom House 
and Polity IV democratic indexes.  
Section 7.3 will describe the operationalisation of the independent variables by 
explaining each one of them separately and the way by which they relate with 
democracy. To do that, subsection 7.3.1 will explain the operationalisation of the 
variable elite political culture and its relationship with democracy. To this end, first, I 
will use a qualitative approach that includes an extended archive revision of 
constitutional reforms and amendments over the whole period of analysis (53 years) 
which is summarized in appendix 2. And second, based on the input mentioned above, 
I build a comprehensive database, summarised in appendix 3, which allowed me to 
operationalise political culture as a quantitative variable. This variable will be included 
as an independent variable into the multivariate regression model in chapter 8. Next, 
subsection 7.3.2 will operationalise the hypothesis variables electoral systems and new 
constitutions. To operationalise electoral system, I will measure concentration of 
power caused by changes in the electoral rules. To do that, I will use the Herfindhal-
Hirschman Index of plurality (hereafter HHI) as a proxy variable that will measure the 
effect of electoral reforms on power concentration in the legislature. Additionally, the 
variable for new constitutions (hereafter NC) will also be introduced to measure the 
effect over democratic performance at the time in which the enactment of the new 
constitutions took place in both countries (i.e. Colombia 1991 and Venezuela 1998). 
This variable will require a descriptive statistical analysis because it is a dummy 
variable. 
Finally, subsection 7.3.3 accounts for the set of control variables that will allow me to 
measure the relative impact of a different set of independent variables over the 
regressed variable in the model, while keeping the ‘hypothesis variables’ constant. 
Section 7.4 concludes with a summary of each one of the variables described in the 
previous sections, which will allow us to have an input to get a better understanding 
of the multivariate regression model that will be estimated in chapter 8. 
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7.2. Operationalisation of democracy as the dependent variable 
For estimation purposes the dependent variable will be democracy (D), rather than 
democratic divergence. The reason is straightforward: to assess divergence, it is 
necessary to test the effects that both independent variables (i.e., elite political culture, 
and political institutions) have over the dependent variable. Hence, if the independent 
variables have an opposite effect by country over democracy, then it is possible to 
claim the existence of a divergent process of democratisation. But, if their effects over 
democracy on both countries is similar, then the hypothesis should be rejected. Thus, 
Democracy (D) as dependent variable of the empirical model will play a neutral role, 
which is crucial in determining whether the phenomenon of democratic divergence 
can be assessed also at an empirical level. 
With this aim in mind, the operationalisation and the empirical measurement of the 
dependent variable will rely on Barreda´s insights to solve the problem related with 
the lack of consensus among political scientists to operationalise democracy (see 
Munck 2009; Munck, et. al., 2002; Coppedge, et. al., 1990). In fact, Barreda (2011) 
exposes three ways to operationalise this variable: first, by using existing indexes such 
as Freedom House and Polity IV; second, by using aggregate indexes or factorial 
analysis of principal components and; third, a mix of quantitative and qualitative data 
concerning the performance of democracy. This project will measure democracy (D) 
using the Freedom House221 and Polity IV democracy indexes. Both indexes report 
annualised time data series, which are adjusted to estimate the regression analysis.222 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 reports, once again,223 the democratic trends of these two indexes 
                                                 
221 As explained in the first part of the project, Freedom House Index is an average of two variables: 
Political Rights (1-7 interval) and Civil Liberties (1-7 interval). A score of 7 represents the worst score 
(least free) and a score of 1 is regarded the best score (the freest). In turn, the Political Rights variable 
is scored by considering a subset of criteria related with: the electoral process, political pluralism and 
participation, and functioning of government in each country. Furthermore, the Civil Liberties variable 
is scored by considering criteria such as: freedom of expression and belief, associational and 
organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights in each country. Each of 
these criteria will receive a weight to aggregate them in one only score for each variable. Afterwards, 
the aggregate score of each one of the variables is averaged to obtain the overall FH score for each 
country and for a specific period of time. 
222 Freedom House index provides information since 1972 for Colombia and Venezuela. The only 
missing data from the time series on this index is the year of 1983. Freedom House did not report data 
for that year in any of the two countries under analysis. On the other hand, Polity IV index provides 
information from 1830 for the Venezuelan case, and from 1832 for the Colombian one. 
223 These figures with some differences were already used in chapter 1 to describe and show the period 
of time in which democratic divergence occurred. Please see that chapter for a detailed description of 
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during the ´transitional period´ and ´divergence period´ explaining the opposite 
democratic trajectories these polities faced during the latter period.  
As figure 7.1 shows, Freedom House data lets us see that the countries under analysis 
have a similar democratic trend over most of the ‘transitional period.’ During this 
period (from 1973 to 1988) Freedom House classified Colombia with the status of 
‘free’ country. Later, however, Colombia became a ‘partly free’ country from 1989 
until 1990. As for the Venezuelan case, its democracy moved from being ‘free’ from 
1958 to 1992, to becoming ‘partly free’ from 1993 to 1996, and finally returning to 
being ‘free’ from 1997 to 1999. 
Figure 7.1 also shows that when the ‘divergence period’ began, the democratic trend 
in both countries changed dramatically, i.e. these polities took completely opposite 
directions. This finding confirms the dramatic change in the democratic trend that 
Venezuelan democracy experienced, whereas the Colombian trend remained rather 
stable as a ‘partly free’ country. That is, Colombian Freedom House scores fluctuated 
in a bounded interval during most part of the whole period of analysis (i.e., in both the 
‘transitional and divergence periods’) but always keeping its classification as a ‘partly 
free’ country. However, unlike Colombia, Venezuela´s democratic performance was 
much more unstable over this period. Its classification went through a severe fall 
locating this regime at the end of this period close enough to be regarded a ‘not free’ 
country. Its uneven democratic performance began when Hugo Chávez was elected as 
Venezuelan president in 1998. On that year, Freedom House classified it as ‘free’ 
(scored 2,5), but by 2000 its democratic rating changed negatively to ‘partly free’ 
(scoring 4). Since then, Venezuela’s democratic performance has seriously worsened, 
reaching a worrisome score of 5 by the end of the ‘divergence period’ in 2010. In sum, 
figure 7.1 shows the democratic gap that was widened. This gap is what this project is 
meant to explain because it reflects the democratic divergence that Colombian and 
Venezuelan democracies faced over this period. 
                                                 
the democratic performance of these polities during the whole period of analysis (i.e., ‘transitional 
period’ and ‘divergence period’). 
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Figure 11.1. 
Democratic divergence: Freedom House 
Source: Freedom House 
An alternative way to analyse divergence is through the Polity IV democracy 
index.224According to the data gathered for this index (see figure 7.2), Colombia has 
been a democracy during the whole period of analysis (1957 to 2010), reaching its 
highest performance during the period 1991 – 1994; in other words, since the 
beginning of the divergence period and right after the enactment of the new 1991 
Constitution. In the same way, Venezuela had been a democracy from 1958 to 2005, 
when it became an ‘open anocracy’ until 2010. As figure 7.2 clearly shows, Venezuela 
had a better democratic performance than Colombia from 1960 to 1990 when the 
divergence path began. However, their democratic performance changed dramatically 
when Colombia outperformed Venezuela for first time in its democratic history right 
after Venezuela enacted its 1999 new constitution. 
                                                 
224 Polity IV democratic index scores ranges from -10 to +10. Here, unlike Freedom House´s index, the 
higher the score the better the performance of the democracy. This index is calculated as the difference 
between two variables: Democracy (0-10 interval) and Autocracy (0-10 interval). Hence, Polity IV 
reflects three essential criteria: the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can 
express preferences about alternative policies and leaders; the existence of institutionalised constraints 
on the power of the executive; and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens (Polity IV, 2016). The 
Autocracy variable is measured by negative versions of the elements listed above. In overall, then, if 
the score falls between [10 and 6] the regime will be regarded as democratic, but if the score falls 
between [6 and -6] the regime will be an Anocracy, and finally, if the interval falls between [-6 and -
10] then the regime will be an Autocracy.  
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Figure 12.2. 
Democratic divergence: Polity IV 
Source: Polity IV 
As can be observed from figures 7.1 and 7.2 both indexes showed that Colombia and 
Venezuela took different democratic paths over the ´divergence period´, which means 
that, as Lagos (2008) stresses, both indexes can be regarded as a good tool to 
operationalise democracy as the dependent variable. However, this project will base 
the analysis on democratic divergence using Freedom House data since this index is 
more volatile over time than the Polity IV index. This is because the former includes 
elements related with civil liberties that are not included in the latter which is mainly 
focus on elements concerning political rights. Hence, due to Freedom House index is 
a more thorough index allow us to understand better the reasons behind why this two 
cases took different democratic paths (Munck 2009; Coppedge, et. al. 2011).  
Notwithstanding the above, it is important to stress that both indexes also present some 
similarities particularly on the political rights criteria which can cause some 
overlapping on the elements they measure. The correlation coefficient between both 
indexes was 0,68; confirming the overlap and the similarities between the indexes, and 
therefore their usefulness to be regarded as dependent variable on this project.  
In sum, because Freedom House is a more comprehensive index I will take it as the 
dependent variable to regress the models (Coopedge, et. al. 2011). However, and due 
to its high correlation with Freedom House, Polity IV democracy index will also be 
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used in appendix 4 to assess the robustness of the results presented by the statistical 
model estimated with data from Freedom House. 
7.3. Operationalisation of the independent variables 
This section will provide a primary approach related with sources, methodology and 
the statistical analysis used to operationalise each one of the variables that explain 
democratic divergence. First, I will describe the set of ‘hypothesis variables’ in the 
following order: political culture and political institutions (i.e., electoral system and 
new constitutions). Finally, I will justify the introduction of the six control variables 
to isolate the effect of political culture and political institutions over democracy. 
7.3.1. Elite political culture and democracy 
As it has been argued in the first part of this project, elite political culture has a major 
impact when trying to explain democratic performance in both countries through the 
effect that political actors have over two key political institutions such as constitutions 
and electoral systems. Therefore, it is necessary to understand how elite political 
culture will be measured so that it can be included into the multivariate regression 
models that will be presented in the following chapter. 
To do so, I constructed a proxy variable that could capture the changes on elite´s values 
and beliefs occurred across time.225 To this end, first, I conducted a qualitative analysis 
to assess whether there were changes on elite’s values by conducting a comprehensive 
                                                 
225 The reason for having to build a proxy variable to operationalise elite political culture was due to the 
impossibility to find enough and reliable data from existing traditional and well-known organisations 
such as: the Iberoamerican Institute from University of Salamanca, Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
World Value Survey, among others. In fact, the first attempt to measure elite political culture was by 
using data from the Observatory of Parliamentary Elites of Latin America (PELA) from Salamanca 
University. The data collected by this organisation focuses on interviews to parliamentarians around 
Latin America. By using this source, it was possible to gather parliamentarians’ political perceptions, 
values and belief for both cases under study. However, after analysing PELA’s database, two problems 
arose. First, respondents (parliamentarians) could lie or have a different understanding of what 
democracy meant, therefore, the information provided by them can be regarded as biased.225 Second, 
data was incomplete and did not cover the period under study (1958 - 2010) especially for the 
Venezuelan case, which implied missing values. In other words, PELA’s database, in the case of 
Venezuela, had information for the period between 1993 and 2000 whereas Colombia only had data for 
the following years: 1998, 2002 and 2006. Hence, there wasn’t enough information to cover (i) the 
´transitional period´ for the Colombian case, and (ii) most of the ‘divergence period´ for the Venezuelan 
case. Bias in the information provided by parliamentarians, few observations (n=10), and the lack of 
information that does not cover the same periods under analysis, are the reasons why comparisons 
between these countries was an impossible task. Hence, this option was ruled out. 
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archive research. Second, and based on the previous input, I used a methodology to 
measure elite’s political culture as a quantitative variable. The following provides a 
detail account on how these two methodological approaches were conducted and how 
they allowed me to operationalise elite’s political culture. 
The archive research began, by consulting the constitutions that contained all the 
reforms and amendments implemented by Colombia and Venezuela from 1957 until 
2010.226 The goal of pursuing this archive research method was meant to assess if a 
constitutional reform or amendment can be regarded as pro-democratic or non-
democratic according to Dahl’s definition of Liberal democracy227 (appendix 2 show 
a detail account of how this archive research was built and the methodology used for 
it).  
The rationale behind using this approach is based on the idea that by tracking the type 
of political reforms it is possible to recover elites’ changes in their political beliefs and 
values over time.228 That is, by gathering information about how elites (in parliament) 
conducted political reforms before and after both countries enacted their new 
constitutions it is possible to assess whether there was a change in their political culture 
between the ‘transitional period’ and the ‘divergence period’.  I argue that this 
methodological approach is a valid one because when the type of constitutional 
provisions enabled by the ‘old elites’ (‘transitional period’) are compared with those 
                                                 
226 This project studied two constitutions in each period, one for each country, as a baseline to compare 
their amendments and constitutional reforms. That is, for the ‘transition period’, the 1886 Colombian 
Constitution and the 1961 Venezuelan Constitutions were taken as baselines. As for the ‘divergence 
period’, the 1991 Colombian Constitution and the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution were the point of 
analysis. To figure out the specific years of the amendments and constitutional reforms that affected 
democratic performance I used Negretto’s (2013) book “Making Constitutions”. The constitutional 
texts were analysed from Restrepo (2003), and Secretary of the Senate (Secretaría General del Senado) 
for Colombia, and the Official Gazette of the Republic of Venezuela (Gaceta Oficial de la República de 
Venezuela) for the Venezuelan case. The qualitative analysis is described in detail in appendix 2 and 
was supported with other sources such as Brewer-Carías (1996, 2007, 2008 and 2009). The purpose of 
this archive research was to identify the reforms or constitutional amendments that would have direct 
effects on the country's democratic performance by reviewing several Political Constitutions published 
over the whole period of analysis. 
227 A pro-democratic reform is understood as those constitutional provisions that satisfy Dahl´s 
democratic conceptualisation in the sense that a polyarchy can improve both political liberties and civil 
rights. Moreover, a non-democratic reform, are the constitutional provisions that do not fulfil at least 
one or none of Dahl´s democratic criteria. 
228 Both constitutional reforms or amendment are political outputs that could be understood as 
manifestation of the preferences on different bills that have effects on political institutions and 
democratic performance - no matter the legislative or party games including party discipline, log rolls 
or agenda settings. 
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enabled by the renewed ones (‘divergence period’) in each country it would be possible 
to capture changes in their political values and perceptions.  
To assess whether the archive research presented in appendix 2 manages to capture 
changes over time on political culture at the elite level, I will offer an initial analysis 
meant to figure out if the political reforms conducted by parliamentarians (i.e., 
constitutional reforms and amendments) were pro-democratic or non-democratic, and 
if their character changed or remained stable over time. 
In this sense, Figure 7.3 summarises the number of pro-democratic and non-
democratic reforms conducted for the two countries over the ‘transitional and 
divergence periods.’229 The arrows in the figure are meant to show the changes in the 
number of constitutional provisions implemented by each country among periods. This 
figure also depicts the equal distribution line (dashed line), which is meant to 
categorise the countries under analysis as predominantly pro-democratic (area under 
the dashed line) or predominantly non-democratic (area above the dashed line) based 
on the number of constitutional reforms and amendments enabled in both periods. 
Figure 13.3. 
Number of pro/(non) democratic constitutional reforms and amendments 
 
Source: Own estimations based on appendix 2 
From Figure 7.3, it can be inferred that the constitutional reforms and amendments in 
Colombia have been predominantly pro-democratic during both periods because 47 
pro-democratic reforms were enabled during the ´transitional period´ compared to 1 
                                                 
229 For a detail description of each of these pro-democratic and non-democratic amendments and 
reforms please see appendix 2. 
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non-democratic reform; whereas in the ´divergence period’ the country conducted 40 
pro-democratic reforms and amendments and only 2 non-democratic reforms. 
Conversely, Venezuela carried out constitutional reforms and amendments that failed 
to yield constitutional provisions as those in Colombia. That is, Venezuela carried out 
4 pro-democratic reforms, and 0 non-democratic reforms or amendments during the 
´transitional period´, while in the ´ divergence period´ it carried out 12 non-democratic 
reforms and 0 pro-democratic reforms.230 This particular outcome can be observed in 
figure 7.3 when the arrow crosses the equal distribution line231 for the Venezuelan 
case, whereas for the Colombian case the arrow remains below the equal distribution 
line in the area corresponding to pro-democratic provisions.  
Because Colombia´s pro-democratic reforms (87) outnumbered the non-democratic 
reforms (3) in both periods of analysis, it is possible to infer that elite´s political values 
and beliefs remained rather steady over time, fostering a political culture that promotes 
liberal democracy. Moreover, Venezuela shifted from being predominantly pro-
democratic (4) in the ´transitional period´ to predominantly non-democratic (12) in 
the ´divergence period´.232 The arrow crossing the dashed line in figure 7.3 represents 
this outcome, which shows that there was a change in Venezuelan elite´s values, and 
beliefs that fostered a political culture to promote a democratic decline rather than a 
its consolidation. Hence, it is possible to stress that Venezuela and Colombia took 
different paths during the ‘divergence period´, which was caused by a change in the 
elite political culture. In this order of ideas, it can be argued that this archive research 
do capture changes in the political culture at the elite level, and therefore it can be used 
to operationalize a quantitative variable that measure changes in political culture at the 
elite level and its impact over democratic performance. 
Taking into account that the qualitative analysis discussed above and summarised in 
appendix 2, lead us to operationalise political culture only as a dichotomous variable 
by discriminating the amendments and constitutional reforms as pro-democratic or 
                                                 
230 Appendix 2 provides a detail account of the number of constitutional reforms and amendments  
231  As mentioned above, the dashed line represents the equal distribution line in figure 7.3. It implies 
that the number of pro-democratic and non-democratic reforms and amendments are equal. Any point 
located over this line should be interpreted as a perfect balance among amendments or constitutional 
reforms that cannot place any country either as pro or non-democratic. 
232 The notion of democratic predominance in this project refers to the case when pro-democratic 
reforms outnumber non-democratic ones in a specific period. The opposite applies for non-democratic 
predominance. 
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non-democratic, and such dichotomisation reduces significantly the explanatory 
power of this variable to explain democratic divergence,233 it is necessary to introduce 
a new methodology to operationalise the variable called elite political culture (PC) as 
a continuous variable. This is explained in detail in appendix 3. 
To do so, and based on the outcome obtained in appendix 2, I asked two external 
examiners to weight the extent to which each pro-democratic or non-democratic 
amendment or constitutional reform have an impact over democratic performance.234 
Each examiner was told to score pro-democratic amendments with a value of 1 or 2, 
and non-democratic amendments with a value of -1 or -2. A value of 1 means that the 
amendment has a low impact, and 2 that it has a high impact over democracy. On the 
other hand, a value of -1 is meant to show a low negative impact over democracy, and 
-2 means that the amendment has a high negative impact over democracy. Finally, the 
impact of each amendment and constitutional reform over democracy is measured as 
the average of the two examiners’ scores (see column 6 in appendix 3). Then, I took 
these average scores, and build the variable PC using a process divided in two stages.  
These two stages were operationalised as follow. Given that examiner’s average scores 
were estimated by amendment and not by years, it is possible to find years with none, 
one or many amendments or constitutional reforms, therefore, the aim of the first stage 
is to estimate a unique value by year for each country. For instance, if there is only one 
amendment or constitutional reform by year, the value for that specific year will be the 
                                                 
233 A first attempt to operationalise variable PC on this research was conducted by measuring the mode 
of the pro-democratic and non-democratic amendments and constitutional reforms enacted by each 
country over the ‘transitional period’ and the ‘divergence period’. This operationalisation resulted in a 
dummy variable which took a value of 1 only for Venezuela in the ‘divergence period’ and 0 in the 
other case. This dichotomization reduced significantly the dimensionality of the problem, and therefore 
I decided to operationalise PC as a continuous variable following the methodology to be explained in 
this section. 
234 This methodology was developed aiming to operationalise PC as a variable that could take 
continuous values. Hence, the purpose of using two external examiners was meant to avoid subjectivity 
bias in building the PC’s scores which will be used in the multivariate regression model. The external 
examiners consulted are expert lawyers in constitutional studies. They have written academic papers on 
issues dealing with the effects that constitutional amendments have had over the performance of 
democratic regimes. The first examiner consulted is Dr Lina Buchely, PhD in Law from Los Andes 
University, and she also holds a MA degree in Law from University of Wisconsin - Madison. Currently, 
she works as Director of Law undergraduate program at Icesi University (see her academic profile here: 
http://scienti.colciencias.gov.co:8081/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0001349527
). The second examiner is Dr Mario Cajas, PhD in Law from Los Andes University. He currently works 
as Head of the Legal Studies Department at Icesi University (see his academic profile here: 
http://scienti.colciencias.gov.co:8081/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0000608130
). 
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same average examiner’s score. However, if there is more than one amendment or 
constitutional reform in a specific year, the value for that year will be estimated as the 
mean of the average examiner’s scores. Finally, for those years that had not 
amendments or constitutional reforms, I set a value of 0 to fill the missing 
observations. By conducting this methodology, I managed to construct a continuous 
variable that takes values from -2 to 2 including decimal values over the whole period 
of analysis (see column 7 in appendix 3). 
 The function used to calculate the values of variable PC in the second stage is the 
following: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗)𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=0
 
Where: 
- 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the value of PC for country 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡 
- 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗) is the average calculated in the first stage for country 𝑖𝑖 and year 𝑡𝑡 − 𝑗𝑗 
- 𝑁𝑁 is the number of years since year 1957 until year 𝑡𝑡.  
For instance, the value of the variable PC for Colombia in year 1957 is 2, the same of 
the first stage, because it is the first dataset observation and therefore there is no 
accumulative effect. As for the value of PC in 1958 will be also 2. This is because in 
that year there were no amendments or constitutional reforms in Colombia, therefore 
it takes the value of the previous year. Finally, the value of PC in 1959 will be 3,75, 
because it aggregates the first stage values of years 1957 (2), 1958 (0) and 1959 (1,75). 
The same methodology applies for the following years to estimate the variable PC in 
both countries. 
In sum, the variable PC will be operationalise taking the values estimated in the 
column called “2nd Stage” in appendix 3. Therefore, PC will be introduced in the 
multivariate regression models presented in Chapter 8 as a cumulative and continuous 
variable. 
 181 
 
7.3.2. Political institutions and democracy: electoral systems and new 
constitutions 
As stressed earlier, political institutions represent one of the main explanatory 
variables of this project. Both electoral systems and constitutional reforms are 
independent variables that play an important role in determining the opposite 
democratic paths that Colombia and Venezuela underwent during the ‘divergence 
period’. The following section will explain how each of these variables were 
operationalised and measured to be included in the multivariate regression model that 
will be estimated in chapter 8. 
Electoral systems and democracy 
To explain the operationalisation and measurement of the variable electoral system it 
is important to emphasise that the purpose of suggesting this variable is to capture the 
way by which different electoral formulas affect the power distribution on a given 
regimen. Wills-Otero (2009), side with this argument and explain that in Latin 
America, proportional forms of representation replaced the majoritarian electoral 
system when governments realised that the latter posed a threat to concentrate power 
in a dominant party.235 Hence, to capture the effect that changes in the electoral 
formulas have over power distribution when the electoral reforms are implemented, I 
adopted an economic measurement of market concentration. By using the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index of plurality (HHI), I could capture the concentration of power within 
the legislature. The adoption of this index in political science is meant to measure how 
power is concentrated in a party or political group (Larcinese, 2011). Put differently, 
it accounts for the way by which the institutional framework of any electoral system 
can affect power distribution and democracy. The way to interpret the index is as 
follows: the closer to 1, the electoral formula leads to a relatively more plural electoral 
                                                 
235 As explained in chapter 6, Venezuela and Colombia were not the exception to this regional trend and 
during the ‘divergence period’ they decided to reform their electoral systems to have more 
representatives and become more inclusive. However, the outcome of these electoral reforms could not 
be more contradictory. While Colombia changed its electoral formula in 2003 from a semi-proportional 
Hare quota system to a more proportional D’Hondt system to redistribute power among a greater 
number of parties (see table 6.1), Venezuela did the opposite. In 1999, the country changed its traditional 
D’Hondt system by a Hare quota system in which the concentration of power fell primarily over the 
executive branch rather than distributing it among a larger number of political parties (see table 6.2). 
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system, therefore, power will be concentrated in few political parties. Conversely, if 
the index is closer to 0, the electoral formula leads to a relatively more proportional 
electoral system and power will be distributed more evenly among a more number of 
parties. 
As mentioned above, the index will be labelled as HHI, and will be calculated with the 
following formula: 
∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
2  (7.1) 
 
Where 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 stands for the seats shared by a party from the total seats available in the 
legislature. Hence, the formula is the sum of squares of the share of seats held by a 
political party from the total number of seats available in the legislature. 
To calculate this index, data was collected236 for every parliamentary election that was 
usually held every four years in both countries.237 Additionally, to operationalise this 
index as a continuous variable238 it is important to point out that the seats in parliament 
are held until new elections are called. Therefore, the value of the index will be the 
same throughout the entire parliamentarian period. 
Figure 7.4 depicts the degree of concentration of power in the legislature measured by 
HHI index. This figure shows that both Colombia and Venezuela had a relatively high 
concentration of power during the ‘transitional period’ as these polities fell in a range 
between 0.4 and 0.5 in the index, following a similar path and confirming the findings 
offered in chapter 6. However, these similar co-movements in HHI for both countries 
began to change during the ‘divergence period’ as both countries took completely 
different routes in terms of how power was distributed among political parties in their 
parliaments. From the enactment of the 1991 constitution figure 7.4 also shows that 
Colombian HHI index, began to fall. It passed from a score of 0.45 in 1990 to 0.3 in 
2002, which in turn, implied an improvement in the distribution of power. However, 
                                                 
236 To build the HHI variable, it was necessary first to build a database on parliamentary votes, parties 
and seats based on the following sources: Political Database of the America from Georgetown 
University (www.pdba.georgetown.edu), Observatorio Electoral (www.electoral.org), the National 
Civil Registry (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil), and National Electoral Council (Consejo 
Nacional Electoral). 
237 There are atypical cases. For example, for the Colombian case there were elections in 1990 and 1991 
and for Venezuela there were elections on 1998, 2000, 2005 and 2010. 
238 This index has an annualised periodicity to be consistent with the time scale of all variables included 
in this project.  
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it was not until the electoral reform that came into force in 2003 that the Colombian 
HHI index reached its sharpest fall from 0.3 to 0.15 showing that the shift to the 
D’Hondt system brought an effect over a more equitable distribution of power. 
Figure 14.4. 
HHI 
 
Source: own estimations based on National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral), Electoral Council (Observatorio 
Electoral) and Political Database of the Americas from Georgetown University 
 
The electoral reform conducted by Venezuela had completely different outcomes 
when compared with the Colombian case. Figure 7.4 clearly shows the impact that the 
enactment of the 1999 Venezuelan constitution -which included the electoral reform- 
had over the participation of different political forces in parliament. Despite Venezuela 
finished the ‘transitional period’ with an encouraging HHI index of 0.15 in 1998 its 
index of concentration of power began to deteriorate as soon as the new constitution 
and electoral reform came into force in 1999. In fact, by 2000 Venezuelas’ HHI index 
scored a 0.25, which from there on become higher year after year reaching a worrisome 
score of 0.5 in 2010. This outcome reflects the findings discussed in chapter 6 in which 
the comprehensive reforms carried out by President Hugo Chávez and his allies had 
no other intention than to accumulate power at the expense of opposition parties. 
The usefulness of the HHI index can also be studied by looking at the relation with 
democratic performance measured by Freedom House Index. Figures 7.5 (a) and (b) 
depicts such relationship and shows a rather counterintuitive relationship. That is, 
focusing on the ‘transitional period’ both countries scored good indexes of democratic 
performance as they were regarded as ‘free’ for the Venezuelan case and ‘partly free’ 
for the Colombian case (see figure 7.1). However, their HHI index was relatively high 
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
HH
I in
de
x
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
country = Colombia country = Venezuela
 184 
 
over this period indicating a high concentration of power among a reduced number of 
political parties. 
This finding can be explained by the way the democratic transition took place for these 
countries. As discussed in the first part of this project, the democratic transition was 
reached when the traditional political parties agreed the ‘Punto Fijo pact’ and the 
‘National Front pact’ to put an end to the military rule that used to govern Venezuela 
and Colombia respectively. These pacts, as discussed in chapter 3, guaranteed 
alternation of power between two parties (COPEI and AD in Venezuela; and PL and 
PC in Colombia) and equal participation of all party members in the executive cabinet 
of the winning party (Buxton 2001, 2005). By the nature of these pacts it is expected, 
then, that a high concentration of power would be the outcome which explains the high 
value of the HHI index during this period. What is striking about this relation is that 
despite the high value of the HHI index the democratic score obtained by these 
countries were relatively good (at least ‘partly free’). This relationship is theoretically 
counterintuitive: a relatively more plural electoral system (high HHI) that concentrates 
power among few parties will worsen democracy in heterogeneous societies. 
However, data shows that during the ´transitional period´, when two parties 
concentrated power, the democracy index had a good performance in both countries. 
Figures 7.5 (a) and (b) also shows that the reforms conducted over the electoral 
systems during the ´ divergence period´ had also effects on the democratic performance 
but in different degrees in both countries. When Colombia conducted its electoral 
reform in 2003 by changing its electoral formula from a Hare system to a D´Hondt 
system its impact over Freedom House Index was rather stable. In average, its 
democratic classification remained as a ‘partly free’ country, which fluctuated within 
a bounded interval and enabled it to maintain its previous democratic performance. 
For Venezuela, in turn, the change of its electoral system from a D´Hondt system to a 
less proportional one, such as the Hare System, had the theoretical expected effect over 
its democratic performance. As shown in figure 7.5 (b) the implementation of the 
Venezuelan electoral reform in 1999 had a negative impact over its democratic 
performance as it worsened its Freedom House score to the point that by 2010 this 
country obtained a worrisome score of 5 out of 7. This made it very close to classify 
the country as a ‘not free’ regime. 
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Figure 15.5. 
Democracy and HHI 
a) Colombia             b) Venezuela 
 
Source: Own estimations based on Freedom House, National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral), 
Electoral Council (Observatorio Electoral) and Political Database of the Americas from Georgetown University 
 
Based on the three relations described above, it is possible to infer that the HHI index 
is a good input to measure: the concentration of power between countries, because this 
index contains relevant characteristics derived from the electoral systems that can be 
regarded as an independent variable to explain democratic divergence.  
New constitutions and democracy 
The independent variable for New Constitutions NC should be regarded as a 
dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 after the year the new constitution was 
enacted for each country (1991 in Colombia and 1999 in Venezuela), and 0 
otherwise.239 Hence, the purpose of this variable is to capture the effect of the 
enactment of the new constitutions over the democratic performance in both countries, 
and to check whether the introduction of the new constitutions explains the inflection 
point over the democratic performance in both countries. That is, the 1991 new 
Colombian constitution marked the starting point of a volatility but stable democratic 
trend, while Venezuela´s 1999 new constitution marked the beginning of a deep and 
continuous process of deconsolidation. 
 
                                                 
239 That is, it takes the value of 1 over the ‘divergence period’ and the value of 0 over the ‘transitional 
period’. 
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7.3.3. Control variables 
As mention above, the aim of the control variables is to account exclusively for the 
specific effects of political culture and political institutions over democracy. That is, 
to estimate a multivariate regression model that reflects the incidence of the 
independent variables on democratic divergence. 
For the countries under study this project has considered the inclusion of six control 
variables. The rationale behind including this type of variables is to keep constant other 
factors to isolate not only country economic differences, but also social and 
development variables that might cause some endogeneity problems to test the 
hypothesis of democratic divergence. Two of the six control variables will be used to 
test the hypothesis that the economic growth and the dependence of a specific land–
based or natural resource have not effect over democracy. To test these hypotheses, I 
consider the real GDP growth rate (GDP growth)240 and the Oil rents as percentage of 
the GDP (Oil rents)241 respectively as control variables. That is, these variables have 
also the additional purpose of testing for the effect of the modernisation and the 
resource curse theory as potential theoretical frameworks to explain democratic 
divergence. According to the theoretical Circular Causality Model proposed in chapter 
3, it is expected that none of these variables could explain democratic divergence.  
The other three variables to be considered will be related with the economic, 
development and social phenomena. Specifically, the first of this set of variables is the 
annual inflation rate for each country (inflation),242 which is take as a proxy of 
economic stability that might exert explanatory power to assess the democratic 
performance of each country. The second variable is the gross enrolment ratio in 
primary school (primary enrolment),243 which is a proxy of education level in each 
country. Finally, and based on the more recent empirical literature on this topic, I also 
include the variable Political Terror Scale (PTS),244 as a proxy of violence. This is a 
very important variable to consider into the model. In fact, scholars suggest that 
violence could be one of the most influential variables to explain the poor and/or 
                                                 
240 The data to measure this variable was taken from World Bank (2011) 
241 Idem. 
242 Idem. 
243 Data from this variable was taken from Unesco (2016).  
244 Data from this variable was taken from The Political Terror Scale (2016). 
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steady democratic performance of the countries under analysis (i.e. Thoms, et. al. 
2007; Albertus, et. al., 2012; Hegre, et. al., 2001).245 
Finally, the last control variable is Country. This is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for Venezuela and 0 for Colombia. The inclusion of this variable in the 
multivariate regression model allow me to control by fixed effects, to capture the 
country differences that are not included in the above-mentioned control variables. 
7.4. Conclusion: a summary of the inputs for the multivariate 
regression model 
The main objective of this chapter was to offer the operationalisation and measurement 
of a set of variables that could explain democratic divergence trough the theoretical 
model developed in the first part of this project. The aim of this final section is to 
describe and provide an overview of the inputs that will make up the multivariate 
regression model that will be estimated in chapter 8. To this end, this section will group 
the independent variables into two subtypes according to their explanatory and 
theoretical relevance to assess divergence. Table 7.1 fulfils this dual objective by 
offering a description of the type of variable to be analysed, the subset in which the 
variable was grouped, notation, the purpose of including the variable into the model, 
an overview of the relationships founded in this chapter, and its source of information. 
Finally, after conducting the classification of the variables into the above mentioned 
two subsets (i.e., hypothesis and control variables) the next step is to arrange the 
variables in the way they are going to be introduced in the multivariate regression 
models of the next chapter. That is, for notation purposes and to offer a better 
understanding of the model, the control variables will be grouped into the vector C 
that contains the variables inflation; GDP growth; Oil rents; Enrolment; and PTS (see 
equation 7.2).246 
C = (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟,𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡ℎ,  𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹) (7.2) 
                                                 
245 Other variables like, Human Development Index (HDI), Literacy rate, and Unemployment rate, have 
also some effect over democracy, but the lack of empirical information in some of the years that cover 
this research did not allow me to include these variables as controls. 
246 The variable Country would not be included in the matrix C, because it is going to be used to perform 
interactions with the hypothesis variables in the multivariate regression model. 
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Table 10.1. 
Description of variables 
Type of 
variable 
Subsets of 
variables 
Notation 
(description) Purpose Overview Source 
 
Dependent NA D  (Democracy) 
To assess 
democratic 
divergence 
Both Freedom 
House and Polity IV 
democracy indexes 
are good instruments 
to observe the 
changes of the 
democratic 
performance of 
Colombia and 
Venezuela for the 
periods studied: 
´transitional period´ 
and ´divergence 
period´. 
Freedom House; 
Polity IV 
 
Independent 
variables 
Hypothesis 
variables 
PC  
 
To test the 
effect of elite 
political culture 
over democratic 
performance  
It captures changes 
in the democratic 
performance of the 
countries due to 
changes in the elite 
political culture. 
Political 
Constitutions and 
amendments from 
both countries (see 
appendix 2 and 3) 
 
HHI (electoral 
systems) 
To measure the 
influence of the 
electoral 
reforms over 
power 
distribution in 
parliament 
during the 
whole period of 
analysis. 
It captures the type 
of relationship 
(negative or 
positive) between 
electoral reforms 
and democratic 
performance.   
Mainwaring and 
Stugart (2002); 
Georgetown data 
base of the 
Americas, and 
Electoral 
Observatory of LA 
database 
 
NC (New 
Constitutions) 
To explain if 
there is a 
difference in the 
democratic 
performance of 
the countries 
after the year 
the new 
constitutions 
were enacted. 
It captures the 
difference in the 
average 
performance of 
democracy after and 
before the new 
constitutions were 
enacted. 
Enacted 
Constitutions of 
1991 and 1999 for 
Colombia and 
Venezuela 
respectively. 
 
Controls 
Inflation To keep other 
effects constant 
and test the 
validity of 
modernisation 
and resource 
curse theory 
NA 
World Bank 
GDP growth World Bank 
Oil rents World Bank 
Enrolment Unesco 
PTS The Political Terror Scale 
  Country   NA 
Source: own compilation  
It is important to note that the subset of hypothesis variables should not be grouped 
because they will be regressed in different multivariate regression models that will 
explain democratic divergence as expressed in the following linear functional form:  
D= f(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼,𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃,𝑃𝑃,𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶)    (7.3) 
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Where, D is the dependent variable: democracy, f is a linear function, PC, HHI and 
NC are the hypothesis variables, C is the matrix composed by the control variables, 
and Country is the dummy variable. These functions will be estimated as several 
stochastic247 models in the next chapter to assess whether these sets of variables 
explain democratic divergence in Colombia and Venezuela. 
  
                                                 
247 ´Formally, a sequence of random variables indexed by time is called a stochastic process or a time 
series process. (Stochastic is a synonym for random.) When we collect a time series database, we obtain 
one possible outcome, or realization, of the stochastic process. We can only see a single realization, 
because we cannot go back in time and start the process over again. (This is analogous to cross-sectional 
analysis where we can collect only one random sample.) However, if certain conditions in history had 
been different, we would generally obtain a different realization for the stochastic process, and therefore 
we think of time series data as the outcome of random variables. The set of all possible realizations of 
a time series process plays the role of the population in cross-sectional analysis´ (Wooldridge 2012, p. 
312). 
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Chapter 8 
Testing democratic divergence in Colombia and Venezuela by 
estimating a multivariate regression model 
8.1. Introduction 
Having explained the operationalisation and measurement of the dependent and 
independent variables that makes up the theoretical Circular Causality Model 
introduced in chapter 3, the aim of this final chapter is to estimate a multivariate 
regression model to empirically assess democratic divergence. The theoretical 
discussion in the first part of this project can be considered as the starting point to 
estimate the regression model.248 Hence, the statistical model, in this chapter, relates 
the change in the dependent variable: democracy –as a proxy of democratic 
divergence-, caused by changes in its independent variables: Constitutional reforms, 
Electoral systems and Elite Political Culture.249  
By estimating a multivariate regression model, it is possible to test and quantify the 
statistical importance (significance) of the independent variables in the explanation of 
the divergent democratic paths that Venezuela and Colombia underwent over the 
‘divergent period.’ In this order of ideas, this chapter will be organised in five sections 
being this introduction the first of them. Section 8.2 will describe the way by which 
data was collected and organised. Additionally, it will also provide a detail analysis of 
the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. Section 8.3 will 
introduce and explain the rationale behind the selection of seven multivariate 
regression models to assess divergence, of which the first six will be linear models, 
and the last one a non-linear model (Ordered Probit). Additionally, it will also offer an 
analysis of the expected effect of each of the independent variables over the dependent 
variable. Section 8.4 will estimate the effect of both elite political culture and the 
institutional variables (electoral systems and constitutional reforms) over the 
                                                 
248 ‘Econometrics is based upon the development of statistical methods for estimating economic 
relationships, testing economic [and political] theories, and evaluating and implementing government 
decisions and policies. Econometric methods are relevant in virtually every branch of applied social 
sciences. It comes into play either when we have an economic theory to test or when we have a 
relationship in mind that has some importance for business decisions or political analysis. An empirical 
analysis uses data to test a theory or to estimate a relationship’ (Wooldridge 2012, 1) 
249 For more information, see table 7.1 “variables description” and the general linear function 7.3. 
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democratic performance in Colombia and Venezuela on each of the seven models 
described above.  
The chapter concludes that there is enough evidence to validate the project’s 
hypothesis. That is, there is quantitative evidence that suggest that the divergent paths 
of the Colombian and Venezuelan democracies can be explained by changes in the 
elite political culture, and the reforms conducted over their constitutions, and electoral 
systems. That is, the independent variables included into the theoretical Circular 
Causality Model have a strong statistical significance, whereas most of the control 
variables have no clear significance to explain this phenomenon. As a final remark, 
this section points out some limitations that the empirical analysis faced and that 
should be taken into consideration for future research. 
8.2. Data and descriptive statistics 
As was discussed in the first part of this project, the democratic performance between 
Colombia and Venezuela over the ‘transitional period’ was quite similar as they 
followed a rather stable trend scoring ratings that organisations such as Freedom 
House and Polity IV, regarded them as democratic regimes (see table 2.2). Such 
democratic stability is a good starting point because to assess divergence it is necessary 
to compare both cases with a period that share a common baseline. Therefore, this 
model will use panel data250 to account for differences in democratic performance in 
two levels: countries (cross-section)251 and years (time series)252. Each one of the 
                                                 
250 ‘A panel data set (or longitudinal data) consists of a time series for each cross-sectional member in 
the data set. Panel data can also be gathered from geographical units. For example, we can collect data 
for the same set of counties in a particular regime on topics as diverse as immigration flows, tax rates, 
government expenditures, etc., for the years 1980, 1985, and 1990.’ (Wooldridge 2012, 10). In social 
sciences, it is possible to analyse political parties, constitutional reforms and amendments, conflict, 
peace and constitutions for a set of countries followed over a period of years (Wooldridge 2012). In that 
sense, ‘panel data models allow us to construct and test more complicated behavioural models than 
purely cross-section or time-series data’ (Baltagi 2005, 6). 
251 ‘Cross-sectional information/data set consists of a sample of individuals, households, cities, states, 
countries, or a variety of other units, taken at a given point in time. Cross-sectional data are widely used 
in social sciences and economics. In economics, the analysis of cross-sectional data is closely aligned 
with the applied microeconomics fields, such as labour economics, state and local public finance, 
industrial organisation, urban economics, demography, and health economics’ (Wooldridge 2012, 6). 
As for political sciences, it can be used on individuals, cities, elections, among others at a given point 
in time are important for testing hypotheses and evaluating social policies (Wooldridge 2012). In the 
case of this project, the purpose of using cross-sectional data is to assess a hypothesis of democratic 
divergence in two countries for two periods of time.  
252 ‘A time series data set consists of observations on a variable or several variables over time. Examples 
of time series data include stock prices, money supply, consumer price index, gross domestic product, 
annual homicide rates, and automobile sales figures. Because past events can influence future events 
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variables will be accompanied with the notation it, where i denotes the country and t 
the years within 1976 and 2010 (the boundaries are included). In general, the model 
will be estimated with 70 observations for all the variables included.253 That is, the 
period of analysis begins from 1976 due to data availability from the control variable 
Political Terror Scale (PTS), and the data from the other variables bounds the period 
from this year onwards. In sum, the variables that make up the multivariate regression 
model proposed in this chapter hold a yearly interval from 1976 until 2010, which is 
the last year of the period of study. 
Table 8.1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables that I will use to regress the 
multivariate model. The aim of this table is to summarise basic features of the data 
used in this research to provide a preliminary quantitative analysis of the variables. 
Hence, Table 8.1 is made up by 4 different panels, all panels describe the mean, the 
standard deviation (SD), and the minimum (MIN) and maximum (MAX) values of the 
data gathered in this study.  Panels (a) and (b) show the descriptive statistics of the 
variables in Colombia before and after the new constitution were enacted respectively, 
whilst panels (c) and (d) show the same descriptive statistics but for Venezuela before 
and after the new constitution were enacted.254 
The first column in each panel of table 8.1 provides descriptive statistics of Freedom 
House Index (FH). It shows that the mean of FH, unlike the ‘transitional period’, 
increase over the ‘divergence period’ for both countries. However, the increase was 
much higher in Venezuela when compared with Colombia, explaining the sharp gap 
in their democratic performance in that period. As for the FH’s standard deviation in 
each panel is rather constant in both countries, which means that the variable’s 
volatility remains stable over time. Finally, the analysis of the MIN and MAX values 
                                                 
and lags in behaviour are prevalent in the social sciences, time is an important dimension in a time series 
data set. Unlike the arrangement of cross-sectional data, the chronological ordering of observations in 
a time series conveys potentially important information’ (Wooldridge 2012, 8). Hence, to assess 
divergence, the dependent and each one of the independent variables will contain information of both 
countries (i.e., cross-section data) and years (i.e., time series data). 
253 For example, the dependent variable democracy (𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is operationalised with information gathered 
from the Freedom House democracy index for Colombia and Venezuela (i=Colombia or Venezuela) 
from 1976 until 2010 (t=1976, 1977, …2010), meaning that the number of observations for this variable 
is 70 (N=35 for each country). In the same way, the independent variables and controls are constructed 
and explained as before. 
254 The reason behind tabulate four different panels, is that the central aim of this thesis is to assess 
divergence in the democratic performance after the new constitutions were established in Colombia and 
Venezuela. 
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of FH, shows that the minimum FH value (1,5) between the two countries over the 
whole period of analysis took place in Venezuela’s ‘transitional period’. Nonetheless, 
it is striking to see that the maximum FH value (5,0) also correspond to Venezuela but 
in the ‘divergence period’. This finding supports the assumption that the democratic 
divergence experienced by these two countries is due to the higher volatility 
experienced by Venezuela rather than on the stability experienced over time in the 
Colombian case. 
Columns 2 and 3 in table 8.1 contain descriptive statistics of two out of the three 
hypothesis variables, HHI and PC respectively.255 The mean value of HHI in 
Colombia decrease over the ‘divergence period’ compared with the ‘transitional 
period’, but in Venezuela is rather stable. As discuss in Chapter 6, this finding can be 
interpreted as a support to the claim that the electoral reform conducted by Colombia 
in 2003 had a more proportional effect over the political system than the one conducted 
by Venezuela in 2000.  
As for PC, the analysis will be focused on the trend that this variable will take based 
on the MIN and MAX descriptive values in table 8.1. It is worth noting that this 
descriptive variable takes positive and negative values due to the accumulative way 
PC was operationalised in section 7.3.1 and fully explained in appendix 3.256 As can 
be seen, over the ‘transitional period’ both countries follow a pro-democratic trend, 
because Colombia went from 8,64 (MIN) in 1976 to 12,19 (MAX) in 1990, and 
Venezuela went from 0,0 (MIN) in 1976 to 3,5 (MAX) in 1998 (see appendix 3). Over 
the ‘divergence period’ Colombia continued its pro-democratic trend from 1,67 (MIN) 
in 1991 to 14,54 (MAX) in 2010, whereas Venezuela did change its trend to a negative 
one from -1,75 (MAX) in 1999 to -8,67 (MIN) in 2010. This finding is important 
because, unlike Colombia, Venezuela changed its political values and perceptions 
from pro-democratic over the ‘transitional period’ to non-democratic ones over the 
‘divergence period’. 
                                                 
255 Variable NC is not included in the descriptive statistics, because it is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 0 in the ‘transitional period’ and the value of 1 in the ‘divergence period’. 
256 It is important to mention that the cumulative process to operationalise PC in the ‘transitional period’ 
began from 1957 for Colombia and from 1983 for Venezuela, because these were the years in which 
the first evidence about amendments and constitutional reforms affecting democratic performance was 
found. Please refer to appendix 2 for a detail account about the different years in which the amendments 
and constitutional reforms took place. 
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Table 11.1. 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 8.1.(a): Descriptive statistics in Colombia, ‘transitional period’ 
 FH HHI PC GDP growth Oil rents Enrollment* Inflation PTS 
Mean 2.63 0.46 10.55 4.19 4.26 111.20 24.62 3.20 
Sd 0.35 0.04 1.34 1.91 1.21 6.27 3.26 0.86 
Min 2.50 0.41 8.64 0.95 2.49 103.65 17.11 2.00 
Max 3.50 0.50 12.19 8.46 7.51 121.80 29.17 5.00 
 
Table 8.1.(b): Descriptive statistics in Colombia, ‘divergence period’ 
 FH HHI PC GDP growth Oil rents Enrollment* Inflation PTS 
Mean 3.58 0.26 8.03 3.39 4.76 116.19 14.56 4.65 
Sd 0.44 0.13 4.38 2.50 1.39 3.93 11.33 0.49 
Min 3.00 0.11 1.67 -4.20 2.36 106.14 3.41 4.00 
Max 4.00 0.41 14.54 6.90 7.46 119.84 45.36 5.00 
 
Table 8.1.(c): Descriptive statistics in Venezuela, ‘transitional period’ 
 FH HHI PC GDP growth Oil rents Enrollment* Inflation PTS 
Mean 1.96 0.40 1.91 2.00 25.25 105.98 29.35 2.52 
Sd 0.60 0.11 1.53 4.53 8.21 4.17 28.00 0.95 
Min 1.50 0.17 0.00 -8.57 12.24 97.93 2.90 1.00 
Max 3.00 0.51 3.50 9.73 46.77 111.70 115.52 5.00 
 
Table 8.1.(d): Descriptive statistics in Venezuela, ‘divergence period’ 
 FH HHI PC GDP growth Oil rents Enrollment* Inflation PTS 
Mean 4.00 0.36 -3.82 2.69 25.56 103.73 26.03 3.42 
Sd 0.43 0.13 2.86 8.35 8.05 2.11 11.53 0.51 
Min 3.50 0.17 -8.67 -8.86 15.39 99.15 7.83 3.00 
Max 5.00 0.50 -1.75 18.29 38.64 106.76 45.94 4.00 
Source: Author's calculations. 
* Enrolment should be understood as the gross enrolment ratio in primary school. This variable could be greater than 100 because, 
according to World Bank (2011), "it includes students whose age exceeds the official age group (e.g. repeaters). Thus, if there is 
late enrolment, early enrolment, or repetition, the total enrolment can exceed the population of the age group that officially 
corresponds to the level of education – leading to ratios greater than 100 percent". See: 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/114955-how-can-gross-school-enrollment-ratios-be-over-100. 
 
Finally, columns 4 to 8 in table 8.1 presents the descriptive statistics of five out of six 
control variables.257 Overall, the four panels show that the mean of GDP growth, 
Enrolment, and PTS in Colombia were greater than in Venezuela. In contrast, the mean 
of variable Oil rents in Venezuela was higher than in Colombia. On the other hand, 
Inflation in both countries presented a high mean in the ‘transitional period’, but only 
decreased in Colombia over the ‘divergence period’. In sum, this finding show that the 
economic and development indicators are performing better for Colombia, when 
compared to Venezuela. However, according to the findings is possible to assess that 
PTS as a proxy of violence in Colombia is higher than Venezuela. Hence, ceteris 
                                                 
257 Dummy variable Country is not included in this analysis because the four panels are divided by 
country. 
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paribus, these set of variables can be regarded as valid ones to explain democratic 
divergence in the multivariate regression model.  
8.3. Multivariate regression model 
According to the way the variables were measured and operationalised in chapter 7, 
the multivariate regression model proposed in this project aims to test if the hypothesis 
variables cause a difference in the democratic performance of both countries between 
the ´transitional period´ and ‘divergence period.’ That is, a model with these 
characteristics aims to isolate the effect of institutions and elite political culture to 
assess the different democratic trajectories that Colombia and Venezuela followed 
over the ‘divergence period.’ As discussed earlier, although the empirical model 
specified democracy (D) as the dependent variable, the models, in fact, will explain 
the change in the democratic performance understood as divergence given a change in 
its hypothesis variables: Institutions (constitutions and electoral system) and elite 
political culture. 
Six out of the seven multivariate regression models will be regressed with fixed effects 
by country.258 In this case, the main aim of adding fixed effects by country is to capture 
the unobserved heterogeneity259 to control for the country aspects for which no 
information is available. This could be accomplished by adding the dichotomous 
variable country that takes the value of 1 for Venezuela and 0 for Colombia (see 
description of control variables in table 7.1). These types of models have the advantage 
of offering a better estimation of adjusting dynamics (Ashenfelter, et. al., 1982) and 
identify and measure the effects that cannot be tracked easily in cross-section or time 
series data (Ben–Porath 1973). 
Hence, this project will estimate seven models with different interaction terms to 
measure the effect of the ‘hypothesis variables’ (i.e., new constitutions (NC), elite 
                                                 
258 ‘Fixed-effects models are designed to study the causes of changes within countries. The fixed effects 
formulation implies that differences across groups can be captured in differences in the constant term’ 
(Greene, 2012).  
259 ‘Panel data suggests that individuals, firms, states or countries are heterogeneous. Time-series and 
cross-section studies not controlling this heterogeneity run the risk of obtaining biased results’ (Baltagi 
2005, 4). I performed a Hausman test of fixed effects to decide between fixed or random effects models. 
The null hypothesis of this test is that the preferred model is random effects versus the alternative of 
fixed effects (Greene, 2012). Model I and model II obtained an estimate of 11.5 and 16.6, respectively. 
Both rejected the null hypothesis in favour of fixed effects with a confidence interval of 99%. 
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political culture (PC) and electoral systems (HHI)) to assess democratic divergence. 
Particularly, the ‘hypothesis variables’ PC and HHI will be included into the 
regression models as lagged variables, because these variables do not have an 
immediate effect over the dependent variable. Therefore, the current value of the 
dependent variable (D) in one specific year (t) will be estimated based on the values 
of PC and/or HHI of the previous year (t-1). 
In sum, this project will estimate seven multivariate regression models. The first six 
will be linear of which five of them will have fixed effects, and one will be estimated 
as a pooled model.260 The last model will be estimated as a non-linear model also with 
fixed effects. These seven models, arises from the linear function depicted in the 
previous chapter (see equation 7.3). 
For purposes of easy and clarity, the functions that make up each of the seven models 
to be regressed will be organised in three separated groups. The first group will show 
and explain the linear functions of models I, II and III, which individually assess the 
effect of each of the hypothesis variables over democracy. The second group, include 
linear models IV and V which group together all the hypothesis variables without and 
with fixed effects respectively. These models are meant to check whether the 
unobserved characteristics of the countries have an effect on democracy. Finally, the 
third group will include models VI and VII as robustness checks for model V.261 To 
do this robustness check, I will assume different specifications for the dependent 
variable. Hence, model VI will assume a truncated dependent variable, whilst model 
VII assumes a discrete choice dependent variable. After introducing the functions for 
each of these groups, I will describe the variables and coefficients used in each of these 
three separated groups. 
Model I estimate a linear model to test the effect the new constitution of each country 
have over Democracy (D). To this end, the model will include the ‘hypothesis 
variable’ NC and an interaction term between the above variable and the dummy 
Country (NC*Country). This interaction term accounts for the effect of the enactment 
                                                 
260 This model (Model IV) is estimated for the purpose of comparing the effect over democracy when 
it does not take into account the unobserved characteristics of the countries under study. 
261 The reason behind choosing Model V to be checked with the robustness models VI and VII is because 
the former model gathers all the variables that make up the theoretical ‘circular causality model’ 
proposed in Chapter 3 as the theoretical approach to explain democratic divergence. 
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of the new constitution in Venezuela over the ‘divergence period’ have over D when 
compared to Colombia. This model also includes the set of control variables depicted 
in vector C (see equation 7.2), and the dummy variable Country to correct unobserved 
heterogeneity by fixed effects.  
Model I: 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖             (8.1.) 
Model II, in turn, will estimate a linear model that is meant to show the effect that 
changes in the electoral system has over democracy (D). That is, it includes the lagged 
‘hypothesis variable’ HHI, along with the set of control variables C, and the dummy 
variable Country. 
Model II: 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝛿𝛿1𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖             (8.2.) 
The model III will estimate also a linear model meant to measure the effect that 
changes in political culture at the elite level has over Democracy (D). In this case, I 
include also the lagged ‘hypothesis variable’ PC, and like models I and II, it also 
includes the vector C, and the dummy variable Country. 
Model III: 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼1 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝛿𝛿1𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖            (8.3.) 
In sum, the above three linear models consist of the following variables and 
coefficients: 
- 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   is the dependent variable democracy index in country 𝑖𝑖 and year 𝑡𝑡. 
- 𝛼𝛼1 is the models’ intercept coefficient. 
- 𝛽𝛽1 is the first coefficient of interest in model I, it shows the effect of NC over 
D in Colombia. 
- 𝛽𝛽2 is the second coefficient of interest in model I, it shows the difference 
between Colombia and Venezuela of the effect of 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃 over 𝐺𝐺.262 
                                                 
262 That is, 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2 shows the effect of NC over D in Venezuela. 
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- 𝛾𝛾1 is the coefficient of interest in model II, it shows the effect caused by 
changes in the electoral system in the previous period over democracy in the 
current period. 
- 𝜃𝜃1 is the coefficient of interest in model III, it allows me to know if changes in 
elite political culture in the previous period has an effect on democracy in the 
current period.  
- 𝛿𝛿1 is a row vector that contains the marginal effects of the changes in each of 
the five control variables in vector 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
- 𝛿𝛿2 is the coefficient that captures the unobservable heterogeneity by country 
(fixed effects).  
- 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the value of the variable 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃 in country 𝑖𝑖 and year 𝑡𝑡. 
- 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−1) is the value of the variable 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 in country 𝑖𝑖 and year 𝑡𝑡 − 1. 
- 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−1) is the value of the variable 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼 in country 𝑖𝑖 and year 𝑡𝑡 − 1. 
- 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the vector of control variables in country 𝑖𝑖 and year 𝑡𝑡. 
- 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the value of the variable 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶 in country 𝑖𝑖 and year 𝑡𝑡. 
- The error term is referred as 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and is assumed to have zero mean and no 
correlation between periods. 
 
As for the second group that includes model IV and V. Model IV will be estimated as 
a pooled linear model with the whole set of ‘hypothesis variables’, and the vector of 
control variables. This model also includes two additional lagged interaction terms. 
The first one, is the interaction between variables 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼 and 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃 (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼*𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃). This 
interaction will allow me to test the difference between the effect that has the 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼 
variable over 𝐺𝐺 before and after the new constitutions were enacted in each country. 
The second interaction term is between variables PC and NC (PC*NC). This 
interaction allows me to test the difference between the effect that 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 variable has 
over 𝐺𝐺 before and after the new constitutions were enacted in each country. 
 
Model IV: 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−1) +  𝛾𝛾2𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−1)𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝜃𝜃2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−1)𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
             (8.4.) 
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Like model IV, model V will be estimated in the same way but including fixed effects 
by country. That is, it will include the dummy variable 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶, and the interaction 
term between variables NC and Country (NC*Country).  
Model V: 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝛾𝛾2𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−1)𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−1) +
𝜃𝜃2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−1)𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖             (8.5.) 
The main reason to estimate these two separated models, is to compare the effects of 
the independent variables over democracy assuming that both countries either behave 
similarly (Model IV), or differently (Model V) and, therefore, check if they are able to 
test whether the unobservable heterogeneity of each country affect democracy. 
Overall, the variables that make up models IV and V are described in the same way as 
the first group of models (Models I, II and III). The only difference between the first 
and the second group of models are the addition of the following variables and 
coefficients: 
- 𝛾𝛾2 is the coefficient of interest, it shows the difference in the effect of the 
electoral system over democracy, between the ‘transitional period’ and the 
‘divergence period’. 
- 𝜃𝜃2 is the coefficient of interest, it shows the difference in the effect of the 
political culture over democracy, between the ‘transitional period’ and the 
‘divergence period’. 
 
Finally, as explained above, the third group contains models VI and VII. Both models 
will be estimated as robustness check for model V. 
Model VI estimates a truncated model.263 The decision to use this kind of model comes 
from the realization that the values of the dependent variable are bounded in an 
                                                 
263 This model assumes that the dependent variable follows a truncated distribution. This kind of 
distribution when is regressed as a OLS model will bring about biased estimations for the coefficients 
of the independent variable. Therefore, to solve this statistical setback, it is necessary to include the 
inverse Mills ratio into the truncated model, which provides unbiased and consistent coefficients for all 
the independent variables. 
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established range of values264. Hence, this model will be regressed with the same 
independent variables as model V. The main difference is that model VI will assume 
that the dependent variable is truncated, and therefore should be transformed into a 
latent variable which aims to normalise its distribution. 
Model VI: 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝝋𝝋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (8.6) 
Model VI consists in the following variables:  
- 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   is the dependent variable democracy index in country 𝑖𝑖 and year 𝑡𝑡.  
- 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector that contains all the independent variables listed in model V in 
country 𝑖𝑖 and year 𝑡𝑡 (see equation 8.5). 
- 𝝋𝝋 is the row vector of coefficients accompanying each independent variable 
(i.e., 𝝋𝝋 represents the coefficients accompanying all the independent variables 
introduced in model V).  
- 𝜎𝜎 is the coefficient accompanying variable 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
- 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the inverse Mills ratio. That is, the ratio between the probability of the 
truncated distribution in the observation over the cumulative function of the 
truncated distribution. 
- The error term is referred as 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and is assumed to have zero mean and no 
correlation between periods. 
 
Model VII, in turn, is a nonlinear model, specifically an ordered probit model. It 
assumes the dependent variable as a discrete one.265 It will allow us to test whether 
changes between scores in the dependent variable are linear or not. The inclusion of 
this regression model is based on the hypothesis that the effort a country can make to 
move from one democracy score to another is different depending on the democracy 
score level the country used to have in the previous period.  For instance, it aims to 
                                                 
264 Regardless, whether Freedom House or Polity IV indexes being used as the dependent variable, it is 
important to remember, as explained in Chapter 7, that these indexes are bounded in an interval from 1 
to 7 and -10 to 10 respectively.  
265 According to Greene (2012) the ordered probit is an ordered choice model that accounts to regress 
discrete choice variables as a dependent variable. This type of models assumes that differences between 
two levels of rating scales of the dependent variable are nonlinear, and is necessary the use of a strictly 
nonlinear transformation to estimate the model. In this case, I assume that the dependent variable of 
democracy is a discrete choice variable, and changes between scales are nonlinear. 
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check whether the effort a country needs to make to pass from 6 (not free) to 5 (partly 
free) in freedom house index, is different to the one when the country moves from 3 
(partly free) to 2 (free),266 even though the change in the democratic performance in 
both cases are in the same direction (improvement of democracy) and in the same 
magnitude. 
Model VII: 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝑣𝑣ℎ𝟏𝟏(𝑘𝑘ℎ−1 < 𝝋𝝋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑘𝑘ℎ)𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1
 (8.7) 
Model VII consists in the following variables:  
- 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   is the dependent variable democracy index in country 𝑖𝑖 and year 𝑡𝑡.  
- 𝐻𝐻 is number of possible scores taken by variable 𝐺𝐺.  
- 𝑣𝑣ℎ is the value taken by variable 𝐺𝐺. For instance, 𝑣𝑣1 is the lowest value that 
variable 𝐺𝐺 can take, and 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 is the highest value taken by variable 𝐺𝐺. 
- 𝟏𝟏 is a conditional function that takes the value of 1 if the condition between 
parenthesis is fulfilled, and 0 otherwise. 
- 𝑘𝑘ℎ is the intercept value coefficient for each score taken by variable 𝐺𝐺. Where 
𝑘𝑘0 is taken as −∞ and 𝑘𝑘𝐻𝐻 is taken as ∞.  
- 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector that contains all the independent variables listed in model V in 
country 𝑖𝑖 and year 𝑡𝑡 (see equation 8.5). 
- 𝝋𝝋 is the row vector of coefficients accompanying each independent variable 
(i.e., 𝝋𝝋 represents the coefficients accompanying all the independent variables 
introduced in model V). 
- The error term is referred as 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and is assumed to have zero mean and no 
correlation between periods. 
 
As mentioned earlier, to obtain a better interpretation of the results in the models 
proposed above I used data from Freedom House index to explain the dependent 
                                                 
266By “effort” this research means that the institutional arrangements or the changes in elite political 
culture need it to move from a higher (6) to a middle (5) democracy index is different in terms of 
magnitude when  it is compare with a move from a middle (3) index to a lower one (2).  
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variable (D), or its proxy democratic divergence.267 As it will be discussed, the 
interpretation of the expected effect of each independent variable over the dependent 
variable is related with the scale that Freedom House uses to measure democracy. That 
is, an increase in the index (closer to 7) should be interpreted as a deconsolidation. 
Conversely, if the index is decreasing (closer to 1), then, the interpretation should be 
that the democracy is consolidating. Therefore, if the sign of the coefficient 
accompanying any independent variable in the seven models proposed is positive 
means that increases in the independent variable associated to that coefficient produces 
a negative effect over democracy, while if the sign of the coefficient is negative, means 
that increases in the independent variable improves the democratic performance of the 
countries under study.268 In other words, the coefficient accompanying any 
independent variable in the models put forward above, represents an inverse relation 
between that independent variable and democracy.269 
In what follows, I am going to explain the expected signs for the coefficients 
accompanying the hypothesis variables, the interaction terms, and the control variables 
included in the seven models to be estimated in the next section. 
Chapter 7 claimed that the hypothesis variable new constitutions (NC) is a 
dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 after the year the new constitution was 
enacted for each country (1991 in Colombia and 1999 in Venezuela), and 0 otherwise. 
In other words, this variable takes the value of 1 during the ‘divergence period’ in both 
countries, and takes the value of 0 during the ‘transitional period’ also for the both 
countries. Therefore, the inclusion of this variable into the models allows me to 
                                                 
267To assess the robustness of the results obtained with Freedom House data in models I to VII, this 
project also estimated an additional regression with data from Polity IV democracy index. The results 
of this regression are shown in Appendix 4. 
268 It is worth nothing that this form of interpretation applies also for the coefficients accompanying the 
interaction terms in models IV, V, VI and VII. 
269 The results in this chapter for the seven models were interpreted exclusively using Freedom House 
data, however they can be also interpreted in a similar way by using Polity IV data to check for 
robustness (appendix 4 will show the estimation of the regression model using these data). As discussed 
in chapter 7, the preference to estimate the model with Freedom House data instead of Polity IV data 
cannot be understood as a methodological bias since the results were similar. Hence, selection of 
Freedom House index is solely due by the way this index has been built, which is more comprehensive 
than polity IV index (Munck 2009; Coppedge, et. al. 2011). That is, Freedom House index includes a 
broader subset of indicators to measure democracy as it includes both political rights and civil liberties 
measurements, while Polity IV is mainly focused on political rights. For this reason, Freedom House 
data offers a more accurate measurement to account for changes in the democratic performance, 
understood as democratic divergence that may be caused by changes in elite political culture, 
constitutions, and electoral system variables. 
 203 
 
estimate its coefficient that accounts for the change in the democratic performance 
after the enactment of the new constitutions in both countries.  
However, since the effect of new constitutions over democracy is different for each 
country, I also include an interaction term between variables NC and Country 
(NC*Country). Hence, the coefficient accompanying this interaction term will help to 
differentiate the above effect between countries. Although it is expected that the NC 
have different effects over democracy in each country, this project will not consider 
an expected sign for these coefficients because it is not possible to determine a priori 
its theoretically effect on democracy. 
The second hypothesis variable that will be tested in this project is HHI. This variable 
measure the degree of power concentration achieved through the implementation of 
an electoral system. It is expected that the effect of an increase in this index will 
deconsolidate democracy, because electoral systems that are relatively more 
majoritarian (plural) tend to concentrate more power in the executive branch and 
therefore are prone to be less democratic than proportional electoral systems (Wills-
Otero 2009). This is particularly true in socio-economically diverse countries such as 
the ones study in this project. Therefore, the expected sign of the coefficient 
accompanying HHI should be positive. 270 
The third hypothesis variable included into the models is PC. As discussed in the 
theoretical chapters, this variable captures changes in the elite political culture over 
time. It is expected that improvements in both political values and believes by political 
elites will cause an improvement in the democratic performance on the cases under 
study. Therefore, the coefficient accompanying variable PC, would have an expected 
negative sign, because increases in PC would lead to a decrease in FH (i.e., 
improvements in the democratic performance).271 
                                                 
270 Another argument to justify this expected sign is based on the analysis offered in the theoretical 
chapters. There, it was explained that unlike Colombia, Venezuela during the ‘divergence period’ 
underwent a critical electoral reform that changed its electoral formula from a D’Hondt electoral system 
to a Hare quota system. In doing this, Venezuela could concentrate power in hands of the official 
political parties affecting in this way the pro democratic tradition that this country used to have in the 
´transitional period´. In other words, the more concentration of power caused by changing the electoral 
formula in Venezuela during the ‘divergence period’ would lead to explain the deterioration of its 
democratic performance. 
271 To be sure about the relation introduced above, chapter 6 described that Colombia had a renewal in 
its political elites because of the election of the National Assembly that enabled the new 1991 
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To capture the differences in the impact of the hypothesis variables (i.e., HHI and PC) 
over the dependent variable, I also included two additional interaction terms into the 
specifications of the last four models.272 The aim of the interactions HHI*NC and 
PC*NC allowed to differentiate the effect that both electoral systems and elite political 
culture have over democracy when compared the ‘transitional period’ with the 
‘divergence period’. Therefore, the expected signs for these interactions are positive 
and negative respectively. The former is positive, because increases in HHI during the 
‘divergence period’ would lead to deteriorate democratic performance (increase FH) 
in each country. This logic applies primarily to the Venezuelan case, as this country 
takes to concentrate power during the divergence period as state in subsection 7.3.2. 
By the discussion offered in the theoretical chapters, the latter would be negative 
because a non-democratic elite political culture during the ‘divergence period’ would 
lead to deteriorate the performance of democracy (increase FH) in each country. 
Finally, as for the control variables included in the seven models: Inflation, GDP 
growth, Oil rents, Enrolment, PTS (violence), and the dichotomous variable Country, 
have the purpose of testing different effects to explain democratic divergence. For 
instance, variables Inflation and GDP growth are meant to test the hypothesis that 
modernisation theory affects the democratic performance of each country. According 
to the discussion offered in chapter 2, it is expected that neither inflation nor GDP 
growth influence the democratic performance in the countries studied due to 
modernisation theory cannot explain the divergent democratic trajectory of these 
countries over the ‘divergence period’. Variable Oil rents is included into the models 
as a control variable to test for the effect of the resource curse theory as a potential 
theoretical framework to explain democratic divergence. As discussed in chapter 2, it 
                                                 
Constitution. The election of this new political elites led to a deepening in the pro-democratic reforms 
that used to characterise the constitutional provisions conducted during the ‘transitional period’. 
However, unlike Colombia, Venezuela had an inflexion point in the structure of its political culture. 
That is, the renewal of its political elites at the beginning of the ‘divergence period’ implied the 
appointment, not the election –as in the Colombian case- of the members of its Constitutional Assembly. 
Consequently, the appointment of the members of this institutional body was arranged according to the 
political wishes of President Chávez, excluding the opposition political parties (Bejarano 2011). In 
virtue of the above, this project claims that the renewal in the political culture of the Venezuelan elites 
had implications over the type of constitutional provisions enabled during the ‘divergence period’ in 
the sense that most of the reforms had non-democratic characteristics (see appendix 2). 
272 At this point, it is important to remember that Model I (see equation 8.1) only includes the interaction 
term NC*Country, whereas model IV (see equation 8.4) includes the interaction terms HHI*NC and 
PC*NC. Additionally, models V, VI and VII include all the three interaction terms mentioned above. 
Please, see section 8.3 for a detail justification on the way by which the above-mentioned models have 
these specification types. 
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is expected that the variable has not significant effect to explain divergence. The 
inclusion of the variable Enrolment273 as a control variable is meant to account for the 
effect that improvement in economic development -not economic growth- have over 
democratic performance in both countries. The coefficient of this variable is expected 
to take a negative value, because improvement in the educational coverage should lead 
to improve a polity’s democratic performance. The variable PTS (Political Terror 
Scale) is included into the model to measure the effect that violence could cause on 
the countries’ democratic performance. This is an important control variable because 
scholars (Moore 1998; Albertus, et. al., 2012; Thoms 2007) studying processes of 
democratisation claim that civil war and/or military conflict have a negative effect on 
the performance of democracy. Finally, the last control variable is the already 
mentioned Country. This variable takes the value of 1 for Venezuela and 0 for 
Colombia. This project will not offer an expected value for this variable because it 
accounts for the unobservable characteristics of each country. Therefore, it is not 
possible to determine a priori its theoretical effect on democracy. 
8.4. Estimation results 
Table 8.2 shows the results of the determinants of democratic divergence after 
conducting the estimation of the multivariate regression models explained in section 
8.3. The estimation of models I, II, III and V were regressed using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) adding the variable Country to account for fixed effects. Model IV, in 
turn, was regressed using OLS but without fixed effects.274 Model VI and VII, were 
regressed as robustness checks using a truncated model, and a multinomial ordered 
probit respectively. They also include the variable Country to account for fixed effects. 
The innovation of these models can be attributed to the use of the panel data. The 
errors in all seven models were corrected for heteroscedasticity applying the Jackknife 
method to estimate the variance covariance matrix of the regressions (Tukey, 1958), 
which is commonly used in estimations with small samples. 
                                                 
273 Please bear in mind that Enrolment as a control variable should be understood as the gross enrolment 
ratio in primary education. 
274 As explained in the previous section, the main reason to estimate model IV, is to compare with model 
V the effects of the explanatory variables over democracy assuming that both countries either behave 
similarly (Model IV), or differently (Model V). 
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As was outlined above, Model I275 tests the influence of the new constitutions over 
democracy to assess divergence in Venezuela when compared with Colombia. The 
coefficient estimated for variable Country in this model showed that in the ‘transitional 
period’ the Freedom House index in Venezuela was bigger than Colombia in average 
0.105, but that difference is not statistically significant according to Table 8.2. This 
outcome shows that during the ‘transitional period’ both countries follow similar 
democratic paths. However, the coefficient estimated for the interaction term 
NC*Country shows that during the ‘divergence period’ Venezuela took a different path 
than Colombia as its Freedom House index was in average 1.41 higher than the 
Colombian case. This result also shows that the difference is statistically significant, 
concluding that the change in Venezuela´s elite political culture occurred with the 
appointment of the members of the Constituent Assembly in 1999, caused a 
deconsolidating effect on democracy when compared with Colombia. Conversely, 
another way to interpret this result from the Colombian perspective is that the election 
of the Constituent Assembly's members in 1991 had a consolidating effect on 
democracy when compared to Venezuela since the renewal of its political elites 
reflected at least a more stable political system. Hence, the enactment of the new 
constitutions marked an inflexion point in the process of explaining democratic 
performance between the two countries. 
The results for this model in table 8.2 show that the global significance F test is equal 
to 56.79 which means that the independent variables (i.e., hypothesis and control 
variables) are jointly significant with a confidence interval of 99%. The results confirm 
that these variables provide valuable information to understand the divergent 
democratic trajectories over time. Moreover, the overall goodness of fit of this model 
(𝑅𝑅2) was good because at least the 85% of the change in democratic performance can 
be explained by variations in NC and the control variables. 
Model II test the influence of the electoral systems over democracy during the whole 
period of analysis. This model show that HHI have not effect over democracy due to 
                                                 
275 It is worth nothing here that model I, unlike the rest of the models, it is regressed without lagged 
variables, because this model only includes the hypothesis variable NC which, as explained in section 
8.3, is a dummy variable that measure the effect of the new constitutions over democracy. However, 
models II to VII will be regressed with lagged hypothesis variables HHI and/or PC. That is, this project 
assumes that the effect of changes in the electoral system and elite political culture will be reflected in 
subsequent periods over the performance of democracy in the countries under study. 
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its associated coefficient is not statistically significant. Additionally, the sign of the 
coefficient is counterintuitive to the theory. This is because the ‘pacted democracies’ 
generated by the elite settlements during the first years of the ‘transitional period’ in 
both countries improved the overall democratic performance instead of 
deconsolidating it, as the theory would claim.276 In other words, the effect that the 
‘pacted democracies’ had on concentration of power in few political parties is negative 
correlated with the scores of Freedom House index showing a good democratic 
performance (please see figure 7.5). Finally, despite that the global significance F test 
show that the independent variables are jointly significant with a confidence level of 
99%, it is important to note that the independent variables only explain the 57% of the 
change in democratic performance, according to the R2. 
Model III is meant to test the impact that changes in elite political culture have over 
democracy during the whole period of analysis. To this end, table 8.2 show that the 
coefficient of the hypothesis variable PC is statistically significant at 90%, and its sign 
is consistent with the theory. This outcome is important for this project because 
individually the inclusion of this variable seems to have explanatory power to assess 
the process of democratic divergence in Colombia and Venezuela. This is because the 
accumulation of pro-democratic values by the political elites (increases in PC) will be 
reflected in an improvement in the democratic performance (decrease of FH) of the 
countries under analysis. Hence, the sign associated with this coefficient, as the theory 
claim, show an inverse relationship between FH and PC. That is, the higher the 
accumulation of pro-democratic values are, the better the democratic performance of 
that country would be. As for the goodness of fit measures, despite the fact the 
hypothesis variable is significant, the R2 associated with the model is low and equal to 
0.62, which means that the independent variables only explained the 62% of the 
changes in the democratic performance. 
Unlike models I, II and III, the results of the remaining models include the interaction 
terms HHI*NC and PC*NC. The purpose to include these two interactions is meant to 
differentiate the effect that both the electoral system and the elite political culture 
                                                 
276 This is because one would expect that the greater the concentration of power is -caused by the ‘pacted 
democracies’- the worse would be the democratic performance of these polities. 
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respectively have over democracy during the ‘divergence period’ when compared with 
the ‘transitional period’ in both countries. 
Accordingly, model IV is estimated without fixed effects (i.e., variables NC*Country 
and Country are excluded from the model), but includes all the hypothesis variables, 
the two aforementioned interaction terms, and the set control variables included in 
vector C.277 The results of this model show that the coefficients of variables HHI and 
PC (which show the effect that these two variables have over democratic performance 
in the ‘transitional period’), are statistically significant but their signs are 
counterintuitive with the theory. However, the estimated coefficients of the interaction 
terms are significant, and with the expected signs. The former result for HHI is not a 
surprise due to the explanation provided in the results of model II.278  As for the result 
for PC, it is explained because during the ‘transitional period’ the values and believes 
of the elite political culture in both countries were quite similar.  
As for the latter results in the interaction terms, proves that the effects over democracy 
caused by changes conducted on the electoral system and the renewal on the political 
elites during the ‘divergence period’ are significant and agrees with predictions from 
the theory. This is a striking result because this model shows that the selection of the 
hypothesis variables are indeed relevant to assess processes of democratization. In this 
sense, this model seems to show that both changes in the electoral formula and 
accumulation of different sets of political values over the ‘divergence period’ do have 
explanatory power to provide answers for the process of democratic divergence in both 
countries. 
In terms of the goodness of fit on this model it can be argued that both R2 and the 
global significance F test have better results when they are compared with the previous 
three models. For instance, the R2 shows that the independent variables of this model 
explain at least the 87% of the variance in the dependent variable. Additionally, the F 
                                                 
277 As explained before, the reason behind regressing model IV without fixed effects is because I want 
to compare whether the unobservable characteristics of both countries either behave similarly (without 
the dummy variable Country), or differently (applying fixed effects) as in model V. 
278 Again, the counterintuitive sign in the coefficient HHI is explained because of the implementation 
of ‘pacted democracies’ by elite settlements in both countries at the beginning of the ‘transitional 
period’. 
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test shows that independent variables are jointly significant, with a confidence level of 
99%. 
Unlike model IV, model V is regressed with fixed effects because it is important to 
check whether the unobserved characteristics of each country have different effect 
over democracy in each country.279 That is, this model group together all the 
independent variables included in model IV but, additionally, it also includes the 
dummy variable Country to account for fixed effects and, the interaction term 
NC*Country. The results of this model are similar to model IV, and also showed that 
the coefficient of the dummy variable Country is positive but not statistically 
significant, which means that the unobservable characteristics of each country had no 
effect over democracy. Hence, it is possible to claim with high level of certainty that 
the hypothesis variables included in the model do explain the different democratic 
paths that both countries took during the ‘divergence period’. This finding is supported 
by the lack of significance found in most of the control variables included into the 
model. 
Overall, for the five linear models described above it is important now to consider 
which is the best model to explain democratic divergence. To this end, this project 
uses the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to measure the relative qualitative of 
these five models.280 Table 8.2 provides information of this measure in each model 
that, in turn, can be used to select the best model to explain divergence. By looking at 
these results, it is fair to claim that model V provides the best specification of all 
because despite this model uses the highest number of independent variables, its AIC 
is the lowest. Therefore, the goodness of fit in model V is higher than the others, even 
considering the penalty of loss of degrees of freedom that result from adding variables 
to the model.281 
                                                 
279 It is worth remembering here that model V is like those regressed in models I, II and III, in that all 
of them accounts for fixed effects. However, the main difference in model V is that it includes all the 
hypothesis variables. 
280 According to Green (2012) the AIC is a measure of the relative quality of a model. It is calculated 
by considering the R2, and it penalizes the model when the number of independent variables increase. 
Therefore, this measure provides a way to select the model with the best explanatory power to assess 
democratic divergence.  
281 Other similar measures to AIC are the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and the adjusted R2. All 
these measures help to select the best model to explain the dependent variable. According to Diebold 
(1998) all these measures have their virtues and neither of them have an obvious advantage over the 
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Table 12.2. 
Determinants of democratic divergence. 
 
Dependent variable: democracy index from Freedom House (FHit) 
Independent 
variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII 
        
NCit 0.317   0.488 0.796 0.898 6.475 
 (0.234)   (0.424) (1.326) (1.377) (6.058) 
        
NCit*Countryit 1.409***    -0.0158 -0.0514 -2.095 
(0.229)    (0.955) (0.976) (3.668) 
        
HHIi(t-1)  -0.994  -3.783*** -3.100*** -3.055*** -10.29 
  (0.749)  (0.737) (0.857) (0.902) (6.516) 
        
HHIi(t-1)*NCit    3.327*** 3.320*** 3.300** 12.52* 
   (1.154) (1.234) (1.256) (6.984) 
        
PCi(t-1)   -0.0731* 0.0915*** 0.145 0.157 0.954** 
   (0.0377) (0.0232) (0.0913) (0.0965) (0.422) 
        
PCi(t-1)*NCit    -0.158*** -0.177* -0.187* -0.989** 
   (0.0207) (0.103) (0.107) (0.414) 
        
GDP growthit 0.849 1.270 1.598 -0.731 -0.475 -0.402 2.118 
 (1.326) (2.057) (2.039) (1.211) (1.329) (1.380) (6.021) 
        
Inflationit -0.0200** -0.0128 -0.0141 0.00209 -0.00904 -0.0113 -0.104* 
 (0.00946) (0.0182) (0.0172) (0.00677) (0.00705) (0.00857) (0.0569) 
        
Oil rentsit 0.0152 -0.0122 -0.00784 0.0142 0.0283** 0.0310** 0.163** 
 (0.0123) (0.0178) (0.0165) (0.00936) (0.0127) (0.0135) (0.0651) 
        
Enrolmentit 0.0928 -1.089 -0.915 -0.329 -0.265 -0.230 0.277 
  (0.450) (0.767) (0.613) (0.367) (0.383) (0.398) (1.305) 
        
PTSit 0.397*** 0.683*** 0.660*** 0.137 0.169 0.178 0.705 
 (0.0921) (0.0983) (0.0835) (0.109) (0.156) (0.159) (0.474) 
        
Countryit 0.105 0.671 0.0195  0.864 1.002 7.953* 
 (0.306) (0.489) (0.548)  (0.759) (0.831) (4.334) 
        
Constant -0.295 2.353 2.219 1.546 -1.014 -1.485  
 (1.482) (2.223) (2.024) (1.089) (1.944) (2.141)  
        
Mills ratio      0.317***  
      (0.0368)  
N 70 68 68 68 68 68 68 
R2 0.851 0.575 0.621 0.873 0.887   
AIC 73.37 140.4 132.5 64.25 60.23 60.22 143.9 
F 56.79 18.28 21.04 84.24 57.48 52.79 4.102 
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Unlike all the models described this far, model VI and VII are nonlinear models which 
are meant to check the robustness of model V. As mentioned above, Model VI assumes 
that the dependent variable FH is truncated between 1 and 7. This model also considers 
                                                 
other. Nonetheless, after conducting several tests I realized that either BIC or adjusted R2 were similar 
to AIC, showing that model V have the best outcome for all three measures. 
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all the set of independent variables used in the regression of model V. As shown in 
Table 8.2, all the coefficients in this model have the same signs and levels of 
significance obtained in model V. The coefficient accompanying the inverse mill ratio 
variable is positive and statistically significant. It means that the dependent variable 
truly follow a truncated distribution, and the coefficients estimated in the model must 
be analysed with caution, considered the truncated distribution of the dependent 
variable. 
In turn, the last model used a multinomial ordered probit regression. In this case, 
because Freedom House index can only take 13 values between 1 and 7, the measure 
of democracy is assumed here as a discrete choice variable (and not as a continuous 
variable, as was assumed in models I to V). As explained before, this model assumes 
that differences between two levels of rating scales are nonlinear, and could change 
the effect that the independent variable have over democracy. The interpretation of 
this model would be rather different from the previous ones. The reason for this is due 
to the coefficients accompanying the independent variables in Table 8.2 (see column 
model VII), do not capture the marginal effect of these variables over democracy, and 
an interpretation based on those coefficients may be misleading. Therefore, to interpret 
the effect that the hypothesis variables have over democracy, I will take a different 
approach by conducting a separated analysis based on the marginal effects that PC and 
HHI have over democracy. To do so, I rely on figures 8.1 and 8.2 below.282 
Figure 8.1 is meant to explain the effect that changes in PC have over the probability 
that each one of the possible scores of the dependent variable (FH) might happen,283 
and the differences of this effect between the ‘transitional period’ (NC=0) and the 
‘divergence period’ (NC=1),284 captured by the interaction term PC*NC. Hence, 
                                                 
282 At this point, it is important to note that the results obtained from the ordered probit model should 
be taken with caution, because the data used contain only one observation for FH=4.5 and FH=5 (In 
both instances for the Venezuela case). This situation leads to perfectly determine the estimation in one 
of the observations in the model, and therefore the standard errors could be biased. However, and despite 
this setback, regressing this model can be helpful as a robustness check for model V. 
283 As can be seen in Figure 8.1, FH only takes values from 1.5 to 5, due to these scores are the only 
ones that are included in the database over the entire period of analysis for the cases under study. 
284 NC takes the value of one after the constitutional reforms were enacted for each country (i.e., 1991 
Colombia and 1999 Venezuela), and it takes the value of cero before the constitutional reforms were 
enacted. In figure 8.1 NC=0 is depicted by intervals in hollow triangles, whilst NC=1 will be depicted 
by intervals in solid circles. 
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Figure 8.1 is divided in 8 graphs, and each one of them denotes the probabilities of 
each possible score for FH. Each graph is composed by: 
• The horizontal axis shows different possible values that PC takes, based on the 
scores calculated in appendix 3. This axis is labelled in the graphs as PC. 
• Confidence intervals in hollow triangles and solid circles showing the marginal 
effect of different values of PC over the probability that the FH score happen 
in the ‘transitional period’ and the ‘divergence period’ respectively. The scale 
of these intervals is shown in the left vertical axis, and is labelled as the Effect 
of one unit increase in PC. 
• A frequency distribution for the variable PC is superimposed over each 
marginal effect plot.285 The scale of this variable is presented on the right 
vertical axis, and is labelled as the % of observations in PC. 
As explained above, the results from models I to VI in table 8.2 showed an inverse 
relationship between PC and FH, which is boosted over the ‘divergence period’. 
Hence, the outcome of the ordered probit model shown in figure 8.1 is expected to be 
consistent with the results obtained with the former models. By looking at the graphs 
of the probabilities when variable FH takes the values of 1.5, 2 and 2.5, it is possible 
to identify that the likelihood to achieve these values is not caused by changes in PC. 
This is because most of the confidence intervals in these graphs include both positive 
and negative values for both periods (i.e., transitional (NC=0) and divergence 
(NC=1)), and therefore neither of them are statistically significant. 
By contrast, figure 8.1 shows that PC has a positive286 but decreasing effect over the 
probability that the variable FH takes the values of 3, 3.5, 4 and 4.5 in the ‘divergence 
period’ for all the values of PC, while in the ‘transitional period’ the effect is positive 
only for certain values of PC (particularly for values between 6 to 13).287 This result, 
confirm the theoretical hypothesis from the Circular Causality Model introduced in 
chapter 3 which claimed that higher levels of accumulation of prodemocratic values 
                                                 
285 The combination of a histogram with the outcome of the marginal effects in any graph help us to 
determine if the effects are concentrated or not in the areas with high number of observations of PC. 
286 As can be seen by the confidence intervals in the graphs when FH equals 3, 3.5, 4 and 4.5, the effect 
is statistically significant. This is because, the values in the confidence intervals are always higher than 
cero. 
287 See the slope of the confidence intervals depicted by solid circles in figure 8.1 for FH=3.5 and FH=4. 
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among political elites produce improvements on the democratic performance on the 
countries under study during the ‘divergence period’. In addition, this same set of 
graphs also indicate that, while the confidence intervals depicted in solid circles 
(‘divergence period’) are decreasing as PC values are higher, these intervals, in turn, 
are placed below the confidence intervals depicted in hollow triangles (‘transitional 
period’) for some values of PC located at the following ranges: for FH=3.5 between 
7 to 9, for FH=4 between 8 to 11, and for FH=4.5 for the range between 10 to 13. 
These range of values points out that there is a difference between the marginal effect 
of PC over democracy in the ‘divergence period’ when compared with the 
‘transitional period’. This result confirms the assumption that changes in the 
accumulation of political culture values, in any direction, have a bigger effect over 
democracy during the ‘divergence period’, but conditional to high values of PC. 
Finally, graph FH=5 in figure 8.1 shows that changes in PC have no effect over the 
probability that FH take the value of 5. This is because, there is only one observation 
in the sample for that score of FH, and therefore it produces a perfect determination 
by using the ordered probit model trough the constant value, removing any possible 
relation between the dependent variable and the independent variables. 
In sum, the result of the analysis presented in figure 8.1 allows us to offer two 
important conclusions. The first one, is that for low scores of FH (when democracy is 
highly consolidated),288 changes in PC have not a significant effect over FH. This is 
because, for low scores of FH, it is supposed that the regime is already democratic 
meaning that political elites have accumulated a high proportion of prodemocratic 
values (Inglehart 2000; Inglehart, et. al., 2005). Hence, at these levels of FH, an 
increase of one unit in PC have no effect over democracy due to the regime had already 
been consolidated. The second conclusion is even more important for this study, 
because it is related with cases in which the regimes have not been achieved a full 
consolidation (i.e., when the score values of FH are between 3 and 4.5). On these cases, 
it is possible to infer a meaningful difference on the effect caused by changes of one 
unit of PC over democracy, when a constitutional reform is implemented (NC=1). 
This is because, the results shown in graphs when FH equals 3, 3.5, 4 and 4.5 clearly 
                                                 
288 This effect is observed in graphs FH=1.5, FH=2 and FH=2.5 of figure 8.1. 
 214 
 
present an inverse relationship between PC and FH, conditional to enact a 
constitutional reform promoting either pro or non-democratic values. 
Figure 16.1. 
Marginal effect of PC 
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Unlike figure 8.1, figure 8.2 will explain the effect that changes of one unit of HHI 
have over the probability to achieve a given score of FH, discriminated by period 
(NC=0 and NC=1) captured by the interaction term HHI*NC.289 Like the previous 
figure, figure 8.2 will be also divided in 8 graphs each one of them will denote the 
probabilities to achieve each possible score for FH. In this case, each graph is 
composed by: 
• The horizontal axis shows different possible values that HHI takes, based on 
the descriptive statistics shown in table 8.1. This axis is labelled in the graphs 
as HHI. 
• Confidence intervals in hollow triangles and solid circles showing the marginal 
effect of different values of HHI over the probability that the FH score happen 
in the ‘transitional period’ and the ‘divergence period’ respectively. The scale 
of these intervals is shown in the left vertical axis, and is labelled as the Effect 
of one unit increase in HHI. 
• Once again, a frequency distribution for variable HHI will be superimposed 
over each marginal effect plot to check the areas where the observations of 
HHI are concentrated. The scale of this variable is presented on the right 
vertical axis, and is labelled as the % of observations in HHI. 
Considering the findings shown in model V, the relationships between HHI and FH 
was negative, and therefore counterintuitive with the theory over ‘transitional period’. 
This is because, theoretically it is expected that setting up electoral systems enabling 
higher concentration of power (high values of HHI) will bring about worse levels of 
democratic performance (high values of FH). However, as explained before this 
counterintuitive finding it is explained by the nature of the democratic pacts that 
brought about the transition from authoritarianism to democracy in Colombia and 
Venezuela over the ‘transitional period’.290  
This finding is once again confirmed by looking at the first four graphs in figure 8.2, 
which show the results of marginal effects of HHI over FH when an ordered probit 
model is used. Focusing on the graphs when FH equals 1.5 and 2, they show positive 
                                                 
289 As explained above, figure 8.2 also depict NC=0 by intervals in hollow triangles, and NC=1 with 
intervals in solid circles. 
290 Please refer to section 7.3.2 for a detail account of this counterintuitive relationship. 
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and statistically significant values for those confidence intervals placed in high values 
of HHI at the ‘transitional period’ (intervals in hollow triangles). Additionally, these 
confidence intervals are in the area where there is a high concentration of observations 
of HHI, according to the frequency distribution of HHI plotted in the graph. These 
results indicate that the probability to achieve low values of FH is higher when an 
electoral system enabling high levels of power concentration (high levels of HHI) is 
setting up. Now, when FH equals 2.5 and 3, the graphs show a positive but decreasing 
confidence intervals showing that the negative relationship between HHI and FH arise 
only when low values of FH occur during the ‘transitional period’ (confidence 
intervals in hollow triangles).291 
According to the findings obtained in model V, it was possible to confirm that changes 
in the concentration of power distribution (HHI) was positively correlated with 
variable FH over the ‘divergence period’. By looking at the last four graphs in figure 
8.2 (when FH equals 3.5, 4, 4.5 and 5) it cannot be confirmed the relationship 
mentioned above. This is because, in most of these four graphs292 the confidence 
intervals related to the ‘divergence period’ -and marked by solid circles- include both 
positive and negative values, and therefore neither of these intervals are statistically 
significant. That is, changes in one unit of HHI have no effect on the probability to 
achieve any score of FH. The only exception to this trend is presented when FH=4.5 
where it is observed that the confidence intervals are positive and statistically 
significant. However, it is not possible to determine the slope of these intervals when 
HHI increase, and therefore it cannot be inferred if changes in HHI increase or reduce 
the probability of FH to achieve a score of 4.5. 
  
                                                 
291 This effect occurs because in the ‘transitional period’ variable FH only takes values from 1.5 to 3.5, 
and therefore I do not consider the last four graphs of figure 8.2. 
292 Here, the analysis is referred only for graphs when FH equals 3.5, 4 and 5. 
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Figure 17.2. 
Marginal effect of HHI 
 
 
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
E
ffe
ct
 o
f o
ne
 u
ni
t i
nc
re
as
e 
in
 H
H
I
0
2
4
6
8
10
%
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 in
 H
H
I
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5
HHI
FH=1.5 (13 obs.)
-.5
0
.5
1
E
ffe
ct
 o
f o
ne
 u
ni
t i
nc
re
as
e 
in
 H
H
I
0
2
4
6
8
10
%
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 in
 H
H
I
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5
HHI
FH=2 (3 obs.)
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
E
ffe
ct
 o
f o
ne
 u
ni
t i
nc
re
as
e 
in
 H
H
I
0
2
4
6
8
10
%
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 in
 H
H
I
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5
HHI
FH=2.5 (16 obs.)
0
.0
05
.0
1
.0
15
.0
2
E
ffe
ct
 o
f o
ne
 u
ni
t i
nc
re
as
e 
in
 H
H
I
0
2
4
6
8
10
%
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 in
 H
H
I
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5
HHI
FH=3 (10 obs.)
-.0
02
0
.0
02
.0
04
.0
06
.0
08
E
ffe
ct
 o
f o
ne
 u
ni
t i
nc
re
as
e 
in
 H
H
I
0
2
4
6
8
10
%
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 in
 H
H
I
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5
HHI
FH=3.5 (10 obs.)
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
E
ffe
ct
 o
f o
ne
 u
ni
t i
nc
re
as
e 
in
 H
H
I
0
2
4
6
8
10
%
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 in
 H
H
I
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5
HHI
FH=4 (16 obs.)
0
.1
.2
.3
E
ffe
ct
 o
f o
ne
 u
ni
t i
nc
re
as
e 
in
 H
H
I
0
2
4
6
8
10
%
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 in
 H
H
I
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5
HHI
FH=4.5 (1 obs.)
-1
0
1
2
3
E
ffe
ct
 o
f o
ne
 u
ni
t i
nc
re
as
e 
in
 H
H
I
0
2
4
6
8
10
%
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 in
 H
H
I
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5
HHI
FH=5 (1 obs.)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Histogram of HHI NC=1 NC=0
  
 218 
 
In short, unlike the theoretical approach stablished by this study, and according with 
the results obtained from model VII (ordered probit model), it seems that electoral 
systems measured by the independent variable HHI cannot be used as a predictor to 
determine the probabilities to achieve a score of FH for the countries under study.  
Overall, after conducting the analysis based on figures 8.1 and 8.2, it is possible to 
conclude that PC is a good predictor of FH over the ‘divergence period’. However, 
this is only possible when countries have not completely achieved their democratic 
consolidation. That is, when countries scored a FH between 3 and 4. In contrast, 
variable PC is not a good predictor to explain changes in FH, if the countries have 
either achieved high or low scores of FH. Additionally, figure 8.1 also denotes that 
variable PC is not a good predictor of the democratic performance over the 
‘transitional period’. As for HHI, the ordered probit model indicates that changes in 
the electoral systems have no effect to explain the process of democratization in both 
countries. One possible explanation for this outcome could be that the data used to 
regress the models contain only one observation when scores of FH equals to 4.5 and 
5. This situation leads to a perfect determination of one observation in the model,293 
and therefore a bias in the standard errors leading to mistakes in the interpretation of 
the coefficients significance.294 
Finally, the interpretation of the coefficients results from the set of control variables 
(C) included in Table 8.2, will be explained together for the first five linear models, 
because the last two models (as mentioned before) are regarded as robustness checks. 
                                                 
293 A perfect determination of one observation in an ordered probit model is produce due to the use of 
multiple constants, depending on the number of categories found in the dependent variable. If some 
observation is perfectly determined, it is because can only be explained by one constant, and therefore 
this observation cannot be considered to estimate the relationship between the independent and the 
dependent variables. 
294 In addition to the robustness check conducted in the previous models VI and VII, I also used an 
alternative robustness check using Polity IV as a dependent variable. To do so, I regressed Polity IV 
over the independent variables using the same specification of the first five linear models explained in 
section 8.3. The results of these alternative estimations are shown in Appendix 4. These results are 
consistent with the ones obtained using Freedom House in table 8.2, as they are a quite similar in terms 
of significance and signs of the coefficients. The F-statistics of the ones estimated with Polity IV data 
are also significant, but its goodness of fit (𝑅𝑅2) are lower than the models showed in Table 8.2. This 
means that the independent variables included in the models of Appendix 4 explain in lesser extend the 
variation of democracy. The difference in the goodness of fit of these models (Freedom House Vs. 
Polity IV) is one of the reasons I decided to work with Freedom House as the dependent variable to 
measure democratic divergence. 
Model VI and VII were left out of the analysis shown in appendix 4, because initially they were used 
as robustness check for model V when FH were used as the dependent variable in table 8.2. 
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The result of the first two control variables GDP growth and Inflation, showed that in 
general their coefficients are not statistically significant in any of the models contrary 
to what modernisation theory suggest (Lipset, 1959). That is, these variables 
consistently have no effect on democratic performance. As for the control variable Oil 
Rents, it is striking to note that it becomes statistically significant only in model V, 
when it is put together with all the hypothesis variables, and when it considers the 
heterogeneity between countries.  
The coefficients of the control variable Enrolment in the models consistently show that 
is not statistically significant to assess democratic divergence for the countries under 
study. This result, can be interpreted as if variables related with economic development 
have not explanatory power to assess divergence, at least for these two countries, and 
for the periods of analysis. Finally, the results of the PTS coefficients are consistent 
with the theory in the sense that the sign of the coefficient shows an inverse 
relationship between violence and democracy. However, its statically significance 
disappear in models IV and V, when all the hypothesis variables were included. It 
seems that the effect that violence has over democracy is absorbed mainly by the 
hypothesis variable PC, and in a lesser extent by the hypothesis variable HHI.295 
The last control variable (Country) was included for statistical purposes to estimate 
the model considering the unobservable characteristic of each country. Overall, its 
coefficients are positive but not statistically significant, which implies that the 
unobservable characteristics of each country do not affect their democratic 
performance. 
8.5. Discussion and final remarks 
The use of a multivariate regression model with panel data and with or without fixed 
effects can be regarded as a technique commonly used in the field of political science, 
and it shows that its application can be useful to perform quantitative and comparative 
analysis to test relevant research questions such as the one proposed in this project. As 
has been discussed over this project the theoretical and empirical evidence gathered 
offer an important contribution to explain the reasons behind how the democratic 
                                                 
295 The correlation between variables PC and PTS is around 0.5, whilst the correlation between variables 
HHI and PTS is around -0.3. 
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performance of the pair of cases chosen by this study took different paths during the 
‘divergence period’.  
This section is meant to summarise the main findings obtained by the regression of the 
seven models showed in the previous section. To do so, first the analysis will be focus 
on describing the impact that individually each of the three hypothesis variables have 
over democracy (Models I, II and III). Next, by focusing on models IV and V, the 
analysis will summarise the outcomes of the regressions when all the hypothesis 
variables are put together. These models in turn are meant to operationalise the 
theoretical Circular Causality Model introduced in Chapter 3. Then, the outcomes of 
models VI and VII will be regarded as robustness checks for model V. Finally, the 
findings over the set of control variables will be explained to infer whether these 
variables might produce an important effect to explain democratic divergence. 
As can be seen in Table 8.2, models I, II and III individually represent the effect of 
each of the three hypothesis variables over democracy in the whole period of analysis 
(i.e., ‘transitional period’ and ‘divergence period’). Thus, model I confirms the 
assumption that over the ‘transitional period’ Colombia and Venezuela share a similar 
democratic performance (see figure 1.1). Additionally, it also shows that when the new 
constitutions were enacted in each country, their democratic performance took 
different paths over the ‘divergence period’, this can be observed because the 
coefficient accompanying the interaction between variables NC and Country is 
statistically different from cero. 
Model II, showed that changes in the electoral system (HHI) do not have an effect over 
democracy considering the whole period of analysis. That is, the coefficient 
accompanying variable HHI was not statistically significant. In turn, model III showed 
that changes in the elite political culture (PC) have a negative but small effect over FH 
over the whole period of analysis. This finding explains and confirms that an 
accumulation of pro-democratic values has a positive effect to explain processes of 
democratic consolidation.  
Having determined the individual effect of each hypothesis variable over democracy, 
models IV and V were meant to analyse together the influence that all the variables 
included in the theoretical Circular Causality Model have, to explain democratic 
 221 
 
divergence. These models showed that during the ‘transitional period’ the hypothesis 
variables HHI and PC had not the expected sign, as they exhibited a counterintuitive 
effect over democracy during that period of analysis. However, during the ‘divergence 
period’ the effect of these hypothesis variables over democracy changed, because the 
sign of the interaction terms between these variables and variable NC were opposite 
when compared to the ones without interaction. In sum, these findings validate the 
hypothesis offering in this study, in which changes on both the political culture at the 
elite level and the electoral system implemented over the ‘divergence period’ 
explained the different democratic paths taken by Colombia and Venezuela. 
To be sure, two robustness checks296 were regressed in models VI and VII. Whilst the 
results of the truncated regression presented in model VI were similar to model V 
because the signs and significance of the estimated coefficients remained equal, the 
ordered probit regression presented in model VII allowed me to identify an additional 
finding to explain the effect of the hypothesis variables over democratic divergence. 
That is, the latter model confirmed once again that changes in the political culture at 
the elite level had an effect to explain democratic performance in the ‘divergence 
period’. However, this effect is only significant when countries are located at the 
middle range of Freedom House scores (i.e., when FH equals scores from 3 to 4.5, see 
figure 8.1). Nonetheless, unlike the six first models, this one also showed that changes 
on the electoral systems had not a significant effect to explain democratic performance 
during the ‘divergence period’. This finding is not a surprise, because despite the 
coefficients of the interaction between HHI and NC in the previous models were 
positive and statistically significant, these results were partially offset by the 
coefficients that accompany HHI when was not interacted, meaning that the effect of 
HHI over democracy during the ‘divergence period’ is low or cero. 
The economic (i.e., inflation and GDP growth) and development (i.e., Enrolment) 
control variables had the expected outcome in both the theory, and within the estimated 
models. That is, they have none significant effect to explain democratic divergence. 
This finding is important because it reinforces the hypothesis outlined in chapter 2, 
which said that modernisation theory cannot be regarded individually as a valid 
                                                 
296 As mentioned earlier, it is important to note here that in order to check the robustness of the results 
presented in table 8.2, an additional check was conducted by using the variable polity IV as the 
dependent variable. Please, refer to Appendix 4 for a detail description of the above results. 
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theoretical framework to explain divergence for the countries under analysis. As for 
the control variable Oil rents, its coefficient had a positive and statistically significant 
value only in model V. This finding validates the central hypothesis of the resource 
curse theory. It seems that the dependence of a specific natural resource is a key 
determinant to explain processes of democratic deconsolidation. However, it is 
counterintuitive to the theoretical discussion offered in chapter 2.  Regarding the 
variable PTS, its effect over democracy disappear when all the hypothesis variables 
were included. That is, because it seems to be related with some other variables which 
absorb the effect of variable PTS. Finally, the variable Country is only included in the 
estimation model for statistical purposes as a control variable (fixed effect), therefore 
there is no interpretation a priori. Ex post, the variable depicts that there were not 
significant differences between the unobservable characteristics of each country. 
In sum, the multivariate regression models with panel data were used to test the 
hypothesis that elite political culture along with electoral systems and the enactment 
of new constitutions as independent variables explain democratic divergence in 
Venezuela and Colombia. The empirical models proposed in this chapter have an 
advantage over the traditional descriptive statistics to explain divergence because the 
former enables to include control variables. This inclusion is important to accurately 
estimate the impact of the changes that both elite political culture and electoral system 
reforms have over democratic performance in both countries. The results from the 
estimated models support the importance of elite political culture to explain 
democratic divergence after the enactment of the Venezuelan and Colombian new 
constitutions. At the same time, the results also support the hypothesis that electoral 
systems reforms, conducted in 1999 in Venezuela and in 2003 in Colombia, have an 
effect but in lower or null magnitude to explain democratic divergence.297  
These findings confirm that the Venezuelan democratic path deviated from the 
Colombian one, and had a worse democratic performance during the ‘divergence 
period’ (finding validated in model I). Additionally, this democratic gap is mainly 
explained, as can be seen in Model V, by changes in the political culture at the elite 
level during the ‘divergence period’, and in lesser extend by changes in the electoral 
                                                 
297 Models I to IV showed that electoral reforms have a positive but low effect over the dependent 
variable in the ‘divergence period’. In contrast, model VII revealed that this effect is not statistically 
significant. 
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reforms. Overall, these results support the thesis offered by the Circular Causality 
Model proposed in chapter 3, and favour the hypothesis that elite political culture and 
electoral system reforms have an effect on explaining democratic divergence in low to 
middle income countries such as the two studied in this project. 
As a final remark, it is necessary to express at least two limitations. First, as was 
discussed in chapter 7, the available data appropriate for conducting a quantitative 
analysis was scarce and most of the time inexistent. When data could be found, most 
of it was dichotomous and might not have been recorded consistently over time, which 
affects the sample size caused by missing values. Data with these limitations can 
considerably reduce the spectrum of quantitative or regression analysis that can be 
performed. For instance, data from potential control variables that could have an effect 
over democracy, such as HDI, literacy rate, and unemployment rate, were left out from 
the analysis because of the lack of information for some of the years of the period 
covered by this project. 
The second important limitation is related with the measurement of democracy as 
dependent variable by both Freedom House and Polity IV. Since the methodology used 
by these organizations is based on discrete scores, small efforts made by countries to 
change their current democratic status, might not be considered it by those 
measurements, and therefore they are not reflected in the indexes. Hence, changes in 
the independent variables are not reflect on the dependent variable because the latter 
have not enough volatility. In this sense, it is quite difficult to estimate an accurate 
relationship between democracy indexes and the variables that cause changes in 
democratic performance in the countries. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions 
Over the second part of the twentieth century the democratic performance followed by 
Latin American countries was a recurring topic of discussion and analysis by political 
scientists due to during the second wave of democratisation almost every country in 
the region were facing authoritarian regimes. Scholars´ attention on these countries 
relied on the interest to know the reasons behind why Latin American regimes were 
unable to make a rapid transition to democracy as most Western countries did. 
Therefore, the bibliography explaining the region´s reluctance to achieve democracy 
is broad and offers the most diverse theoretical and empirical explanations.298  
Interestingly, only three Latin American countries can be considered as outliers of this 
generalizable democratic performance. In fact, together with Costa Rica, Colombia 
and Venezuela were a set of countries that made their democratic transitions during 
the second wave. They emerged as countries that historically were considered as the 
most stable regimes in the region at least until mid-1990s (Mainwaring 2005, 12; 
Bejarano 2011, 250). However, from these three countries, this thesis has examined 
the process of democratic performance experienced by Colombia and Venezuela since 
late 1950s until 2010, but with particular focus on explaining the causes upon which 
they took different democratic paths over the ‘divergence period.’ 
Unlike Costa Rica, these two regimes in terms of their democratic performance rely 
not only on the similarities they shared in terms of their common history, location 
(neighbouring nations), similar population, same language, same ethnicity, strong 
catholic influence and similar culture, but specially on the way they attained 
democracy by conducting elite settlements embodied as ‘pacted democracies.’299 
These pacts are a distinctive and unique characteristic of these regimens. It was the 
political mechanism that allowed them to hold a long-lasting and stable democratic 
                                                 
298 See for instance: Schneider 1995; Linz, et. al. 1978, 1996a; Linz 1990; Peeler 1986, 1992; Rochon 
1989; Malloy, et. al. 1987; Whitehead 1989; Karl 1990; Collier, et. al. 1991; O’Donnell 1992; 
Valenzuela 1992; Scott 1996; Lagos 1997; Mainwaring 2000; Camp 2001a; Naím 2001; Smith 2005; 
Carrión 2009. 
299 Scholars developing different approaches on the nature and effects of these ‘pacted democracies’ 
over democracy are: Karl 1987; McCoy 1995; Hellinger 1991; Ellner and Hellinger 2003; Buxton 2001, 
2005; Buxton and McCoy 2008; McCoy and Myers 2004; Lander, et. al., 2000, 2008; López Maya 
2002, 2003, 2004; among others. 
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performance during the whole ‘transitional period.’ However, since mid-1990s these 
elite settlements proved to be exhausted as they couldn’t provide solutions to solve the 
economic, social and political crises these polities were facing (Buxton 2001). 
Citizen’s discontent and lack of confidence with the political outcomes caused by 
those crises exerted pressures to carry out structural reforms in the political 
organisation of these states to prevent a serious threat to the democratic foundations 
of these regimes (Buxton 2005; López Maya 2002, 2003, 2004; McCoy and Myers 
2004 ). Although the reforms implemented were similar as they involved both agency 
and structural factors their outcome were completely different in terms of the 
democratic performance followed by these regimes. That is, both countries during the 
time that the ‘divergence period’ lasted ended up taken opposite democratic paths, 
finishing this way a similar democratic performance that during the ‘transitional 
period’ characterised these former stable and rather steady democracies. 
This thesis offered a systematic comparative analysis of the drivers that could explain 
the process of democratic divergence experienced by these South American 
democracies. Thus, my research is grounded in providing both a theoretical framework 
embodied in a so-called: Circular Causality Model. It states that changes in the 
political culture at the elite level, and institutional reforms such as those conducted 
primarily on the electoral systems and the enactment of new constitutions can be 
regarded as a good set of independent variables to explain this phenomenon. 
Additionally, it also introduced a statistical analysis to test the robustness of the 
theoretical model proposed in this research. By gathering information from statistical 
datasets published by governmental and international institutions (e.g.: Freedom 
House, Polity IV, IMF, among others), and by building two comprehensive datasets, 
this research also estimated several multivariate regression models to assess 
democratic divergence.  
The first part of this project focused its attention on delivering a theoretical model to 
explain the drivers that caused the process of democratic divergence followed by the 
countries under study. To this end, chapter 2, empirically assessed and confirmed the 
existence of the divergent democratic performance followed by Colombia and 
Venezuela over the ‘divergence period.’ After analysing the data obtained from 
Freedom House index and Kaufmann’s dimensions of governance I argued that the 
process of democratic divergence did happened and that it can be explained by 
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structural and agency factors. By asking what could be the theoretical framework that 
better explain and assess divergence, I took issue with those accounts that traditionally 
have been considered good approaches to explain this phenomenon. Thus, I reviewed 
four approaches (i.e., (i) modernisation theory, (ii) resource curse theory, (iii) 
institutional theory, and (iv) political culture theory) and critically argued that the 
former two should be rule out from the analysis as their primarily assumptions do not 
fit accurately to explain processes of democratisation that take opposite democratic 
paths. However, I also argued that the latter two despite the fact they are good 
approaches, individually, couldn’t be regarded as self-sufficient theoretical 
frameworks to explain divergence.  
Hence, and to solve this theoretical puzzle, in chapter 3 I proposed a different approach 
which consist in combining, or merging, the two latter theories. To this end, I throw 
into question the reliability of these two traditional theoretical frameworks by 
addressing three distinct literatures in a critical fashion. First, the literature on the 
conceptualisation of political institutions and its linear causality to explain democratic 
consolidation (Lijphart 1999, 2012), second the theory of political culture and its 
emphasis on masses to also explain democratic consolidation (Inglehart 1988, 1990, 
1991), and finally the literature on the necessary distinction between the role that elites 
and masses play in order to explain processes of democratic performance on either 
divided or homogeneous societies (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  
Several shortcomings were identified in each of them. Consequently, an alternative 
critical theoretical framework was proposed. Thus, the Circular Causality Model was 
placed at the centre of my analysis arguing that this model can effectively respond to 
the problems detected in the above-mentioned literatures. It argued that to explain the 
process of democratic divergence experienced by my cases it is necessary to merge 
both the institutional approach and the political culture approach because its 
interaction offer a circular causation that reinforce itself repeatedly over time allowing 
to understand the opposite democratic paths followed by Colombia and Venezuela. 
Additionally, this novel theoretical model allowed identifying the independent 
variables that, it was argued, has explanatory power to assess democratic divergence. 
Elite political culture, and the performance of two specific political institutions; 
namely: constitutional reforms and electoral systems were chosen to establish the 
circular relation between these variables to describe and analyse divergence. 
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Chapters 4, 5 and 6 focused on the conceptualisation of the dependent and independent 
variables that makes up the Circular Causality Model. Chapter 4 discussed the most 
important theoretical influences to explain democratic divergence as the dependent 
variable of this project. To detect the most suitable theoretical framework to 
conceptualise divergence a handful of theories were studied. After analysing the 
Institutional approach, the Social Structure approach, and the Path Dependent 
approach, I argued that an adapted version of Schedler’s (1998a) Path Dependent 
approach is the most appropriate framework to conceptualise the dependent variable. 
This reformulated version which includes only three out of the four types of regime 
classification proposed originally by Schedler best fit to explain the process of 
democratic performance followed by both Latin American countries in general, and 
for those of Colombia and Venezuela (see figure 4.5). The main reason for preferring 
this approach was based on premise that it offers a comprehensive normative 
classification that allows identifying ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ notions of democratic 
performance. Therefore, I argued that the adapted version of Schedler’s classification 
can be considered as a reliable conceptual approach for the dependent variable as it 
lets us trace the opposite democratic trajectories followed by my cases. Additionally, 
it also helps to clarify the role and effects of structural factors at the social, political, 
and economic levels that these countries were facing at the end of the ‘transitional 
period.’ 
Chapters 5 and 6, in turn, analysed the conceptualisation of the independent variables: 
elite political culture, and constitutional and electoral reforms respectively. Chapter 5 
claimed that culture matters as a concept to explain processes of democratisation due 
to it can explain the diversity among, and continuity within the democratic 
performance of different regimes and other political groups. However, I argued that 
the conceptualisation of political culture should be treated differently from that 
traditionally used in Western democracies because there exist differences in the way 
value systems and worldviews between masses and elites in developed and developing 
countries are form. Those differences primary arise from the cross-cultural variations 
masses hold in term of materialist vs. post-materialist values. By comparing the 
political culture’s distinctive characteristics in both types of societies, I showed that 
masses in develop regimes hold emancipative values allowing them to have a direct 
influence in the political outcomes required to consolidate their democracies. Whereas 
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masses in developing societies usually hold materialist values which prevent them to 
have a direct influence in the political outcomes. This is because masses must be more 
focused on the struggle for economic wellbeing and their survival, rather than 
enhancing the set of values required to consolidate their regimes (Inglehart 2000). 
Consequently, the distinction of cross-cultural variations –identified as materialist and 
post-materialist values- are an important source to conceptualise political culture in 
Latin America as they help to understand why elites' political traditions, rather than 
those of the masses, matter most for explaining the process of democratic divergence 
experienced by Colombia and Venezuela. Therefore, elite political culture was 
considered as an accurate explicative variable to explain divergence as the renewal of 
these political actors at the beginning of the ‘divergence period.’ played a strategic 
role and influence in reforming the state and its political institutions with direct 
implications for the democratic performance of these Latin American countries. 
In chapter 6, Lijphart institutional approach was criticised and a more reduce set of 
political institutions –from those offered by Lijphart (1999, 2012)- were proposed as 
the second set of independent variables to explain democratic divergence. Despite 
acknowledging the important contribution this scholar made to explain patterns of 
democracies in divided societies, I argued, based on the criticisms made primarily by 
Schmidt (2000), Cranenburg, et. al. (2004), Doorenspleet (2013), among others, that 
Lijphart’s framework is biased in favour of his definition of consensual democracies, 
and that the relative weight of his chosen criteria should not necessarily be the same 
to evaluate processes of democratic divergence. A solution to this problem was offered 
by proposing a two-story institutional building, as opposed to the Lijphart´s 10 story 
building, where constitutions and electoral systems were considered as key political 
criteria with the highest relative weight over which political elites exerted a profound 
reform during the ‘divergence period’ which, in turn, caused a change in the 
democratic performance of these two countries. 
The constitutional reforms and further amendments carried out in Colombia in 1991 
and in 1999 in Venezuela were identified as a critical juncture over which the renewed 
political elites exerted their influence. The comparative analysis conducted over three 
types of constitutional reforms, namely: power distribution, electoral systems, and 
policy-making reforms, were conclusive (see tables 6.1 and 6.2). The enactment of the 
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1999 ‘Bolivarian Constitution’ led the presidency into being the centre of gravity, 
favouring concentration of power in hands of President Chávez and its allies. 
Consequently, it limited political rights and civil liberties of those that were part of the 
opposition. In other words, the adoption –via referendum- of the new Venezuelan 
constitution marked the beginning of Venezuelan democratic regression. Conversely, 
the enactment of the 1991 Colombian new constitution proved to be favourable as it 
improved the democratic performance of this country. In fact, this progressive 
constitution (Noguera-Fernandez 2011) strengthened democratic institutions and 
systems of checks and balances, bolstered the rule of law, fostered power distribution 
by means of privilege political competition, and curbed the legislative power that the 
executive branch of government used to have when the bipartisan tradition ruled the 
country over the whole ‘transitional period.’ 
In sum, I argued that the constitutional reforms and further amendments conducted by 
a renewed set of political elites over the whole ‘divergence period’ was the critical 
juncture that marked the beginning of the opposite democratic paths followed by these 
polities. I explained that this is because the political elites who participated in the 
enactment of the new constitutions hold a different set of political values and believes 
from those that used to make up the parliaments during the ‘transitional period.’ Hence 
the comparative analysis conducted over the constitutional provisions enacted in both 
periods in each of the countries under study demonstrated that the new political elites 
elected in Colombia or appointed in Venezuela were set up with different political 
agendas that ended up taking their democracies to opposite democratic performances 
(see appendix 2 for a detailed account of this phenomenon).  This theoretical 
discussion was supported by the empirical analysis conducted in chapter 8, as can be 
seen in Model I (see table 8.2). 
As for the electoral reforms, I claimed that among the comprehensive constitutional 
reforms, the one conducted by the renewed elites over the electoral system have the 
greater explanatory power to explain divergence. That is, the change observed in the 
democratic trend that placed Colombia above Venezuela for first time in history in 
terms of its democratic performance from 2002 onwards (see table 2.2, and figures 1.1 
and 1.2) can be explained by the decisive effect exerted by the change in the electoral 
formula that took place in Venezuela and Colombia in 1999 and 2003 respectively. I 
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showed that the change in the electoral formula from a pure PR system with the 
D’Hondt formula to a mixed PR system with a prominent plural component in 
Venezuela proved to have a negative effect over the democratic performance of this 
regime. In fact, when this reform was implemented in 1999 the scores of both Freedom 
House and Polity IV fell sharply, and with it, the inevitable erosion of Venezuela’s 
democracy began. In sum, I argued that the combination of both reforms, namely: the 
constitutional and the electoral one, allowed me to place the Venezuelan regime below 
the notion of an electoral democracy and very close to fall back into the levels of 
authoritarian regimes according to the reformulated Schedler´s classification model 
introduced in figure 4.5.  
Unlike Venezuela, I also showed that the electoral reform implemented by Colombia 
in 2003 had a positive impact over its democratic performance but only when this 
reform became operational three years later. That is, when the next legislative election 
was held in 2006. In fact, it was observed that the change in the electoral formula from 
a semi-PR with Hare quota system to a pure PR system with the D’Hondt formula 
produced an improvement in the democratic performance of this country. Despite 
Freedom House kept its rating stable as a ‘partly free’ country, its score, improved 
because it passed from 4 in 2002 to 3 in 2006 (see table 2.2) showing an improvement 
in its democratic performance. From here arose the possibility to place, in the 
reformulated Schedler’s classification model proposed in figure 4.5, the Colombian 
regime above the notion of electoral democracy and moving to the right approaching 
to the notion of Liberal democracy, which, as it was argued, corresponds to the ideal 
notion of democracy for a regime to be considered as fully consolidated. 
The second and last part of this thesis estimated several statistical models to assess 
whether the theoretical Circular Causality Model introduced in the first part was a 
valid approach to explain divergence. The multivariate regression models with and 
without fixed effects proposed in chapters 7 and 8 proved to be an important empirical 
tool to test the reliability of the tree independent variables chosen in this research to 
explain democratic divergence. 
The empirical regression models proposed in this project specified democracy (D) as 
the dependent variable. It was operationalized and measured by using two indexes: 
Freedom House and Polity IV. These indexes, it was argued, help to explain the change 
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in the democratic performance as they can capture processes of democratic divergence. 
Moreover, the models also showed how the independent variables can be 
operationalised and measured. First, it operationalized elite political culture by 
introducing the variable PC. The purpose of this variable was to test the effect that the 
renewal of political elites had over the democratic performance on the two countries 
under analysis. Next, it was introduced the variable HHI to operationalize changes in 
electoral system during the whole period of analysis and for both countries. Finally, 
the variable NC was operationalised as a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 
1 after the year the new constitution was enacted for each country (1991 in Colombia 
and 1999 in Venezuela), and 0 before the enactment of the new constitutions. Hence, 
it captures the difference in the democratic performance before and after the new 
constitutions were enacted in each country.  
To capture the effect that variables Country, PC and HHI had over democratic 
performance on both the ‘transitional period’ and the ‘divergence period’, I interacted 
each one of these variables with variable NC. The first interaction term NC*Country 
was introduced to differentiate the average democratic performance between 
Colombia and Venezuela over the ‘divergence period’. The second interaction term 
HHI*NC is meant to test the difference in the effect that HHI could cause over 
democracy between the ‘transitional period’ and the ‘divergence period’. Finally, the 
third interaction term PC*NC tested the incidence of political culture over the 
democratic performance in the ‘divergence period’ when compared with the 
‘transitional period’. 
The outcomes of the models contained in both table 8.2 and appendix 4 showed the 
following results: (i) the hypothesis variables that made up the theoretical model 
correctly predict the opposite democratic path followed by Colombia and Venezuela 
during the ‘divergence period’. (ii) It was possible to test that changes in both elite 
political culture and the electoral system had explanatory power to explain democratic 
divergence but only over the ‘divergence period’. However, the latter variable (HHI) 
had a lower or null effect to explain democratic divergence when compared with PC. 
This is because, unlike model VII, all the models regressed where coefficients of the 
interaction term HHI*NC were included turned out to be positive and statistically 
significant. The only exception to this result was in model VII where cannot be tested 
a statistically significant relationship between HHI and FH during the ‘divergence 
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period’. (iii) the overall goodness of fit (𝑅𝑅2) of the first five models in table 8.2 turned 
out to be significant because, as can be seen in model V, at least 88% of the change in 
democratic performance can be explained by variations in the hypothesis, and control 
variables. Whereas, for models in Appendix 4 the 𝑅𝑅2 showed that at least 61% of the 
variation in democracy is explained by the independent variables. And (iv) the control 
variables have a small or null effect over the dependent variable.  
In sum, the multivariate regression models estimated with different definitions of 
democracy, with and without fixed effects, and different specifications (i.e., OLS 
model, truncated models, and ordered probit model) provided enough evidence to 
validate the project’s hypothesis. That is, there is quantitative evidence that suggest 
that the divergent paths followed by Colombian and Venezuelan democracies can be 
explained by changes in the elite political culture, and the reforms conducted over their 
constitutions, and electoral systems. Therefore, the hypothesis variables included into 
the theoretical Circular Causality Model have a statistical significance, whereas the 
control variables have no strong significance to explain this phenomenon. 
From the preceding analysis, there have been four inter-related layers of theoretical 
and empirical investigation throughout the thesis which forms its novelty and 
contribution: First, I have learned that studying phenomena related with processes of 
democratic divergence is a challenge that is worthwhile. This is so, because observers 
of Latin American politics (e.g., Whitehead 1992, O´Donnell 1992, Schmitter 1994, 
1995) have traditionally focused their efforts in predicting whether the countries in the 
region will follow either a consolidated path in which they could attain a fully effective 
liberal democracy, or a regressive path that could place them close or below to an 
electoral democracy or even falling back into some form of authoritarianism. 
However, little attention has been placed to explain the origins and effects that cause 
processes of democratic divergence in the Latin American context. Therefore, this 
study can be regarded as a contribution for deepening the debate on democratisation 
that deals with processes of democratic divergence. 
Second, the advocacy of the Circular Causality Model as an alternative theoretical 
approach to explain divergence can also be considered a contribution of my thesis. 
This model has critically distanced itself from the linear explanations offered by 
traditional theoretical accounts such as those of the modernisation, cultural or 
 233 
 
institutional approaches which in order to explain processes of democratisation rely 
on singe causalities based upon either agency or structural factors (see figures 3.1 and 
3.2). Instead, I have argued that my theoretical model can be considered as a fresh 
approach with more explanatory power because it takes together both agency and 
structural aspects to explore the extent to which democratic divergence in Colombia 
and Venezuela can be explained by changes in the functioning and transformation of 
political institutions caused by changes in the beliefs, values, and attitudes of political 
elites. Hence, by reconsidering the linkage between the elite political culture (as an 
agency theory), and the institutional approach (as a structural one), I claim that these 
frameworks together produce a cyclical impact, which reinforces themselves 
repeatedly over time to explain democratic divergence (see figure 3.3). 
Third, from an empirical perspective, the creation of an entirely new dataset by using 
various research methods comprises an additional aspect of the contribution of the 
thesis. This new dataset was the outcome of pursuing an extensive archive research 
based on consulting several constitutions for both countries which contained all the 
constitutional reforms and amendments implemented by Colombia and Venezuela 
from 1957 until 2010 in order to convert the qualitative information collected into a 
quantitative continuous variable that could allow me to claim the extent to which a 
constitutional reform or amendment can be regarded more or less democratic 
according to Dahl’s definition of Liberal democracy (see appendix 2 and 3). The 
rationale behind using this novel methodological resource was based on overcoming 
the lack of information to operationalise and measure, from a different perspective, the 
political culture variable. 
The fourth and final contribution of this thesis, has to do with the decision to use 
multivariate regression models with and without fixed effects, instead of using 
traditional cross-section or time series models to test and quantify the statistical 
importance (significance) of the independent variables in the explanation of the 
divergent democratic paths that Venezuela and Colombia underwent over the 
‘divergence period’. The advantage of using multivariate regression models lies in the 
possibility to isolate the effect that the introduction of control variables (i.e. GDP 
growth, Inflation, Oil rents, Enrolment, PTS and Country) could exert over the 
dependent variable. Thus, it is possible to know whether the independent variables 
chosen by this project have a real effect and can explain divergence. This is an 
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important characteristic that regression analysis provides because it enables us to avoid 
collinearity which can mislead the effect of independent variables over the dependent 
one. This is the reason why this thesis is in capacity to claim that the set of hypothesis 
variables that make up the Circular Causality Model are significantly associated and 
explain democratic divergence in Venezuela and Colombia. 
To conclude, Colombian and Venezuelan regimens are a good pair of cases to compare 
because they provide insights to explain democratic divergence that is a rather 
phenomenon in the Latin American context. Therefore, it is hoped that the arguments 
raised in this thesis will inform and contribute to future studies in the field of 
democratisation, which will build on the strengths and overcome the limitations and 
shortcomings of this research project and enhance the heuristic value of the proposed 
theoretical and empirical frameworks further with the addition of new case studies. 
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Appendix 1 
Constitutional reforms and constitutional amendments in Colombia 
and Venezuela 1900 – 2010 
 
Country Constitutional Reform Constitutional Amendment 
Colombia 
1886 
1894, 1898, 1905, 1907, 1909, 
1910, 1914,1918, 1921, 
1924,1930,1931,1932,1936,1938,
1940,1943, 1944, 1945, 
1946,1947, 1952, 1953, 1954, 
1956, 1957, 1959,1960, 1963, 
1968, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, 
1983, 1986, 1989  
1991 
1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2007, 2009. 
Venezuela 
1893, 1901, 1904, 1909, 
1914, 1922, 1925, 1928, 
1929, 1931, 1936, 1945, 
1947, 1953, 1961 1973, 1983, 1989, 1990 
1999 2006,2007, 2008, 2009 
Source: Own compilation from Negretto (2013) 
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Appendix 2 
Constitutional reforms and further amendments in Colombia and 
Venezuela from 1957 until 2010 
This appendix aims to offer a qualitative analysis based on an archive research that it 
is used to track changes on the political culture at the elite level over time for the two 
countries under study. This project argues that by looking at how elites in parliament 
conducted political reforms before and after the countries under study enacted their 
new constitutions it is possible to determine whether or not there was a change in their 
political culture between the ´transitional period´ and ´divergence period.´ As 
introduced in the first part, it is claim that this approach is a valid one because when 
the type of constitutional provisions enabled by the ‘old elites’ (‘transitional period’) 
are compared with those enabled by the renewed ones (‘divergence period’) in each 
country it would be possible to capture changes in the political values and perceptions 
in the political culture at the elite level. 
Hence, the tables300 depicted below are the result of consulting several constitutions 
for the both countries that contains all the reforms and amendments implemented by 
Colombia and Venezuela from 1957 until 2010. The goal of pursuing this archive 
research method was meant to convert all the information collected for each 
amendment and constitutional reform into a quantitative dichotomous value that could 
allow me to claim if they can be regarded as pro-democratic (0) or non-democratic (1) 
according to Dahl’s definition of Liberal democracy. This database will be used in 
appendix 3 to operationalize the variable elite political culture, which in turn will be 
used to estimate the multivariate regression model in chapter 8.  
To achieve this aim, this appendix will be organised according to the following 
structure. The first section will enumerate and explain the different categories that 
make up the columns of the tables that summarised the construction of the database. 
The second section will explain the methodology implemented for the construction of 
                                                 
300 This appendix will depict four tables (A.2(a); A.2(b); A.2(c); and A.2(d)) showing the types of 
constitutional reforms and amendments that each one of the two countries conducted either over the 
‘transitional period’ or over the ‘divergence period’ to track whether these constitutional provisions can 
be regarded as pro-democratic or non-democratic. Therefore, table A.2(a) will display all the 
constitutional provisions conducted in Colombia during the ‘transitional period’; table A.2(b) will do 
the same but for the ‘divergence period’ in Colombia, while tables A.2(c), and A.2(d) will contain the 
same information for the ‘transitional and divergence periods’ in Venezuela. 
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the database. And finally, the third section will depict the four tables that summarise 
the main constitutional reforms and amendments conducted by Colombia and 
Venezuela during the ‘transitional period’ and the ‘divergence period’ to determine 
whether they were pro-democratic (0) or non-democratic (1).  
1. Categories used for the construction of the database 
The construction of the database required the selection of various literature sources to 
systematise a large amount of diverse information. The tables resulting from this 
systematisation is helpful to easily understand the type and the ‘spirit’ of the 
constitutional provisions conducted over time, as well as its implications for the 
democratic performance of the countries under study. As can be seen in the tables that 
accompany this appendix (see below), the categories to systematise the information 
are:  
Year: This category was created to identify the year in which the constitutional 
modification was made in terms of reform or constitutional amendment. 
Type of constitutional change: This category reflects the need to identify the 
magnitude of the change or the constitutional amendment regarding the institutional 
design. In other words, it seeks to identify whether the constitutional change was of 
nature or degree. It is important to clarify that for practical purposes of the 
investigation; only the following types are considered: the reform and the 
amendment.301 
Reform: refers to a fundamental constitutional change. That is a change in the deepest 
of the Political Constitution (hereafter PC), a modification of the constituent spirit, 
ultimately, revocation of the Constitution and the enactment of a new one. 
The amendment: refers to a non-essential circumstantial change, which allows 
establishing a mechanism, element or different system, without changing the 
fundamental principles and values on which the legal and political system rests. In 
                                                 
301 It is important to note that in legal terms, the constitutional change (e.g., constitutional reform or 
constitutional amendment) obeys more specifically to the type of procedure used to carry out the review 
of the Political Constitutions, depending on the degree of the proposed change. 
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short, it allows modification of articles without affecting fundamental aspects of the 
political pact. 
Date and number of the legislative act –Colombia-/ date and number of 
publication in the Official Gazette -Venezuela-: This category helps to identify the 
date and number of the legislative act, or the Official Gazette, whether it be Colombia 
or Venezuela respectively; to have a reference to consult the official institution in 
charge of giving publicity to the modifications of their respective constitutions. 
Purpose of the reform or amendment: This category is essential to expose the 
purpose of the reform/amendment summarised; it obeys to questions such as: why the 
constitution was changed? What is intended when introducing ‘x’ change? In short, it 
establishes the cause of the modification of the constitutional reform or the 
amendment. 
Summary: This category was created to briefly explain what the constitutional 
provision stated before being modified. It obeys to questions like: What existed before 
the change? How does ‘x’ institution, rule, or system worked before the amendment 
or the reform? It is crucial to understand the change in full and not in an isolated 
manner.302 
Modification of constitutional precepts: This category was only applied to 
systematise much of the information identified in the case of Venezuela –therefore, 
this category will only appear in tables A.2 (c) and (d). This is because in Venezuela, 
many of the constitutional amendments were implemented through legislation 
bypassing the procedures established for modifying the PC. Hence, for tables 
summarising the Venezuelan case the category ‘summary’ was used to detail the 
essential aspects of each of the laws, and this category was responsible for describing 
the aspects that existed before the change and the articles being modified (that is, 
replacement in some cases of the summary category). 
Typology (3 criteria): This category was created to respond to the three criteria 
described in chapter 6 over which Colombian and Venezuelan political elites focused 
to conduct reforms or amendments to their constitutions to avoid the collapse of their 
                                                 
302 It is important to clarify that this report does not refer to aspects that existed before the modification, 
as it would go into a degree of specificity that is not required to address and understand the database. 
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democracies at the end of the ‘transitional period’ (see section 6.4.1). The three 
mentioned criteria are:303 
Distribution of power: it is classified within this criterion, all sorts of constitutional 
changes involving the removal, creation, limitation or expansion of the powers of one 
of the three branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial). As well as a 
transfer of political power from one branch to another. On the other hand, any kind of 
constitutional provisions involving a change in the system of checks and balances, or 
that distributes power to citizenship. Finally, it includes all sorts of constitutional 
changes referring to the elimination, creation, limitation or expansion of the powers of 
one of the political-territorial divisions of the country, whether national, state or 
municipal. 
Electoral system: is included in this criterion, any change concerning: (i) the manner 
or method by which votes are translated into seats. (ii) Their relationship with the party 
system. (iii) The electoral formula used for transforming votes into seats. (iv) The 
regulation of electoral campaigns. (v) The distribution of electoral constituencies, 
among others. 
Policy Making: is classified within this criterion, any constitutional change relating to 
(i) Allocation of budgets. (ii) Distribution of the central government financing. (iii) 
Ability to make autonomous decisions. (iv) Decentralisation mechanisms. 
It is important to note that these three criteria fulfilled another function: to serve as 
information exclusion criteria. This means that any constitutional change that 
encompasses an orbit or theme different from distribution of power, the electoral 
system or policy making, was dismissed for lack of relevance and utility to explain 
democratic diverge. It is for this reason that the database does not refer to such 
important constitutional issues such as: economic, social and cultural rights, among 
others. 
Effects on Democracy: This category is undoubtedly the most important, as it 
concentrates the core of the constitutional tracing, since it is the category that helps 
                                                 
303 As discussed in chapter 6, the three criteria of constitutional reform that the tables on this appendix 
explores are by no means arbitrary, they represent the main issues over which the regimes under study 
were losing legitimacy by the end of the 1980s, and, therefore, are the ones that political elites had to 
reform or amend to avoid the collapse of their democracies. 
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determine the effects on democracy caused by the constitutional modifications, which 
was the main objective of doing this archive research and to consolidate a database 
useful to operationalize variable PC in appendix 3. That is, the systematisation of all 
the information in all the above categories, obey to the need to consolidate an 
analytical process that could end up determining whether the studied constitutional 
changes really strengthened democracy or contributed to its weakening. 
Pro-democratic (0) / non-democratic (1): This category is the direct consequence of 
having determined the effects on democracy of the constitutional modifications 
described above. It is very important because it allows to quantify the qualitative 
analysis and convey a more complete and detailed information that can be used as a 
quantitative input to operationalize variable PC. To quantify this qualitative analysis, 
it was determined whether the effects on democracy were: 
(A) A pro-democratic reform: it refers to those reforms or amendments that 
produced progress or strengthen the democratic performance of a country, 
according to Dahl’s definition of democracy. Thus, is a pro-democratic change, 
and it is assigned a value of 0. 
(B) Non-democratic reform: as before, it refers to reforms or amendments that 
involve a reversal or weakening in democratic terms for the country. 
Consequently, it is understood as a non-democratic change and it is assigned a 
value of 1 
2. Methodology 
The construction of the database required a thorough archive review for which official 
sources were consulted, such as the Secretary of the Senate (Colombia) and the 
Official Gazette of the Republic of Venezuela. As well as the compiler book of the 
entire Colombian political constitutions written by Carlos Restrepo Piedrahita (2003), 
and several articles of the author and professor at the Central University of Venezuela: 
Allan Brewer-Carias (1996, 2007, 2008 and 2009). The purpose of this review was to 
identify the reform or constitutional amendment that would have direct effects on the 
countries’ democratic performance studied by consulting a Political Constitution 
published before the application of the amendment or reform. This methodology was 
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intended to determine what was previously established, and proceed to categorise the 
information for examination. 
Four political constitutions corresponding to the periods of analysis were used. To 
analyse the ‘transitional period’ the 1886 (Colombia) and 1961 (Venezuela) 
constitutions were used. To analyse the ‘divergence period’ the 1991 (Colombia) and 
1999 (Venezuela) constitutions were used. On the other hand, to fill the category 
‘effects on democracy’, information found on official sources was not enough, which 
is why, in most cases, it was necessary to investigate further to understand the context 
and conditions in which the constitutional changes occurred. Therefore, many authors 
(e.g., Combellas 2002; Cordero, et. al., 2006; Leal, et.al., 2000; Ortiz 2001; Calvijo, 
et. al., 2009 and 2010; Duque 2014; Henao 2001; Noguera-Hernandez, et. al., 2011; 
Perez 1997; Restrepo 2003; Rodriguez, et. al., 2006; Rozo 1980; and Varón 2009) who 
facilitated the democratic process analysis were consulted. 
3. Tables summarising constitutional reforms and amendments in 
Colombia and Venezuela over the ‘transitional and divergence 
periods.’ 
By way of a summary of the tables that will be presented below, I will first describe 
in general terms the effects on democracy generated by the constitutional 
modifications implemented in Colombia and Venezuela, and also I will list the number 
of pro-democratic (0) and non-democratic (1) reforms the archive research identified 
for both periods of time. 
Colombia  
During the ‘transitional period’ in Colombia, 8 amendments were made to its political 
constitution in relation to the three main criteria (i.e., distribution of power, electoral 
system and policy making) in which the archive research focused on. These 
amendments were carried out in the years 1957, 1959, 1960, 1968, 1975, 1977, 1979 
and 1986304 (Negretto 2013. See appendix 1). Over this period 48 articles were passed 
                                                 
304  The Colombian amendments conducted in 1963, 1981, 1983 and 1989 were not considered for 
building the database because they did not modify any of the three criteria picked by this project to 
analyse democratic divergence. 
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and, therefore, modified by the congress of which 47 were pro-democratic and only 1 
was non-democratic (see table A.2 (a) below).  
On the other hand, during the ‘divergence period’ one constitutional reform was 
conducted in Colombia in 1991, and 15 amendments to its new political constitution 
took place. These amendments were made in the years 1993, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2009 (Negretto 2013. See appendix 1). Over this period, 
a total of 42 articles were amendment and modified by the congress of which 40 were 
pro-democratic, and the 2 remaining were non-democratic (see table A.2 (b) below). 
Venezuela 
During the ‘transitional period’ in Venezuela, two constitutional modifications were 
made in the years 1983 and 1989 (Negretto 2013. See appendix 1)305. From this period, 
a total of 4 articles were modified by the congress being all of them pro-democratic 
reforms –i.e., 0 non-democratic reforms were identified (see table A.2 (c) below). 
Finally, during the ‘divergence period’ in Venezuela, one constitutional reform was 
enacted in 1999, and 8 amendments to the new political constitution took place, in 
relation to the three main criteria in which the archive research focused on. The 
amendments were made in the years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 (Negretto 2013. See 
appendix 1). A total of 12 articles were approved during this period by the National 
Assembly, being all of them non-democratic reforms. That is, 0 pro-democratic 
reforms were identified from the analysis (see table A.2 (d) below).  
Please see tables in the following page. 
 
                                                 
305 As for the Colombian case, the Venezuelan amendments conducted in 1973 and 1990 were not 
considered for building the database because they did not modify any of the three criteria picked by this 
project to analyse democratic divergence. 
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Table A.2 (a) Constitutional reforms and amendments in Colombia, 1957-1986 - ‘transitional period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date it was 
sanctioned Purpose of the reform Summary 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0), non-
democratic 
(1) 
1957 Amendment by 
Plebiscite 
Legislative 
Decree No. 0247 
of October 4, 
1957 // 
Legislative 
Decree No. 0251 
of October 9, 
1957 
 
To establish political parity between liberals 
and conservatives political parties, by granting 
their equal representation in the Supreme Court 
and the Judiciary Council; in the legislative 
chambers, assemblies and city Councils; in 
ministries, governors, mayors, and other 
officials of the administration who do not 
belong to the administrative career. Moreover, 
to grant women political rights. 
The following articles of the 1886 Political 
Constitution (hereinafter PC) were modified: It 
is clarified that it was not possible to find an 
1886 Constitution published before 1957, 
reason why is not possible to identify exactly 
what the article previously stated. However, it 
is considered that the database can identify the 
change introduced in the Constitution, 
allowing analysing the effects on democracy. 
 
 
Power 
Distribution          
 
In order for this amendment to pass, the 
government used the people as a primary 
constituent, with the purpose of manifesting 
their will through a referendum on the proposed 
amendments. This allowed political parity, 
which was necessary at that historic moment in 
which a strong power struggle was lived 
through a dictatorship. It also allowed women’s 
political recognition as key actors in 
democracy, materializing their right to equality. 
Importantly, the alternation of liberals and 
conservatives in the presidency of the republic 
was constitutionally recognized only until the 
1959 amendment. 
0 
1959 Amendment 1 No. 1 of 
September 15, 
1959. 
To establish political parties’ alternation in the 
Presidency and state that whoever replaces the 
President, in accordance with articles 124 and 
125 shall be of the same political affiliation. 
Articles 124, 125 and 127 of the PC were 
modified. Article 124 gave Congress the power 
to appoint the replacement of the President in 
case of absolute or temporary absence; article 
125 established permanent and temporary 
vacancies; and article 127 stated that in case of 
President’s absence, the designated would 
assume the presidency until the end of the 
period. 
Power 
Distribution  
This amendment, introduced for the 1962-1974 
period, established that the presidency was to 
be exercised alternately by citizens who belong 
to the two traditional political parties, the 
conservative and liberal. This allowed the 
partisan coexistence, rejecting sectarianism, 
hegemony and electoral fraud. Compared with 
the dictatorship lived by the country, a period 
of alternation in power as the National Front 
was better. It is important to note that the 
amendment established that political parity 
would end in 1974, date from which it would go 
back to proportional party representation 
according to the electoral strength. 
0 
 
1959 Amendment 2 No. 4 of 
December 
24,1959 
To modify the composition of the Senate and 
House of Representatives, stating that each 
department shall elect at least 3 Senators and 3 
Representatives. 
Articles 93 and 99 of PC were modified, which 
referred to the composition of the Senate (Art. 
93) and the House of Representatives (Art. 97), 
stating that each department elected 2 senators 
and two 2 representatives. 
Electoral 
System  
 
This amendment allowed the electoral system 
to be more inclusive, by giving departments the 
opportunity to choose at least 3 members of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives. 
0 
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Table A.2 (a) Constitutional reforms and amendments in Colombia, 1957-1986 - ‘transitional period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date it was 
sanctioned Purpose of the reform Summary 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0), non-
democratic 
(1) 
1960 Amendment No. 1 of 
December 
10,1960 
To establish Congress’s control to the 
exceptional regimen of the State of Siege 
declared by the President 
 
Article 121 of the PC was modified, which 
gave the President the faculty to declare the 
exceptional regimen of State of Siege in case 
of foreign war or internal disturbance. This 
constitutional precept established that, once 
such a regime was declared, the legal authority 
to issue the necessary decrees to cope with the 
situation was activated, which could even 
suspend the laws that were incompatible with 
the State of Siege. 
Power 
Distribution   
This amendment indicated that the President is 
unable to exercise the faculties of article 121 
(State of Siege), without assembling the 
Congress in the same decree declaring 
disturbed the public order. Having convened 
the Congress, the absolute majority would 
decide whether the decrees issued by the 
government in exercise of the extraordinary 
faculties should be reviewed by the Supreme 
Court to decide on its constitutionality. This 
amendment was a counterweight to control the 
Executive. 
0 
1968 Amendment 1 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To increase the period of the Comptroller 
General of the Republic, from 2 to 4 years 
Article 59 of the PC was modified, which 
provided a 2 year period for the Comptroller 
General. 
 
 
Power 
Distribution 
By increasing the period of the Comptroller 
General by 2 years, it gave stability to this 
office and sufficient time to undertake and 
execute the necessary reforms. In addition, this 
amendment improves the institutional checks 
and balances to control the government. 
0 
1968 Amendment 2 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To set a restriction on Congress and a power to 
the government by stating that the norms 
relating to the annual budget, the Economic 
and Social Development Plan (ESDP), public 
debt, national debt, tariffs, customs, 
investments, holdings in national income etc., 
could only be dictate and reformed by 
government’s initiative. 
Article 79 of the PC was modified, according 
to which laws could be originated from any of 
the two chambers, having been proposed by 
their respective members or cabinet ministers. 
 
Policy 
Making 
This amendment creates an exception to article 
79, which states that the laws on fiscal and 
economic issues should only be initiative of the 
government, both for creation and reform. This 
allowed that the overall development plan 
prepared by the Executive was not frustrated by 
the will of the Legislature. While this 
amendment gives a very wide discretion to the 
President, Jacobo Perez (1997) considered that 
it was necessary since the government has a 
better capacity to perform that function in an 
orderly and responsible manner. 
0 
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Table A.2 (a) Constitutional reforms and amendments in Colombia, 1957-1986 - ‘transitional period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date it was 
sanctioned Purpose of the reform Summary 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0), non-
democratic 
(1) 
1968 Amendment 3 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To create a Permanent Special Commission 
(PSC) within Congress to control and monitor 
the ESDP’ implementation and government’s 
public expenditure. It also requires the 
executive to establish proposals on creating a 
new service or a particular investment in the 
ESDP, even though it judges the initiative as 
unacceptable if the PSC insists on the vote of 
two thirds of its members. 
Article 80 of the PC was modified, creating the 
Permanent Special Commission (PSC) within 
Congress, and regulating their composition, 
functions and procedure of the bills’ first 
debate. The previous content of article 80 
became part of article 72, concerning the 
chambers’ permanent commissions, and 79, 
which deals with the origin of the laws. 
Power 
Distribution 
By creating the PSC, and by requiring the 
Executive to introduce services or investments 
proposed by the PSC, a counterweight to the 
power previously granted to the President (of 
being the only one entitled to propose laws and 
reforms concerning the ESDP) is created, since 
the power control of the legislative branch on 
the executive branch is increased, which is 
necessary to maintain the balance of power. 
0 
1968 Amendment 4 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To allow the government to speed up the 
legislative process at his request, when 
insisting in the urgency of a bill. Such 
acceleration is given under joint consideration 
of the two permanent commissions of each 
chamber. 
Article 91 of the PC was modified, which 
previously did not have the possibility 
available to the government, to accelerate the 
legislative process when insisted on the 
urgency of a bill. 
Policy 
Making 
It allows the President to exert some pressure 
on Congress, in order to generate debate on a 
bill that it considers urgent, according to the 
context and government policies. 
0 
1968 Amendment 5 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To extend the period of the members of the 
House of Representatives from 2 to 4 years. 
Article 101 of the PC was modified, which 
established a 2-year period for members of the 
House of Representatives and the possibility of 
being re-elected indefinitely. 
Electoral 
System 
By increasing the period of the House of 
Representatives’ members by 2 years, stability 
and sufficient time to undertake their political 
programs was given to this position. 
Additionally, the amendment ensures more 
effective monitoring from the Legislative to the 
Executive since extending time in office 
improves the institutional checks and balances. 
0 
1968 Amendment 6 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To increase from 6 months to 1 year the period 
of ineligibility for senior national officials to be 
elected as members of the Congress after their 
functions have ceased. As well as to include the 
vice-ministers and the National Registrar of 
Civil State in the list of officials. 
 
Article 108 of the PC was modified, which 
devoted to the senior national officials, a 6 
months period of disability to be elected as 
members of Congress, after their functions 
have ceased. 
 
 
 
Power 
Distribution 
 
The separation of powers was strengthened by 
increasing the period of inability for senior 
officials of national government to be elected as 
Senators, and by including new positions within 
this disability. 
 
0 
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Table A.2 (a) Constitutional reforms and amendments in Colombia, 1957-1986 - ‘transitional period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date it was 
sanctioned Purpose of the reform Summary 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0), non-
democratic 
(1) 
1968 Amendment 7 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To establish that the governors, mayors, 
departmental comptrollers and the secretaries 
of the interior could not be elected as deputies 
until 1 year after their functions have ceased. 
Also, to increase the period of inability to fill 
the positions of senator and deputy from 3 to 6 
months, of any officer exercising civil, political 
or military jurisdiction (other than those 
already included in article 108), in the 
respective electoral district. 
 
Article 108 of the PC was modified, which did 
not state the inability referred to senior 
departmental and municipal positions. On the 
other hand, it established a 3-month inability 
period for officials exercising civil, political, 
and military jurisdiction. 
Power 
Distribution 
 
The separation of powers was strengthened by 
including senior departmental and municipal 
officials in the disqualification of 1 year to be 
elected as Congress members after their 
functions have ceased, and by increasing the 
inability period to all other officials exercising 
civil, political or military jurisdiction. 
 
0 
1968 Amendment 8 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To include vice-ministers, heads of 
administrative departments and the mayor of 
Bogota within the charges excluded from the 
prohibition made to the President to appoint as 
employees. 
 
Article 109 of the PC was modified, which 
established that the positions of ministers, 
governors, diplomatic agents and military 
chiefs were included within the positions 
exempted from the prohibition made to the 
President to provide employment. The article 
stated the ban for the President to provide 
employment to senators and representatives 
during the period of their duties (which 
remained with the amendment). 
Power 
Distribution.  
 
This amendment allowed the President to have 
a more stable work team in order to realize its 
government program and public policy. It 
contributed to a more efficient management and 
a reduction of patronage by the government and 
public administration, both at national, 
departmental and municipal levels. 
0 
 
1968 Amendment 9 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To establish a ban for senators and 
representatives, to conduct business (in their 
own or another name) related to government, 
departments, municipalities and official and 
decentralized entities. 
Article 110 of the PC was modified, which 
established the prohibition to make contracts 
with the government, only to senators and 
representatives  
Power 
Distribution  
 
By expanding the prohibitions or 
incompatibilities applicable to senators and 
representatives, we can affirm that the 
protection of the general interest in the 
legislative function is guaranteed, since 
preventing the realisation of it is hindered by 
the pursuit of purely private interests. 
 
0 
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Table A.2 (a) Constitutional reforms and amendments in Colombia, 1957-1986 - ‘transitional period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date it was 
sanctioned Purpose of the reform Summary 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0), non-
democratic 
(1) 
1968 Amendment 10 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To unify the President, senators and 
representatives elections. 
Article 114 of the PC was modified, which 
stated that only the President was elected by 
citizens’ direct vote and for a 4-year period in 
the manner determined by the law. This 
amendment ensures voter turnout. 
 
Electoral 
System 
This amendment is counterproductive for 
democracy because by introducing the 
attendance in the elections of the Executive 
with the Legislative, the electoral incentives of 
voters are affected since they end up favouring 
the election of senators that correspond to the 
same President´s political party. 
1 
1968 Amendment 11 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To establish the President’s obligation to 
present at the beginning of each legislature a 
detailed report on the ESDP’s implementation 
and the evolution of public expenditure. 
Article 118 of the PC was modified or added, 
in which the duties and powers of the President 
in relation to Congress were established. 
 
Policy 
Making  
 
The control function of the administration 
assigned to Congress is eased by establishing 
the President’s obligation to present a detailed 
report on the ESDP’s implementation and the 
evolution of public expenditure. Vertical 
accountability and checks and balances. 
0 
1968 Amendment 12 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To limit the government's power to declare a 
State of Siege by suspending only the rules that 
the Constitution provides for it, by only 
declaring it in case of war or internal 
commotion, and by stablishing the decrees’ 
automatic judicial control issued in exercise of 
such powers. 
Legislative Act No. 1 of 1960 was annulled, 
which reformed article 121 of the PC that 
provided as follows. Before, the President 
could suspend the Constitution as a whole 
under the exceptional regime of State of Siege, 
without limitation; the modalities of internal 
commotion and war were not considered; and 
there was no automatic control by the Supreme 
Court of Justice. Congress was the one who 
decided whether to send the decrees issued by 
the President under the State of Siege to the 
Supreme Court for constitutional review. 
Power 
Distribution  
The amendment limited President’s legislative 
faculties under the State of Siege, including in 
the Constitution itself the only rules that can be 
suspended under the exceptional regime. It also 
limited in which cases a State of Siege can 
proceed, in order to prevent an insignificant 
situation to be used as grounds for declaring it. 
It eliminated the political control on the 
President, by removing the power to Congress 
to decide the appropriateness of decrees’ 
judicial control, and the Immediate judicial 
control was introduced, strengthening control 
over the President; this consolidated a much 
stronger counterweight. 
0 
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Table A.2 (a) Constitutional reforms and amendments in Colombia, 1957-1986 - ‘transitional period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date it was 
sanctioned Purpose of the reform Summary 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0), non-
democratic 
(1) 
1968 Amendment 13 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To create a State of Emergency, which can only 
be declared by the President, upon events that 
disrupt or threaten the economic or social order 
or which constitute serious public calamities. 
In such exceptional regime, the President can 
issue decrees to resolve the crisis. Also, to 
create a double control: political and judicial in 
which Congress acquires the power to repeal, 
modify or add the specific subjects of the 
decrees issued by the President under the State 
of Emergency. On the other hand, the Supreme 
Court must decide on the decrees’ 
constitutionality. 
Article 122 of the PC was added. Power 
Distribution. 
Is it feasible to say that this amendment (by 
creating the State of Emergency and double 
control -legislative and judicial- to decrees 
issued under such exceptional regimen), 
although it gives new power to the President, 
has the necessary mechanisms to regulate the 
handling of that power, since it is not only 
controlled by Congress, but also by the 
Supreme Court. 
0 
1968 Amendment 14 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To establish that senior national officials can 
only be elected as President 1 year after their 
functions have ceased (the disability was 
increased from 6 months to 1 year) 
Article 129 of the PC was modified, under 
which senior government officials could not be 
elected as president but 6 months after their 
functions have ceased. The article also 
specified the ban on President’s re-election 
(which remained with the amendment). 
Power 
Distribution 
By increasing the inability period for senior 
officials of national power to be elected 
President, the separation of powers was 
strengthened. 
0 
1968 Amendment 15 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To ensure proportional party representation, 
when 2 or more individuals are voted for on 
popular elections or public corporation. The 
Hare method is introduced to distribute 
parliamentary seats. 
Article 172 of the PC was modified, which 
established the majority formula when 2 
individuals where voted for in popular 
elections or a public corporation. 
Electoral 
System 
By eliminating the majority formula (the most 
restrictive in terms of electoral competition) 
and adopting the semi-proportional 
representation formula (Hare’s system), we can 
affirm that the electoral system became more 
diverse and plural, and therefore more 
democratic. 
0 
1968 Amendment 16 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To establish that beginning with the 1970 
elections, the partisan parity principle in 
departmental assemblies and city councils 
established in the period of the National Front, 
is eliminated. 
By which the temporary paragraph was added 
article 172 of the PC, which established the 
procedure to elect members of popular 
elections and public corporations. 
Electoral 
System  
It contributed to implement the proportional 
representation of the parties. It assured the end 
of partisan parity established in the National 
Front, in order to allow genuine political 
pluralism, and consequently a greater 
representation of the various interests of the 
population. 
0 
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Table A.2 (a) Constitutional reforms and amendments in Colombia, 1957-1986 - ‘transitional period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date it was 
sanctioned Purpose of the reform Summary 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0), non-
democratic 
(1) 
1968 Amendment 17 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To establish the departments’ obligation to 
exercise administrative supervision over the 
municipalities, in order to plan the regional and 
local development and service provision. As 
well as to create the central government 
financing, establishing by law that a percentage 
of nation’s revenues must be distributed to the 
Department. 
Article 182 of the PC was modified, which did 
not state the department’s administrative 
supervision above the states nor did it establish 
the central government financing. What the 
article established was the departments’ 
independence for the administration of 
sectional matters. 
Policy 
Making 
The amendment strengthened regional and 
local development. At the same time, it 
improved quality of service delivery by 
establishing planning and coordination between 
the department and the municipalities, the first 
one exercising supervision over the second one. 
Consequently, the creation of fiscal support 
allowed the progress in terms of 
decentralisation, since establishing the transfer 
of nation’s tax resources to the departments, 
small municipalities and police stations, 
strengthens the ability to make policy decisions. 
0 
1968 Amendment 18 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To strengthen mayors, so they can attend 
municipality’s economic and social problems 
by stating that the government can only give 
mayors the initiative of the bills related to the 
municipality’s economic and social 
development plans and programs. 
Article 189 of the PC was added. Policy 
Making 
By leaving open the possibility that mayors can 
obtain the initiative of the bills related to the 
municipalities’ economic and social 
development plans and programs, a fertile 
ground is created for progress in 
decentralisation and local autonomy. 
0 
1968 Amendment 19 No. 1 of 
December 11, 
1968 
To authorize the city councils to create local 
administrative boards, delegating 
administrative functions to them. 
Article 196 of the PC was modified, which did 
not state the possibility of creating local 
administrative boards. It only concerned the 
composition of the city council and the 
councillors’ ineligibilities and 
incompatibilities. 
Power 
distribution 
This amendment allowed for greater citizen 
participation in the administration of local 
affairs, which strengthened participatory 
democracy. 
 
0 
1975 Amendment No. 1 of 
December 18, 
1975  
To allow the direct election of town councillors Article 171 of the PC was modified, which 
stated the direct election of councillors, 
deputies to departmental assemblies, 
representatives, senators, and President. 
Electoral 
System 
This amendment strengthened public 
participation, which was located in the small 
municipalities of the Republic, such as Arauca, 
Casanare, Putumayo, San Andrés and 
Providence. 
0 
1979 Amendment 1 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To regulate the operation of political parties 
and allowing state funding of party activity. 
Article 47 of the PC was modified, which 
stated that the popular political permanent 
boards were banned. 
Power 
distribution 
By introducing state funding of party activity, it 
sought to prevent private economic groups 
from seizing the parties through patronage. 
0 
 251 
Table A.2 (a) Constitutional reforms and amendments in Colombia, 1957-1986 - ‘transitional period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date it was 
sanctioned Purpose of the reform Summary 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0), non-
democratic 
(1) 
1979 Amendment 2 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To prohibit the immediate re-election of all 
members of the nation’s supervisory 
organisations. 
By which the following items were modified: 
article 59, which established a period of 4 years 
for the Comptroller General; article 142, which 
established a period of 4 years for the Attorney 
General's Office; article 146, which established 
a period of 6 years for the Prosecutor General's 
Office; article 148, which established a period 
of 8 years for the magistrates of the Superior 
Council of the Judiciary; article 149, which 
established periods of 8 years for the 
magistrates of the Supreme Court and the 
Judiciary Council; and article 190, which 
referred to the departmental comptrollers’ role 
as regulators of the departments and 
municipalities’ fiscal administration (The 
amendment includes a new clause prohibiting 
re-election). 
Power 
Distribution   
By prohibiting the immediate re-election of all 
members of the nation’s supervisory 
organisations, the amendment is consistent with 
the principle of power alternation. 
0 
1979 Amendment 3 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To prohibit immediate re-election of the 
members of the boards of chambers and 
permanent commissions. 
Article 72 of the PC was modified, which 
stated that each chamber will choose 
permanent commissions (to process the first 
bills’ debate) for not less than a 2-year period. 
Power 
Distribution 
This amendment allowed the parliamentary 
power alternation, specifically in the permanent 
commission. 0 
1979 Amendment 4 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To allow the Congress’s permanent 
commissions to conduct studies and hearings 
on national problems and develop bills or 
legislative acts as a result, it also makes 
recommendations to the government on 
matters in which it has the initiative. 
Article 72 of the PC was modified, including a 
new clause as mentioned before. This article 
regulated matters related to the chambers’ 
permanent commission in their composition, 
election, period and functions. 
Power 
Distribution  
This amendment led to a dialogue between the 
executive and legislative branches. 
 0 
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Table A.2 (a) Constitutional reforms and amendments in Colombia, 1957-1986 - ‘transitional period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date it was 
sanctioned Purpose of the reform Summary 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0), non-
democratic 
(1) 
1979 Amendment 5 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To set as new ground for removal from office 
of Congress, the missing on an annual 
legislative session without justification, to 8 
plenary sessions that draft legislative acts 
projects or bills. 
Article 75 of the PC was modified, which 
stated the infringement of rules of disabilities 
and incompatibilities, as the only ground for 
parliamentary disability. 
 
Power 
Distribution 
This amendment allowed attacking the 
parliamentary absenteeism, in order to punish 
with loss of investiture those congressmen who 
violate their duties. 
0 
1979 Amendment 6 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To introduce political control over the acts of 
the government and administration, requesting 
information to ascertain their actions; it also 
adds as function of Congress the possibility to 
summon and require ministers in order to make 
them observations. Finally, it allows Congress, 
in line with its role of political control, to give 
motions of censure about official acts, without 
damage to the motions of observation which 
paragraph 4 of article 103 refers to. 
Section 1 of article 76 of the PC was changed, 
which stated the faculties of Congress, within 
which political control is not found. Paragraph 
3 of article 78 was also modified, which forbid 
Congress to give motions of censure regarding 
official (government) acts. 
Power 
Distribution 
This amendment is a counterweight to the great 
powers of the Executive. This act of the 
government and the administration control was 
given by requesting information to ascertain 
their actions; and summon and requiring 
ministers, in order to make them observations 
(this is looked in depth below). 
0 
1979 Amendment 7 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To introduce in the chambers’ faculties two 
political control modalities: Request reports 
from the government and convoke ministers 
and make them objections. 
Two modalities of political control were added 
to article 103 of the PC, in which the powers of 
each chamber are established. 
Power 
Distribution 
This amendment, by allowing the Congress to 
request reports from the government as well as 
to convoke ministers and make them 
objections, strengthened the control power of 
the legislative branch over the executive 
branch. Checks and balances. 
0 
1979 Amendment 8 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To limit the authorisations Congress can give 
to government, by eliminating the possibility 
that Congress authorizes the government to 
"exercise other functions within the national 
orbit". 
Section 11 of article 76 of the PC was 
modified, which empowered the Congress to 
"grant authorisation to government to make 
contracts, negotiate loans, alienate national 
property and perform any other duties within 
the national orbit" 
Power 
Distribution 
This amendment took away power from the 
National Executive, by restricting the 
authorisations that it may ask to Congress. This 
because before the amendment, it had a very 
wide margin, as it could evoke any necessary 
function to perform within the national orbit. 
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Table A.2 (a) Constitutional reforms and amendments in Colombia, 1957-1986 - ‘transitional period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date it was 
sanctioned Purpose of the reform Summary 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0), non-
democratic 
(1) 
1979 Amendment 9 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To take away Congress’s faculty to temporarily 
cover the president with extraordinary powers, 
automatically, for necessity or public 
convenience. Also, to give Congress the 
faculty to repeal, modify, or add without 
matters of limitations the decrees issued in 
exercise of extraordinary powers. 
Paragraph 12 of article 76 was modified, which 
allowed at the initiative of the Congress itself, 
to temporarily give the President extraordinary 
powers. Through the amendment the option 
referred to in numeral 2 of the previous section 
was added. 
Power 
Distribution 
With this amendment Congress may grant such 
extraordinary powers only by government’s 
initiative, which allows a more functional and 
dialogic relationship between the executive and 
legislative branches. The control Congress can 
make on President’s extraordinary powers is 
very broad, as it is entitled to intervene as well 
consider, in legislation made by the President. 
0 
1979 Amendment 10 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To establish a ban for the Attorney General , 
the Prosecutor General, the legal 
representatives of decentralized entities, and 
members of the Superior Council of the 
Judiciary (in general, any public official) to be 
elected members of Congress for one year after 
their functions have ceased. 
Article 108 of the PC was modified, which 
already stated the same prohibition to other 
officials at the national, departmental and 
municipal levels. 
Power 
Distribution 
This amendment contributes to the separation 
of powers and is consistent with the principle of 
power alternation. 
0 
1979 Amendment 11 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To grant the President, in relation to the 
administration of justice, the faculty to 
promote the accusation against any public 
employee for violation of the PC or laws. 
Article 119 of the PC was modified (adding 
such faculty), in which the powers of the 
President in relation to the administration of 
justice were established. 
Power 
Distribution 
It allowed greater control of the President 
against the mismanagement of public 
employees, by enabling him to participate in 
their prosecution. 
0 
1979 Amendment 12 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To allow the common citizen to exercise public 
action of unconstitutionality against the 
decrees issued under the exceptional regimen 
of State of Siege and State of Emergency. 
Articles 121 and 122 of the PC were modified, 
in which there only was established the 
requirement for the government to send to the 
Supreme Court of Justice the legislative 
decrees issued under the exceptional regimen 
of State of Siege and State of Emergency. 
Power 
Distribution 
This amendment gave citizens the power to 
exercise direct control on the President, by 
being able to exercise public action of 
unconstitutionality on decrees issued under the 
State of Siege and State of Emergency. 
0 
1979 Amendment 13 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To establish that no member of Congress may 
be arrested or deprived of liberty for any 
reason, unless judicial conviction of first 
instance is rendered against it. 
Article 107 of the PC was changed, according 
to which any member of Congress could be 
apprehended and called at criminal trial 
without permission from the chamber to which 
it belonged. 
Power 
Distribution 
This amendment allows that in case of crime, a 
congressman can be sent directly to the 
competent authorities and without Senate’s 
permission to be judged. This amendment 
strengthens the political control made to 
members of Congress by boosting the 
immunity they had for flagrant offenses. 
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Table A.2 (a) Constitutional reforms and amendments in Colombia, 1957-1986 - ‘transitional period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date it was 
sanctioned Purpose of the reform Summary 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0), non-
democratic 
(1) 
1979 Amendment 14 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To set for all congressmen the duty to inform 
the board of the respective corporation if 
within 2 years prior to their election they lent 
paid services to guilds or private law persons 
on whose interest or businesses, which directly 
affect matters under Congressional study. Once 
Congressman reports it, it is up to the board of 
the chamber to determine whether it should 
refrain from participating in the proceedings 
and voting on the matter. 
Article 105 of the PC was added. Power 
Distribution 
This amendment allowed that the legislative 
function did not focus on the promotion and 
protection of private interests. This protected 
public interest, which should form the core of 
the parliamentary function. It attacked the 
legislative corruption. 
0 
1979 Amendment 15 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To create the Superior Council of the Judiciary, 
composed by 9 magistrates who are elected by 
the system of total co-optation (elected by the 
same corporation intervention of another 
agency). The most important duties are 
monitoring and controlling the judicial 
officials, intervene in the election of 
magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice 
and the Judiciary Council, and impose 
sanctions to judicial officials. 
Article 148 of the PC was modified, which 
regulates only the time and mode of election of 
the Supreme Court of Justice. The amendment 
formally includes in the article the existence of 
the Superior Council of the Judiciary. 
Power 
Distribution 
This amendment created a supervisory figure 
for the judicial branch, which was much needed 
as judges have great power within the 
democratic constitutional system. 
0 
1979 Amendment 16 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To remove the system of total co-optation, and 
instead establish a system of semi-co-optation 
for the election of members of the Judiciary 
Council and the Supreme Court of Justice, by 
determining that they would be elected by the 
respective corporations, from lists prepared by 
the Superior Council of the Judiciary. Also, to 
end the lifelong charges of magistrates by 
establishing that they should retire from office 
when reaching the age of mandatory 
retirement, and that their term would be 8 years 
long. 
Article 149 of the PC was modified, which 
established a full co-option system, by which 
the new magistrates were appointed by the 
current magistrates. At the same time, it 
established lifelong charges for magistrates. 
Power 
Distribution  
This amendment ensured that the high courts 
continued to have the necessary autonomy to 
make the final decision of who would be the 
new magistrates. At the same time, it allowed 
the election of magistrates to be more 
transparent, by letting the Superior Council of 
the Judiciary postulate the list of magistrates to 
choose from. Finally, it guaranteed the 
alternation in power principle. 
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Table A.2 (a) Constitutional reforms and amendments in Colombia, 1957-1986 - ‘transitional period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date it was 
sanctioned Purpose of the reform Summary 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0), non-
democratic 
(1) 
1979 Amendment 17 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 To create the Attorney General’s Office, stating that the Attorney General would be 
appointed by the Supreme Court of Justice 
based on a list sent by the President of the 
Republic (which should have at least 5 names 
belonging to different political parties), for a 
period of 6 years. The most important functions 
of the Attorney General are: to advance the 
investigation of crimes, to accuse against the 
Supreme Court the officials whose judgment 
corresponds to that corporation, and to monitor 
the enforcement of sentences handed down by 
the judges. 
Article 146 of the PC was modified, which 
regulated the composition and mode of election 
of the Judiciary Council’s Prosecutor, which 
disappears with the figure of the Attorney 
General of the nation. 
Power 
Distribution  
This amendment created a key organism such 
as the Office of the Attorney General, which 
has a very strong control role within the State, 
as is the prosecution of crime. 
0 
1979 Amendment 18 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To proclaim the independence of the Attorney 
General of the nation and its agents, by 
eliminating the subordination of this in relation 
to the government. The most important new 
features that obtained under this independence 
are: receive and decide on complaints obtained 
about human rights violation incurred by 
public employees or officials; monitor the 
official conduct of public employees and 
officials, and exercise disciplinary power over 
them; and promote before the competent 
authority the investigation of officials’ acts 
which may constitute criminal offenses. 
Articles 142, 143 and 145 of the PC were 
modified. Article 142 stipulated that the public 
ministry was exercised under the supreme 
direction of the government; article 143 
established the general functions of the Public 
Ministry; and article 145 stated the Attorney 
General’s special functions, within which the 
aforementioned were not included, due to the 
Inspector General’s lack of autonomy. 
Power 
Distribution 
By granting autonomy, this amendment 
strengthened the Attorney General’s control 
function regarding public administration, 
becoming a guarantor for the proper execution 
of public functions. System of checks and 
balances. 0 
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Table A.2 (a) Constitutional reforms and amendments in Colombia, 1957-1986 - ‘transitional period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date it was 
sanctioned Purpose of the reform Summary 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0), non-
democratic 
(1) 
1979 Amendment 19 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To extend the control power of the Supreme 
Court of Justice so that it can definitely decide 
on the unconstitutionality claims brought 
against legislative acts because of procedural 
defects. Also, to take away the Supreme 
Court’s power to control the national 
government decrees issued by congressional 
authorisation to make contracts, negotiate 
loans and alienate national assets, when they 
had been accused of unconstitutionality. 
Article 214 of the PC was modified (adding the 
faculty mentioned above), in which all the 
powers of the Supreme Court of Justice 
regarding the custody of the Constitution are 
established. Paragraph 2 of the same article is 
changed, as the power mentioned in the 
previous section is eliminated, but the 
following powers remain: monitoring 
government decrees issued under the 
extraordinary powers acquired by the President 
in case of necessity or public convenience; and 
controlling the ESDP, when after 100 days it 
had not been approved by the legislature. 
 
Power 
Distribution 
It strengthened the system of checks and 
balances, by creating a better institutional 
balance. Given the number of legislative acts 
issued to amend the Constitution, it was 
necessary that they were known by the supreme 
constitutional authority, under claims of 
unconstitutionality. Importantly, control would 
have been more complete if it had been allowed 
to control these activities against their material 
or background vices. 
0 
1979 Amendment 20 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To establish the autonomous jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court 
of Justice, formed by 8 magistrates to rule 
definitively on the unconstitutionality 
objections that the government makes to the 
bills, also on claims brought against laws and 
decrees of the National government. Also, to 
grant full autonomous authority to the Supreme 
Court of Justice to definitively rule on the 
unconstitutionality of legislative acts, on 
procedural defects. 
Article 214 of the PC was modified (adding the 
faculty referred to above), in which all the 
faculties of the Supreme Court of Justice 
regarding the custody of the Constitution are 
established. 
Power 
Distribution 
The amendment strengthened the constitutional 
control, in order to prevent that the 
Government, in its large sphere of power, was 
unaware of the Constitution (supreme law and 
most important political institution within the 
institutional framework). Checks and balances. 
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Table A.2 (a) Constitutional reforms and amendments in Colombia, 1957-1986 - ‘transitional period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date it was 
sanctioned Purpose of the reform Summary 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0), non-
democratic 
(1) 
1979 Amendment 21 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To establish the requirement, regarding 
budgetary matters and public spending, that the 
budget allocations for regional development 
can only be approved after a public debate on 
the budget committees and plenary sessions. 
As well as to Prohibit that regional 
contributions are made for the benefit of 
private entities. Also, to determine that the total 
budget approved for such contributions should 
be distributed equally among departments, and 
in proportional amount to the national 
territories. 
Article 207 of the PC was modified, which 
only provided the impossibility to make any 
public expenditure without having been 
previously dictated by Congress or by the 
departmental assemblies. At the same time, it 
prohibited credits transfer to a subject not 
covered in the respective budget. 
Policy 
Making 
By allowing the community to participate 
through a public debate regarding regional 
budget allocations, it made the procedure more 
democratic for making public policy decisions. 
It also protected the regional patrimony, by 
prohibiting regional contributions made for the 
benefit of private entities, which was decisive 
in the pursuit of general interest. 
Simultaneously, it became an anti-corruption 
mechanism; finally, it established equity and 
equality conditions in the distribution of 
regional contributions. 
0 
1979 Amendment 22 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To establish that the ESDP must be presented 
by the government and approved by Congress, 
and that the Plan’s law will have supremacy 
over those issued to ensure achievement. Also, 
to establish that any modification involving an 
economic burden for the state or that varies the 
inventory of its resources will require prior 
favourable concept of planning agencies. As 
well as to set that during the first 100 days of 
his constitutional term, the government will 
submit to Congress a bill with the changes it 
considers requires the general part of the plan. 
Last, to establish that if the plan is not approved 
by Congress within 100 days following 
ordinary or extraordinary sessions from its 
presentation, the government may implement 
projects by decrees with the force of law. 
Article 80 of the PC was completely modified, 
in which the general part regarding national 
and regional policies did not exist and such 
supremacy was not stated. Also, the 
requirement of the concept was not established 
and the government had to make adjustments 
to the ESDP, when the permanent commission 
proposed a particular investment or the 
creation of a new service. Likewise, the 
government could enforce projects by decrees 
with the force of law, if the permanent 
commission did not approve the respective 
plan during the five months it had to decide. 
Besides, the permanent commission had the 
same functions. 
Policy 
Making 
The general policies on economic and social 
planning, were fundamental to overcome a 
deficiency of this system according to the 
author Margarita Varon (2009): she focused 
mostly on solving specific problems and 
specific investment programs "without wide 
coverage and intervention pretentions to evolve 
towards establishing government priorities 
under the macroeconomic context" (ibid.:14). 
This ensured the ESDP’s effectiveness and it 
allowed the planning system to be more 
organized and coordinated. It strengthened the 
relationship between the Executive and the 
Legislature and the President’s prerogative to 
issue projects through decrees with the force of 
law, as the time that Congress has the power to 
approve them was decreased. 
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Table A.2 (a) Constitutional reforms and amendments in Colombia, 1957-1986 - ‘transitional period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date it was 
sanctioned Purpose of the reform Summary 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0), non-
democratic 
(1) 
1979 Amendment 23 No. 1 of 
December 4, 1979 
To grant legislative faculties to Congress lost 
to the 1968 amendment, by stating that the laws 
that determine the services in charge of the 
nation and territorial entities, as well as the 
ones determining the central government 
financing would not follow the proceedings on 
the laws and economic programs, but would 
have the normal procedure of the other laws. 
For this reason the Legislative reacquired the 
power to propose the creation or modification 
of laws relating to public spending. 
The final paragraph of article 79 of the PC was 
annulled, which stated that the laws relating to 
services provided by the nation and territorial 
entities, as well as the ones determining the 
central government financing, would be 
processed according to the rules of article 80 of 
the PC, which established the method of 
creating the laws concerning the ESDP. It is 
important to remember that the laws that 
followed such proceedings could only be 
created or modified by government’s initiative. 
Policy 
Making 
  
The amendment rebalanced the powers of the 
Legislature against the execution and planning 
of public spending; it allowed a more active and 
less dependent Congress intervention regarding 
the Executive. 0 
1986 Amendment No. 1 of January 
9, 1986 
To allow the popular election of mayors for a 
period of 2 years, to let popular consultations 
to decide matters that interest the residents of 
the municipality, and to eliminate the 
governors’ faculty to revoke mayors’ actions. 
The following articles of the PC were 
modified: article 171, which stated that citizens 
will directly elect the President, senators, 
deputies and small municipalities’ councillors 
(the amendment included mayors); and article 
201 which established that the mayor exercised 
governor´s agent functions and that it would be 
the head of the municipal administration. 
Electoral 
System 
This amendment strengthened democracy since 
it allowed the local administrative 
decentralisation through an electoral reform. At 
the same time, it granted genuine autonomy to 
the mayors by taking away their quality of 
subordinates of the Governor. It emphasized 
democratic principles, as mayors became the 
representatives of the collective aspirations, 
and it strengthened participatory democracy by 
allowing citizens to elect mayors by popular 
vote. 
0 
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Table A.2 (b) - Constitutional reforms and amendments in Colombia, 1991-2009  - ‘divergence period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date it was 
sanctioned Purpose of the reform Summary 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0)/ Non-
democratic 
(1) 
1991 1991 
Constitutional 
Reform 1 
Political 
Constitution of 
1991 
With the 1991 Constitution, it was intended to 
overcome excessive Presidentialism and 
exclusive bipartisanship. Also, it sought to 
amend the Political Constitution of Colombia, 
annulling the 1886 PC and creating the new 
1991 PC. This database will only take into 
consideration changes regarding the three 
typologies in which this research focuses on: 
A) Power Distribution, B) Electoral System 
and C) Policy making. 
The state is organised based on the principle of 
separation of powers and mutual control 
between the branches of government, in order 
to avoid the concentration of power in the 
hands of a single branch. Article 190: 
Presidential term of 4 years without re-
election; article 150: The President can only be 
vested with extraordinary powers to issue 
statutory rules when necessary or when the 
public requires it, with the approval of the 
absolute majority of the members of both 
chambers. The Legislature is given the power 
to adopt a motion of censure and public 
hearings on management control of ministers. 
Regarding the judiciary, the Constitutional 
Court (Art. 241) was created, the election and 
appointment mechanisms of high courts 
magistrates were improved, and it was made 
sure that their constitutional periods, did not 
coincide with those of the president. The 
president loses exclusivity over the nomination 
of judges to the court, which he now shares 
with other organisations. In relation to the 
oversight bodies, it was established that its 
function was effective and independent of the 
executive power (Arts. 257-284). The office of 
the Ombudsman is created. 
Power 
Distribution  
The strengthening of democracy is evidenced 
by establishing the conditions for the 
presidential system to operate without 
concentration of power by guarantying the 
separation of powers. This because the 
presidential re-election is prohibited, the 
extraordinary powers of the President which are 
subject to parliamentary approval are limited, 
and the President’s appointing power is 
restricted. Additionally, the necessary 
conditions to establish the independence of the 
judiciary are given with the creation of the 
Constitutional Court and with the election and 
appointment mechanisms of magistrates, where 
the President lost exclusivity on the nomination 
of magistrates to the court, which he now shares 
with other organisations. The Comptroller and 
the Public Ministry, by acquiring autonomy, 
can exercise their duties independently, without 
government’s interference. 
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Table A.2 (b) - Constitutional reforms and amendments in Colombia, 1991-2009  - ‘divergence period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date it was 
sanctioned Purpose of the reform Summary 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0)/ Non-
democratic 
(1) 
1991 1991 
Constitutional 
Reform 2 
Political 
Constitution of 
1991 
With the 1991 Constitution, it was intended to 
overcome excessive Presidentialism and 
exclusive bipartisanship. Also, it sought to 
amend the Political Constitution of Colombia, 
annulling the 1886 PC and creating the new 
1991 PC. This database will only take into 
consideration changes regarding the three 
typologies in which this research focuses on: 
A) Power Distribution, B) Electoral System 
and C) Policy making. 
Article 108 allowed political and social 
organisations to obtain legal status to compete 
electorally by collecting 50,000 signatures, the 
same number of votes or effective 
representation in Congress. Article 35 
authorised the National Electoral Council 
(NEC) to automatically grant legal status to 
political parties and movements represented in 
the National Constituent Assembly, and 
allowed the parties and movements with legal 
status to register candidates without any 
additional requirement. Expands and 
strengthens the channels of citizen 
representation, incorporating four 
constituencies for the election of Congress: a 
national constituency for Senate, 32 
departmental constituencies for the Assembly, 
plus 3 special constituencies for black 
communities, indigenous communities and 
citizens living abroad. Participation 
mechanisms expand and besides the universal 
vote, the plebiscite, referendum, popular 
consultation, open councils, the legislative 
initiative and the recall of the mandate are 
included. 
Electoral 
System 
It incorporated elements that allowed different 
political and social organisations to obtain legal 
status in a simpler way, and it strengthened the 
democratic regime through the recognition of 
ethnic minorities, strengthening new direct 
elections and the formation of more 
competitive constituencies. However, the 
electoral system did not suffer many changes 
with the new constitution, as it did not change 
the electoral rule that was used with the 1886 
PC for converting votes into seats. That is, the 
Hare quota formula was maintained during this 
period. Thereby it sought that each sector 
managed to see their interests reflected in the 
legislature. 
0 
1991 1991 
Constitutional 
Reform 3 
Political 
Constitution of 
1991 
With the 1991 Constitution, it was intended to 
overcome excessive Presidentialism and 
exclusive bipartisanship. Also, it sought to 
amend the Political Constitution of Colombia, 
annulling the 1886 PC and creating the new 
1991 PC. This database will only take into 
consideration changes regarding the three 
typologies in which this research focuses on: 
A) Power Distribution, B) Electoral System 
and C) Policy making. 
The following relation was maintained with the 
1886 PC:. Article 341: The hierarchical status 
of the law and the power of the Executive to 
issue the National Plan of Development (NPD) 
and public investment, by statutory decree, if 
Congress does not approve it within 3 months 
after being presented.  Article 341: The 
restrictions on the legislator to modify the bill 
submitted by the Executive, as he can only do 
it without changing the economic balance. 
Policy 
Making 
Democracy was strengthened by involving 
citizens in the discussion of the development 
plan. Functional relationships between the 
Judiciary and the executive and legislative 
branches are created and it was intended to 
promote greater autonomy and independence of 
the Central Bank, and reduce the influence of 
the executive branch that predominated in the 
1886 PC about the macroeconomic system. 
This made sure that the government did not 
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Article 342: The requirement to issue an 
organic law on planning. New articles were 
added to improve policy making. Article: 342 
Citizen Participation in the discussion of the 
plan; article 343: The creation of performance 
evaluation systems; article 341: the Judiciary 
was included in the plan elaboration process. It 
was established that the dispositions of the 
NPD are binding and do not require any other 
legal provision for implementation, and that 
the plans’ general part can be executed by the 
Executive despite the legislature’s 
disagreement. 
have election powers to elect the members of 
the Board during its tenure, anticipating a 
constitutional period of 4 years. 
1993 Amendment 1 No. 2 of 
November 23, 
1993 
To allow the head of the administration of the 
territorial entity to issue a decree on the 
development plan (either departmental, district 
or municipal), in case such public territorial 
corporation has not approved and issued the 
plan. 
Transitory article 60 of the PC was added, 
which stated that the departmental, district and 
municipal development plans will be approved 
by the respective public territorial corporation 
(once submitted by the head of administration 
of the territorial entity). 
Power 
Distribution 
This amendment gives exceptional power to the 
head of territorial administration, by allowing it 
to issue the development plan proposed by it. 
This allowed that the development of territorial 
entities does not obstruct the refusal of the 
public corporations to approve and issue the 
respective plan. 
0 
1993 Amendment 2 No. 3 of 
December 15, 
1993 
To allow that permanent or temporary absences 
of members of the public corporations are 
filled by candidates in order of registration, 
successively and descending, that correspond 
to the same electoral list. 
Article 134 of the PC was modified, which 
provided only that the absolute absences would 
be filled by unelected candidates in the order of 
registration in the corresponding list. 
Electoral 
System  
This amendment implemented a mechanism to 
avoid empty seats in case one of the members 
popularly elected at the respective public 
corporation were to miss temporarily for any 
reason. 
0 
1995 Amendment No. 1 of 
December 1, 1995 
To define the municipalities’ general system of 
participation and their budgetary annual 
increase, according to the average of the 
current revenue of the nation. Also, to allow the 
municipality to freely allocate certain 
percentage in investment, and to require the 
municipal authorities to be accountable for its 
Article 357 of the CP was added, which stated 
that the municipalities would participate in the 
nation’s current income, and that the 
government’s initiative law would determine 
the minimum participation percentage and 
would define the priority areas for social 
investment. It is noteworthy that it was 
established in the paragraph that municipalities 
Policy 
Making   
This amendment strengthened the 
municipalities’ capacity to implement their 
policies. However, the government continued 
to have an important role in determining those 
municipalities’ investments, which reflects the 
unitary state as a state organisation. By 
requiring municipal authorities to present to 
control and evaluation agencies a detailed 
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administration to the oversight bodies, or 
criminal penalty. 
could freely allocate certain percentages for 
investment, according to the category formerly 
occupied. The above percentages ranged from 
15% to 30%. The municipal authorities were 
asked for accountability against control 
agencies, in case the transparent and efficient 
use of resources cannot be proved. 
management report which showed the efficient 
and correct use of resources, it allowed that the 
freedom acquired to execute public policies, 
were not exercised regardless of the priority 
areas for investment. Such accountability is 
fundamental in any democratic state. 
1996 Amendment 1 No. 1 of January 
15, 1996 
To establish administrative autonomy and an 
own budget to the departmental assembly 
(administrative corporation of popular 
election), as well as to grant deputies with the 
quality of public servants. 
Article 299 of the PC was modified, which 
only established the popular election of the 
members of the departmental assembly, the 
requirement that the regime of disabilities and 
incompatibilities was not be less stringent than 
one for Congress, and the requirements to be 
elected deputy. 
Power 
Distribution  
This amendment granted autonomy to the 
departmental assemblies and therefore enabled 
decentralisation. It also allowed greater 
Deputies’ control by making them public 
servants; they are subject to different types of 
special responsibilities such as: tax, criminal, 
disciplinary and civil; if their actions do not 
conform to the laws and/or regulations. 
0 
1996 Amendment 2 No. 1 of January 
15, 1996 
To grant the power to the departmental 
assemblies to request reports on the exercise of 
their functions to the department’s Comptroller 
General, cabinet secretaries, heads of 
administrative departments and departmental 
decentralized institutes’ directors. 
Article 300 of the PC was modified, adding the 
new faculty mentioned above, in a new 
paragraph. Such article establishes the 
functions and powers of the departmental 
assemblies. 
Power 
Distribution 
This amendment established a political control 
by the departmental assemblies, by granting the 
authority to request management reports to 
oversight bodies and local government 
employees.  
0 
2001 Amendment 1 No. 1 of July 30, 
2001 
To create the General Participation System of 
departments, districts, and municipalities, in 
order to attend the services in charge of these 
and provide the resources to adequately finance 
its provision. Also, to allow the law to point out 
cases in which Nation may attend the 
expenses’ financing of services within the 
departments, districts and municipalities’ 
responsibility. Finally, to prohibit the powers’ 
decentralisation without prior allocation of 
sufficient fiscal resources to address them. 
Article 356 of the PC was modified, which 
only stated that the law devised by the 
government would set the services in charge of 
the nation and territorial entities, as well as the 
central government financing (percentage of 
the current revenue of the nation which would 
be given to departments and districts). 
Policy 
Making  
This amendment allowed the departments, 
districts and municipalities to have a more 
effective control over the management of their 
care interests. It strengthened the capacity of 
developing public policies. Administrative 
autonomy. It also strengthened the 
effectiveness and functionality of the powers 
decentralisation, since it makes no sense to 
distribute power without the corresponding 
financial support to realize public policy 
projects. 
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2001 Amendment 2 No. 2 of 
December 27, 
2001 
To recognise jurisdiction to the International 
Criminal Court, according to the established by 
the Rome Statute: facing charges of genocide; 
war crimes; and crime of aggression. 
Article 93 of the PC was modified, which only 
stated that International treaties ratified by 
Congress, which recognize human rights and 
prohibit their limitation in states of emergency, 
have priority in the internal order. It also 
established the rights and obligations 
recognized in the PC must be interpreted in 
accordance with international human rights 
treaties ratified by Colombia. 
Power 
Distribution  
The amendment made to the Colombian state to 
the forefront of public international law, by 
giving its jurisdiction to an international court 
(giving up some of its sovereignty) for the most 
serious crimes of international concern. Which 
at that time was an advanced decision crossing 
the democratic nations of the world. 
0 
2002 Amendment 1 No. 2 of August 
6, 2002  
To modify the terms for governors, deputies, 
mayors, town councillors and councilman. It 
went from 3 to 4 years.  
The following articles of the PC are modified: 
30, which established the duties of the 
governor and a its 3-year period; 209, which 
established the role of departmental 
assemblies, the requirements to be elected 
deputies and its 3-year period; 314, which 
established the role of the mayor and its 3-year 
period; 312, which established the 3-year 
period for the city council; and 323, which 
established the district councils’ composition 
form and a 3-year period for councilman. 
Electoral 
System 
By increasing by 1 year the mayors’ term, that 
office was given stability and enough time to 
undertake and implement public policies. 
0 
2002 Amendment 2 No. 3 of 
December 19, 
2002 
To establish the adversarial system of criminal 
justice by providing that the Attorney General's 
Office (AGO) is required to advance the 
exercise of criminal action and conduct an 
investigation of the facts which are 
characteristics of a crime that comes to their 
attention. In turn, establish the discretionary 
principle, according to which the Prosecutor’s 
office has the right to initiate, suspend or 
terminate the criminal proceeding according to 
criminal justice policies. Also, by Removing 
the AGO’s power to adopt security measures to 
ensure the appearance of the alleged criminal 
law offenders, and instead grant such power to 
a criminal judge. Finally, by setting two judges 
Article 250 of the PC was modified, which 
established that the Prosecutor’s Office would 
advance the investigation and accuse the 
alleged criminal law offenders, and ensure 
their appearance, by adopting assurance 
measures (judicial functions,) and taking 
action to restore rights and compensate the 
damaged caused by the crime. 
Power 
distribution 
This amendment took place within a context in 
which Colombians had completely lost 
confidence in the judicial system. It 
strengthened the criminal system, because the 
Prosecutor lost his judicial functions, and 
acquired only the function of conducting the 
investigation and criminal prosecution, 
collecting all evidence and bringing it to the 
judge. The established discretionary principle 
was from the Continental European system, 
which requires the judge’s legality control in 
order to be materialized, which provides 
guarantees, as it prevents the Prosecutor from 
overflowing in its action and stops him from 
opening a criminal investigation without valid 
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in the new system: the supervisory judge and 
the trial judge. The supervisory judge cannot be 
a trial judge. 
reason. Also, The Prosecutor’s loss of judicial 
function protects the democratic system, since 
it is necessary that the agency which 
investigates and accuses is not the same to 
decide the alleged criminal law offender’s legal 
status (for example, freedom). Finally, the 
supervisory judge is the one to decide 
everything concerning restriction of 
fundamental rights. The trial judge is the one 
who delivers sentence. 
2003 Amendment 1 No. 1 of July 3, 
2003 
To prohibit citizens to simultaneously belong 
to more than one party or political movement 
with legal status. Likewise, to allow political 
parties to have popular or internal consultations 
that matches or not with the public 
corporations elections, in order to make their 
own decisions or choose their candidates. 
Article 107 of the PC was modified, which 
only guaranteed citizens their right to form and 
develop political parties and political 
movements and the freedom to join them. A 
transitional paragraph is added to article 108 of 
the PC. 
Electoral 
System  
The amendment forbade the double political 
militancy, and allowed greater population 
participation in relation to the political parties 
that reflect their interests and political, 
economic, cultural and social preferences. By 
allowing citizens to intervene in the election of 
their candidates, it strengthened representative 
democracy even more. 
0 
2003 Amendment 2 No. 1 of July 3, 
2003 
An electoral threshold of 2% was established 
as a requirement to access the seats distribution 
by political parties, political movements and 
significant groups. It seeks to allow parties and 
political movements to regulate their internal 
disciplinary system through statutes; to 
establish that "members of public corporations 
chosen by the same party or political 
movement, act on them as caucus" in 
accordance with the law, and the decisions 
taken democratically; and to allow the internal 
statutes of parties and political movements, to 
establish penalties for non-compliance with the 
directives by the members of the caucus. These 
penalties can see the expulsion and loss of 
Article 108 of the PC was modified, which 
established that as a requirement to access to 
the seats distribution, parties and political 
movements must obtain at least 150,000 
signatures or had obtained in the previous 
election the same number of votes or achieved 
Congress representation. 
Electoral 
System  
This reduced the prevailing personalism in the 
Colombian political party system, allowed a 
better political party internal management, 
promotes political party cohesion and prevents 
intra-party competition, and enables political 
parties’ discipline in case a parliamentary does 
not act as a caucus. 0 
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voting rights of: congressman, deputies, and 
councilmen; for the remainder of the period for 
which it was elected for. 
2003 Amendment 3 No. 1 of July 3, 
2003 
To include the significant groups of citizens as 
major political agents, in addition to political 
movements and parties; to establish the state 
funding of political parties and political 
movements, through the replacement by votes 
cast system; to establish that the campaigns to 
elect the President will have access to a 
maximum of radio and television advertising 
space, paid for by the state; and to establish the 
loss of investiture or position, for those who 
violate the maximum ceilings for campaign 
financing. 
Article 109 of the PC was modified, which 
stated that the state would contribute to the 
funding of electoral campaigns for political 
movements and parties with legal status. 
Electoral 
System 
It strengthened participatory democracy by 
recognizing the citizens’ significant groups as 
key political actors in the political game, and 
seeks to prevent economic groups from seizing 
parties by allowing political parties’ state 
funding. Also, setting the broadcasting of 
presidential election campaigns in the media 
pretends to extend participatory democracy for 
citizens to know the various proposals and have 
complete judgment to decide who to vote for. 
Finally, it is a mechanism to control and punish 
those party members who violate the financing 
ceilings. 
0 
2003 Amendment 4 No. 1 of July 3, 
2003 
To formally include the term opposition to 
refer to political parties and movements which 
seek to pursue a critical role against the 
government as well as plan and develop 
political alternatives. Also, to formally 
establish the constitutional and legal restriction 
on the rights of access to information and 
official documents, hold by opponents. Finally, 
to introduce the response in the media a general 
law, without restricting it to specific cases. 
Article 112 of the PC was modified, which 
instead of referring to the opposition spoke of 
the possibility of freely exercise the critical 
role by the parties and movements that do not 
participate in government. In turn, this article 
did not establish that the rights of access to 
information and legal documentation had legal 
restrictions. The response was established only 
for these cases: serious and flagrant 
misrepresentations or uttered public attacks by 
senior officials, and participation in the 
electoral organisations. 
Electoral 
System  
It strengthened democracy by protecting 
constitutionally the opposition (political 
minority), first by giving recognition (which 
implied its valuation in the new Rule of Law as 
a fundamental political actor), and second, it 
empowered the opponent by allowing it to reply 
through the media at the time it deems 
appropriate. It also protects the opposition 
parties’ confidentiality. 
0 
2003 Amendment 5 No. 1 of July 3, 
2003 
To establish conciliatory commissions and its 
composition by the same number of senators 
and representatives. So when they gather 
together, they try to reconcile the texts, and if 
is not possible, define it by a majority. Also, to 
Article 161 of the PC was modified, which in 
the event of discrepancies before a bill between 
the two chambers, it stated the formation of 
accidental commissions to jointly draft the text 
to be submitted for final decision at a plenary 
session of each chamber. 
Policy 
Making  
By creating conciliatory commissions, made up 
in equal proportion of representatives and 
senators, this amendment strengthened the 
dialogue between the two chambers, and their 
functional relationship, in order to avoid 
discrepancies to frustrate public policy projects 
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establish that the bill be deemed denied if the 
difference persists in a second debate. 
when writing laws. Consequently, it was a 
mechanism to improve the legislative function. 
It seeks to avoid an unnecessary legislative 
burnout. 
2003 Amendment 6 No. 1 of July 3, 
2003 
To establish as a state´s duty to make sure 
citizens exercise the right to vote secretly and 
without any coercion, and to include political 
movements and parties in the demand 
addressed to the electoral organisation, to 
provide voters equally the instruments in which 
the different movements, parties and 
candidates should appear clearly identified and 
under equal conditions. Also, to establish the 
requirement to repeat only once the elections 
(of public corporations’ members, governors, 
mayors and president), when the blank ballots 
constitute an absolute majority in relation to 
the valid votes. If the above occurs: prevent the 
same candidates from repeating in the single 
elections. Therefore, establish that for the 
public corporations elections, the lists that have 
not reached the threshold may not be 
introduced in the new elections. Likewise, it 
seeks to allow the implementation of electronic 
voting to achieve agility and transparency in 
the vote. 
Article 258 of the PC was modified, which 
provided only that the vote was a right and a 
civic duty, and also established the conditions 
for a transparent and secret vote. 
Electoral 
System  
This amendment strengthened democracy by 
protecting the right to vote, which must be 
completely free. This intended that popular 
elections happened within a transparency 
framework, to allow real political competition. 
It allowed political competition under equal 
conditions, and gave great value to the blank 
vote by preventing candidates who do not 
satisfactorily represent the needs and priorities 
of the citizenry as a whole, from being 
popularly elected, showing the above, through 
a blank majority vote. This assessment was 
completed allowing citizens to attend new 
elections, with new options for candidates in 
order to find suitable proposals and 
representatives. 
0 
2003 Amendment 7 No. 1 of July 3, 
2003 
SINGLE LISTS: to establish the requirement 
for political movements and parties, to present 
single lists and candidates, whose number of 
members cannot exceed charges of seats to be 
filled in such election. ELECTORAL QUOTA: 
to introduce the electoral quota formula to 
distribute the public corporations seats, in 
order to ensure fair representation of political 
Article 263 of the PC changed completely, 
which established the electoral quota system, 
when two or more individuals were elected on 
a public election or public corporation, in order 
to ensure parties’ proportional representation. 
The electoral quota was the result number after 
dividing the total valid votes by seats to be 
filled. 
Electoral 
System 
It allowed preventing an overflowing political 
offer for voters, and achieving consistent and 
disciplined lists. It enabled to correct the 
electoral quota and residues system misuse 
from electoral micro-businesses, to reward 
parties that obtain the highest votes with a 
proportionately larger number of seats. Making 
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movements and parties, and citizens’ 
significant groups. 
the Senate´s composition more proportional, 
and according to the citizens preferences. 
2003 Amendment 8 No. 1 of July 3, 
2003 
ELECTORAL QUOTA: set the electoral quota 
formula to allocate the seats among the 
members of the respective corporation. 
PREFERENTIAL VOTE: establish the 
possibility that each party or political 
movement can pick or not the preferential 
voting mechanism. 
Article 263 was added to the PC. Electoral 
System  
This amendment enabled to correct the 
electoral quota and residues system misuse 
from electoral micro-businesses, to reward 
parties that obtain the highest votes with a 
proportionately larger number of seats, to 
ensure that the Public Corporation’s 
composition better reflects the preferences of 
citizens. It also allowed voters to be who 
determine the list’s final order. This 
strengthened representative democracy through 
a participatory democracy mechanism.  
Importantly, this allowed the legislators to be 
true representatives of citizens, and not 
representatives of the political parties’ leaders 
as it used to be. 
0 
2003 Amendment 9 No. 1 of July 3, 
2003 
To take away the state’s faculty to elect the 
National Electoral Council (NEC) members 
and grant it to Congress, together with the 
electoral quota system, upon previous 
nomination of political parties or movements 
with legal status or by coalitions between them. 
Also, to establish the quality of public servants 
to NEC member, and to expand the 
composition of NEC members, from 7 to 9 
members. Finally, to allow one-time re-
election of NEC members, and to state that the 
contentious administrative courts would decide 
on electoral nullity action. 
Article 264 of the PC was modified, according 
to which the Judiciary Council was in charge 
of electing the NEC members, from the lists of 
three drawn up by political movements and 
parties with legal status. It did not contemplate 
the quality of public servants of NEC 
members; the NEC was composed for at least 
7 members, according to the law. Finally, it 
prohibited the re-election of NEC members, 
and did not devote any action against electoral 
nullity. 
Electoral 
System  
The amendment legitimized the election of 
NEC representatives and allowed better control 
to NEC members; by making them the public 
servants they are subject to different types of 
special responsibilities such as: tax, criminal, 
disciplinary and civil, if their actions do not 
comply with the laws and/or regulations. It 
ensures greater democratic representation in the 
NEC, and it strengthens participatory 
democracy and the electoral system’s control, 
by giving the jurisdiction the power to decide 
whether a particular act of election by popular 
vote was invalid. 
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2003 Amendment 10 No. 1 of July 3, 
2003 
To take away the National Electoral Council’s 
authority to elect the National Civil Registrar, 
and grant it to the presidents of the 
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and 
the Judiciary Council, through merit-based 
competition. Also, to reduce the National 
Registrar’s period from 5 to 4 years and to 
establish a requirement that the National 
Registrar has not exercised functions in 
management positions in political parties or 
movements within the year immediately 
preceding his election. Finally, to allow the 
National Registrar’s one-time re-election. 
Article 266 of the PC was modified, according 
to which the National Registrar was elected by 
the National Electoral Council, for a period of 
five years. It did not establish such restriction, 
and the National Registrar's re-election was 
prohibited. 
Power 
Distribution.  
This amendment made more transparent the 
National Registrar’s elections by allowing the 
high courts to intervene, guaranteed a service 
period equal to that of popularly elected 
officials, prevented the National Registrar from 
developing its role in a biased manner, taking 
into account political interests and favouring 
political groups, and generated continuity in 
relation to the management of the National 
Registrar. 
0 
2003 Amendment 11 No. 1 of July 3, 
2003 
To establish the loss of political rights for those 
who have been convicted at any time by the 
Commission for crimes involving the State’s 
patrimony, and those who allowed the State to 
be sentenced for compensatory damages, under 
its wilful or severely negligent misconduct, 
determined by court decision. 
Paragraph 5 of article 122 of the PC was 
modified, which established only as a 
punishment for that public servant who was 
convicted of crimes against State’s patrimony, 
the inability to perform functions. 
Power 
Distribution  
This amendment by declaring the impossibility 
for public servants who had affected state’s 
patrimony, to be registered as candidates for 
elected offices, or elected or appointed as 
public servants, or enter into contracts with the 
State; it took away the power of those who 
because of their wrong and unethical behaviour, 
affect State’s patrimony, which must have the 
general welfare as the sole destination. 
0 
2004 Amendment 1 No. 2 of 
December 27, 
2004 
To allow political participation to state officials 
and its decentralized entities that exercise 
jurisdiction, civil or political authority and 
administrative positions. The following were 
excluded from such faculty: state employees 
who work in the judicial branch, the electoral, 
control and security bodies. Also, to determine 
that members of the security forces are 
prohibited from political participation, and to 
establish the President and Vice-president may 
only participate in electoral campaigns 4 
months before the date of the presidential 
Paragraphs 20 and 30 of article 127 of the PC 
were modified, which established the 
prohibition from engaging in political issues to 
state employees and their decentralized entities 
exercising jurisdiction, civil or political 
authority, administrative positions, or serve in 
electoral, judicial, or oversight bodies. It also 
provided as grounds for misconduct the use of 
employment to pressure citizens to support a 
cause or political campaign. 
Power 
Distribution 
This amendment allowed state officials and its 
decentralized entities exercising jurisdiction, 
civil or political authority, and administrative 
positions, to take part in political activities and 
controversies. These restrictions are based on 
the subordination of the armed forces to civilian 
authority that leads the government. 
Constitutionally the armed forces and the police 
are not deliberative, ensuring the performance 
of their duties. It prevented the President and 
Vice-president from starting their campaign 
before their political contestants, taking 
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election’s first round Finally, to prohibit the 
President and Vice-president during the 
campaign, the use of state property or National 
Treasury’s resources, other than those offered 
on equal terms to the other candidates, except 
those intended for the duties of office. 
 
 
advantage in power, and it guaranteed that the 
opposition and other political parties and 
movements can compete on equal terms with 
the President and the Vice-president, who claim 
to be re-elected. 
2004 Amendment 2 No. 2 of 
December 27, 
2004 
To establish a ban on being elected President 
of the Republic for more than 2 periods, which 
actually introduced the immediate re-election 
(which was forbidden) and allow the Vice-
president’s re-election as long as it integrates 
the same formula the president. Allow the 
Vice-president to be elected President for the 
next period, only if the President in office is not 
presented as a candidate. 
Article 197 of the PC was modified, which 
provided that there could not be elected 
President the citizen who had served as 
President. Such article also made mention of 
the ineligibility causes to be president. 
Power 
Distribution  
Allowed the immediate presidential re-election, 
which contradicts the principle of alternation in 
power, essential in any democratic state. It is 
noteworthy that this affected the institutional 
design that had been secured by the 1991 CP, to 
establish checks and balances, as with the 
materialized re-election, the autonomy of the 
bodies called to control the Executive due to its 
independence was affected, as did President 
periods coinciding with the other supervisory 
bodies, as it made the president’s period to 
coincide with other oversight bodies’ period, 
which resulted in the President influencing the 
election of almost every organ that controlled 
him/her. In addition to the above, allowing 
immediate re-election of the Vice-president 
contradicts the principle of alternation in 
power, fundamental in any democratic state. 
1 
2004 Amendment 3 No. 2 of 
December 27, 
2004 
To include the Armed Forces Commanders and 
the Police Director General, in the prohibition 
on being elected President, if they exercised 
such charges a year before the election. Also, 
to allow the Vice-president to be elected 
President for the next period, only if the 
President in office is not presented as a 
candidate. 
Article 197 was modified, which established 
the same prohibition to be President of the 
Republic was stated, if he or she had exercise 
any of the following positions a year before the 
election: high courts magistrate, minister, 
member of the National Electoral Council, 
member of the Superior Council of the 
Judiciary, Attorney General, Comptroller 
Power 
Distribution 
The amendment guaranteed the separation of 
powers, and the independence for the exercise 
of elected office. 
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General, Prosecutor General, National Civil 
Registrar, governor or mayor. It did not 
mention anything about it. 
2005 Amendment No. 3 of 
December 29, 
2005  
To establish that there will be 2 representatives 
for each territorial district and one more for 
each 365,000 inhabitants or fraction over 
182,500. Also determine that there can be 
elected up to 4 representatives for each 
jurisdiction. 
Article 176 of the PC was modified, which 
stated that there would be 2 representatives 
from each territorial district and one more for 
each 250,000 inhabitants or fraction over 
125,000 that had in excess of the first 250,000. 
It also determined that through that district 
there could be chosen up to 5 representatives. 
In general, the article established how the 
House of Representatives is elected. 
Electoral 
System  
It prevented electoral constituencies from 
losing representation due to the steady growth 
of the population. 
0 
2007 Amendment 1 No. 1 of June 27, 
2007  
To extend the power of each chamber by 
allowing them to summon and require not only 
ministers, but also the superintendents and 
directors of administrative departments to 
attend the meetings. Also, to allow establishing 
the motion of censure also against 
superintendents and directors of administrative 
department, when do not attend the summons, 
without an excuse accepted by the respective 
chamber. 
Paragraph 8 of article 135 of the PC was 
modified, which stated that the chambers 
would have the power to summon and require 
ministers to attend sessions. The possibility to 
establish a motion of censure against the 
minister, when it did not attend, without 
reasonable excuse. 
Power 
Distribution  
The motion of censure is the possibility of 
removing ministers, directors of administrative 
departments and Superintendents from office 
for dereliction of duties. First, it is pertinent to 
note that the motion of censure is an effective 
way of exercising the political control and 
accountability of the legislature, and 
corresponds to a system of checks and balances 
which leads to a regulation of executive power. 
After exposing the above, is relevant to say that 
by extending the censure of motion to the 
Superintendents and directors of administrative 
departments (DAD), political control was 
strengthened, as the directors of administrative 
departments perform their duties under the 
President’s supervision. 
0 
2007 Amendment 2 No. 1 of June 27, 
2007 
To extend the censure of motion regarding 
superintendents, ministers and directors of 
administrative departments, by inattention of 
Congress’s requirements and citations. Also, to 
establish that the poll will be done with the 
respective officer’s public hearing, and to 
Paragraph 9 of article 135 of the PC was 
modified, which only stated the motion of 
censure concerning ministers and for issues 
related to duties of the office. Approval 
required the absolute majority of the members 
of the two chambers. It did not establish 
Power 
Distribution  
The amendment prevented the ministers, 
superintendents and directors of administrative 
departments, from evading the political control 
exercised by Congress. It allowed the 
participation of the official exercising its right 
to defence, at the public hearing in which the 
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modify the approval, requiring the affirmative 
vote of half plus one of the members proposed 
by the chamber. Finally, to determine that the 
resignation of the official in respect of which 
the motion of censure has been promoted does 
not prevent it from being approved, and to 
inhibit a chamber when the other has ruled on 
the motion of censure.  
anything about it, and it was not limited to a 
chamber when the other had spoken. In 
general, the article establishes the powers of 
each chamber. 
censure of motion is decided. Also, it made the 
mechanism for exercising the censure of 
motion more flexible and gave it a more 
viability, as the previous regulation was very 
demanding and made its implementation 
almost impossible. Finally, it strengthened 
political control, and it eased the procedure, in 
order to make it operative. 
2007 Amendment 3 No. 1 of June 27, 
2007 
To grant departmental assemblies the power to 
exercise political control over the departmental 
administration, and to modify the deputies’ 
term, it went from 3 to 4 years. 
Article 299 of the PC was modified, which 
established the departmental assembly’s 
administrative autonomy and own budget and 
regulated the departmental assembly’s 
composition, the disqualifications and 
incompatibilities of deputies, among other 
things. It did not have the faculty to exercise 
such political control, and the deputies’ term 
was of 3 years. 
Power 
Distribution 
The amendment implemented a checks and 
balances’ mechanism to control the function of 
the departmental administration. By increasing 
the deputies’ term by one year, that position 
was given stability and sufficient time to 
undertake its political program. 
0 
2007 Amendment 4 No. 1 of June 27, 
2007 
To grant the following powers to the 
Departmental Assembly: summon and require 
the Secretaries of the Governor’ Office to 
attend the assembly’s sessions. Also, to allow 
proposing a censure motion if they do not 
attend without an excuse accepted by the 
Assembly, and to propose a censure motion 
regarding the Secretaries of the Governor’s 
office for matters related to functions of office, 
or by overlooking the assembly’ requirements 
and citations. 
Numerals 13 and 14 are added to Article 300 
of the PC, which established the functions to be 
fulfilled by the departmental assemblies 
through ordinances. 
Power 
Distribution 
Allowed the exercise of the functions of the 
Secretary of the Governor’s office, to be 
controlled by the Departmental Assembly. 
Checks and balances. It also increased 
decentralisation.  0 
2007 Amendment 5 No. 1 of June 27, 
2007 
To extend the term of the city council from 3 to 
4 years. 
Article 313 of the PC is modified, which 
considered a 3-year period for city councils and 
also the councillors’ disqualifications and 
incompatibilities. 
Policy 
Making  
By increasing 1 year increased the councillors’ 
term, that position was given stability and 
sufficient time to undertake its political 
program. 
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2007 Amendment 6 No. 1 of June 27, 
2007 
To grant the following powers to the councils: 
summon and require the mayor’s office 
secretaries to attend the meetings. Also, to 
allow them to propose a motion of censure if 
they do not attend without an excuse accepted 
by the district or municipal council and to 
propose censure of motion regarding the 
mayor’s office secretaries for issues related to 
functions of office, or inattention to the 
requirements and citations of the district or 
municipal council. 
Paragraphs 11 and 12 were added to article 313 
of the PC, which stated the councils’ powers. 
Power 
Distribution 
It allowed the exercise of the functions of the 
mayor’s office clerks were controlled by the 
departmental assembly. Checks and balances. 
0 
2007 Amendment 7 No. 4 of July 11, 
2007 
To allow the national government to define a 
strategy for monitoring, tracking and integral 
controlling the spending implemented by local 
authorities with resources from the General 
System of Participation, to ensure fulfilment of 
the goals of coverage and quality. It is 
determined that this strategy should strengthen 
public participation forums in social control 
and accountability processes. Also, to allow the 
national government to regulate and define the 
events in which the proper provision of 
services by territorial entities and the 
preventive and corrective measures are at risk. 
Two paragraphs are added to article 356 of the 
PC, which regulated matters relating to the 
services in charge of the nation and the 
territorial entities. Priority investment areas for 
the general government financing were also 
stablished. 
Policy 
Making  
 
This amendment allowed the government to 
control the execution of spending by territorial 
entities, in order to ensure fulfilment of the 
goals of coverage and quality. Such control is 
necessary to achieve the goals set by the 
government. By establishing the government’s 
obligation to involve citizens in the control and 
accountability mechanisms, it creates a 
mechanism that strengthens participatory 
democracy. This removed autonomy to 
territorial entities, because the power given to 
the government was very extensive, and based 
on that, it could create preventive and 
corrective measures that transfer powers from 
territorial entities to national power. 
0 
2007 Amendment 8 No. 4 of July 11, 
2007 
To establish that the General System of 
Participation of departments, municipalities 
and districts will be increased annually by a 
percentage equal to the average of the 
percentage variation that the Nation’s current 
income has had the in the past 4 years. Also, to 
determine that municipalities classified in 
categories 4th, 5th, & 6th, may spend freely, for 
Article 357 of the PC is modified, that only 
regulated the municipalities’ participation in 
the national’s current income. 
Policy 
Making 
The amendment allowed that the General 
System of Participation of departments, 
municipalities and districts did not lose 
purchasing power over time. It granted more 
autonomy to municipalities to manage the 
affairs under their care and to exercise their 
public policies. 
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investment and other expenses of the municipal 
administration, up to 42% of the funds received 
in respect of the General System of 
Participation.  
2009 Amendment 1 No. 1 of July 14, 
2009 
To establish ethical principles for the 
functioning of political parties and political 
movements such as transparency, objectivity, 
morality, gender equity and the duty to disclose 
their political programs. Also, to prohibit 
citizens to participate in two popular 
consultations of movements or political parties 
and to establish the obligation for managers of 
political parties and movements, to promote 
internal democratisation process and the 
strengthening the caucus regime. To set that 
political parties and movements should answer 
by any violation of the rules governing its 
organisation, operation and financing, endorse 
candidates elected in popular election positions 
or public corporations, which were convicted 
in exercise of charge. Finally, to endorse 
candidates not elected to offices or public 
corporations, if they were convicted of any 
crime, and to establish the requirement for the 
member of a public corporation that wishes to 
apply for the next election by a different party, 
to waive the seat at least 12 months before the 
first day of registration. 
Several paragraphs are added to article 307 of 
the PC, which only stated: the guarantee to all 
nationals to establish, organize and develop 
political parties and movements as well as the 
guarantee for all the social organisations of 
their right to manifest and to participate in 
political events. 
Power 
Distribution 
Before considering the effects on democracy, it 
is important to note that this amendment arose 
from the need to end the illegitimacy and 
corruption that had taken over Congress, by the 
infiltration of illegal armed actors. Therefore, 
the objectives of the amendment were mainly to 
prevent the financing, infiltration and 
involvement of actors outside the law in 
national politics, and to make political parties 
accountable for their actions. It laid down the 
guiding principles for the democratic 
organisation of the parties, which respond to the 
need of partisan ethics, evidenced through the 
diffusion of their actions and political 
programs. Also, it allowed the consolidation of 
political-citizen participation coherent with 
strong ideologies, and strengthened parties 
internally by disciplining them through the 
caucus regime, which allows forming a party 
with clear and solid policies and ideology. 
Finally, it strengthened democracy by 
establishing the parties’ political responsibility 
for their actions 5) It prohibited double 
militancy. 
0 
2009 Amendment 2 No. 1 of July 14, 
2009 
To establish an electoral threshold of 3% as a 
requirement for access the seats distribution of 
political parties, political movements and 
citizens’ significant groups in elections for the 
House of Representatives and the Senate. Also, 
to set as grounds for loss of the legal status of 
Article 108 of the PC was changed, which had 
been previously modified by Legislative Act 
No. 1 of July 3, 2003. The article provided the 
requirement of a 2% electoral threshold for 
access to the seats distribution. There was no 
loss of legal status for such reason, nor was it 
Electoral 
System  
By increasing the electoral threshold by 1%, the 
political party system was strengthened 
(avoiding further personalism), without 
infringing the rights of minorities to participate 
in politics. It was a breakthrough for political 
parties to fulfil their purpose in democracy. In 
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parties and political movements and the failure 
to hold (for every 2 years) conventions that 
enable its members to influence decision 
making in major political organisation. Finally, 
to determine that the National Electoral 
Council shall revoke any registration of a 
prosecuted candidate in an event of disability. 
 
given to the National Electoral Council the 
power to revoke the disabled candidate. 
other words, it contributed to political parties 
effectively operate as "institutions in charge of 
grouping the political preferences of society to 
build the general interest" (Prieto Botero, 2010: 
23). It Strengthened control system over the 
elected candidates. 
2009 Amendment 3 No. 1 of July 14, 
2009 
To remove the votes replenishment system by 
which state funding for political parties and 
movements’ campaigns are made, and set the 
partial financing of those with state resources. 
To establish the possibility of limiting the 
amount of expenses that can be used in election 
campaigns and establish maximum levels in 
accordance with the law. To prohibit parties, 
political movements and citizens’ significant 
groups to receive funding for electoral 
campaigns from foreign natural or juridical 
person, and also state that no private funding 
may be for undemocratic purposes or to violate 
public order. 
Article 109 of the PC was modified, which had 
previously been modified by Legislative Act 
No. 1 of July 3, 2003. The article provided the 
vote’s replenishment system, for state 
financing of election campaigns. This 
possibility was not established neither was the 
prohibition. 
Power 
Distribution 
By establishing the partial financing of 
electoral campaigns with state resources, by 
setting a maximum amount for such funding, 
and by prohibiting private financing to political 
parties, the following strengthened: 
competition between various parties on equal 
terms. (i) Transparency in the financing of 
candidates and political parties. (ii) Greater 
relevance of the party in the electoral process. 
0 
2009 Amendment 4 No. 1 of July 14, 
2009 
To extend the loss of political rights to elected 
officials who have been sentenced for crimes 
related to membership, promotion or financing 
of illegal armed groups, crimes against 
humanity or drug trafficking in Colombia or 
abroad. 
Article 122 of the PC is changed, which had 
previously been modified by Legislative Act 
No. 1 of June 3, 2004. The article stablished the 
loss political rights for those who have been 
convicted at any time by the commission of 
crimes involving State’s patrimony, and those 
who allowed the state to be sentenced for 
compensatory damages, under its wilful or 
severely negligent misconduct, determined by 
court decision. This currently operates. This 
amendment extended the loss of political rights 
to the politicians who have belonged, promoted 
or financed illegal armed groups, who have 
Power 
Distribution 
This amendment strengthened the prevention 
and punishment of crime in politics. It is 
pertinent to note that this amendment was 
crucial to democracy, as it was introduced to 
remedy the lamentable "para-politics" 
phenomenon, which acquired this qualifier due 
to a large number of congressmen involved in 
criminal investigations for alleged ties with 
illegal groups. 
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committed crimes against humanity or drug 
trafficking in Colombia or abroad. 
2009 Amendment 5 No. 1 of July 14, 
2009 
To eliminate the possibility of substitution for 
temporary absence, of members of the public 
corporations of popular election and allow it 
only in cases of absolute absence. To prevent 
that a member of a public corporation of 
popular election is replaced from the moment a 
warrant is issued, within a criminal process for 
offenses related with links to illegal armed 
groups and drug trafficking activities or crimes 
against humanity. The condemnatory sentence 
has the effect of permanent loss of the seat to 
the party to which the public corporation 
member belongs to. 
Article 134 of the PC was modified, which 
stipulated that only the absolute or temporary 
absences of public corporations’ members 
would be filled by the candidates who, in the 
order of registration, successively and 
downward, correspond to the same list. 
Power 
Distribution 
This amendment strengthened democracy 
because it established the parties’ political 
responsibility regarding their members’ 
activities (the empty chair was implemented). 
Anti-corruption mechanism. 
0 
2009 Amendment 6 No. 1 of July 14, 
2009 
To introduce the exercise of lobby and its 
regulation by law. 
Article 144 of the PC was modified, which 
stated only that: the sessions of the chambers 
and their standing committees would be public, 
with the limitations arranged by its regulation 
(currently operating as well). 
Electoral 
System  
N/A 
1 
2009 Amendment 7 No. 1 of July 14, 
2009 
To grant two new powers to the National 
Electoral Council: review of its own motion or 
upon request, the ballots and electoral 
documents relating to any stage of the election 
administrative process in order to guarantee 
transparency in the electoral results. 
By which 2 new paragraphs are added (with the 
content discussed above) to article 265 of the 
PC, which establishes the powers of the 
National Electoral Council. 
Electoral 
System 
 
This amendment ensured transparency in 
electoral matters. 
0 
 
  
 276 
Table A.2 (c) - Constitutional reforms and amendments in Venezuela, 1983-1989 - ‘transitional period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date and 
publication 
No. in the 
official gazette 
Purpose of the reform Summary 
Modification of 
constitutional 
precepts 
Typology                        
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
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1983 Amendment 1 March 16, 1983 / 
Official Gazette 
No. 3.224 
extraordinary of 
7/24/1983. 
To allow the implementation of a 
special electoral system for the 
election of members of the city 
councils and legislative assemblies, 
different from the electoral system 
disposed for the election of senators 
and deputies. 
Article No. 113 of the Constitution 
was modified, in which the principle 
of minorities’ proportional 
representation was devoted to the 
electoral system. 
 
N/A Electoral 
System 
This amendment had concrete 
political will to introduce the single 
vote of the members of the city 
councils and the state’s legislative 
assemblies, differing from the 
electoral system of proportional 
representation that existed for the 
national representative figures (Senate 
and chamber of deputies). 
0 
1983 Amendment 2 March 16, 1983 / 
Official Gazette 
No. 3.224 
extraordinary of 
7/24/1983 
To introduce the participation of 
Congress in designing the Economic 
and Social Development Plan of the 
Nation (ESDP). 
It modified articles 227, 228 and 231 
of the Political Constitution (PC). 
Article 227 stipulated that no 
expenditure would be made from the 
National Treasury that had not been 
foreseen by the annual budget law; 
article 228 devoted that expenses 
which exceed the amount of the 
estimates of the respective budget law 
would not be authorized; article 231 
specified that public credit operations 
require a special law which granted 
the authorisation and validity. In none 
of the articles, Congress participation 
was available. 
N/A Policy 
Making 
 
This amendment introduced the 
requirement to the Executive, to 
submit to Congress the ESDP for 
approval. Thus, it tried to correct the 
lack of dialogue and coordination 
between the Executive and the 
Legislative, urging Congress to link 
its activity according to the ESDP, and 
the Executive to submit to the 
guidelines of the budget plan 
approved by Congress. 
0 
1989 Amendment 1 Official Gazette 
No. 4.086 
extraordinary of 
4/14/1989 
To introduce the political autonomy of 
the counties, by allowing direct 
election of governors, based on article 
22 of the PC, which gave Congress the 
power to establish the system of 
election and removal of governors. 
Law on election and removal of state’s 
governors, which deprived the 
President of the Republic the power to 
elect them. 
Numeral 17 of article 
190 was amended, 
which provided the 
following authority to 
the President: 
"Appoint and remove 
the governors of the 
federal district and the 
federal territories”. 
Electoral 
System 
This amendment allowed the election 
of governors by direct secret popular 
vote (Art. 2). At the same time, it 
allowed the nomination of the 
governor by the national political 
parties, regional parties, groups of 
voters and 10 citizens registered in the 
electoral registry. That is, as the 
President completely lost the power to 
appoint governors, citizens were 
empowered and won the opportunity 
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(1) 
to participate in this process through 
the faculty of nominating their state’s 
governors. 
 
 
1989 Amendment 2 Official Gazette 
No. 4.153 
extraordinary of 
12/28/1989 
To introduce the principles for 
administrative decentralisation of the 
federation based on article 137 of the 
PC, according to which Congress 
could transfer to the states and 
municipalities matters of national 
power, in order to promote 
administrative decentralisation. 
Organic law on decentralisation, 
delimitation and transfer of powers of 
government; whereby a set of national 
powers exclusively to the states, and 
another set of concurrent powers 
assumed by the national bodies are 
transferred. 
N/A Policy 
Making  
This amendment, by conveying a wide 
range of powers exclusively to the 
states, granted them a genuine 
autonomy to make decisions about 
public policy and execute them, as it 
was given complete freedom to: plan, 
coordinate and promote their own 
integral development, manage their 
property and invest the budget and 
other income, and use of public credit. 
All this, without more limitations than 
those imposed by the PC and the law. 
0 
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1999 Creation of 
the National 
Constituent 
Assembly 
Public Power 
Transition 
Decree / Official 
Gazette No. 
36859 of 
12/29/1999 
To create the transitional regime 
of public power in order to 
dissolve the legitimate bodies of 
government and in its place 
establish another new bodies 
lacking legitimacy. 
The National Constituent 
Assembly (NCA) decreed the 
transitional regime of public 
power by which it decided the 
dissolution of Congress and the 
cessation of functions of the 
senators and deputies who had 
been elected a year earlier, 
leaving the country without a 
legislature until new elections 
were made. It also definitively 
dissolved the Legislative 
Assembly of the States and the 
municipalities, declaring the 
cessation of functions of deputies 
and councillors that formed it. 
Instead, the ANC appointed 
unilaterally the members of the 
new state legislative committees 
for this transition period. The 
Supreme Court with all its rooms 
and dependencies was eliminated, 
and instead the Supreme Tribunal 
of Justice was created with the 
following rooms: constitutional, 
social and electoral, expected in 
the new PC. In the absence of a 
Legislative Assembly, the ANC 
appointed unilaterally all 
members of the oversight bodies: 
Comptroller General’s Office, 
Ombudsman, and Prosecutor 
General. 
N/A Power 
Distribution 
With the appointment of the 
ANC, two parallel constitutional 
regimes coexisted in Venezuela: 
one contained in the 1990 PC, 
approved by the people; and 
another subsequently dictated by 
the ANC, not approved by the 
people, with an indefinite period 
until the legislation that had 
arranged the 1999 PC was 
approved, which in 2009 had not 
yet occurred. With this, the 
democratic principle that 
preaches that municipal 
authorities should be popularly 
elected was violated, as well as 
the guarantee of municipal 
autonomy. Additionally, the ANC 
appointed the magistrates of the 
Supreme Tribunal, without being 
subject to the requirements 
provided in the new PC for the 
election of such charges. 
1 
1999 Reform 1 Referendum 
performed on 
This constitutional reform 
substantially amended the 
Venezuela’s PC repealing the 
Decentralisation is set as a public 
policy that contributes to 
deepening democracy (Art. 158). 
N/A Power 
Distribution 
Establishing decentralisation as a 
necessary public policy to deepen 
democracy is a major advance in 
1 
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democratic 
(1) 
December 15, 
1999 
1961 PC and creating the new 
1999 PC. This database will only 
be considered changes compared 
with the three typologies in which 
this research focuses on: A) 
Power Distribution, B) Electoral 
System and C) Policy making. 
The states and municipalities’ 
autonomy is enshrined (Art. 159 
and 168). Along with the three 
classic branches of public power, 
two institutions are created: 
citizen power consisting of the 
Ombudsman, the Public Ministry 
(Prosecutor General's Office), the 
Comptroller General’s Office of 
the Republic (Art. 273) and the 
Electoral Power (Art. 292). Also, 
immediate re-election of the 
President was established, only 
once and for an extended period 
of 6 years (Art. 230). The 
President acquires the power to 
dissolve Congress and create a 
unicameral National Assembly 
(Art. 236). The 1999 PC formally 
establishes a framework that 
distributes power and 
participation mechanisms to 
citizenship, strengthening 
participatory democracy by 
encouraging states and 
municipalities to participate in 
public affairs, as well as to 
monitor and control public 
administration. Article 70 
establishes the following 
mechanisms of participation: 
election of public officials, 
referendum, popular suffrages, 
mandate revocation, legislative 
initiatives, constitutional and 
constituent, open councils and 
relation to the 1961 PC. However, 
decentralisation in practice does 
not work because the distribution 
of fiscal resources is defined at the 
central level, which prevents 
states and municipalities to 
acquire real autonomy and fiscal 
sovereignty. Therefore, we can 
affirm that the decentralisation 
project fails because autonomy 
and decentralisation are only 
achieved if there are sufficient 
resources to adopt public policy 
decisions at the micro level. 
Regarding the presidential 
system, a concentration of power 
in the Executive becomes clear 
with the extension of the 
President´s term to 6 years and his 
re-election. The principle of 
separation of powers and the 
system of checks and balances is 
affected by eliminating the 
bicameral system, since it affects 
democracy adversely. 
Strengthening the principle of 
participatory democracy, which 
extends the range of democratic 
participation rights by distributing 
power to citizens to mend 
relations between the state and 
society, has not been fulfilled in 
practice because participation 
mechanisms, such as the 
revocation of mandates, involve 
highly complex requirements to 
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citizens’ assembly. Article 67 
gives political parties and citizens 
the right to participate in elections 
through nomination of 
candidates, supervision, 
monitoring and control of the 
electoral process. Innovatively, it 
enshrines the right to revolt, 
allowing the citizen to "disown 
any regime, legislation or 
authority that violates the 
principles, values and democratic 
guarantees or violates human 
rights” (Art. 350). 
meet, which makes its 
implementation impossible. 
1999 Reform 2 Referendum 
performed on 
December 15, 
1999 
This constitutional reform 
substantially amended the 
Venezuela’s PC repealing the 
1961 PC and creating the new 
1999 PC. This database will only 
be considered changes compared 
with the three typologies in which 
this research focuses on power 
distribution, electoral System and 
policy making. 
The state has political pluralism 
as its highest principle (Art. 2), 
the essential purpose of it is the 
democratic exercise of the 
popular will (Art. 3); the exercise 
of sovereignty resides in the 
people (Art. 5) and the 
government is self-conceived 
"forever as democratic, 
participatory, elective, 
decentralised, alternative, 
responsible and pluralist" (Art. 6). 
According to article 63, voting is 
a right exercised through free, 
universal direct and secret polls. 
Also, it provides that the electoral 
law must guarantee the principle 
of personalisation of suffrage and 
proportional representation. 
Article 228 established a simple 
majority to elect the President. 
The public financing of political 
N/A Electoral 
System 
 
The 1999 PC included the 
principles of personalisation of 
suffrage and proportional 
representation with the aim of 
consolidating a more plural and 
participatory electoral system. 
However, the electoral statute that 
regulated them did not manage to 
materialize them for the following 
reasons: It included a majority 
vote, which opposes the 
proportional system of 
representation. Also, it arranged 
closed and blocked lists, which 
prevents a true personalisation. 
Importantly, the 1961 PC 
established the principle of 
proportional representation of 
minorities through D’Hont’s 
formula for converting votes into 
seats. The new constitution 
changed the electoral formula to 
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parties, organisations and 
associations with political 
purposes is prohibited (Art. 67). 
The National Electoral Council 
(NEC) which directs electoral 
power (Art. 292) is created, and 
its main function is to organize, 
manage and administer the 
electoral process and calls for 
mandates (Art. 293). 
one with more majoritarian 
characteristics.   
1999 Reform 3 Referendum 
performed on 
December 15, 
1999 
This constitutional reform 
substantially amended the 
Venezuela’s PC repealing the 
1961 PC and creating the new 
1999 PC. This database will only 
be considered changes compared 
with the three typologies in which 
this research focuses on: A) 
Power Distribution, B) Electoral 
System and C) Policy making. 
It gives the Central Bank 
autonomy to formulate and 
implement budgetary policies 
within its power (Art. 318) and it 
demands accountability to the 
National Assembly (Art. 319). 
The Federal Council of 
Government is created, and it is 
responsible for planning and 
coordinating the process of 
decentralisation and transfer of 
responsibilities of national power 
to the states and municipalities 
(Art. 185). A comptrollership in 
every government agency is also 
established, who is responsible 
for controlling, monitoring and 
supervising revenues, 
expenditures and state property 
(Art. 163). Taxing power is 
established in the three levels of 
public power exercise (national, 
state and municipal – Art. 156, 
162, 180), but national power may 
limit revenue to be allocated and 
distributed to states or 
N/A Policy 
Making 
Although the 1999 PC formally 
introduced the principles of 
decentralisation and citizen 
participation, to strengthen 
democracy, it is seen that in real 
terms the tax decentralisation is 
restricted. This happens because 
the national power and the 
Executive hold the tax power and 
the faculty to set the participable 
income without limitation. 
Articles in the 1999 PC, regarding 
public policy, do not really give 
the tax authority to the states and 
municipalities. In that sense, it is 
possible to affirm that the PC fails 
in its attempt to consolidate the 
states and municipalities as 
autonomous territorial entities. 
This is because autonomy and 
decentralisation are only possible 
if there are enough resources to 
take policy decisions. In relation 
to the power given to the 
President to negotiate national 
loans without the approval of the 
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municipalities (Art. 156), which 
implies that the national power 
reserves the tax power, separating 
itself from collection, control and 
administration. The Executive 
acquires the authority to 
determine the percentage of 
income co-participable in the 
National Budget Law, without 
setting limits as to the maximum 
or minimum participable 
percentages. The National 
Assembly acquires the power to 
set policy guidelines on public 
debt (paragraph 6, Art. 187). It is 
recognized as a faculty of the 
President the ability to "negotiate 
national loans" (paragraph 12, 
Art. 236), without the contracted 
operation being subject to 
legislative approval. 
National Assembly, we can say 
that this contradicts the following 
constitutional precepts: article 
150 states that any national 
celebration of contracts of public 
interest must be approved by the 
National Assembly, and 
paragraph 3 of article 187 
determines that the legislature 
should control the government 
and the public administration. 
2006 Amendment  Official Gazette 
No. 5.806 
extraordinary of 
4/10/2006 
To replace the municipality as the 
primary political unit in the 
national organisation, for the 
community, linked to a system of 
entities without any political 
autonomy called the Popular 
Power (Community Councils - 
CC), directly linked and 
dependent on a centralized power 
structure, directed from the 
executive branch by the President 
through a Presidential 
Commission of Popular Power. 
This law created the CC, 
integrating them into a centralized 
state structure, with the peak in a 
National Presidential 
Commission of Popular Power 
appointed and chaired by the 
President, which designates in 
each state the Regional 
Presidential Commissions of 
Popular Power, and the local 
commissions, without any 
governors and mayors’ 
participation. At the same time, 
this law, calling for a "greater 
popular participation", ended 
The following articles 
were modified: article 
168, which 
established the 
municipality as the 
primary political unit 
within the national 
public organisation; 
And article 136, 
according to which 
the municipality is 
assumed as the lower 
territorial level within 
the vertical 
distribution system of 
Power 
Distribution 
This law ended the representative 
democracy at the local level, as 
the CC members are not elected 
by suffrage, but appointed by 
citizen assemblies controlled by 
the executive power itself. Also, it 
finished with territorial 
autonomy, which is the essence of 
decentralisation and local self-
government, emptying their state 
powers through direct budgetary 
transfer to the CC. 
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with the popular representation, 
derived from suffrage in political 
entities such as municipal, by 
organizing CC that have no 
representative electoral origin. 
government, and as a 
political entity in 
charge of enforcing 
citizen participation. 
2007 Amendment by 
enabling law: 
introduced 
legislation that 
authorizes the 
President to 
issue decrees 
with rank, value 
and force of law 
in delegated 
matters.1 
Official Gazette 
No. 38.617 of 
2/1/2007 
To allow the President to issue 
decrees concerning the following 
subjects: Transformation of state 
institutions, popular participation, 
essential values of the exercise of 
public functions, economic and 
social, financial and Tax, citizen 
and legal security, science and 
technology, spatial planning, 
security and defence, 
infrastructure, and transportation 
and services, for 18 months (1 
year and a half). 
This law was enacted 
simultaneously with the 
presidential announcement to 
initiate a referendum process to 
reform the 2007 PC. As the 
referendum was rejected by the 
people, the Law of Legislative 
Delegation was the instrument 
used to implement many of the 
rejected reforms. 
N/A Power 
Distribution 
This law is completely 
undemocratic and 
unconstitutional for the following 
reasons: the power to legislate on 
matters of national power, moved 
from the legislature (National 
Assembly) to the executive 
branch, even though it already 
completely controlled the first one 
without encountering any 
opposition in the National 
Assembly. Also, by giving the 
power to the President to legislate 
on matters that affect the other 
branches of government, both in 
its horizontal division (legislative, 
executive, judicial, citizens and 
electoral) and in its territorial 
distribution (states and 
municipalities), it was removed 
by full every sense of the 
separation of powers. Finally, it 
completely attacked the principle 
by which, within a state, laws 
must emanate from the people's 
behalf under a formation 
procedure specified in the 
Constitution surrounded by 
transparency and popular 
consultation. 
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2007 Amendment 2 Official Gazette 
No. 5.841 
extraordinary of 
6/22/2007 
To structure a centralized 
socialist state particularly in the 
economic and social area. To 
centralize national planning 
establishing itself as a system 
under which the adopted plans are 
mandatory on all organisations 
and agencies of the government. 
With the above, the aim is to 
eliminate organisational and 
administrative autonomy and 
administrative-financial 
planning. 
This law created the Central 
Planning Commission as a 
permanent figure of public 
administration. It also empowered 
the commission to develop, 
coordinate, monitor and evaluate 
the guidelines, policies and plans, 
considering the provisions of the 
ESDP. These policies and plans 
include the political, social, 
economic, political-territorial, 
security and defence, scientific-
technological, cultural, 
educational and international 
fields. In that sense, states and 
municipalities, as well as the 
actors of private sector, must 
follow all those plans. The 
commission is responsible for 
monitoring and coordinating 
public administration which 
results on all decentralized 
attached entities losing complete 
autonomy. Finally, all the policies 
and plans should be subject to 
President’s approval. 
The following was 
modified: article 4, 
which stated that 
Venezuela was a 
decentralized federal 
state; article 16, 
which declared that 
the territorial political 
division should 
guarantee municipal 
autonomy and 
political-
administrative 
decentralisation; 
article 300, which 
gave the legislator the 
power to establish the 
conditions for the 
creation of 
functionally 
decentralized entities 
to perform social or 
business activities; 
and article 185, which 
provided that the 
Federal Council of 
Government must 
plan and coordinate 
policies for 
decentralisation and 
transfer of National 
Power’s 
responsibilities to 
States and 
Municipalities. 
Policy 
Making 
This law was the first formal state 
act that began the construction of 
a socialist State. It is 
unconstitutional and 
undemocratic for the following 
reasons: it created a centralized 
and obligatory planning mounted 
on the power concentration of the 
head of state, and it was based on 
an unconstitutional enabling law. 
Also, it was issued without 
guarantying the citizen’s right to 
participation through public 
consultation, required by the bill, 
which was mandatory under 
article 70 of the PC. It was issued 
without consultation with the state 
authority entities, since it was 
legislating on a matter that 
directly affected that obligation 
emanated from article 206 of the 
PC.  Finally, it attacked the 
Constitution by avoiding the 
mandate to implement public 
policy in a decentralized manner 
and it ended with some of the 
achievements of the transition 
period, backing on 
decentralisation and political 
autonomy. 
1 
 285 
Table A.2. (d) Constitutional reforms and amendments in Venezuela, 1999-2009 - ‘divergence period’ 
Year 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Date and 
publication 
No. in the 
official 
gazette 
Purpose of the reform Summary 
Modification of 
constitutional 
precepts 
Typology                    
(3 
criteria) 
Effects on democracy 
Pro-
democratic 
(0), non-
democratic 
(1) 
2008 Amendment 1 Decree Law No. 
6.217 of July 15, 
2008. 
To fully centralize public 
administration in the 3 levels of 
vertical distribution of public 
power, eliminating the 
decentralisation principle. 
This law centralized public 
administration into only one, 
nationalizing the regime itself, by 
having its rules apply to the public 
administration that includes all 3 
levels of public power 
distribution (National, states and 
municipalities), without mayors 
and governors having any 
autonomy in their public 
administrations. Likewise, it 
submitted the 3 levels of power to 
whatever the National Executive 
defines, through the Central 
Planning Commission and it 
attributed to the President of the 
Republic, the power to appoint 
regional authorities who would 
have the function of planning, 
implementation and territory 
development, approved under 
central planning. 
N/A 
 
Policy 
Making 
This modification dismantled 
completely the decentralisation 
principle, making the Venezuelan 
"Federal" state one fully 
centralized, directed from the 
apex of national power, by the 
President of the Republic. 
1 
2008 Amendment 2 Sentence of the 
Constitutional 
Chamber of the 
Supreme 
Tribunal No. 
565 of April 15, 
2008 
To change the system of 
territorial distribution of powers 
between national power and the 
states of the federation, by taking 
the sole responsibility from the 
states on "The conservation, 
management and exploitation of 
national expressways and 
highways, as well as ports and 
airports of commercial use, in 
coordination with the national 
power ". 
The Constitutional Chamber of 
the Supreme Tribunal as ultimate 
interpreter of the Constitution, 
decided on a request for 
interpretation of article 164, 10 of 
the PC, brought by the Attorney 
General's Office. In this regard, 
the Supreme Tribunal changed 
the content of this constitutional 
norm, providing a binding 
interpretation, that it was not a 
matter exclusive to the States of 
the federation, but a concurrent 
responsibility with national 
It modified the article 
164, 10 of the PC, 
which provided the 
exclusive jurisdiction 
of the federation’s 
states on 
"Conservation, 
management and 
exploitation of 
national expressways 
and highways, as well 
as ports and airports 
in commercial use, in 
Policy 
Making 
This adjustment done by the 
Supreme Tribunal of Justice, 
usurped the popular will and the 
constituent power that belongs to 
the people, by illegally changing 
the Constitution in territorial 
distribution of powers, trying to 
achieve what failed in the popular 
consultation of 2007. 
Consequently, Brewer-Carias 
(2008) argues that "again, with 
this ruling, the Constitutional 
Chamber of Venezuela highlights 
the danger to the Rule of Law and 
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power. In addition, it decided that 
even the national power could 
reverse all decentralised powers 
eliminating.  
coordination with the 
national power" 
the legitimacy of constitutional 
justice that the figure responsible 
of exercising it, is under the 
power, instrument of 
authoritarianism. In cases like 
this, citizens are helpless, as their 
Constitution is modified without 
their participation, and without 
the procedure prescribed in the 
PC, and they do not have ways to 
demand control of unlawful acts 
contrary to it”. 
2009 Amendment 1 Official Gazette 
No. 39.140 of 
March 17, 2009 
To remove several exclusive 
powers of the states of the 
federation and expand the 
jurisdiction and faculties of the 
Executive in relation to the 
system of territorial division of 
powers. 
This law eliminated the exclusive 
power of the states. And added 
two new norms authorising the 
National Executive, to reverse the 
transfer of powers to the states 
and to decree the intervention of 
public goods and services 
transferred to the states in this 
matter. 
It modified Article 
164 of the PC, which 
gave 11 exclusive 
powers to the states. 
Power 
distribution 
This law, by taking away the 
exclusive powers to the states, 
snatched the autonomy to make 
decisions and execute public 
policy. One can say that it was a 
setback in the conquest achieved 
with the 1989 amendment, which 
modified the Constitution through 
the Organic Law on 
Decentralisation, Delimitation 
and Transfer of responsibilities of 
Public Power, to decentralize the 
federation by providing a wide 
range of responsibilities to the 
states. 
1 
2009 Amendment 2 February 15, 
2009 by 
approving 
referendum 
To allow continuous and 
indefinite re-election of the 
President of the Republic, state 
governors, municipal mayors, 
members of the legislative 
councils of the states and 
members of the National 
Assembly. 
Articles 160, 162, 174, 192 and 
230 of the PC were modified 
which respectively stated that 
governors, members of the 
legislative councils, mayors, 
members of the National 
Assembly and the President of the 
Republic could be re-elected 
N/A Power 
Distribution 
The principle of alternation of 
power in relation to all the popular 
election positions established in 
article 6 of the PC, fundamental in 
any democratic state, was 
eliminated. It is pertinent to 
emphasize that the referendum 
that approved the amendment 
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immediately and only once, for a 
new period. 
project violated the constitutional 
ban on a referendum on 
amendments to the Constitution 
already rejected by the people in 
the same constitutional period, 
indicated in article 345 of the 
Constitution. 
2009 Amendment 3 Official Gazette 
No. 39.156 of 
April 13, 2009 
To remove the Capital District 
(where national powers are 
based) as a political territorial 
entity within the federal form of 
government, to establish the 
missing figure of the Federal 
District as totally dependent on 
the national power without self-
government. 
This law created the Federal 
District, as a dependency of the 
national power with territory 
scope and it established that the 
Federal District has no 
government authority, but is 
governed by the national power. 
Also, it stated that the legislative 
function of the Federal District 
oversees the National Assembly 
and that the executive branch is 
exercised by a head of 
government, who is appointed 
and removed by the President. 
N/A Power 
Distribution 
This law demonstrates the 
centralist orientation given 
throughout the period of 
divergence. Capital District’s 
autonomy was eliminated. 
Importantly, in the 1999 
Constitution, the Capital District 
existed. In that sense, the political 
regime of the capital city 
(Caracas) was a decentralized and 
democratic local government 
system, which should guarantee 
municipal autonomy and political 
participation of the many entities 
constituting the city. Under the 
above, there was a metropolitan 
government on 2 levels, to ensure 
global city government and local 
government. So in 1999, the 
figure of the Federal District was 
eliminated, as it was considered a 
vestige of the traditional past of 
the world federations. 
1 
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Appendix 3 
Methodological approach to operationalize political culture in 
Colombia and Venezuela from 1957 until 2010 
This appendix aims to explain the way by which this project managed to operationalize 
the variable PC as a continuous one to estimate democratic divergence in the multivariate 
regression models. To do so, this appendix departs from the results obtained in the last 
column from the tables A.2 (a, b, c and d). That is, having assessed if the amendment or 
constitutional reform was pro-democratic or non-democratic, and with the objective of 
preventing subjectivity bias in the construction of the scores, I asked two external 
examiners to weight the effect of each amendment over democracy in the country. For a 
detail explanation on how the examiners weighted the amendments and reforms into 
scores, please referred to section 7.3.1. Thus, the tables depicted below (A.3(a); A.3(b); 
A.3(c); and A.3(d)) show the results of the operationalisation of variable PC. 
This appendix will be organised according to the following structure. The first section will 
enumerate and explain the different categories that make up the columns of the tables that 
summarised the construction of the database. And finally, the second section will depict 
the four tables that summarise the values taken by the variable PC in Colombia and 
Venezuela during the ‘transitional period’ and the ‘divergence period’, and used to regress 
the models.  
1. Categories used for the construction of the database 
As mentioned above, the first three categories of this appendix correspond to the 
categories named as ‘year’, ‘type of constitutional change’, and ‘Pro-democratic (0), non-
democratic (1)’ in appendix 2. The first two categories were used to identify both the 
timeframe and the type of each amendment and constitutional reform conducted over the 
period of analysis. The third category, is the one that the consulted examiners started the 
analysis to weight the extent to which each amendment or constitutional reform can be 
regarded as high/low pro-democratic or non-democratic. 
The other categories to systematise the information are: 
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Examiner 1: This category contains the score that the first examiner gave to each of the 
constitutional reform and amendment as explained in section 7.3.1.  
Examiner 2: This category contains the score that the second examiner gave to each of 
the constitutional reform and amendment as explained in section 7.3.1.  
Average score: This category contains the average between the scores from examiner 1 
and 2. As mentioned in Chapter 7, averaging examiners’ scores allow us to prevent 
subjectivity bias measuring variable PC. 
1st. Stage: Given that in some years were conducted several amendments or reforms, this 
category aims to stablish only one value by year and country. It is calculated as the average 
of the scores presented in the column “Average Score” by year and country, as explained 
in section 7.3.1. Additionally, this category stablished a value of 0 for those years in which 
amendments or reforms were not enacted. 
2nd. Stage: This category, as explained in Chapter 7, is the result of adding together the 
values contained in column “1st. Stage” for both the current and the previous years of a 
specific country. It aims to show the cumulative effect of political culture over time. 
Please see tables A.3 in the next page. 
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2. Tables summarising the operationalisation of PC in Colombia and 
Venezuela over the ‘transitional and divergence periods.’ 
Table A.3 (a) Operationalising PC in Colombia, 1957-1990 - ‘Transitional Period’ 
Yea
r 
Type of 
constitutiona
l change 
Pro-democratic (0), 
non-democratic (1) 
Examiner 
1 
Examiner 
2 
Average 
score 1
st. Stage 2nd. Stage 
1957 Amendment by Plebiscite 0 2 2 2 2 2 
1958 NA*    0 0 2 
1959 Amendment 1 0 1 2 1,5 1.75 3.75 Amendment 2 0 2 2 2 
1960 Amendment 0 2 2 2 2 5.75 
1961 NA     0 5.75 
1962 NA     0 5.75 
1963 NA     0 5.75 
1964 NA     0 5.75 
1965 NA     0 5.75 
1966 NA     0 5.75 
1967 NA     0 5.75 
1968 
Amendment 1 0 1 2 1,5 
1.39 7.14 
Amendment 2 0 1 1 1 
Amendment 3 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 4 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 5 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 6 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 7 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 8 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 9 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 10 1 -2 -2 -2 
Amendment 11 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 12 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 13 0 1 1 1 
Amendment 14 0 1 1 1 
Amendment 15 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 16 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 17 0 1 1 1 
Amendment 18 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 19 0 2 2 2 
1969 NA     0 7.14 
1970 NA     0 7.14 
1971 NA     0 7.14 
1972 NA     0 7.14 
1973 NA     0 7.14 
1974 NA     0 7.14 
1975 Amendment 0 2 1 1,5 1.5 8.64 
1976 NA     0 8.64 
1977 NA     0 8.64 
1978 NA     0 8.64 
1979 
Amendment 1 0 1 1 1 
1.54 10.19 
Amendment 2 0 1 2 1.5 
Amendment 3 0 1 2 1.5 
Amendment 4 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 5 0 1 1 1 
Amendment 6 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 7 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 8 0 1 1 1 
Amendment 9 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 10 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 11 0 2 1 1,5 
Amendment 12 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 13 0 1 1 1 
Amendment 14 0 1 2 1,5 
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Table A.3 (a) Operationalising PC in Colombia, 1957-1990 - ‘Transitional Period’ 
Yea
r 
Type of 
constitutiona
l change 
Pro-democratic (0), 
non-democratic (1) 
Examiner 
1 
Examiner 
2 
Average 
score 1
st. Stage 2nd. Stage 
Amendment 15 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 16 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 17 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 18 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 19 0 1 1 1 
Amendment 20 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 21 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 22 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 23 0 1 2 1,5 
1980 NA     0 10.19 
1981 NA     0 10.19 
1982 NA     0 10.19 
1983 NA     0 10.19 
1984 NA     0 10.19 
1985 NA     0 10.19 
1986 Amendment 0 2 2 2 2 12.19 
1987 NA     0 12.19 
1988 NA     0 12.19 
1989 NA     0 12.19 
1990 NA     0 12.19 
 
Table A.3 (b) Operationalising PC in Colombia, 1991-2010 - ‘divergence period’ 
Yea
r 
Type of 
constitutiona
l change 
Pro-democratic (0), 
non-democratic (1) Examiner 1 Examiner 2 
Average 
score 1
st. Stage 2nd. Stage 
1991 
 
 
1991 
Constitutional 
Reform 1 
0 2 2 2 
1,67 1,67 
1991 
Constitutional 
Reform 2 
0 1 2 1,5 
1991 
Constitutional 
Reform 3 
0 1 2 1,5 
1992 NA     0 1,67 
1993 Amendment 1 0 1 1 1 1 2,67 Amendment 2 0 1 1 1 
1994 NA     0 2,67 
1995 Amendment 0 1 2 1,5 1,5 4,17 
1996 Amendment 1 0 2 2 2 1,75 5,92 Amendment 2 0 1 2 1,5 
1997 NA     0 5,92 
1998 NA     0 5,92 
1999 NA     0 5,92 
2000 NA     0 5,92 
2001 Amendment 1 0 2 1 1,5 1,75 7,67 Amendment 2 0 2 2 2 
2002 Amendment 1 0 1 1 1 1,5 9,17 Amendment 2 0 2 2 2 
2003 
Amendment 1 0 2 2 2 
1,77 10,94 
Amendment 2 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 3 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 4 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 5 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 6 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 7 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 8 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 9 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 10 0 1 1 1 
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Table A.3 (b) Operationalising PC in Colombia, 1991-2010 - ‘divergence period’ 
Yea
r 
Type of 
constitutiona
l change 
Pro-democratic (0), 
non-democratic (1) Examiner 1 Examiner 2 
Average 
score 1
st. Stage 2nd. Stage 
Amendment 11 0 1 2 1,5 
2004 
Amendment 1 0 1 1 1 
0 10,94 Amendment 2 1 -2 -2 -2 
Amendment 3 0 1 1 1 
2005 Amendment 0 1 1 1 1 11,94 
2006 NA     0 11,94 
2007 
Amendment 1 0 1 2 1,5 
1,31 13,25 
Amendment 2 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 3 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 4 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 5 0 1 1 1 
Amendment 6 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 7 0 1 1 1 
Amendment 8 0 1 1 1 
2008 NA     0 13,25 
2009 
Amendment 1 0 2 2 2 
1,29 14,54 
Amendment 2 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 3 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 4 0 2 2 2 
Amendment 5 0 1 2 1,5 
Amendment 6 1 -1 -2 -1,5 
Amendment 7 0 1 2 1,5 
2010 NA     0 14,54 
 
 
Table A.3 (c) Operationalising PC in Venezuela, 1983-1998 - ‘Transitional Period’ 
Yea
r 
Type of 
constitutiona
l change 
Pro-democratic (0), 
non-democratic (1) Examiner 1 Examiner 2 
Average 
score 1
st. Stage 2nd. Stage 
1983 Amendment 1 0 2 1 1,5 1,5 1,5 Amendment 2 0 1 2 1,5 
1984 NA     0 1,5 
1985 NA     0 1,5 
1986 NA     0 1,5 
1987 NA     0 1,5 
1988 NA     0 1,5 
1989 Amendment 1 0 2 2 2 2 3,5 Amendment 2 0 2 2 2 
1990 NA     0 3,5 
1991 NA     0 3,5 
1992 NA     0 3,5 
1993 NA     0 3,5 
1994 NA     0 3,5 
1995 NA     0 3,5 
1996 NA     0 3,5 
1997 NA     0 3,5 
1998 NA     0 3,5 
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Table A.3 (d) Operationalising PC in Venezuela, 1999-2010 - ‘divergence period’ 
Yea
r 
Type of 
constitutional 
change 
Pro-democratic (0), 
non-democratic (1) Examiner 1 Examiner 2 
Average 
score 1
st. Stage 2nd. Stage 
1999 
Appointment of 
the National 
Constituent 
Assembly 
1 -2 -2 -2 
-1,75 -1,75 
Reform 1 1 -2 -2 -2 
Reform 2 1 -2 -1 -1,5 
Reform 3 1 -1 -2 -1,5 
2000 NA     0 -1,75 
2001 NA     0 -1,75 
2002 NA     0 -1,75 
2003 NA     0 -1,75 
2004 NA     0 -1,75 
2005 NA     0 -1,75 
2006 Amendment 1 -2 -2 -2 -2 -3,75 
2007 Amendment 1 1 -2 -2 -2 1,75 -5,5 Amendment 2 1 -1 -2 -1,5 
2008 Amendment 1 1 -1 -2 -1,5 -1,5 -7 Amendment 2 1 -2 -1 -1,5 
2009 
Amendment 1 1 -1 -1 -1 
-1,67 -8,67 Amendment 2 1 -2 -2 -2 
Amendment 3 1 -2 -2 -2 
2010 NA     0 -8,67 
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Appendix 4 
Checking for robustness: estimation of the model with different 
dependent variables 
In chapter 8 this project estimated seven multivariate regression models (i.e., models I to 
VII in table 8.2) to assess democratic divergence in Colombia and Venezuela with data 
from Freedom House democracy index as a dependent variable. Since there are many 
ways to understand and measure democracy this project considers necessary to assess 
divergence using a different dataset well known in political science to measure 
democracy: The Polity IV democracy index.  
In this sense, this appendix aims to show the robustness of five additional models 
regressed using data from Polity IV, and compare them with the models that were 
regressed with data from Freedom House (models I to V). As discussed above, the Polity 
IV democracy index has a different scale than the Freedom House one. That is, the closer 
the index is to 10 the better the quality of the democracy is, but if the index is closer to      
-10 then the democratic performance is deteriorating. For this reason, if the estimation is 
consistent between the two indexes of democracy, it is expected that they have opposite 
signs in the regression. 
Table A.4 shows that the regression models conducted with Polity IV data are consistent 
with the Freedom House regressions. To be sure, the testing hypothesis variables regressed 
in Model I to V for Freedom House are consistent with the estimations using Polity IV 
data in table A.4. 
Please see estimation in the following page. 
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Table A.4 
 Checking for robustness: estimation of the model with  
Polity IV 
 
Independent 
variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
      
NCit 0.348   -0.220 0.673 
 (1.124)   (1.429) (5.705) 
      
NCit*Countryit -4.370***    -1.419 
 (1.224)    (4.101) 
      
HHIi(t-1)  -1.563  8.052*** 6.219** 
  (2.560)  (2.726) (2.467) 
      
HHIi(t-1)*NCit    -10.09** -10.73** 
    (4.994) (4.825) 
      
PCi(t-1)   0.255 -0.183** -0.249 
   (0.163) (0.0810) (0.358) 
      
PCi(t-1)*NCit    0.413*** 0.336 
    (0.107) (0.441) 
      
GDP growthit 2.975 1.661 0.928 7.396 5.753 
 (5.463) (6.073) (4.724) (5.538) (5.938) 
      
Inflationit 0.717 2.916 2.048 1.392 1.218 
 (2.458) (2.256) (2.042) (2.605) (2.673) 
      
Oil rentsit 0.0583 0.0465 0.0461 -0.00780 0.0378 
 (0.0457) (0.0545) (0.0460) (0.0335) (0.0356) 
      
Enrolmentit -0.0511 0.0204 0.0282 -0.0421 -0.0944** 
 (0.0316) (0.0390) (0.0386) (0.0295) (0.0429) 
      
PTSit -0.432 -1.042** -0.664** 0.385 0.138 
 (0.531) (0.424) (0.295) (0.566) (0.910) 
      
Countryit -1.057 -2.759 0.0383  -2.180 
 (0.927) (1.758) (1.366)  (2.570) 
      
Constant 14.51*** 9.306** 4.228 8.903** 17.04*** 
 (4.355) (3.978) (5.533) (3.484) (5.284) 
N 70 68 68 68 68 
R2 0.545 0.203 0.340 0.572 0.610 
adj. R2 0.486 0.110 0.263 0.497 0.525 
AIC 264.5 295.0 282.2 258.8 256.4 
F 11.74 2.615 2.632 10.91 8.727 
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: Own calculations. 
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